The problem is that in order for our own categories and intuition to 'ordain' the empirical world, I believe you need to posit some structure onto the noumenal and this suggests that we do have some knowledge of the noumenal, — boundless
aren't puzzling features of physical reality that need to be accounted for — Wayfarer
They are obviously physical events happening out in reality — Apustimelogist
Because registering a measurement result requires the measuring device to physically interact with the system you are measuring. — Apustimelogist
The explanation of uncertainty as arising through the unavoidable disturbance caused by the measurement process has provided physicists with a useful intuitive guide… . However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impression that uncertainty arises only when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement. As an example, take a look at a particularly simple probability wave for a particle, the analog of a gently rolling ocean wave, shown in Figure 4.6.
Since the peaks are all uniformly moving to the right, you might guess that this wave describes a particle moving with the velocity of the wave peaks; experiments confirm that supposition. But where is the particle? Since the wave is uniformly spread throughout space, there is no way for us to say that the electron is here or there. When measured, it literally could be found anywhere. So while we know precisely how fast the particle is moving, there is huge uncertainty about its position. And as you see, this conclusion does not depend on our disturbing the particle. We never touched it. — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos
the solution or interpretation would still have to account for how measurements to have a disturbing physical effect. — Apustimelogist
What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular. — Relativist
So again this lends support to some basic aspects of Kant's (as distinct from Berkeley's) form of idealism. The idea that 'the structure of possible experience constrains what can count as empirical knowledge' has had considerable consequences in many schools of thought beyond quantum mechanics. As for Berkeley, though, these kinds of developments provide a partial vindication - by bringing the observer back to the act of observation ;-) — Wayfarer
But where is the particle? Since the wave is uniformly spread throughout space, there is no way for us to say that the electron is here or there. When measured, it literally could be found anywhere. So while we know precisely how fast the particle is moving, there is huge uncertainty about its position. And as you see, this conclusion does not depend on our disturbing the particle. We never touched it — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos
The claim "esse est percipi", to perceive is defined and explained clearly in many of the philosophers' passages. Berkeley's is no different -- to perceive is to use the 5 senses and of course the understanding of this perception. — L'éléphant
I think you must be conflating physicalism with "matter" which we call substance that is independent of tangible things and perceptible qualities. — L'éléphant
Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense
I will adopt the policy of using both terms interchangeably.
Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words. — RussellA
Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.
Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.
Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.
In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.
In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.
In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present. — RussellA
For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B. — RussellA
I don't believe so. Newton like others of his period was deist. Deists believed that God 'set the world in motion' but that thereafter it ran by the laws that Newton discovered. Hence LaPlace's declaration (LaPlace being 'France's Newton'), when asked if there were a place for the Divine Intellect in his theory, that 'I have no need of that hypothesis'. — Wayfarer
But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium? — Metaphysician Undercover
To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover
The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it. — Metaphysician Undercover
This assumes measurement is fundamentally about one physical system causally interacting with another physical system. — Wayfarer
The "disturbance" language already smuggles in a particular metaphysical picture - that there are definite physical properties in existence that are disturbed by measurement. — Wayfarer
In any case, the so called 'interaction-free measurements' are ways to get new information without getting 'positive' results. — boundless
I guess that for me Kant's (…) approach is incomplete…. — boundless
However, it seems to me that if the 'reality beyond/before phenomena' was structureless, it would not possible for us to give it a 'form'. — boundless
Not sufficient to explain the commonality of experience. That's why Kant says there are things in themselves which appear to us as phenomena. Schopenhauer disagreed and claimed there cannot be things in themselves if there is no space and time (both of which are necessary for differentiation) except in individual minds. To posit an undifferentiated, unstructured thing in itself that gives rise to an unimaginably complex world of things on a vast range of scales is, to say the least, illogical. — Janus
Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas. — RussellA
Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world. — RussellA
My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time. — RussellA
Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way? — Metaphysician Undercover
If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. — Metaphysician Undercover
They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels. — RussellA
Do you see the distinction being made between reasons and causes? — Wayfarer
Reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences.
Logic in a narrow sense is equivalent to deductive logic. By definition, such reasoning cannot produce any information (in the form of a conclusion) that is not already contained in the premises.
Berkeley has the problem that afflicts many philosophers who want to deny the existence of something. The kinds of thing that philosophers are interested in are such that to deny their existence seems to be to deny the existence of things whose existence is blindingly obvious. Wittgenstein’s private language argument is a case in point, and recent philosophy has been much concerned about Dennett and others who seem to claim that our perceptions are all illusions.I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ‘matter’ or ‘corporeal substance’. — Berkeley - Treatise 35
This is is final move. So what it all comes to is that incorporeal active substance or spirit replaces the inert substance matter.I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call ‘matter’ or ‘corporeal substance’. — Berkeley Treatise 26
It is true that the idealism of Bradley, Green and Bosanquet fell out of favour. That was in the Hegelian tradition. But the sense-data theory of Ayer and the phenomenalism of Carnap was very much in the tradition of Berkeley.However, by the early 20th century, philosophical idealism fell out of favor — particularly in the English-speaking world
I hope this is of some interest. — Ludwig V
One of the reasons that it is so hard to discern what Berkeley is claiming is that he goes back on things that he has said. For example, he proposes that to exist is to be perceived (I don’t know what arguments he has to back up that claim, but let that pass). — Ludwig V
There once was a man who said “God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there’s no one about in the Quad.”
Dear Sir,
Your astonishment’s odd.
I am always about in the Quad.
And that’s why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by…
Yours faithfully,
God
But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived. ...
And later (§89):
“From what has been said it is plain there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives. But for the fuller understanding of this, it must be considered that we do not see spirits … we have no ideas of them. Hence it is plain we cannot know or perceive spirits, as we do other things; but we have some notion of our own minds, of our own being; and that we can have no idea of any spirit is evident, since it is not an idea. Spirits are things altogether of a different sort from ideas.”
the sense-data theory of Ayer and the phenomenalism of Carnap was very much in the tradition of Berkeley — Ludwig V
Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.
They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.
Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen
Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen. — RussellA
To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined. — RussellA
In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom, because you don't have any. That might work on some people, but you can't pull the wool over my eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover
In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom — Metaphysician Undercover
And if we think of "physical matter" in this way, we get the appearance of an infinite regress, because each time we find what looks to be the fundamental elements, we then find out that they can be broken down into further spatial relations. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a strong argument for the ideality of spatial relations......................................The developing problem, is that as described above, the "spatial relations" are ideal, conceptual mathematics and geometry — Metaphysician Undercover
===============================================================================Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?
This is why space itself needs to be understood as real active substance. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now we have a second possible intuition. Perhaps there is no fundamental matter at all, and the activity is simply the activity of space. What was represented as particles of matter existing in 'changing spatial relations', may actually be just 'changing spatial relations' without any real particles of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein’s private language argument is a case in point, and recent philosophy has been much concerned about Dennett and others who seem to claim that our perceptions are all illusions. — Ludwig V
Perhaps I should have explained properly. You are right, of course. Neither of them claims that what we experience doesn't exist. But the PLA is often treated as enormously paradoxical, as I'm sure you are aware. But Wittgenstein is only trying to demolish a philosophical myth, not deny that we can talk to ourselves. Again, Dennett is arguing that our perceptions are not what they seem to be, not that we don't have any.I don't think either of these philosophers claim that what you experience doesn't exist in some sense though. — Apustimelogist
Do you mean that they are capable of engaging in rational discourse without the benefit of human consciousness?LLMs are demonstrating his beetle-in-box argument. — Apustimelogist
Was he saying that relations don't really exist? Or just that they don't really exist in the physical world?FH Bradley made a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations in the world — RussellA
Quite so. I just wanted to suggest that even though Hegelian idealism was widely rejected, Berkeley was still remembered with approval in some positivist quarters.Only insofar as all were empiricists - 'all knowledge from experience'. IN other respects, chalk and cheese. Ayer and Carnap would have found Berkeley's talk of spirit otiose, to use one of their preferred words. — Wayfarer
I understand Berkeley as adopting a rather literal interpretation of substance and assigns it the role of "supporting (standing under) the existence of things". That was precisely what God was supposed to do - not only creating things, but maintaining them in existence. I'm sure you know about Malebranche and Occasionalism. Philosophers mostly seem to skate over Berkeley's project and its roots in the theology of the time. But, in a sense, it makes a nonsense of Berkeley's project to leave God out of it - not that he wasn't interested in science, as you point out.Note again that 'substance' here is from the Latin 'substantia', originating with the Greek 'ousia'. So it could equally be said 'there is not any other kind of being than spirit', which sounds to me less odd than 'substance' in the context. — Wayfarer
Oh, you certainly did make it clear. I'll take you word for it that he sees it as an abstracting. I rather think, though, that "bearer of predicates" is a translation into modern terminology. My point is only that, whatever exactly he is denying, he is clear that its conceptual role will be fill by the spiritual substance which is God.What Berkeley denies is the existence of corporeal substance, where 'substance' is used in the philosophical, rather than day-to-day, sense: the bearer of predicates, that which underlies appearances. He claims that is an abstraction - which is a point I hope I made sufficiently clear in the OP. — Wayfarer
That's trivially true. His problem is that once he has got people to grasp that he does believe that things do not exist unless they are perceived, they find wheeling in God to save himself from absurdity to be too little, too late.So he's saying objects of perception exist in perception - if not yours or mine, then the Divine Intellect, which holds them in existence. — Wayfarer
You were quite right to do so. I'm not sure what you are referring to. I wanted to stay near the heart of the matter, so had to be very selective, so it is not impossible that I failed to acknowledge what you actually said properly.Indeed, I did also mention that, to dispel the idea that Berkeley dismissed sensible objects as mere phantasms. — Wayfarer
Do you mean that they are capable of engaging in rational discourse without the benefit of human consciousness? — Ludwig V
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