I'm pretty sure David Hume invalidated metaphysics 300 years ago. — Wheatley
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
However, as many have pointed out, exactly the same can be said for the book at the end of which this passage appears. — Wayfarer
Another reason to always be on guard. — Wheatley
Though your metaphysics (positivism) is showing, a handy and insightful synopsis. :up:I would define metaphysics as follows: anything left over that won't be explained by more rigorous fields. To the extent that it has value, the field of being and content has been removed from metaphysics by physics, phenomonology, etc. To the extent that it has value, the field of causation and origins has been stolen by science generally and cosmology and evolutionary biology in particular. To the extent that they have value, the constants of nature have been annexed by physics. If any idea in metaphysics is found to have any value, it ceases to be metaphysics and becomes something else. Metaphysics is then all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value. I'd put them in the following groups:
• Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes.
• Metaphysics of the unfalsifiable: This relies on the outside chance that an unjustifiable idea might be true, such as the existence of God.
• Metaphysics of ignorance: This relies on the metaphysician not knowing or pretending to not know how something is so they can continue on the basis that it is not, such as the evolution of species or the arrow of time (although some metaphysical questions regarding the arrow of time fall under MotG). The difference between this and MotG is that the latter claims justification via the gaps, whereas this tends to insist on purely metaphysical (i.e. not useful) approaches to well-understood problems.
• Metaphysics of the impossible: This relies on considering only scenarios that are logically impossible or factually untrue, such as the "do otherwise" scenario of anti-determinist free will formulations.
You can do metaphysics then by picking one of the above ... — Kenosha Kid
And also this post, where I elaborate further, from an old thread Metaphysics - what is it?Metaphysics, again as I understand it, proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality can be) - btw, I'm an actualist, not a possibilist - thereby concerning the most general states of affairs; unlike the sciences, which consist of testing models of how possible transformations of specific, physical (class, or domain, of) state of affairs from one to another (can be made to) happen, and thus is explanatory (even if only approximative, probabilistic), metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics isn't theoretical. — 180 Proof
Though your metaphysics (positivism) is showing, a handy and insightful synopsis. — 180 Proof
Finally, there can be no doubt that the one characteristic of "reality" is that it lacks essence. That is not to say it has no essence, but merely lacks it. (The reality I speak of here is the same one Hobbes described, but a little smaller.) — Woody Allen: My Philosophy
The causal relationship between the first principle (i.e., God, or a strong wind) and any teleological concept of being (Being) is, according to Pascal, "so ludicrous that it's not even funny (Funny)." — ibid.
It can be said, but only falsely, since An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does indeed "contain experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence", such as the verifiable difference between the experience of ideas and the experience of externally existing things via sensation. — Kenosha Kid
• Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes. — Kenosha Kid
I'm pretty sure David Hume invalidated metaphysics 300 years ago. — Wheatley
When can one define metaphysics? — Shawn
I had my problem with Hume's problem of induction for a while. Many accuse me of not grasping it, but I get the sense that I am missing something. I suppose I must resign and leave it to the philosophers grapple with it.What does his problem of induction depend on in order to remain relevant? Maintain its force? — Yellow Horse
I suppose I must resign and leave it to the philosophers grapple with it. — Wheatley
I'm sure there's a whole system of philosophy that goes into the seemingly innocuous word "experience."Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. — Yellow Horse
Hume explained that the problem of induction is a problem for us feeble humans. I remember Hume saying something about the whimsical condition of humanity. The problem is very intuitive to many, and I do not expect the majority of philosophers to accept that there is a solution.Maybe it was impossible then and is impossible now, but will it remain impossible? It seems that some notion of reason is held fixed here and projected into the future. — Yellow Horse
It all comes down to "experience," I suppose. Does the problem of induction rely on empiricism? That's one of the hardest things for me to grasp about Hume's problem; it seems to rely on his philosophical predispositions.So we have yet another version of the structure of all possible experience, seemingly a deeply metaphysical concept, conquering the future from the present. — Yellow Horse
No experimental evidence required — Wayfarer
Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading. — Wayfarer
No experimental evidence required
— Wayfarer
He invites the reader to compare sensation with memory of sensation or idea. This is a perfectly experimental approach. — Kenosha Kid
Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes. — Kenosha Kid
Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading.
— Wayfarer
It has everything to do with Kant, no misreading required. — Kenosha Kid
It's not subject to empirical validation, it's still philosophy rather than an objective science. — Wayfarer
Kant wasn’t concerned with the unknown, as much as the unknowable, and the ultimate unknowable, the unconditioned, this alone being the backdrop for pure reason, the speculative, the theoretical or the practical. — Mww
Be that as it may, for Kant the unknown is contingently so, possibly reducible by experience, the unknowable is necessarily so, regardless of experience. But the unknowable can still be thought, which tends to make “metaphysics of the gaps” a Kantian non-starter. — Mww
It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism. — Kenosha Kid
It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism. — Kenosha Kid
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