These two come off as contradictory:
1. There are only blocks within the game of building.
2. There is more than language; there certainly are blocks. — Fire Ologist

You have misunderstood.

The bit you miss is that language games and language are not the same.

A language game - moving blocks, counting apples - is not confined to language.

So, "There are only blocks within the game of building" is not confined to language. It directly invovles blocks.

And so a language game involves more than just language.

How will you respond?

To address the form of life in your Gavagai example would require a linguist who is attempting to interpret the language not of a foreign people but of a lion. The lion represents the being with a differing form of life, who, per Wittgenstein's clear statement, we would not understand. The Gavagai example is no different from French to English to German. That is, all those folks share a form of life. We're looking for those who don't. — Hanover

This supposes that the we and the French participate in the same Form of Life...

Are you confident in that? :wink:

Even less so with ChatGPT, since it participates in a form of life in the way of a block or an apple.

So my problem here is that if we're going to say that we're taking as a hinge belief the uniformity of thought processes among various people, why not just make it a hinge belief that we truly have the same beetle metaphysically. — Hanover

That's certainly not something I'm suggesting. "The unity of thought processes" cannot be confirmed in any other way than by what people say and do. It's not a "hinge belief" that brings about any unity. The unity is seen in what is said and done, and that alone.

Hence, we do not have to agree on a hinge belief about gavagai in order to go on the hunt. It;s the doing that counts.

And so a language game involves more than just language. — Banno

I think I see. And thanks for the reply.

Language itself is not the game. Interesting. Because “a language game involves more than just language.”

Does this then make sense:

In the case of building with blocks, we can construct a language game wherein two people work together and one yells “block” and as the other person hears the language and plays the game of building the other then brings the block because he heard “block” and knows the game. The 1. language game of building here involves 2. language and 3. blocks (likely among other things and more language and more complex gaming). But it takes 2 and 3 before 1 can emerge.

And when you say “we are always already in a language” (which I think you said a few times), does that mean we are always sort of given into a language game, already playing by communicating through language, or does it mean something else, like in a language but not in a language game? I took it to mean we are already in a game when we are thinking/communicating in a language about the world.

What do you mean by “already in a language” then?

For instance, I don't think one has the demonstrate that a faculty of noesis exists in order to point out that presupposing as a given that it doesn't seems unwarranted. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are presupposing that it is a mere presupposition. How about thinking that in the absence of any possibility of demonstrating that a faculty of noesis exists, the conclusion that is does not is warranted? Or more modestly a pragmatic conclusion that if it cannot be demonstrated to exist then it is of no philosophical use?

You are presupposing that it is a mere presupposition. How about thinking that in the absence of any possibility of demonstrating that a faculty of noesis exists, the conclusion that is does not is warranted? Or more modestly a pragmatic conclusion that if it cannot be demonstrated to exist then it is of no philosophical use?

This is what the eliminativist says about consciousness. Of course there are demonstrations, that's why it was the dominant theory. But if one presupposes epistemic standards that remove it by default (much as behaviorism and eliminativism make consciousness epiphenomenal by default) one hasn't done much of anything except beg the question.

And that's not really the point. If such a faculty is accepted as a hinge proposition, it shows that the theory of hinge proposition itself is not presuppositionless, but fails to obtain given certain assumptions.

Where the empiricist tradition has ended up, bottoming out in denying consciousness, denying truth as anything more than a token in "games," etc., along with the radical skepticism engendered by arguments from underdetermination, which are undefeatable given its premises (likewise for Hume's attack on induction), is arguably a reductio conclusion against the initial assumptions.

This is what the eliminativist says about consciousness. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why change the subject to consciousness. Consciousness is obviously amply demonstrated.

And that's not really the point. If such a faculty is accepted as a hinge proposition, it shows that the theory of hinge proposition itself is not presuppositionless, but fails to obtain given certain assumptions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Are you suggesting that noesis has been accepted as a hinge proposition? If so, what evidence do you have that that is so?

Noesis has not been demonstrated to exist. If you disagree then show the evidence that it exists. And note, I am treating the belief in noesis as the idea that our metaphysical intuitions can be known to give us, or at least sometimes can be known to give us, a reliable guide to the nature of realty―not reality as sensed, which is obviously intelligible to us, but reality in a purportedly absolute or ultimate sense.

Hume's attack on induction — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hume did not attack induction―he merely pointed out that inductive reasoning is not logically necessary in the way that valid deductive reasoning is.

Much of this has little to do with OC.

This supposes that the we and the French participate in the same Form of Life...

Are you confident in that? :wink:

Even less so with ChatGPT, since it participates in a form of life in the way of a block or an apple. — Banno

So a rabbi and an anthropologist walk into a bar, and Ludwig asks "why are you here?" They each say "it's the right time to be here. " And they don't communicate because their forms of life vary, despite the syntactically correct response, yet the question and answer were entirely different to each.

The question then is where is this form of life? You say, I don't care where it is, I just need to know that it is. I see it in the way the anthropologist looks at and speaks of evolution and the way the rabbi prays and reads his Talmud.

But my response is it absolutely matters where it is because unlike meaning of language being use, form of life is not in behavior. It is assumed from behavior, but not caused by behavior, meaning a rabbi who mimics an anthropologist to avoid persecution remains a rabbi.

Form of life is inherent in the being. ChatGPT given time will be spoken from the perfect robot, whose behavior will perfectly mimic the human's. I contend it will not use langauge. It is a lion.

A thought experiment: would a community of AI generators that speak publicly create langauge because they all have the same form of life?

Would their language be just as much language as the one we speak?

Yep.

358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.) — OC

This last parenthetical sentence ought give us pause when considering the usefulness of "form of life".

I can't follow your reasoning here, sorry. Was that your point?

The form of life is what we do. It's not here nor there. Consider:

355. A mad-doctor (perhaps) might ask me "Do you know what that is?" and I might reply "I know that it's a chair; I recognize it, it's always been in my room". He says this, possibly, to test not my eyes but my ability to recognize things, to know their names and their functions. What is in question here is a kind of knowing one's way about. Now it would be wrong for me to say "I believe that it's a chair" because that would express my readiness for my statement to be tested. While "I know that it..." implies bewilderment if what I said was not confirmed. — OC

The form of life as "a kind of knowing one's way about".

Are you after something about the supposed missing internal life of a community of AI's? Do you think I am suggesting that there is no "internal life" for the users of "gavagai"? I'm not; I'm just pointing out that you may get your rabbit stew regardless of that internal life. Or not.

Oh, I don't think 'moving blocks' is a language game at all. You can do that without any form of language. That's probably what prompted language to occur - the need to systematize bare action.

I don't think its arguable, either. The use of the words (or, the fact of, i guess) is clearly a language game. Simply moving objects isn't. No?

You are familiar with the example, from PI? There is presumably a difference between moving blocks and moving blocks following an instruction.

Language itself is not the game. Because “a language game involves more than just language.”

Does this then make sense:

In the case of building with blocks, we can construct a language game wherein two people work together and one yells “block” and as the other person hears the language and plays the game of building the other then brings the block because he heard “block” and knows the game. The language game of building here involves language and blocks (likely among other things and more language and more complex gaming). But it takes language and blocks before the language game can emerge. — Fire Ologist

3 distinctions to grapple with? 1. Language, 2. the world to which language is applied, in a 3. language game.

Or

The use of the words (or, the fact of, i guess) is clearly a language game — AmadeusD

This sounds like using language itself is a game (maybe because it comes with syntax, or subject/predicate functioning)? Or is language still not itself a game, and we can talk about language without its gaming application?

I think these are valid questions, no? I certainly don’t know how to address.

This sounds like using language itself is a game (maybe because it comes with syntax, or subject/predicate functioning)? — Fire Ologist

This seems true even without Wittgenstein's insights. We play games with our interlocutors. Some explicit uses would be sarcasm or hyperbole.

Yes, i am familiar. I agree, but the actual moving of the object doesn't seem to me part of the game. Like orange slices at half time.

but the actual moving of the object doesn't seem to me part of the game. — AmadeusD

I don't understand this. If "Block" did not result in the apprentice moving a block, then we have no game. Moving the blocks is constitutive of the block game.

I disagree. There is nothing beyond "I should now do x" contributing to the game, in my view. Moving blocks is not something we do with words (other than to denote what was moved, in the case of a discussion about language games hehehe)

Moving blocks is not something we do with words — AmadeusD

Yeah. The master moves blocks by giving a command as much as by pushing them with their hand. I'm sorry you can't see that. It prevents you participating fully in this discussion.

That's probably a bit too strong. I gather you want something in the mix about agency and instrument? Perhaps we might agree that under a certain description, it's the apprentice who moves the block, yet under another description, it's the master? Adopting the idea that an intention varies with a description, form Davison and Anscombe...

Your first comment: Yes, not only strong, semi-nonsensical. But this second one clarifies, so...

it's the apprentice who moves the block, yet under another description, it's the master? — Banno

I would be hard pressed, but i can certainly see my way to it, yes!