I see three problems with this otherwise plausible hypothesis: (1) It requires one neural state to encode multiple concepts. (2) There seems to be no mechanism this "solution" could have evolved. (3) Neural states do not represent as other signs do.... to ensure body survival as effectively as possible, nature, I suggest, stumbled on a highly effective solution: representing the outside world in terms of the modifications it causes in the body proper, that is representing the environment by modifying the primordial representations of the body proper whenever an interaction between organism and environment takes place. (p. 230) — Anthony Damasio
First...There is no difference, even in principle, between a neural message saying we are seeing a red apple and one saying we are seeing (having our bodily state modified by) a red apple.
It seems to me that grasping this difference requires a direct intuition of the object as an object, as other -- and this, or something functionally equivalent, is missing from our model. — Dfpolis
Second...What a neural signal encodes is immaterial as long as the response to it is biological effective (evolutionarily fit). However, if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis
Third, the idea that neural impulses act as a signs glosses over and obscures the dynamics of sensory awareness. — Dfpolis
I agree with this, and suggest this may just mean we have a problematic paradigm. E.g. reference to "information" seems problematic, because information connotes meaning, and meaning entails (conscious) understanding - which seems circular, and it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. That doesn't prove mind is grounded in the nonphysical, it may just be an inapplicable paradigm.Like the problem of distinguishing self-data from object-data, this seems to intimate that we have a capacity to grasp intelligibility that is not fully modeled in our present understanding. — Dfpolis
it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. — Relativist
That doesn't prove mind is grounded in the nonphysical, it may just be an inapplicable paradigm. — Relativist
Consciousness is that which mediates between stimulus and response. — Relativist
I don't think it requires redefining "physical" and "natural", it means reconsidering the nature of our thoughts. A visual image is something distinct from the object seen, it's a functionally accurate representation of the object. In general, our conceptual basis for a thought is based on the way things seem to be, but the seemings may be illusory. It seems as if a concept is a mental object, but when employed in a thought, it may more accurate to describe it as a particular reaction, or memory of a reaction: process and feeling, rather than object.Physical" means now the reality it calls to mind now. Its meaning may change over time (and has), but the present paradigms are based on our conceptual space as it now exists. Changing paradigms involves redefining our conceptual space, and a consequent redefinition of terms such as "physical" and "natural." — Dfpolis
Signals are not only transmitted from environment to body to mind, but also from mind to body, causing change in the environment. The capacity for motor coordination differentiates object (other) and self in the mind of a sentient being....if consciousness of objects is solely due to awareness of neurally encoded content, we can have no basis for thinking objects are distinct from ourselves. To do so we must grasp an intelligible difference between our self and the object, and there is none in the neural signal. — Dfpolis
Communication (including: data, encoding, code, message, transmission, conveyance, reception, decoding, information) is a good analogy for the sensation process if a physical (as opposed to only semantic) type is acknowledged.E.g. reference to "information" seems problematic, because information connotes meaning, and meaning entails (conscious) understanding - which seems circular, and it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. — Relativist
It's a useful analogy in some contexts, but it may not be the best analogy for analyzing the ontology of mind. For example, we aren't going to find a physical structure that corresponds to a packet of data (from perception) or of decomposable information (like the logcal constructs that define a concept). That is not sufficient grounds to dismiss physicalism; it may just mean we need a different paradigm.Communication (including: data, encoding, code, message, transmission, conveyance, reception, decoding, information) is a good analogy for the sensation process if a physical (as opposed to only semantic) type is acknowledged. — Galuchat
It's a useful analogy in some contexts, but it may not be the best analogy for analyzing the ontology of mind. — Relativist
A visual image is something distinct from the object seen, it's a functionally accurate representation of the object. — Relativist
It seems as if a concept is a mental object, but when employed in a thought, it may more accurate to describe it as a particular reaction, or memory of a reaction: process and feeling, rather than object. — Relativist
Signals are not only transmitted from environment to body to mind, but also from mind to body to environment. The capacity for motor coordination differentiates object (other) and self in the mind of a sentient being. — Galuchat
I am not arguing for solipsism. I take as a given that we are conscious of objects other than ourselves. Rather than questioning this datum, I am trying to understand the dynamics making it possible — Dfpolis
I suggest that it's a consequence of the neural connections being different. Consider how we distinguish the location of a pain in the left knee - it's a consequence of the specific connections from peripheral nerves to specific areas of the central nervous system, wherein we become consciously aware of the pain's location. Even after the pain is gone, the memory of the pain is unique from other conscious experiences. Visual and auditory information are also unique, and processed through unique neural paths, and this maps to conscious experiences that are also unique.I agree, but how does this allow us to distinguish body states from external states? — Dfpolis
I think that mind is an integrated set of organism events which produce an individual's automatic and controlled acts, so; an open sub-system of (at least certain) organisms (e.g., those having a central nervous system). But, the ontology of mind is off-topic. — Galuchat
I suggest that it's a consequence of the neural connections being different. — Relativist
For those of us who are not physicalists
When a pain receptor is fired, the mind experiences it as the quale "pain". That is the nature of the mental experience. In effect, the signal passes through a transducer that converts the physical signal into a mental experience.how do I distinguish a signal indicating the existence of a condition causing pain from a signal that says only that a pain receptor is firing? Since they are one and the same signal, I do not see how I can. — Dfpolis
In Descartes' Error neurophysiologist Antonio Damasio argues that our knowledge of the external world started as neural representations of body state and evolved into representations of the external world as the source of changes in our body state:
I see three problems with this otherwise plausible hypothesis: (1) It requires one neural state to encode multiple concepts. (2) There seems to be no mechanism thise "solution" could have evolved. (3) Neural states do not represent as other signs do.
To take your example, how do I distinguish a signal indicating the existence of a condition causing pain from a signal that says only that a pain receptor is firing? Since they are one and the same signal, I do not see how I can.
Just to make one thing clear. There is no such thing as “immaterial” or “non-physical”, it’s a self-contradiction. — Zelebg
From a 3rd person perspective, neural states represent mental content in the form of electromagnetic and chemical signals, just like virtual reality of a simulated content is represented inside the computer in the form of signals between the logic gates and other circuits. — Zelebg
so it’s too optimistic to expect we could yet explain the ghost in the machine. — Zelebg
Meaning comes from the grounding inherent in a decoder / interpreter system, also called personality, identity, ego, self... — Zelebg
When a pain receptor is fired, the mind experiences it as the quale "pain". That is the nature of the mental experience. — Relativist
For example, my intention to go to the store acts to motivate my motion toward the store.
Would you care to show the contradiction? Please define "material" and "existence" and then show that existence entails material. I ask this because on the usual understandings these terms do not mean the same thing.
Your argument simply begs the question by assuming, a priori, that everything must be "made of something."
Of course, but what I am discussing is the first person perspective -- how it is that we know the difference between body states and object states.
While I agree, this does not solve the problem I am raising.
As I said, the pain signal (in effect) reaches a transducer which produces the mental state of localized pain. Does this much sound plausible? If so, what is your specific issue?Yes, it does. How does this allow us to distinguish data on the sensor state from data on the sensed? — Dfpolis
Intentions, and other mental states, feelings and qualities, are not immaterial, they are virtual. — Zelebg
To exist is to be (made of) something rather than nothing. — Zelebg
Can you give examples of what you are talking about? — Zelebg
I have no idea what this means. "Virtual" usually means "potential." Clearly, my actual intentions are not longer potential.
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