What we do is assume intention, or purpose, as final cause, without claiming to know the source of that intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we do not normally assume intention, or purpose, as final cause in cases where no human is involved. Again, a seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline has a final cause, regardless of whether any intelligent agent (i.e., God) wills it to be so.

However, in theology they want to go beyond this, to account for the existence of intention in general, as it appears to be a very unusual (unnatural) form of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Intention may seem "unusual" or "unnatural" to some, but final causes are quite common and natural, as Aristotle observed. That is why I do not think it is accurate to equate the two.

"There is a continuity of usage without which meanings would be incomprehensible" and "You can use words to mean whatever you want them to mean and they'll be comprehensible" is a false dichotomy.

Or in other words, requesting empirical evidence or an argument for the first claim doesn't imply acceptance of the second claim.

But we do not normally assume intention, or purpose, as final cause in cases where no human is involved. Again, a seed in the ground or a ball at the top of an incline has a final cause, regardless of whether any intelligent agent (i.e., God) wills it to be so. — aletheist

I think there is a problem with this statement. Some people would see final cause in these instances that you mention, and most of those people would be religious people, and attribute this intention to the Will of God. Also, many science minded people would not see any instance of final cause here. Physicalists for example claim that all instances of causation are reducible to efficient causation. This is the basis for determinism. So they don't see final cause here at all. If some people, such as yourself, attribute final cause to these instances, yet they do not believe that this final cause is the Will of God, then I think they are of the minority, and I would not agree that this is what we "normally assume".

Some people would see final cause in these instances that you mention, and most of those people would be religious people, and attribute this intention to the Will of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you require every final cause to be identical to some intention in some mind, then I agree that this is the only approach that works; but since it effectively presupposes theism, obviously non-theists will reject it out of hand.

Physicalists for example claim that all instances of causation are reducible to efficient causation. This is the basis for determinism. So they don't see final cause here at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

My understanding is that @Terrapin Station is a physicalist, and yet he is arguing for final causes along lines similar to what I have been saying. I think that it is important to be able to talk about final causation without relying on human and/or divine intentions.

My understanding is that Terrapin Station is a physicalist, and yet he is arguing for final causes along lines similar to what I have been saying. I think that it is important to be able to talk about final causation without relying on human and/or divine intentions. — aletheist

Yeah, I'm a physicalist. However, all I'm arguing is that Metaphysician Undercover is not understanding Aristotle's "final cause" as it's normally understood. I'm not actually arguing in favor of final causes, I'm not arguing anything like "there are final causes" where I'm asserting some sort of realism for them. And I don't at all buy teleological accounts of the world. I don't think that Aristotle's four cause analysis is very useful, really. It seems rather unfortunate to me that a lot of folks think it's a good idea, along with a ton of other Aristotle analysis. I think folks of his cultural stature (so also including philosophers like Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.) often get a break simply because of that cultural stature, where I think that a lot of their work should be fit for the garbage bin aside from it being a matter of historical curiosity (and sometimes entertaining because it's so ridiculous). We could do with more iconoclasm and less reverence. Plato, Aristotle, etc. were just guys with ideas and biases etc. like the rest of us.

Fair enough, thanks for clarifying.

If you require every final cause to be identical to some intention in some mind, then I agree that this is the only approach that works; but since it effectively presupposes theism, obviously non-theists will reject it out of hand. — aletheist

But I don't require that intention be related to some mind, I told you this earlier, so I'm in more of a position similar to your beliefs. I associate intention with purpose though, as it is associated by common definition, and I see no reason why purpose requires a conscious mind. That was your claim, that you could not conceive of intention without a conscious mind, but I don't see the need for a conscious mind. I think that this restriction is brought about by habitual usage.

We so often hear, and use "intention" to refer to the conscious decision making of human beings, that this is the most common sense of the word. Since it's seldom used now, we've forgotten about the more general sense of the word, which allows that anything with purpose is intentional. So if we compare human beings with other creatures, we get a very vague boundary between self-conscious, conscious, and non-conscious living creatures, but purpose and intention crosses all these boundaries, such that they all act with purpose (final cause, intention). And, we can see that within the human being, intention crosses the boundary between conscious decision making, and subconscious acts. We are sufficiently habituated in our ways of acting, we just respond to the situations which we find ourselves in, without making conscious decisions, the acts are initiated by habit, but these acts are still intentional.

Intention is defined by purpose, and I see that living things in general, act with purpose. Purpose (intention, final cause) is inherent within living things, it is essential to life, and we don't need to assume that these things have a conscious mind to understand that, only that living beings act with purpose, intention. Conscious decision making is a highly developed form of intention.

Intention is defined by purpose, and I see that living things in general, act with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non-living things, such as a ball at the top of an incline, do not have intentions or act with purpose; yet they have final causes, such as coming to rest at the bottom of the incline.

Non-living things, such as a ball at the top of an incline, do not have intentions or act with purpose; yet they have final causes, such as coming to rest at the bottom of the incline. — aletheist

I would not say that a ball which roles down a hill is caused to do this by a final cause. The religious way of thinking might assign this activity to the Will of God, but I would not, I would deny that there is any final cause here. The ball does not move down the hill because it wants to get to the bottom, it does so because of gravity. And if it did act from final cause, the bottom of the hill would not be "the end", because gravity "wants" the ball to move to the centre of the earth. But the ball is impeded from this end by other things which make up the composition of the earth itself. So if we look at gravity from the perspective of final cause, gravity wants many things to be in the same place at the same time, but this is impossible. Unless we can see some purpose to this, it doesn't really make sense to say that gravity "wants" this, so it doesn't make sense to say that this is a final cause. But that's why Aristotle identified different types of causation, it is probably more appropriate to speak of gravity in the sense of material cause.

I would not say that a ball which roles down a hill is caused to do this by a final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would, and so would others. Per Wikipedia, citing Edward Feser's book on Aquinas: "Finality thus understood is not purpose but that end towards which a thing is ordered. When a match is rubbed against the side of a matchbox, the effect is not the appearance of an elephant or the sounding of a drum, but fire. The effect is not arbitrary because the match is ordered towards the end of fire which is realized through efficient causes."

I would, and so would others. Per Wikipedia, citing Edward Feser's book on Aquinas: "Finality thus understood is not purpose but that end towards which a thing is ordered. When a match is rubbed against the side of a matchbox, the effect is not the appearance of an elephant or the sounding of a drum, but fire. The effect is not arbitrary because the match is ordered towards the end of fire which is realized through efficient causes." — aletheist

But the Thomistic tradition, which is what Feser refers to, assigns this final cause to the Will of God. When something like the ball on the hill is ordered towards an end, it is God who is doing this ordering. There is no such thing as "the ball being ordered to the bottom of the hill", except by the Will of God. If we remove the Will of God here, as you desire, there is no more final cause here. The claim of final cause is supported by the assumed Will of God.

In the case of the match, it is an artificial thing, created by human beings, so we can say that "the match is ordered towards the end of fire", by the will of the human being who struck the match. And the will of the human being who produced the match ensured that this would be the case. Again, without the will of the human being here, there is no final cause here.

When something like the ball on the hill is ordered towards an end, it is God who is doing this ordering. — Metaphysician Undercover

The laws of nature are what order it toward that end. God is one explanation of those laws, but obviously not the only one. The final cause would still be there, even if it turned out that there is no God; belief in final causes does not entail theism. Final causation has to do with regularities in the universe, not just the intentions of intelligent agents.

... we can say that "the match is ordered towards the end of fire", by the will of the human being who struck the match. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the match is ordered towards the end of fire by its chemical composition and the phenomenon of friction. After all, it is conceivable (though unlikely) that a match could be struck without any human involvement at all. Alternatively, think of a lightning strike in a dry forest - it is also ordered towards the end of fire by the laws of nature. With that in mind, are you prepared to say that the will of God is the final cause of all natural disasters?

The laws of nature are what order it toward that end. God is one explanation of those laws, but obviously not the only one. The final cause would still be there, even if it turned out that there is no God; belief in final causes does not entail theism. Final causation has to do with regularities in the universe, not just the intentions of intelligent agents. — aletheist

Those who understand it as God ordering it to an end see it as final cause. Those who see it as the laws of nature, see it as efficient cause. There is no end to the laws of nature, efficient causation continues onward indefinitely. The hand strikes the match, the fire lights the cigarette, the man smokes the cigarette. The man dies from cancer. The body rots into the ground. None of these are ends.

No, the match is ordered towards the end of fire by its chemical composition and the phenomenon of friction. — aletheist

But fire is no longer "the end". When you remove the intention you no longer have an end. The fire of the match lights something else, and so on. Sure you can say that the match is ordered toward the "end" of fire, but you are just imposing that judgement. It is not a description of what is really happening unless you allow that there is intention ordering the chemicals to an end. It is intention which produces the chemical composition, and intention lights the match. With that intention we have final cause. There is nothing about the chemical composition of the match which gives it an inherent "end" of fire, it could just as well get rained on and rot into the ground. "End" refers to the intended purpose.

If the same chemicals happened to come together to produce a match stick, without being produced by human intention, this would just be a case of efficient causation. There would be no final cause unless we said God did it. And if a match happens to catch fire by something other than being struck by a hand, this is just efficient causation in action. There is no final cause unless we say God did it. Final cause directs specific efficient causes toward ends. But without intention there is no such "directing", and no final cause.

Those who see it as the laws of nature, see it as efficient cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see it as the laws of nature, and I see it as final cause. If there were no final causes, then there could be no laws of nature - no predictable regularities in the universe. "Final causation without efficient causation is helpless; mere calling for parts is what a Hotspur, or any man, may do; but they will not come without efficient causation. Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing." (Peirce)

On one level If the world is what appears, then its appearance is prior to being. The objects of our experience must be differentiated one from another and we are only able to do this cognitively after the in-fact of our experience of what is apparent. The separation of what is from what appears is a formal/mental/rational/essential distinction not a substantive distinction, the formal-essential distinction presupposes but does not have to conform to appearance.

The essence of something is that which if you took it away, the identity would change to something else. Identity is usually a convention of language. Humans being the only animals with language, we create identity based on certain measurements/distinctions. Once the convention is established as to the definition of a thing, we can then determine at what point a thing is no longer a thing. Interestingly enough, once a thing has been a thing, it's parts can still be referenced to the prior situation of that thing. A smashed table, can still have legs that once were a part of the thing, but are now its own thing. So oddly, the trace of a thing can not be taken away once it has already been established. The thing can have residual existence beyond its presence as a reference. — schopenhauer1

The question would then be if the existence can be without its essense. My answer is no.

Identity is usually a convention of language. — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by this? Do you imply that essense of a human being is a language?

A smashed table, can still have legs that once were a part of the thing, but are now its own thing. — schopenhauer1

I disagree with the example used here. A table is not alive, is not living. Therefore I don't see a reason to use it as an example.

An essense of a human being is what makes us human. This essense is individual. We could say that a person is a person when he/she is alive. We cannot say the same about a dead corpse, that is no longer a living person. Person's essense is no longer present and therefore it is just a dead corpse.

Obviously so, in my opinion, since essences only obtain by there being sentient beings who mentally form type abstractions. — Terrapin Station

Doesn't this simply affirm that the object in question must exist before any sentient being could identify its essence?

How does this refute the statement that existence precedes essence?

Doesn't transformation present a problem for determining 'essence' of some kinds of objects? — Bitter Crank

I think the problem of transformation could be avoided if we simply say that an object which has undergone some form of transformation is no longer the same object but a different one.

In your example, a railroad spike has an essence of being spiky, while its molten form would simply be a different object whose essence is its liquidity or whatever.

Would the essence of a railroad spike make sense without the essence of a hammer. Does something in the essence of a hammer precede the being of a railroad spike?

That's an interesting question.

Does something in the essence of a hammer precede the being of a railroad spike? — Cavacava

I'd say a railroad spike is merely an object occupying some portion of space at some point in time having the property of "spikiness'' which we call its "essence".

I don't see why the story of how this essence came about is necessary for identifying the essence itself. But yeah, if you go about trying to explain how the essence of the spike came to be, then you would find that the essence of a hammer or some similar essence must precede it in terms of time.

We could do with more iconoclasm and less reverence. Plato, Aristotle, etc. were just guys with ideas and biases etc. like the rest of us. — Terrapin Station

I think this is an important point. As much as I love some of the old masters, they could not have foreseen the 21st century that I walk, live, and breath in. Presumably the famous old masters became distinct, noteworthy philosophers precisely by absorbing and transcending what preceded them, which would of course require irreverence. If they broke new paths altogether, then this too required irreverence or perhaps even ignorance of what came before. Life is our primary object of study. Books, no matter how valuable, come second.

Thanks.

Problems related to this arise with a "citation/precedence" culture, too. Although folks will overtly say they know this is a fallacy, there's a tendency in practice to believe that something is better-supported and more plausible just because someone else--especially someone famous, noteworthy, well-respected or influential--said it before.

That's not to suggest that citations have no use, of course, but the mere fact that someone said something that we agree with or that our view is (historically) popular is not at all a support of any view.