The dynamical structures at issue, in the case of living organisms, are autopoietic in the sense articulated by Maturana and Varela. The whole is structured in such a way as to ensure the production of the parts, and the parts (e.g. the organs, or cellular organelles) are structured in such a way as to sustain the organization of the whole.

Yes, we are a colony of cells which readily (it seems) organise into complex organisms and organisms with rational minds. Minds in which reason can free the being from the mythological interpretation of the world. To emerge from the Dreamtime into a world of insight in the clear light of day. There does seem to be a teleology going on there.
But what is the next stage, are we supposed to launch off into space, colonise other planets and form the intergalactic federation? Are we supposed to stay here on earth and start manipulating material into some sort of nirvana? Or are we supposed to focus on sustainability and nurture the biosphere which kindly brought us into being?
There is a steep trajectory here and unless we answer these questions sharpish, we will more likely fall back into another fallen species in a long line failed experiments*.

*it may already be too late.

Consciousness emerges out of a subtle interplay of electrical states and processes within the cells of the body. This life then animates the body (a colony of cells). Resulting in sentient conscious beings.

Somebody first needs to explain why emergence should be considered to refer to a physical or metaphysical property, as opposed to referring to grammatical structure.

Relations are never logically reducible to the related subjects. E.g. the relation John loves Mary isn't reducible to the concepts of John, Loving, and Mary considered separately, and yet nobody (at least since Francis Herbert Bradley) seems to think of such a relation as posing a profound question for science or philosophy, in the same way that is alleged for relating consciousness to physical states.

The comprehension of any non-atomic proposition in a given language entails a unity of thought that isn't itself expressed propositionally in the language used to express the proposition concerned. This implict understanding of propositional unity is expressed non-propositionally in terms of the grammatical rules of the language. Why should the supposed "unity of consciousness" be interpreted physically or metaphysically, when the concept of propositional unity is generally ignored?

I think that dodges the issue. Consciousness isn’t just a structure of terms like a sentence, it’s an experience. It has qualia. When I imagine a red apple, there’s redness. The agony of an impacted tooth is a brute, felt fact that needs to be scientifically explained, which leads to the Hard Problem. So no, the ‘unity of consciousness’ isn’t like the unity of a sentence.

I think that dodges the issue. Consciousness isn’t just a structure of terms like a sentence, it’s an experience. It has qualia. When I imagine a red apple, there’s redness. The agony of an impacted tooth is a brute, felt fact that needs to be scientifically explained, which of course leads to the Hard Problem. So no, the ‘unity of consciousness’ isn’t like the unity of a sentence. — RogueAI

What is meant by a scientific explanation here? If scientific knowledge is conceived to be reducible to a formal system, then a scientific explanation of experiential redness must either take experiential redness at face value as an atomic proposition, meaning that science assumes rather than explains the phenomena, else experiential redness must be reducible to more fundamental relations and relata - in which case we end up with the unity of the proposition problem, which concerns the meaning of relations and relata and whether they are distinct and atomically separable concepts.

that's not what "strong emergence" is saying. — flannel jesus

What is the difference between a dead brain and an alive brain to a physicalist, then?

What is meant by a scientific explanation here? If scientific knowledge is conceived to be reducible to a formal system, then a scientific explanation of experiential redness must either take experiential redness at face value as an atomic proposition, meaning that science assumes rather than explains the phenomena, else experiential redness must be reducible to more fundamental relations and relata - in which case we end up with the unity of the proposition problem, which concerns the meaning of relations and relata and whether they are distinct and atomically separable concepts. — sime

If science takes experiential redness as an “atomic proposition,” then it’s not a scientific explanation at all. it’s a label slapped on a mystery. That’s just hand-waving with a fancy name. But if you try to reduce redness to more basic physical or relational terms, then yes, you do face the problem of unity, but that’s not some knockdown argument against reductionism. It’s a reminder that experience isn’t just structure.

The unity of a proposition in language is one thing; the unity of experience is something else entirely. When I imagine a red triangle, I don’t just have “red” and “triangle” floating around in my head in some grammatical alignment. I have a coherent perceptual experience with vivid qualitative content. The parts of the brain firing don’t have that quality. There’s nothing red in the neurons, just as there’s nothing red in a sentence that uses the word “red.”

So no, I don’t buy that this is a problem of grammatical form. Experience isn’t grammar. You can’t dissolve the hard problem by shifting the conversation to the philosophy of language. You just move the goalposts and pretend the mystery went away.

I don't see how those two questions are related to each other. I'm just saying, strong emergence is absolutely the opposite of saying emergent things are not causal - if anything, they're MORE causal than weak emergence.

We say that we are dealing with weak emergence when the property of a system can be simulated in terms of the properties of parts as well. The problem with a large system is that we cannot find an analytical solution for the properties of the system in terms of the properties of parts, given that the behaviors of parts are lawful. So, we have to use a simulation, which is a numerical method for deriving the properties of a system in terms of the properties of its parts. Therefore, strong emergence cannot be simulated since all properties of the system that can be simulated are sort of weak emergence properties.

Somebody first needs to explain why emergence should be considered to refer to a physical or metaphysical property, as opposed to referring to grammatical structure. — sime

I am not a language expert, but this is my understanding of language. Any meaningful sentence in any language is made of parts, but it can create a new idea that the sentence is referring to in the mind of an intelligent creature once the parts of the sentence are arranged in a proper order and observed by the creature. So there is a relation between the idea that a sentence is referring to and how the parts of a sentence are arranged as well. So, the ideas are weak emergent things as well.

I don't see how those two questions are related to each other. — flannel jesus

Physicalists claim that consciousness is the result of neurons firing. So consciousness to them is the result of the motion of electrons and chemicals.

and do you think they're talking about strong or weak emergence?

To them, the phenomenon of experience is the result of strong emergence, by which they mean that the experience is the result of the properties of matter in the brain only. I am, however, arguing that consciousness, defined as the set of all experiences, is a function of the properties of the brain; therefore, we are dealing with weak emergence at least when it comes to consciousness.

I truly think that you've got entirely turned around on what the difference is between strong and weak emergence. In your op, you worded certain things that made it sound like you got it right, but since then you seem to have doubled down into what looks to be interpretations that are the direct opposite of what those two terms mean.

Even in this last post, you say strong emergence is "properties of matter in the brain only" and weak is "a function of the properties of the brain". Something is mixed up for you.

I truly think that you've got entirely turned around on what the difference is between strong and weak emergence. In your op, you worded certain things that made it sound like you got it right, but since then you seem to have doubled down into what looks to be interpretations that are the direct opposite of what those two terms mean. — flannel jesus

I am a substance pluralist. I am not discussing here that the experience is the result of the mind perceiving the object. I get their definition of experience as a mental event, which is due to properties of parts in the brain. They call this strong emergence. Why? Because they believe that the parts do not experience anything at all. I am saying that consciousness, given my definition of weak emergence, is weak emergence. Therefore, they are wrong.

okay, well at least I've done my part in informing you that you're using those words in a way other philosophers who are familiar with those words will be likely to misunderstand. Strong and weak emergence don't mean what you mean to most philosophers who use them.

Even the way you use the phrase "a function of", now that I've realised what you've been saying the whole time, turns out to be off from how everyone else uses it.

Consciousness emerges out of a subtle interplay of electrical states and processes within the cells of the body. This life then animates the body (a colony of cells). Resulting in sentient conscious beings. — Punshhh

Is consciousness emergence weak or strong?

Even the way you use the phrase "a function of", now that I've realised what you've been saying the whole time, turns out to be off from how everyone else uses it. — flannel jesus

I explained what I mean by function in the example of antiferromagnetism.

strong emergence, by which they mean that the experience is the result of the properties of matter in the brain only — MoK

Up here you say experience is strong emergence because it's the result of the properties of matter in the brain only. That's "a function of". Why do you think that's not "a function of"?

We know that the quality of experience is a function of the properties of parts. We know what the properties of parts are, such as mass, charge, speed, etc., but experience. So we are dealing with weak emergence when it comes to the quality of experience. And we have an extra thing, which is the experience itself. Considering that any quality of experience is a function of the properties of parts, no extra function is left to describe the experience itself!

what I'm trying to get at is, the way you've described both strong and weak emergence, the higher level property is "a function of" what's happening at a lower level in either case.

what I'm trying to get at is, the way you've described both strong and weak emergence, the higher level property is "a function of" what's happening at a lower level in either case. — flannel jesus

No, I am saying that the set of properties of the system exhausts all functions in which each function relates a specific property of the system to specific properties of parts. No function is left to explain experience itself. Therefore, experience itself is not a function of the properties of parts.

exhausts all functions? What does that mean?

It seems like you think every property of a system has to have a 1-to-1 mapping to a property of the components, and that somehow you know that all the available mappings have been taken before consciousness can be accounted for. I don't see why you think either of those things are true. Have you mapped ALL the system properties before consciousness? And where are you getting this 1-to-1 idea from?

I mean, whatever function you possibly could imagine, a function relates a specific property of the system in terms of the specific properties of parts, is a member of a set, let's call this set S. All functions are in S.

and who says the functions have to be one to one? Why does it have to be "a specific property that relates to a specific property"? I just don't think that's true at all - I think you've invented this conception of how a function has to work and you've imposed it too strictly.

Any number of properties can be combined in any number of ways to create any number of system-level properties. It's not a property-to property one to one mapping.

Think about a high level property in Conway's game of life - a glider has the property that it travels diagonally. This property doesn't come about because of a one to one mapping with some specific property of the little pieces, this property comes about because of the interactions of many of the properties of many little pieces.

It's not one to one at all, and nobody else but you is talking about properties being functions of other priorities like it has to be one to one.

and who says the functions have to be one to one? Why does it have to be "a specific property that relates to a specific property"? I just don't think that's true at all - I think you've invented this conception of how a function has to work and you've imposed it too strictly.

Any number of properties can be combined in any number of ways to create any number of system-level properties. It's not a property-to property one to one mapping. — flannel jesus

Suppose that you move your hand slightly. The specific location of your hand is a function of the specific location of parts. That does not seem to be the case when it comes to experience at first. Does removing a neuron change your perception where there are many, many neurons involved in any stance of perception? I would say yes, the change is only innoticable. You experience a noticeable change when you move many neurons.

Think about a high level property in Conway's game of life - a glider has the property that it travels diagonally. This property doesn't come about because of a one to one mapping with some specific property of the little pieces, this property comes about because of the interactions of many of the properties of many little pieces. — flannel jesus

Do you always get the same property in this system as a function of time if you run the simulation with the same initial condition? Sure, you get the same property. It is a simulation.

I'm failing to see how any of that is an argument for "a function of" meaning a one to one mapping. I think that's just a deep confusion of yours, and unfortunately it doesn't seem like you want to hear that. In a mathematical sense, if you have "a function of" many variables (like a function of lower level properties), that function doesn't just have a one to one relationship between the many inputs and the output. That's not what anybody else means but you. You seem pretty locked into that though and I can't pull you out.

Yes, that's a much clearer approach than a reliance on the merely physical.

Therefore, the property of such a system is a function of the properties of the parts. Therefore, we are not dealing with strong emergence in the case of consciousness. — MoK

How do you know this? There are those that disagree and say that consciousness is not a function of the properties of the parts. They also often claim to 'know' this.

Suppose I have a microchip (or series of microchips wired together) with x amount of switches. Are you saying that if I flip enough switches a certain way, consciousness will emerge? — RogueAI

I think you are talking about strong emergence here. — MoK

This seems very inconsistent. Why is one a function of the parts and the other is not a function of parts with nearly identical relevant properties?

I like Patterner's example of air pressure being emergent from gas molecules, none of which has itself a property of pressure, at least not that kind of pressure.
And yes, I also like @Pierre-Normand's emergence of chess from the movement of figurines, none of which are chess.

I wasn't entirely sure what op meant by "a function of" in this context, so I (perhaps embarrassingly) asked ai:

"In the context of the provided text, saying one thing is "a function of" another thing means that the property of a system can be mathematically or logically described and derived from the properties of its constituent parts [textual content]."
That sounds like an epistemological definition. Something is an emergent property of the parts if we know how, and can derive (predict0 the emergent property. That seems to have nothing to do with if it actually is a function of the parts or if outside influence is required. The dualists have always leaned on such a definition. "I refuse to pay attention to advances in the field, so consciousness will forever not be a function of brain activity. They demonstrate always correlation, never causation.".
— flannel jesus

I agree. But I don't think all properties are physical. — Patterner

That's another tack, suggesting properties of trivial parts (atoms say) that have never been measured by anything studying atoms.

I don't think this is correct. I don't believe in strong emergence, but if there were strong emergence it would be casual - arguably more casual than weak emergence. — flannel jesus

Yes, it would be causal, and that makes for an empirical test for it.

It is correct. If matter moves on its own, and experience is the result of how matter moves, then how could experience be causally efficacious? — MoK

Obviosly some physical change (a deliberate one) would have to lack a physical cause. The laws describing the states of matter would necessarily be incomplete.

I agree. But I don't think all properties are physical.
— Patterner
That's another tack, suggesting properties of trivial parts (atoms say) that have never been measured by anything studying atoms. — noAxioms

If consciousness is fundamental, then we can't measure it in the ways we measure everything else. It's not physical, and all of our methods of detecting and measuring are physical.