...there seems to be a kind of logic built into the world around us and how we interact with that world. — Sam26

Rather than a logic I would say an intelligible regularity. Even in the Tractatus he says:

For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

(T 6.41)

There is a kind of logic that even (at least some) animals are capable of that is quasi-deductive: for example if something is solid I will not be able to walk through it, or, because I know from experience that things that are not supported by anything solid will fall, I will fall if I try to walk off the edge of the cliff. Of course, I'm not suggesting that animals formulate such logical "deductions" in words.

Rather than a logic I would say an intelligible regularity. — Fooloso4

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities?

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities? — Janus

It might be more productive to see what he excludes. From On Certainty:

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us.

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And
no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us.

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And
no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions. — Fooloso4

The kind of expectation that things in the future will be as things have been in the past does seem to be instinctive in animals as well as humans. The implicit logic there would be "regularities remain invariant", but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

So, I don't think there is really any "law of induction", or at least it would be some kind of conditional deductive formulation such as, "if there are laws that govern observed invariances, and if those laws are changeless, then we could expect observed regularities to remain regular".

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities? — Janus

Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege.


My original point, is that logic still plays a significant role in W's later thinking, is, I believe, an important continuation for W. In W's. later thinking logic is "...everything descriptive of a language-game... (OC 56)." My contention, and the contention of others, is that logic still plays a central role in W's later thinking, and it's the chief method of investigation, not only in the T., but also in the PI and beyond (especially in OC). So, in the PI and beyond, logic is seen in the various uses of the proposition in our forms of life. Logic, then, is still about the proposition, but it's internal to the various uses we give to the proposition. Logic, is intrinsic to how we use propositions in various settings, and it's what gives propositions their sense.

So, in the PI and beyond, logic is seen in the various uses of the proposition in our forms of life. Logic, then, is still about the proposition, but it's internal to the various uses we give to the proposition. Logic, is intrinsic to how we use propositions in various settings, and it's what gives propositions their sense. — Sam26

This is where we disagree. I think there is a distinction between a propositional logic and a logic "good enough for "a primitive means of communication". When a baby cries I do not think this means of communication is propositional.

I would argue that the logic of our most primitive forms of life lies foremost in the activity, what is done, rather than what is said. Someone could, for example, learn to fish in the same way non-linguistic animals do, by imitation. There were builders before there was a builder's language.

I would argue that the logic of our most primitive forms of life lies foremost in the activity, what is done, rather than what is said. — Fooloso4

It's both, the logic is seen in both forms of communication, i.e., in very primitive forms of life or communication and more sophisticated forms of communication (e.g. propositions). You can't separate what is said (propositions) from what is done, which is why language-games are connected with our forms of life (activities). For communication or language-games to have sense they must be connected with other activities, this includes primitive communication.

You can't separate what is said (propositions) from what is done, which is why language-games are connected with our forms of life (activities). — Sam26

What he being said when the baby cries? It it communicating but is it trying to communicate and what is it saying? My dog will knock over her metal water bowl when it is empty. It is loud enough to be heard even if you are not in the room. It has become an effective means of communication but is it a proposition? I agree with those who question the usefulness of the term.

In many cases they can't, but spatial thinking does not always require anything being said.

402. In the beginning was the deed.

— On Certainty

The deed was not a word.

What he being said when the baby cries? It it communicating but is it trying to communicate and what is it saying? — Fooloso4

You're leaving out an important part of what I said, viz., "...the logic is seen in both forms of communication..." the primitive forms that you site, and the propositional forms that I'm emphasizing. One doesn't have to communicate via propositions, that's a given, but even in these primitive forms of communication the logic is seen in the activities associated with them. OC 402 does nothing to diminish my point. Obviously the deed is first. We wouldn't get to language without the deed being first.

What the baby and the dog want can be put into a statement.

Seems propositional to me.

What the baby and the dog want can be put into a statement.

Seems propositional to me. — Banno

So can the baby wants to eat the dog.

Not sure who you're responding to, maybe both of us. All I'm doing is trying to show that logic is not only part of W's thinking in his early philosophy, but it's also part of his later philosophy as well. seems to want to deny this, or dimmish it. There is ample evidence that logic is important to W's later thinking. First and foremost W. is a logician and a mathematician.

As for your comment that rudimentary communication can be put into a proposition, it's true of course, but the point is that it's not a proposition until it's used as a proposition.

Both, I suppose.

It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form - and this regardless of whether it has been expressed in a proposition by someone.

So, the obvious question to is, what place does logic have in PI?

I have, perhaps uncritically, suppose that PI led in many ways to the interest in intuitionistic and paraconsistent logic of hte last fifty years.

It seems to me that if something can be put into a proposition, then by that very fact, it has a propositional form — Banno

How can it have propositional form without being a proposition, without being used as a proposition? Are you saying that animals are communicating via propositions? I think we've argued about this before.

I think we've argued about this before. — Sam26

Yeah.

Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready...

Seems to me that if something is the case, then it is in a form that can be put into a proposition - whether it has been or not. IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready... — Banno

We agree that it can be put into a proposition. Where we disagree is that it has propositional form before being used as a proposition. Propositional form is nothing more than a particular kind of statement, and it doesn't exist prior to becoming a statement (to repeat myself) Because something has the potential to become X, it doesn't follow that it is X before its potential is realized.

Where we disagree is that it has propositional form before being used as a proposition. — Sam26

Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts.

Facts and states of affairs are propositional. Hence the world is propositional It can be put into propositions, despite not having all been put into propositions. In this sense the cyr of the baby and the dog tipping its bowl are propositional. Perhaps as "The baby wants its mother" or "The dog wants its water".

But leave this if you like, since it is pulling at the consequences of the Tractatus account, rather than part of what Wittgenstein was saying. My apologies for interrupting.

Not quite. At issue is realism against antirealism. Things can be true and yet unsaid; there are unstated facts. — Banno

Ya, we're very far apart on this. If truth is a property of certain kinds of statements, viz., propositions, then truth is not something unsaid. I can see how you arrived at this though, at least I think I do. It seems to come from your idea of potential propositions. If you believe proposition have form prior to their use, then I can see where you get the idea that truths can be unsaid. Facts, on the other hand, have an ontology that is separate from statements/propositions.

But hence TLP 6.5... "to say nothing except what can be said".

Oh, well.

Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege. — Sam26

I agree and I wasn't thinking about propositional logic but logic in the broader sense of semantic relations or structure.

IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready... — Banno

I'd agree with this, with the qualification that actualities as experienced by humans (and arguably certain other animals) are proposition ready.

But hence TLP 6.5... "to say nothing except what can be said". — Banno

We can talk about anything that exists, including the metaphysical, as long as we have access to it, so I disagree with W. on this.

All I'm doing is trying to show that logic is not only part of W's thinking in his early philosophy, but it's also part of his later philosophy as well. ↪Fooloso4 seems to want to deny this, or dimmish it. — Sam26

Of course it is part of his later philosophy. The question is, where does it fit as part of his later philosophy? You say:

there is an underlying logic to language — Sam26

What does it mean for logic to underlie language? This sounds like what he is rejecting when he says:

For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface.

(PI 92)

Logic does not underlie language. It is not a structure that is already there. The logic of language is built. It develops according to its practice. The idea of a surveyable representation
an 'übersichtlichen Darstellung' is, as he says, of fundamental importance. He is looking at the lay of the land of language, not something underlying it.

His concern with grammar is simply to untangle the philosophical knots.

PI 125.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand: that is, to survey.

Facts and states of affairs are propositional. Hence the world is propositional It can be put into propositions, despite not having all been put into propositions. — Banno

What can be put into the form of a proposition is not a proposition.

The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying

The latter is about the former but is not the same as the former. There is an immediacy and urgency in the baby's crying that is hard to ignore, it demands our attention. The proposition may be false, the baby crying is not.

The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying — Fooloso4

That explanation does not make the difference at all clear.

The proposition does not get hungry or need its diaper changed.

SO
The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: "The baby is crying"

?

The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying — Fooloso4

You seem to be pointing out that the fact is concrete whereas the proposition is abstract. The baby crying is a concrete fact. The term 'fact'; is ambiguous; it can mean either 'true proposition' or 'actuality'.

The proposition does not get hungry or need its diaper changed. — Fooloso4

Hmm. Neither does the fact. You're thinking of the baby.

@Sam26, have you looked at Anscombe's An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus?

The fact is what is the case. What is the case is the baby is crying. You are conflating the fact and a statement of fact.