But the important thing is that they are constitutive and non-present. In that sense consciousness is constituted by that which is not it. — JuanZu

Are you familiar with the book Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon, a biological anthropologist. He develops the idea of absentials, which are ‘constitutive absences’ - a purpose not yet achieved, such as a seed aiming to become a plant, or the absence of a specific structure, like the cylinder in an engine that channels force, which gives it causal power. or the axle hole which allows the wheel to spin.

Sounds a lot like spandrels? Or are biological spandrels only used descriptively in evolutionary biology?

Terrence Deacon's book is pretty novel, although it has convergences with Evan Thompson Mind in Life, and Alicia Juarrero Dynamics in Action (the latter accused him of plagiarising her ideas, but he was later cleared by a formal review.)

Deacon's Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emeged from Matter was published around 12 years ago. Very hard book to descibe in few words. Have a look at the info about it. particularly this interview. He stays within the bounds of scientific naturalism, but is critical of mainstream materialist explanations of living beings. He introduces concepts including 'absentials' and 'ententionality'. Worth knowing about.

So 'absentials' appears to be an umbrella term that covers Spandrels.

Thanks for info. Might be a useful read in the future :)

I don't think that's quite it.

Terrence Deacon's concept of "absentials" from *Incomplete Nature* refers to higher-order phenomena that are defined by what is absent, constrained, or negated rather than by what is materially present. These are real causal powers that emerge from organized absences or constraints.

Here are some key illustrative examples:

**Biological Examples:**
- **A hole in a membrane** - The hole itself is an absence of material, but it has real causal power (allowing specific molecules to pass through while constraining others)
- **Enzyme active sites** - The precisely shaped "empty" space in an enzyme that constrains which molecules can bind and react
- **Ecological niches** - Defined not by what's there, but by the absence of certain competitors, predators, or resources, creating opportunities for specific organisms

**Physical Examples:**
- **Soap bubbles** - The bubble's spherical form is maintained by the constraint of surface tension minimizing area, not by any positive structural material
- **Whirlpools or hurricanes** - Stable patterns maintained by constraints on fluid flow, with no fixed material components
- **Crystalline structures** - The regular lattice emerges from constraints on how atoms can be arranged, creating "forbidden" positions

**Information/Meaning Examples:**
- **Phonemes in language** - The sound /p/ is defined by the absence of vocal cord vibration that distinguishes it from /b/
- **Musical rhythm** - Defined as much by the silences and what doesn't happen as by the notes played
- **DNA's informational content** - Meaning emerges from constraints on which base pairs can form, not just from the bases themselves

**Thermodynamic Examples:**
- **Temperature gradients** - The difference (absence of equilibrium) drives heat engines and biological processes
- **Chemical potential** - The "tendency" for reactions based on what's energetically prohibited vs. allowed

These absentials demonstrate how constraint, absence, and negation can be causally efficacious - they do real work in the world by organizing and channeling material processes, even though they're not material things themselves.

I see. Will be interesting to look into in the future and see how spandrels relate to this concept.

At a glance the above notes you provided remind me of Gleick's book 'Chaos'.

Busy on other projects atm, but sounds super intriguing. I never suffer from lack of distractions! :D

I don't think we can make this conclusion. The flow of time itself appears to be continuous, as a continuous activity, but consider what is happening. Future time becomes past time. August 29 will change from being in the future to being in past. In the meantime, it must traverse the present. What I propose is that the present acts more like a division between past and future, than as a union of the two. Therefore the relation between past and future is discontinuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

From my point of view, the division between past, present, and future is like a painting where three colors are differentiated without there being a clear division. There is a difference between past and future, but the difference is not clear. The discontinuous view of time requires punctuality in which each moment stops, and we would see how everything stops at each moment. But experience shows us the opposite

The difference between the deterministic world view, and the free will world view, is that the deterministic perspective assumes a continuity of existence, from past, through the present, to the future. This is what is supposed to be a necessary continuity, stated by Newton's first law. Things will continue to be, in the future, as they have been, in the past, unless forced to change. Any change is caused by another thing continuing to be as it has been, so that any change is already laid out, determined. That support a block type universe.

The free will perspective allows that as time passes, there is real possibility for change, which is not a continuity of the past. This violates Newton's first law. But in order to allow, in principle, for the possibility of this 'real change', we must break the assumed continuity of existence, past through present, into future. We must allow that at any moment of passing time, Newton's first law, the determinist premise, may be violated. This means that the idea of a thing having equal existence on the future and past side of present, would have to be dismissed as wrong. What this implies is that an object's existence is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is the only principle which will allow that a freely willed act can interfere in the continuity of existence, i.e. the continuity of existence is false. Of course, this is not difficult to accept, for those who believe that objects are a creation of the mind, anyway. The mind can only create the object as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand what you mean, thank you for the clarification.

Why do we need to guarantee such a unity? From the free will perspective this proposed unity makes no sense. Experience is entirely past. We have no experience of the future. We think of the future in terms of possibilities, but it is irrational for me to think that all possibilities will come to pass, and be a part of my experience. Only those possibilities which are actualized will be experienced. Therefore we cannot say that the future and past are united in experience. Only the past has been experienced, and future possibilities always remain outside of experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I speak of guaranteeing the unity of experience simply because I am talking about consciousness and how time passes through it. In this sense, the time of consciousness is analogous to that of the world, but it is not strictly that of the world; it is only a point where a little time flows, so to speak. A small number of events compared to the vastness of all events in the universe.

I agree with this, except there is one big problem. The problem is that we understand the non-present to consist of two parts which are radically different, the past and the future. We know that with respect to the future there is real possibility in relation to what we will do, and what will come to pass. And, we also know that with respect to the past there is an actuality as to what we have done, and what has come to pass. So, if we accept this as a reality, that the past consists of actuality, and the future consists of possibility, dualism is unavoidable — Metaphysician Undercover

For me, the past and the future do not belong to being, so I cannot say that they are substances and therefore I cannot say that there is any dualism. Ousia is precisely present, and this can be found in Aristotle's physics. And when I speak of non-presents, I am speaking of something that is neither ousia nor substance. As I see it, we must opt for a category other than being and substance. Something other than substantialism. Derrida calls them traces, as things that are not present, but never totally absent, since we come into contact with them and they constitute us. According to this, we are made up of traces of the past and the future.

I’ve read the passages you mentioned, he’s explaining how in considering time and causation we can conclude that things have an existence in themselves (in it’s self).

I’ve also had a look at noumenon, I can’t unfortunately copy and paste the text from this pdf. So I will have to paraphrase, the passage I’m thinking of is to be found in B311, page 350, in the text.

It basically explains that noumenon are all things thought about, or which could potentially be thought about, but which are not brought into thought by sensible intuition( thinking about things we experience through the senses), which have an empirical basis. As such they are thought about through insensible intuition, (our imagination) or thought divorced from empirical understanding. That by definition they cannot be thought about, because any thought we do have is conditioned by our sensible intuition. So they are an absence of thought. They cannot be thought in any way. They form a boundary of sensible thought. They are not invented arbitrarily, but are connected with the limit of sensible intuition. Yet without being able to posit anything positive outside the domain of the latter.

They are a limit, or boundary, beyond which we cannot pass. But enable us (hypothetically) to see the the boundary of thought and understanding.

From the text;

Now in this way our understanding acquires a negative expansion, I.e. it is not limited by sensibility(influence of the senses), but rather limits it by calling things in themselves(not considered as appearances) noumena. But it also immediately sets boundaries for itself, not cognising these things through categories, hence merely thinking them under the name of an unknown something.

The way I see it is as a boundary like a line, or plane in three dimensional space. On one side is the world of appearances, the empirical world we know. While on the other side is an absolutely undefined realm, which is not nothing, because it is defined by being on the other side of the boundary, (which certainly exists), because it is defined by the world of the senses. But we can’t project, or say anything about it, it is blank.

However this is not to say there isn’t anything there, there might be. There might be more there than on the side of the senses. But we have absolutely no way of seeing, or knowing that. We are entirely limited to the world of senses and appearances.

For windows, highlight, simultaneously control/c, control/p;
For Mac, highlight, simultaneously command/c, command/p.

I had the same frustration with the Cambridge download.

Are you familiar with the book Incomplete Nature by Terrence Deacon, a biological anthropologist. He develops the idea of absentials, which are ‘constitutive absences’ - a purpose not yet achieved, such as a seed aiming to become a plant, or the absence of a specific structure, like the cylinder in an engine that channels force, which gives it causal power. or the axle hole which allows the wheel to spin. — Wayfarer

This is similar to the idea that knowledge progresses through a determination of what is impossible. In a world of possibility, the impossible constitutes necessity. A multitude of impossibilities may be shaped or formed as constraints, which leave a designed "hole" allowing for only a specific type of possibility.

With modern computational capacity, to collect and classify statistics, the focus has moved away from impossibility, to deal with possibility directly under the concept of probability. However, probability does not obtain the same degree of certainty as the necessity of impossibility.

From my point of view, the division between past, present, and future is like a painting where three colors are differentiated without there being a clear division. — JuanZu

Using your colour analogy, my perspective is that past and future are distinct colours, like yellow and blue for example, and the present is a mixing, or overlapping of the two, green. Like yours, there is no clear division apparent to the observer at the present. However, unlike yours, I assume that there is actually a clear division which can be discovered through analysis of the elements at the present, to reveal which are blue and which are yellow. The issue being that intuition tells us that the past is of a completely different type from the future. Therefore the mixing must only be apparent, a deficiency of the observation tools, and there is a true distinction which lies underneath, waiting to be revealed. The mixing of black elements and white elements produces the appearance of a grey area.

There is a difference between past and future, but the difference is not clear. — JuanZu

When the categories are properly created, actual and possible, the difference is very clear, like black and white.

The discontinuous view of time requires punctuality in which each moment stops, and we would see how everything stops at each moment. But experience shows us the opposite — JuanZu

This is the critical point. The Platonic tradition in philosophy holds the basic principle, 'the senses deceive us'. This is the "deficiency of the observational tools" I refer to above. Experience shows us a continuity of activity, and we do not see that everything stops at each moment, but that does not necessarily mean that this is the reality of the situation. We know that a progression of still frames can produce the appearance of continuous activity. The binary on/off of "everything stops at each moment" could be a fundamental vibration of reality.

I speak of guaranteeing the unity of experience simply because I am talking about consciousness and how time passes through it. In this sense, the time of consciousness is analogous to that of the world, but it is not strictly that of the world; it is only a point where a little time flows, so to speak. A small number of events compared to the vastness of all events in the universe. — JuanZu

I think you should pay close attention to how you conceptualize "the world", and "the universe", especially in relation to the subject of the op. There are two ontologically distinct ways of conceiving "the world". In one way, "the world" is a large external unity, sometimes called "the universe", of which each person is a part of. In the other way, "the world" is a mind-created concept, held by the subject. Of course both are described as "distinct ways of conceiving" therefore the only one which could be true is the latter.

From this perspective, "the time of consciousness" is not "analogous to that of the world", it is that of the world. Any conception of an independent "time of the world", is just an extension of, or projection from "the time of consciousness".

So when you say "it is not strictly that of the world", there is untruth to this because "that of the world" is really just an extension of the time of consciousness. We can assume that there is a distinct 'time of the world', independent from the one we conceive of as an extension of the time of consciousness, but in doing this we must be prepared to accept that it may be completely different from our current conception of time, due to the deficiencies of our observational tools.

For me, the past and the future do not belong to being, so I cannot say that they are substances and therefore I cannot say that there is any dualism. Ousia is precisely present, and this can be found in Aristotle's physics. And when I speak of non-presents, I am speaking of something that is neither ousia nor substance. As I see it, we must opt for a category other than being and substance. Something other than substantialism. Derrida calls them traces, as things that are not present, but never totally absent, since we come into contact with them and they constitute us. According to this, we are made up of traces of the past and the future. — JuanZu

This is why we have to look very closely at "the present", our personal being at the present, and things like that, to question which propositions about the nature of the present are logically consistent with our own conscious being.

Consider the difference between your representation, of three distinct colours, and my representation of two distinct colours producing the appearance of a third, through mixing. The problem with yours is that it produces the need for two distinct boundaries, one between present and past, and one between present and future. This is what is required to isolate the present as distinct, and the only true "substance". That, I see as an unnecessary complication, actually producing three distinct substances. You class the two, future and past together, as other than being. But this is incorrect, because the difference between future and past disallows them from being classed together. The problem with mine is that it produces the need for skepticism and doubt concerning our "experience of the present". There is an appearance that the present is distinct, and separate from the past and future, as the substance of being, but that appearance is misleading. Which do you think i more logically consistent with your own conscious being, yours or mine?

Thanks, but my laptop has been in the drawer for the last few years. I only use an IPad now.

Brain fart. I’ve never used a Mac, and like you I use an iPad these days, so can’t explain why I said Mac.

Anyway….. command/c, command/p.

Here is the whole paragraph of your citation:

I call a concept problematic that contains no contradiction but that is
also, as a boundary for given concepts, connected with other cognitions,
the objective reality of which can in no way be cognized. The concept
of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an ob-
ject of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure un
derstanding), is not at all contradictory; for one cannot assert of
sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. Further, this con-
cept is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in
themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition
(for the other things, to which sensibility does not reach, are called
noumena just in order to indicate that those cognitions cannot extend
their domain to everything that the understanding thinks). In the end,
however, we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and
the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e.,
we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility prob
lematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible
intuition, through which objects outside of the field of sensibility could
be given, and about which the understanding could be employed as-
sertorically. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a bound-
ary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and
therefore only of negative use. But it is nevertheless not invented arbi-
trarily, but is rather connected with the limitation of sensibility, yet
without being able to posit anything positive outside of the domain of
the latter. — CPR B310

The boundary helps us understand what our intuitions do not give us. But Kant puts the kibosh on any attempt to relate the two domains in a wider view. The beginning of the very next paragraph is:

The division of objects into phaenomena and noumena, and of the
world into a world of sense and a world of understanding, can therefore
not be permitted at all, although concepts certainly permit of division
into sensible and intellectual ones; for one cannot determine any object
for the latter, and therefore also cannot pass them off as objectively
valid. If one abandons the senses, how will one make comprehensible
that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for
noumena) still signify anything at all, since for their relation to any ob-
ject something more than merely the unity of thinking must be given,
namely a possible intuition, to which they can be applied? — CPR, B311

I recommend finishing the whole paragraph for yourself as paragraphs are the basic unit in this writing.

To approach the difference between inner and outer, more attention needs to be spent on earlier paragraphs concerning intuition and experience. I will try to point to what stands out for me in the coming days. I have to get back to my chores.

Madhyamaka philosophers say that ālaya-vijñāna risks reifying consciousness into a hidden essence or foundational mind. — Wayfarer

I guess I would agree with the Madhyamika philosophers. Because on the other hand without such a reification, it becomes merely an idea, and thus seems to lose all explanatory power.

I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. On the other hand there is no evidence that our minds are connected in any way such as to be able to explain that shared experience. The default assumption is that things we encounter are real existents that don't depend for their existence on our encountering them. So that model explain why we would experience a shared world. The idealist alternative would be to assume a hidden collective mind or consciousness, or a universal mind of which we are all manifestations, and that could be the Abrahamic God, Brahma, or some creator deity.

I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

CPR, B311 — Paine

That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism.

Some say that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible and that it has nothing to do with sense experience, but they seem to forget that Kant's categories were discovered by him by reflecting on perceptual experience and abstracting its general and necessary characteristics.

I always comes back to this basic problem―experience shows us that we all see the same things at the same times and places is unquestionable that we live in a shared world. — Janus

That's where you're being dogmatic. As has been pointed out, physics itself has cast this into doubt, to which you then say you don't have the expertise to judge that. But it can be explained in English, even if the subject itself relies on mathematics. You can't just brush that off, as if it has no significance, when it's central to philosophy in the 21st century.

The second point is, that I've also repeated a number of times, we share a common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices, which converge on what you describe as a shared world. I say it's a shared experience of the world, which is almost, but not quite, the same thing! The world as it perceived by very different kinds of beings, would be a very different world.

The things we encounter don't depend on us for their existence, but what their existence is for us does. So again you need to get clear what I mean by independent of mind. I say right at the outset there are many things we ourselves will never encounter or know, but that doesn't vitiate the argument, that all we know of existence is dependent on our cognitive and intellectual faculties.

Again what I'm arguing against is the idea of a kind of ultimate objectivtiy, that the real world is what exists independently of any observation or knowledge on our part. I'm arguing that all knowledge has an inelminably - can't be eliminated - pole or aspect. Contrary to what you say, this is not 'trivial', it's something that many objectively-oriented philosophers and scientists don't accept,

It's not dogmatic; it is a phenomenological reflection on our everyday experience. Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily.

What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it.

The commonalities of our sensory organs and cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices cannot on their own explain the fact that we all see the same things at the same times and places. At most it can only explain what might tend to stand out for us, or the general form our perceptions take―for example in regard to the part of the electromagnetic spectrum we can detect, or the limitations on the acoustic frequencies we can detect―as well as the names we give to the things we encounter, and the we have conceptions of them, such as their purpose, place in human life and so on.

Even if it could explain how it is that humans see the same world, it cannot explain the fact that our observations show that our dogs see the same things we do, for example. I live on a fifteen acre property and there are many wallabies. When I walk the dogs I will often catch sight of a wallaby, and the dogs will also, and if I don't restrain them they will be off chasing it. Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby".

I have asked you to explain how "a common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" could determine our seeing precisely the same things. Say, for example you and I have in front of us a white A4 sheet of paper covered with "hundreds and thousands" (I'm sure you are familiar with those little coloured sweet grains). I take a very sharp pencil and point precisely to just one of the hundreds of grains, and ask you what colour it is. You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement?

Our everyday experience shows us clearly that we live in a shared world. It can even be seen as an empirical fact, as it can be demonstrated so easily. — Janus

And what. specifically, about the original post goes against that?

What you are gleaning from physics is just one interpretation―the one you resonate with―there is no solid consensus that your interpretation is the correct one. Also you are not an expert in that field, by any means, which gives you even less warrant to cite it. — Janus

It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. If it were really objective there would be no need for interpretation.

You will agree with me as to whether it is yellow, blue, green or red, undoubtedly. Can you explain how your "common set of cognitve, cultural and linguistic practices" can account for that agreement? — Janus

Don't worry about the original post or QM, just answer the straightforward question above if you can. What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God.

I just can't believe you don't see the problem.

It goes directly against your contention that every observer sees the same thing when the observations show they don’t. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? Well, it doesn't― just as it is possible that people can pass different judgements about anything that is seen doesn't entail that what has been seen is different.

It is not that different things are observed, but that the class that what has been observed should be placed in, or the explanation for what is observed, may differ from person to person. Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.

As to that I meant that when the 'two slit experiment' is carried out every observer sees the inference pattern, and when they pass light through one slit every observer sees the accumulation of points on the photographic plate.

What is at issue is the explanatory power of your idealist thesis absent the inclusion of 'mind at large', collective mind, universal mind, God. — Janus

What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” Agreement on basic perceptual categories doesn’t refute idealism — it actually illustrates it: what we call “the same world” is constituted through intersubjective structures of cognition. That’s the whole point of transcendental idealism: not denying reality, but clarifying that the way it shows up for us is inseparable from the conditions of human experience.

You keep coming back to the idea that I’m saying “the world is all in your mind.” But I’ve disclaimed that right from the start. My point is not solipsism. The point is that the only sense in which we can talk about “the world” is through the cognitive and experiential structures that make it appear for us at all. That doesn’t deny that there is a shared reality — on the contrary, it explains how we come to agree on things like colors in the first place: because we share common forms of sensibility, cognition, and culture.

Are you saying that the fact that there are different conceptual interpretations of the experimental results goes against my claim that every observer sees the same thing? — Janus

You’re the one who said that if science digs down far enough, different observers will converge on the same underlying reality. But quantum physics has shown that this is not straightforward. The uncertainty principle already tells us that knowledge of subatomic particles is inherently approximate, not exact. And in some cases, like the experiment described here A quantum experiment suggests there’s no such thing as objective reality. It doesn’t take a degree in maths to follow it: two observers obtain different and conflicting observations, both of which are accurate. But there are other examples from quantum physics, such as Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment.

And it’s not a matter of my choosing or preferring one interpretation over another. If it were truly objective, there’d be no question of interpretation.

Now the wallaby may look different to dogs than it does to us on account of the fact, among others, that when it comes to colours, they can apparently only see in blue and yellow, but it is undeniable that they see what I call "the wallaby". — Janus

But what is it that you call "the wallaby"? Is it the colour? No, because then the dogs wouldn't be seeing the wallaby. Is it the shape? Why would you think that the dogs see the same shape as you if they do not see the same colours? Colours outline the shape. What exactly is it that you are seeing, which you think the dogs are also seeing, which makes you conclude that they see the same thing as you? That you insist it is "undeniable" that they are seeing the very same thing, which inclines you to say "wallaby", is simply ridiculous.

In reality, you are just seeing something and assuming, or concluding that there is a thing there called a wallaby. But the dogs are neither assuming nor concluding a thing called a wallaby, so why would you conclude that they are seeing a thing called a wallaby? They are seeing something, and perhaps they are even assuming something about what they see, but they are not assuming "a wallaby". So what makes you think that they are seeing "the wallaby"?

You are merely forcing your own subjective conclusion onto the other (dogs in this case). Without even discussing it with the dogs, you simply conclude that because you see what makes you think "wallaby", and the dogs are seeing something, then the dogs must also see the very same thing which makes you think "wallaby". But this is so obviously illogical, not having the premises required for that conclusion.

You even admit that what you are calling "the wallaby" "may look different to the dogs". So, unless you can say what you see which inclines you to designate "the wallaby", and show how the dogs are also seeing the very same, so that they would also be inclined to designate "wallaby" in the same way that you do, your claim is completely unsupported. It's just an arbitrary assertion, perhaps designed to support a very likely ill-conceived ontology.

Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation. — Janus

The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.

You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you.
————-



Wouldn’t you agree it’s possible for a human and some other kind of intelligence to have a common perception? Which is just to say some thing is given by which their respective senses are affected, which in turn is just to say, albeit with fewer technicalities, they see the same thing, isn’t it?

That's an interesting passage from Kant―I don't remember encountering it before. It seems to undercut any move towards dualism. — Janus

There is the dualism between the appearances and the objects generated through thinking. But this is nothing like the "hylomorphism" presented by Aristotle and others. The contemporary use of "mind-independence" as a criterion of objectivity is for Kant a misunderstanding of the soul caused by the limits of our experiences of the "I think":

But without allowing such hypotheses, one can remark generally that
if by a "soul" I understand a thinking being in itself, then it is already in
itself an unsuitable question to ask whether or not it is of the same
species as matter (which is not a thing in itself at all, but only a species
of representations in us); for it is already self-evident that a thing in it
self is of another nature than the determinations that merely constitute
its state. But if we compare the thinking I not with matter but with the intel-
ligible that grounds the outer appearance we call matter, than because
we know nothing at all about the latter, we cannot say that the soul is
inwardly distinguished from it in any way at all. — CPR A360

This should be read in the context of it being but one element of the chapter: "The paralogisms of pure reason" beginning at A341/B399.

Kant is something of a cornerstone in philosophical history so it makes sense to point out mistakes when they occur -- especially when repeated by more than one person. — I like sushi

Then you would do well to actually do this; not make blanket statements not even (until after this passage) supported by even your own take on something.

This misses the mark because he does not talk of a noumenal world in any physical sense. Anything physical is phenomenonal, not merely known through out limited 'senses' as he uses the terms 'intuitions' and 'sensibility'.

You seem to be confusing the 'noumena' with 'transcendental objects'. That is my guess — I like sushi

I think you're wrong, because that is precisely what Kant does. He simply tells us we cannot assert any content to the conceptual objects logically required for the system to work. This is a distinction that it seems you're missing entirely, when thinking about 'physical'. Kant, you're quite right, never discusses noumena as physical objects. In this sense, they present a boundary case for human reasoning.

However, he is also quite clear that these objects are, in fact, required, despite holding for us absolutely no content or quality, for the system to make any sense. Noumena must be physical objects. That is what the system requires. Kant is just extremely careful not to say something he cannot support - therefore, these objects are beyond our ability to conceive. And that's fine.

In reality, the activities of the living being are caused by the being itself, not some external forces. Perception is an activity of living beings. Therefore, we have a very strong reason to "deny that physical objects cause perception of physical objects".

That is why your interpretation of Kant is like Sushi says, "flat out wrong". Kant proposes that the a priori intuitions of space and time are put to work by the human being, like tools in its production of the phenomenon you call "perception of physical objects", rather than perception being caused by what you call "physical objects". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you want to hold that we perceive physical objects without there actually being any objects to cause our perception to be involved in anything whatsoever, I can't understand how you aren't a full-on idealist hoping to one day become a disembodied mind. I can't get on with even the beginnings of such a clearly wrong-headed way of approaching phenomena. My response above clarifies that I don't even disagree with what you're saying, as far as it goes. But it doesn't go far enough. Below...

Your second paragraph is missing a crucial, unavoidable and clearly required aspect. That is the objects which engage our perception. Otherwise, we are perceiving nothing. That's clear. So, If the arguments are going to continue along these lines feel free to assume a W and leave me out of it. Have bene over this several times with several people and it is, to me, obviously and somewhat incredibly, wrong.

Noumena must be physical objects. That is what the system requires. Kant is just extremely careful not to say something he cannot support - therefore, these objects are beyond our ability to conceive. — AmadeusD

Please assemble a collection of citations that support this interpretation.

I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.

The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. The latter might have an action in us, which we can’t measure, or isolate as a property.
Anyway, I was using it to illustrate that there are things/forces in our world which literally affect every movement we make about which we have little understanding.

The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.

Quite, but as I say, it’s presence in our lives might just be inobvious, or orthogonal to our preoccupations.

Referring back to Kant, he is pointing out the limits of our understanding of the world we find ourselves in by delineation the noumenon. Also in Eastern philosophies, such concepts are used the the contemplation of our nature and the realisation of worlds, or realms accessed via meditation, or revelation.
I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example.

I recommend finishing the whole paragraph for yourself as paragraphs are the basic unit in this writing.

Yes, I’ve already realised this. It’s almost like prose.

In pointing out that feature, I am admitting a certain portion of interpretation when I emphasize a particular set of sentences above others. So, I am trying to be fair to alternative readings.

this is nothing like the "hylomorphism" presented by Aristotle and others. — Paine

I've been alerted to a book on Kant called Kant's Theory of Normativity, Konstantin Pollok. He refers to Kant's transcendental hylomorphism, by which he means that Kant transposes Aristotle's form and matter relation to the register of cognition itself (where form is supplied by the a priori structures of sensibility and understanding, and matter by the manifold of intuition). This is foreshadowed in the opening section of the Transcendental Aesthetic, where he writes:

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relationsa I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation. — B34-A20

This is not to suggest a direct equivalence with Aristotelian hylomorphism, but rather a genealogical similarity: Kant is reworking the old form–matter distinction in a new, transcendental key, shifting it from the register of being (ontology) to the register of knowing (episteme).

Incidentally for those interesting reading Kant, the site Early Modern Texts has a useful resource here https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/kant . The translator, Bennett, translates the texts into a more modern idiom with explanatory content. It's more an addition to the Cambridge/Guyer translation, rather than a substitute for it, but also has very useful detailed tables of contents which help with forming a mental map of the materials.

What I’m saying is that the frameworks through which we recognize “yellow, blue, green, red” are already the product of shared cognitive, biological, and cultural conditions. That explains the convergence without appealing to a “mind at large.” — Wayfarer

You are still missing the point. Due to the general structural and functional characteristics of the human eye most of us see the same range of colours. Humans don't see ultraviolet or infra-red. Dogs apparently only see in tones of blue and yellow. That has nothing to do with cultural conditioning. How we categorize and names the more than a million distinct colours we can detect is a function of both cultural conditioning and the similarities between the different hues and tones.

That we agree when I point to one particular coloured particle out of hundreds as to which colour it is is not at all a function of cultural conditioning. I point at a green one say, and that you also see me pointing at a green one shows that there must be something independent of both of us that explains that, provided we accept that our perceptual organs and minds are in no hidden way connected. This is my final attempt to explain it to you―if you still don't get it, then that's pretty incredible but just too bad.

Judgements about what is observed are interpretive and of course may differ―what is observed is not a matter of interpretation.
— Janus

The first is correct, the second is the contradiction of it, which makes it false. That there is a thing observed is not a matter of interpretation, corrects the contradiction.

You’re correct….or, I agree….that you and the dog see the same thing, whatever it may be. Of the two, only you represent the thing seen with a particular concept, but you would readily admit that you haven’t a clue what the dog’s doing with his perception, but you can be sure he isn’t representing it to himself with the same conceptual reference as you. — Mww

It is not merely that there is a thing observed, but that the fact that there is a particular kind of thing observed is also not a matter of subjective interpretation. We both see the dog there and we both class the thing as being a dog, so what you seem to be thinking of as the interpretation only relates to the classing, and the classing is not a subjective interpretation, but a shared practice of naming. If there was a cat or any other other object there neither of us would see a dog.

The dog and I both see something we call a wallaby. I know he sees an animal there and not a runaway trail bike, because if he catches what he sees, he may start to eat it. So, then I know he sees, just as I do, something suitable to be eaten.

I confess I don't understand what you or the quoted passage from Kant is attempting to convey. Can you explain?

The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. — Punshhh

I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.

I have an affinity with these concepts as I am concerned with realising our limitations and developing ways to view our limitations in the context of our lives (living a life), for example. — Punshhh

I have no argument with that―we each have affinities for different ideas.