↪Wayfarer A tendentious "just-so" story if there ever was one! — Janus

:100:

Let's recall the point of the original post. It was that Bishop Berkeley's idealism was a reaction against the emerging scientific worldview which sought objectivity as the sole criterion of truth.

This was connected with the influence of the empirical philosophers, who said that all knowledge comes from (sensory) experience. It was also due to the decline of the 'participatory ontology' of scholastic philosophy, in which 'to know something is not simply to construct a mental representation of it, but to participate in its form — to take into oneself, immaterially, the essence of what the thing is.'

And finally, with Galileo and Locke's division of primary and secondary attributes, whereby the 'primary attributes' were the province of objective knowledge, and the secondary, how things appear or feel to us, relegated to the interior realm of subjectivity.

This is the origin of that distinctly modern form of consciousness, the Cartesian ego seeking to subordinate nature through science and technology. It permeates all of our awareness in today's world.

What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences. — Janus

Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know @Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it.

Note the qualifier, 'objective knowledge'. — Wayfarer

Right. I could say that a mystical experience is about something objective -- God or Divine Reality or whatever phrasing you like -- but only occurs subjectively. But the problem is how a subjective experience could provide evidence for sorting out the difference between some genuine objective reality and a mere psychological event, however powerful. In other words, my asserting the objective existence of what I'm experiencing doesn't make it so. How many such assertions would make it so? That's a complicated question, focusing on the blurred line between objectivity and intersubjectivity. A thousand mystics can all be wrong. Still, what we ideally want is an independent criterion that would tell us whether such a "genuine" experience is even possible.

But to understand why idealism is important, we need to be clear about what prompted its emergence in the early modern period, and what about it remains relevant. That is what I hope this brief essay has introduced. — Wayfarer

Simple, almost, to answer, but it does seem to be, as Heidegger said, the most remote from common sense, yet the most intimate in the midst of our being in the world. The reason why phenomenology persists is because it must, and it must because of the primordiality of phenomenality: It is impossible to observe anything but phenomena. And this deserves a dramatic, Period!

The reason why this is not understood is because it is embedded in some of the most difficult thinking there is; it goes beyond Kant into a labyrinth of neologistic language that most cannot or will not deal with. For me, to read Husserl throws the matter of our existence into a powerful indeterminacy that follows on the heels his neo Kantianism and leads to Heideggerian hermeneutics, and now all that is solid melts into air, philosophically. Hence the need for neologisms: for metaphysics was so burdened by centuries of bad thinking, and this thinking is embedded in language, and so the only way to remove this onto-theological core of metaphysics was to change the language of metaphysics, and bring ontology down from the heights of otherworldliness (Nietzsche partly inspired this, of course) into the finitude of actuality.

Anyway, what prompted its emergence is found in Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the Greeks, Hegel, etc., and what THIS is all about is, even prior to Husserl, the reduction-to-metaphysics discovered in an authentic analytic of what stands right before one's waking eyes. Note that this is just what Kant did to "discover" pure reason (those scare quotes are important): reduce ordinary experience to its logical structure, a structure that is there IN the foundational analysis of experience, and therefore not metaphysics at all---though we all know it really is THE most divisive metaphysics. One does not have to talk about noumena to see this: pure form Cannot be witnessed, only deduced. Deduced to what conclusion? Of course, the metaphysics of reason. Clearly, a big issue; one that divided philosophy in two. But while pure form cannot be witnessed and is hopelessly lost in mere groundless postulation (What is a ground regarding something that cannot be witnessed??), the world as it appears is no postulation at all. The appearance of appearing is as apodictically, well, appearing, as modus ponens. THIS is why phenomenology will not go away. It is certain, not merely likely, that when analytic philosophy learns to drop empirical science from its assumptions, anglo american thinking will turn to the phenomenon: the ONLY thing one has ever "observed" or can ever observe.

Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it. — J

Would you say that it is likely, if someone believes that certain kinds of altered states of consciousness give us access to a divine reality, that they were already inclined, most likely by cultural influences during their upbringing, to believe in a divine reality, and that others who do not have such an enculturated belief might interpret the experience as being a function of brain chemistry?

In other words, is not this world marvelous enough, if seen through fresh eyes? Wherefore the intuition of another world? Is it not more likely on account of a demand for perfection, and the surcease of all suffering and injustice and the introjection of cultural tropes that seem to promise those, than it is an unmediated intuition?

Would you say that it is likely, if someone believes that certain kinds of altered states of consciousness give us access to a divine reality, that they were already inclined, most likely by cultural influences during their upbringing, to believe in a divine reality, and that others who do not have such an enculturated belief might interpret the experience as being a function of brain chemistry? — Janus

Yes.

Wherefore the intuition of another world? — Janus

We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree?

Just to be clear, I don't think an argument from "common longstanding intuitions" can make the case. All it can do is provide evidence that the experiences under discussion have been given a mystical interpretation in many times and places -- along with plenty of non-mystical interpretations, I'm sure. Up until very recently most people had an intuition that the heavenly bodies revolved around the Earth. Well . . . nope. So anyone who doubts the validity of a longstanding intuition has every right to do so.

Again, this is why the topic is so recalcitrant to philosophical expression. I suppose we can do some work on the logic of "self-credentialing experiences," but that's not quite on the money.

We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree? — J

The problem is that the truth (or falsity) of such intuitions is not in any way definitively decidable. We can explain the universality of such intuitions in the moral context, as I said, as stemming from a demand that there should be perfection and justice. We can explain it in the epistemological context as being due to not having scientific explanations for phenomena. And we can explain it in the existential context as being on account of a universal fear of death.

I could say that a mystical experience is about something objective -- God or Divine Reality or whatever phrasing you like -- but only occurs subjectively. But the problem is how a subjective experience could provide evidence for sorting out the difference between some genuine objective reality and a mere psychological event, however powerful. In other words, my asserting the objective existence of what I'm experiencing doesn't make it so. How many such assertions would make it so? That's a complicated question, focusing on the blurred line between objectivity and intersubjectivity — J

You may recall that this is the subject of my essay Scientific Objectivity and Philosophical Detachment. It is also a point made in this OP, that the word 'objectivity' only came into use in the early modern period. The background idea is that the pre-moderns had a very different sense of what is real. Their way-of-being in the world was participatory. The world was experienced as a living presence rather than a domain of impersonal objects and forces. In that context, the standard of truth was veritas - rather than objective validation. This state was realised through the emulation of the sacred archetypes rather than made the subject to propositional knowledge (per Hadot's Philosophy as Way of Life).

what prompted its emergence is found in Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the Greeks, Hegel, etc., and what THIS is all about is, even prior to Husserl, the reduction-to-metaphysics discovered in an authentic analytic of what stands right before one's waking eyes. — Constance

Thanks for your insightful comments! One of the books I've been studying the last couple of years is Thinking Being, Eric Perl. It helped me understand the sense in which metaphysics could be a living realisation, not the static religious dogma it has become. I've read parts of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, but I'm not completely on board with his analysis. I think the flaw that he detects is that of 'objectification' - that philosophy errs in trying to arrive at an objective description of metaphysics, when its entire veracity rests on it being a state of lived realisation. (This is the subject of Perl's introductory chapter in the above book.)

The problem is that the truth (or falsity) of such intuitions is not in any way definitively decidable. — Janus

You say this repeatedly, as if it were revealed truth, when in fact it’s simply the dogma of positivism: that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated definitively.

Religious orders have existed for millennia, during which countless aspirants have practiced and realized their principles. From the outside this may look like hearsay or anecdote, but that is because truths of this kind are first-person. They are not propositional or hypothetical, nor can they serve as scientific predictions.

As Karen Armstrong said

Religious truth is, therefore, a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we cannot learn it in the abstract; we have to plunge into the pool and acquire the knack by dedicated practice. Religious doctrines are a product of ritual and ethical observance, and make no sense unless they are accompanied by such spiritual exercises as yoga, prayer, liturgy and a consistently compassionate lifestyle. Skilled practice in these disciplines can lead to intimations of the transcendence we call God, Nirvana, Brahman or Dao. Without such dedicated practice, these concepts remain incoherent, incredible and even absurd.

The point isn’t that spiritual truths are “indecidable” in principle, but that they are not decidable by the methods of science. Their test is existential: whether practice transforms the one who undertakes it.

You say this repeatedly, as if it were revealed truth, when in fact it’s simply the dogma of positivism: that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated definitively. — Wayfarer

Thanks for distorting what I've said yet again. I have never said that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated. It is obvious that we can state whatever we want to.

Instead I said that only in the case of statements whose assertions are either self-evident or demonstrable by observation can the truth or falsity be determined.

And Armstrong is wrong in my view...religious truth is not "a species of practical knowledge", it is religious practice which is a species of practical knowledge. There is no religious truth in any propositional sense.

Just as in science where the observed predictions of theories do not guarantee their truth, so it is with religious practice...that a practice may transform does not guarantee its truth. And further, the very notion of a true or false practice is inapt. Practices are efficacious or not, not true or false.

Instead I said that only in the case of statements whose assertions are either self-evident or demonstrable by observation can the truth or falsity be determined. — Janus

Which is verificationism in a nutshell . I know you resent being described as positivist, but then you go ahead and make statements right out of the Ayer/Carnap playbook, so how else ought they to be described? The web definition of positivism is 'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism', which you frequently re-state.

There is no religious truth in any propositional sense. — Janus

The four ways of knowing: propositional knowing (knowing that facts are true), procedural knowing (knowing how to do something), perspectival knowing (knowing through a viewpoint), and participatory knowing (knowing through acting and being in an environment).

Which is verificationism in a nutshell . — Wayfarer

No, it's not: verificationism is a theory in the philosophy of science. I've already said that scientific theories cannot be verified to be true, so I don't agree with verificationsim. I don't reject metaphysics; in fact I agree with Popper that, even thought the truth of metaphysical theses cannot be determined by either verification or falsification, they can provide a stimulus that may lead to important scientific results.

Popper himself acknowledges that scientific theories can only be definitively falsified, not verified. I don't believe they can even be definitively falsified. We believe they are true or not only on the grounds of predictive success and general plausibility. As to my attitude to metaphysics: metaphysical speculation is fun, and some of the idea can be inspiring for creative pursuits.

I keep asking you to explain how the truth of any metaphysical thesis could be determined, and you never even attempt to answer the question, which is telling; it seems to show that you are in a kind of denial...not wanting to abandon precious beliefs. It would help the discussion if you read more carefully, and curbed your tendency to jump to silly conclusions about what's being said.

We can verify simple everyday observations such as that plants usually grow better if you feed them with the appropriate fertilizer. There are millions of examples of such easily verified truths.

The four ways of knowing: — Wayfarer

Yes I was already familiar with those conceivable modes of knowing, I formulated them myself before I ever came across them in Vervaeke's lectures.

Truth and falsity, in the sense I intended in this discussion are properties of sentences, or assertions, or propositions. How would you determine the truth of "consciousness is fundamental to reality"? I am not even sure what it means, let alone how I could find out if it true or not. I think you need to open your mind a little.

verificationism is a theory in the philosophy of science — Janus

It is not! Verificationism is not specific to philosophy of science. It is a central tenet of positivism and was associated with the Vienna Circle and A J Ayer (reference).

So this statement:

I said that only in the case of statements whose assertions are either self-evident or demonstrable by observation can the truth or falsity be determined. — Janus

is verificationism, plain and simple. And if you add

even though the truth of metaphysical theses cannot be determined by either verification or falsification, they can provide a stimulus that may lead to important scientific results. — Janus

Then you're still saying the only criterion of factuality is science, again.

I keep asking you to explain how the truth of any metaphysical thesis could be determined, and you never even attempt to answer the question, which is telling; it seems to show that you are in a kind of denial — Janus

I spend lot of time addressing your objections. I write, publish and defend opinion pieces here and on Medium and will always attempt to address questions and criticisms. I have about the second most number of posts on this forum and a very large proportion of them are responses to criticisms.

What I observe of your modus operandi is that there are many questions in philosophy about which you will say there are no determinable facts. Then you'll say, because they're incapable of being determined, therefore nobody can answer them, therefore empiricism is the most plausible attitude.

How to test a 'metaphysical theory'? Just now Kastrup was interviewed by Robert Lawrence Kuhn, he suggests internal consistency, explanatory power, and parsimony would be good starting points. I would concur with that.

But as Karen Armstrong says, spiritual truth is a species of practical knowledge. Like swimming, we can't learn it in the abstract; we have take the plunge. We have to make it meaningful by engaging with it. And that can only be done first person.

How would you determine the truth of "consciousness is fundamental to reality"? I am not even sure what it means — Janus

Plainly!