Mental phenomena, to me, are divided into strong and weak emergence as well. The example of weak emergence is perception, and the example of strong emergence is creating an idea.This argument works from the perspective of Physics. But, in Aristotle's Meta-Physics, he introduces the non-physical notions of Potentiality & Actuality*1, Form & Matter, Essence & Substance. Hence, the Function of a System is non-physical, even though the parts are material items. It's a mathematical input/output relationship that you can't see, but can infer as purpose or meaning. — Gnomon
Yes, creative Ideas are considered to be emergent*1 in that they present a novel or unique perspective on an old problem that, presumably, no one has thought of before. But the emergence of Consciousness in a material world is more challenging to empirical scientists because Sentient Awareness*2 is not an empirical Property, but a philosophical Quality, that includes the power to generate mental images & ideas. We can't trace a lineage of cause & effect leading up to an entity that not only senses its environment (like a plant), but knows that it knows. That self-knowledge is limited to "higher" animals. And, as far as we know, only homo sapiens is able to both imagine abstract ideas, and to communicate them in language.Mental phenomena, to me, are divided into strong and weak emergence as well. The example of weak emergence is perception, and the example of strong emergence is creating an idea. — MoK
Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind, namely, the ability to experience, and it cannot be an emergent thing. The quality of the experience, however, whether it is a simple perception or complex thought processes, is an emergent thing, and for that, you need an organism with a complex brain and a mind. There are two reasons why I consider the mind as an extra component: 1) The hard problem of consciousness, and 2) The efficacy of mental events. I am sure you have heard about (1) but not (2). So, we are dealing with (2) as a serious problem in physicalism, even if the hard problem of consciousness could possibly be resolved. But why (2) is a serious problem? The problem is that mental events have no physical property, so they cannot be causally efficacious in the physical world. So, we are dealing with an anomaly that physicalism cannot resolve.But the emergence of Consciousness in a material world is more challenging to empirical scientists because Sentient Awareness*2 is not an empirical Property, but a philosophical Quality, that includes the power to generate mental images & ideas. We can't trace a lineage of cause & effect leading up to an entity that not only senses its environment (like a plant), but knows that it knows. That self-knowledge is limited to "higher" animals. And, as far as we know, only homo sapiens is able to both imagine abstract ideas, and to communicate them in language. — Gnomon
You cannot get consciousness from complexity. You can, however, get complex behavior when the system under investigation is complex enough.Moreover, Strong Emergence implies that some unpredictable novel property is manifested, not just in localized group behavior, but in the specialized talent of a single species for abstracting ideas (imaginary information) from concrete reality. Emergence of novelty from complexity seems to be inherent in the evolutionary process. But modern science has only recently developed mathematical techniques & computer programs for analyzing & understanding non-linear systems, that defy traditional reductionist methods. — Gnomon
The mind, to me, is an irreducible substance with the ability to experience, freely decide, and cause. The mind is not by byproduct of physical processes in the brain.Some say that Consciousness is not produced mechanically, but magically. I suspect that Mind only seems like Magic, due to our inability to comprehend functions & effects that arise from the most complex structure in the universe : the human brain. — Gnomon
Who says that?Some say that Consciousness is not produced mechanically, but magically. — Gnomon
Isn't "inner experience" or "subjective reality" usually the definition of consciousness?2. Sentient awareness refers to the capacity of a living being to feel, perceive, and be conscious of its surroundings and experiences, often implying an ability to suffer or experience pleasure, and is distinct from mere behavioral responsiveness or simulated intelligence. It involves an "inner experience" or subjective reality, which may be distinguished from "self-awareness" (knowing one is aware) or "sapience" (wisdom) — Gnomon
Yes. I agree that there is a fundamental "substance", in the Aristotelian sense, that eventually produced the Consciousness that we Sapiens take for granted. And Panpsychism is based on the assumption that Mind is fundamental to the Cosmos. But, I think that implies a much too broad definition of "the ability to experience". For me, Consciousness is not a "thing", but a process, a function.Consciousness, to me, is the ability of the mind, namely, the ability to experience, and it cannot be an emergent thing. . . . .
]The mind, to me, is an irreducible substance with the ability to experience, freely decide, and cause. The mind is not by byproduct of physical processes in the brain. — MoK
Daniel Dennett, for one*1.Some say that Consciousness is not produced mechanically, but magically. — Gnomon
Who says that? — Patterner
Yes. But some alternative terms for Consciousness are : awareness, attention, mindfulness, knowledge, cognition, mind, observation, etc.Sentient awareness refers to the capacity of a living being to feel, perceive, and be conscious of its surroundings and experiences, often implying an ability to suffer or experience pleasure, and is distinct from mere behavioral responsiveness or simulated intelligence. It involves an "inner experience" or subjective reality, which may be distinguished from "self-awareness" (knowing one is aware) or "sapience" (wisdom) — Gnomon
Isn't "inner experience" or "subjective reality" usually the definition of consciousness? — Patterner
I think you misunderstood my usage of the term "substance"*1. I was not talking about malleable Matter, but about Causal Energy. For modern scientists, Energy is defined as "ability" or "capability", but Aristotle called it "Potential", as contrasted with Actual, which is the form of frozen Energy we know as Matter (E=MC^2). Energy is physical only in the sense that it is the Dynamic (Causal) Force for the science of Physics. The "control" is provided by Natural Laws (principles ; regulations).The physical substance cannot even cause a change in itself. I have a thread on this topic here. Therefore, the Mind sustains the physical substance (I have a thread on what the Mind is here).
By the way, I am wondering how such a thing as a physical substance that has no control over its movement at all, given the first argument in the first thread above, could be the cause of something that is intelligent, something that can freely decide, etc. what you call the mind. This is a bad model to work on since it has tons of problems and anomalies on the first side. Just accept the substance dualism at least, and you can describe how the physical substance moves. — MoK
The book expands the campaign of militant modern atheism, the offensive launched against religion by Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. Rosenberg’s broadsides attack a wider horizon. Since atheism is thought to be territory already secured, the targets now in view are the Big Questions, questions about morality, purpose and consciousness that puzzle softheaded people who muddle over them. Science brings good news. The answers are now all in. This conviction that science can resolve all questions is known as “scientism” — a label typically used pejoratively (as by Wieseltier), but one Rosenberg seizes as a badge of honor.
The evangelical scientism of “The Atheist’s Guide” rests on three principal ideas. The facts of microphysics determine everything under the sun (beyond it, too); Darwinian natural selection explains human behavior; and brilliant work in the still-young brain sciences shows us as we really are. Physics, in other words, is “the whole truth about reality”; we should achieve “a thoroughly Darwinian understanding of humans”; and neuroscience makes the abandonment of illusions “inescapable.” Morality, purpose and the quaint conceit of an enduring self all have to go.
...Rosenberg’s cheerful Darwinizing is no more convincing than his imperialist physics, and his tales about the evolutionary origins of everything from our penchant for narratives to our supposed dispositions to be nice to one another are throwbacks to the sociobiology of an earlier era, unfettered by methodological cautions that students of human evolution have learned: much of Rosenberg’s book is evolutionary psychology on stilts.
OK, so the question is, how can consciousness, as you've defined it, be any sort of advantage when all the advantages I can think of fall into the categories that you've excluded. — noAxioms
Consciousness is the property by which the thing experiences itself. Without it, nothing experiences itself. — Patterner
This seems all contradictory. it would seem that having a survival advantage (being more fit), or being physically causal at all, would constitute a physical property. By your assertion, consciousness does not contribute to that fitness, else it would have those physical properties.Consciousness does not have physical properties. — Patterner
A particle cannot measure any of those things, let alone experience them. It doesn't even have a spin except as measured by something else. Not even you can experience your own mass, charge, or spin. Arguably charge if you have a lot of it. Anyway, experience of those things requires physical interaction with something not-you, and also requires cognition.When we're talking about a particle, the experience is of things like mass, charge, and spin. — Patterner
There are those of us that say a human can only interact with things according to the laws of physics, despite your assertion of "It is not simple physics taking place.". No demonstration otherwise has ever been made. Going out of your way to not know how it works does not constitute a demonstration.I don't imagine there's much of an advantage, because a particle can only interact with things according to the laws of physics.
Non-sequiturIt is not simple physics taking place. If it was, we wouldn't have everything humanity has created.
It doesn't make logical sense to suggest that laws have intentions. Intentionally created laws in theory reflect the intentions of their creators, but I don't think physical laws are intentionally created. That would be ID, which is different magic.Do you think physical laws and interactions intend states of the future?
This seems to contradict your assertions since the manufacture of a computer probably involves humans and their intent, which you seem to assert do more than just interact with things according to the laws of physics. Perhaps you're including this consciousness as part of those laws, but no laws of consciousness has ever been required to describe how a particle interacts with other particles, and in the end, we're just collections of particles.No step in the manufacture of a computer violates the laws of physics.
All that is also true under physicalism, the only difference being a definition of consciousness as a physical process.Something that didn't exist was wanted. Planned. Intended. It was decided that something that could not be found anywhere, no matter where you look, and that would never come into being due to the interactions of matter and energy following the laws of physics, must come into being. Interactions that were not going to occur had to be arranged. Consciousness used the laws of physics to do very specific things in very specific orders and combinations, that would never have occurred spontaneously.
Excellent illustration of most of my points. You've redefined 'memory' as "information that is conserved for the sake of maintaining homeostasis". OK, you didn't explicitly state that as a definition, but you disqualified all my examples of memory because they did not meet that particular definition.I notice you frequently use the fallacious tactic of refusing to use a word for anything nonhuman or at least nonbiological, as if a definition proves anything. — noAxioms
A definition 'proves' how the word is used. If you wish to re-define memory as 'the past', then the onus is on you to justify it.
Memory: the faculty by which the mind stores and remembers information.
"I've a great memory for faces"
2. something remembered from the past.
"one of my earliest memories is of sitting on his knee — Wayfarer
That's quite different than 'for the sake of maintaining homeostasis'. The kind of memory you now describe is not characteristic of all life, but sure, even trees retain previous experience and act on it.When I say memory is characteristic of life, I mean it in the strong sense: not just a trace of the past, but the active retention of previous experience for the sake of survival and adaptation. — Wayfarer
It means a record of the past in that context. It does not mean 'the past'. And I agree that the term 'memory' is not often used in that context, hence its lack of appearance in the dictionary. The word tends to be used for things that do their own access of that stored information. There is no obligation for a rock to retain a fossil.To equate memory with anything in the past—erosion marks or planetary orbits —dilutes the meaning of the word until it just means “the past.”
Technically they don't. But OK. Memory is still not defined as only that recall of past information solely for the purpose of being fit.But organisms, in contrast to geological or crystal structures, must retain and carry their past forward in order to continue existing
I deny this. Sure, most devices are currently slaved to people or other devices, so their purpose is currently not their own (quite similar to an employee), but that in no way disqualifies their recall of data as 'memory'. Yet again, it being memory is not dependent on the purpose to which it is recalled, but I do concede that there needs to be some sort of self-recall for the word to be reasonably applicable.Artificial systems such as RAM only “remember” as extensions of the organisms that do (those organisms being us).
Your google quote (the entire quote) also does not make an ontological distinction between the two cases.I suggest that the reason you find that unacceptable is that it represents an ontological distinction which your philosophy can't accomodate.
I think everything is conscious.
Particles are conscious, meaning they subjectively experience. — Patterner
. You've redefined 'memory' as "information that is conserved for the sake of maintaining homeostasis". — noAxioms
Ability to recognize people from their faces (a baby knowing its mother say) is not information conserved for the sake of maintaining homeostasis. — noAxioms
you omitting the 3rd definition provided by google, which is:
"3.the part of a computer in which data or program instructions can be stored for retrieval." — noAxioms
And I agree that the term 'memory' is not often used in that context, hence its lack of appearance in the dictionary. — noAxioms
It is based on the fact that there is no physicalist explanation for consciousness, nor even a guess. (If you look below the ********** below, I've copied and pasted what I've said about that before.) Therefore, I'm looking for non-physicalist explanations.But how do you know that. What is this based on? — Outlander
There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says “I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene”, then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entitythat performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake.
This is a nontrivial further question. This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on “in the dark”, free of any inner feel? Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers
Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Greene
Your other question is, why does it feel like something? That we don't know. and the weird situation we're in in modern neuroscience, of course, is that, not only do we not have a theory of that, but we don't know what such a theory would even look like. Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman
It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman
We don't have a clue. Even those who assume it must be physical, because physical is all we can perceive and measure with our senses and devices, don't have any guesses. Even if he could make something up to explain how it could work, Crick couldn't think of anything.“Can you explain,” I asked, “how neural activity causes conscious experiences, such as my experience of the color red?” “No,” he said. “If you could make up any biological fact you want,” I persisted, “can you think of one that would let you solve this problem?” “No,” he replied, but added that we must pursue research in neuroscience until some discovery reveals the solution. — Donald Hoffman
Yes. In the worldviews of Materialism and Physicalism, subjective experience is indeed "strange" because scientists can't track an experience (feeling, sensation, image) back to its source via physical cause & effect evidence. A particular sensation (ouch!) seems to just emerge unbidden in the midst of the "flow" of energy from one material substrate to another. There is an inexplicable break in the causal chain, which Chalmers called the "Hard Problem" for empirical science.I think it is the problem of the model, namely, physicalism, which is a monist model. You have this strange phenomenon, so-called the experience, that you cannot explain its existence. You also cannot explain how the experience can be causally efficacious, as well, given the fact that the experience is a mental event and the physical substances are causally closed. — MoK
Billions of human-made objects are a demonstration of things that did not come about due only to the laws of physics. The interactions of particles and collections of particles that were following nothing but the laws of physics - that were acting only as gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak forces dictated - are not how the cell phones I have used to post here came into being. Or particle colliders, Saturn V rockets, the Snow White movie, indoor plumbing, every book, every pen, and more thanks than we could ever make. Do laws of physics come up with the idea of something that did not exist, the desire to make it exist, a plan, and then do the work to make that future goal a reality? That's not a non-sequiter. That's a key point.There are those of us that say a human can only interact with things according to the laws of physics, despite your assertion of "It is not simple physics taking place.". No demonstration otherwise has ever been made. — noAxioms
Sounds like you are talking about Language as Materialized Thought*1. Meta-physical*2 ideas in an intellectual mind can be Realized by exporting Ideal thoughts into the Real world by means of physical sound waves (speech), or material ink on paper (writing), or digitized data (electronic signals). And the recipient (experiencer) can interpret those coded messages back into meta-physical Meanings, by means of physical-to-mental decoding events in the brain.The mental event/experience has no physical properties, so it cannot be detected nor affect reality. We, however, observe a fascinating relationship between mental events and the part of reality that we form them in; for example, I can type my thoughts. You cannot possibly explain this within physicalism or any form of monism, since you need two substances at least, the experiencer and the object of experience, to explain the experience. — MoK
I deny this. No law of physics is violated by that vague example. In an anthropocentric universe, perhaps humans, as an exception to all other arrangements of the same particles, operate under different laws. But such a universe has not been demonstrated by this weak attempt. I'm asking for where the physics is explicitly violated. Incredulity is not a valid demonstration.Billions of human-made objects are a demonstration of things that did not come about due only to the laws of physics. — Patterner
Why not? Incredulity again, or something actually valid? Is this the best you can do?The interactions of particles and collections of particles that were following nothing but the laws of physics - that were acting only as gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak forces dictated - are not how the cell phones I have used to post here came into being.
No. Never mind the mechanical laws involved in moving the body parts in such a way to create these things. Information processing does that, and information processing can be (but needn't necessarily be) accomplished with neural networks, and such networks are composed of cells that operate under the rules of biology, which in turn operate under chemical laws, which in turn operate under atomic laws, then quantum law, which are in turn grounded by laws of physics. Your incredulity partially stems from your mistake of attempting to comprehend something complex in terms of the most fundamental terms.Do laws of physics come up with the idea of something that did not exist, the desire to make it exist, a plan, and then do the work to make that future goal a reality?
I already conceded this point, not that it doesn't have it, but that 'memory' is not typically used for such a context, and a different term should be selected to describe such a record of past events.'The earth' only has memory in a figurative sense.
Lack of a physical explanation isn't evidence that it isn't a physical effect. There's plenty of things not explained, which is why the scientists still have a job. But science presuming supernatural explanations held progress to a crawl, resulting what's been since named the dark ages. Changing their methodology to presume otherwise resulted in the renaissance and all the progress since.physicalism, which is a monist model. You have this strange phenomenon, so-called the experience, that you cannot explain its existence. — MoK
Actually, they can and do. Not so much an image. It's not like you can clamp on sensors and get a picture of what Bob is thinking about. But they can measure feelings, sensations, and they can detect decisions being made before you realize it yourself.Yes. In the worldviews of Materialism and Physicalism, subjective experience is indeed "strange" because scientists can't track an experience (feeling, sensation, image) back to its source via physical cause & effect evidence. — Gnomon
From a physics standpoint, same thing. I mean, all matter seems to be just a form of energy. As for there being any actual 'material', well, they've never actually found any. The closer you look, the more illusive it gets. Even energy sort of fades away on close inspection, arguably giving way to just mathematics.But in order to actualize, the monistic Singular Substance (Plato's abstract Form) must transform into Dual intermediate concrete sub-forms : Energy & Matter.
My only edit would be that all that stuff is a function of physical processes, not that it necessarily can be explained, especially given the limits of knowledge of those laws. Look at all the quantum interpretations, each giving a different explanation of the same phenomena. OK, that's multiple explanations, not a lack of even one. Maybe the lack of a unified field theory is a good example of something that (currently) unexplained, but without any conclusion that physicalism is thus necessarily wrong. But so many posters come to exactly that conclusion.*1. ... In essence, a physicalist believes that all existing phenomena, including mental states, can be explained in terms of physical processes and matter, making the physical the only fundamental substance in the universe."
No doubt there is a perfectly functioning iPhone lying on a planet somewhere out there, the result of avalanches, volcanic activity, and meteorites. Amazing how such things happen. Metals naturally refine and fall into exact shapes, plastics form just so, tectonic activity bounces all the parts so they happen to land in exact configuration, the tiny screws even jiggling until tight. All I need to do is charge it. Ah, but I'm sure a tiny flicker from a distant lightning strike reached over and did that for me.Why not? Incredulity again, or something actually valid? Is this the best you can do? — noAxioms
I disagree with pretty much everything you said. I'm speaking from an entirely different angle. And I know nobody agrees with me, but I still think what I think. — Patterner
Even if I grant that the experience can one day be explained, then we still have the problem of how the experience can affect physical substance. The second problem is a serious issue since the experience is a mental event only, and it lacks any physical property, so it cannot affect the physical.Lack of a physical explanation isn't evidence that it isn't a physical effect. There's plenty of things not explained, which is why the scientists still have a job. But science presuming supernatural explanations held progress to a crawl, resulting what's been since named the dark ages. Changing their methodology to presume otherwise resulted in the renaissance and all the progress since. — noAxioms
Do you have a solution to that problem with substance dualism?Even if I grant that the experience can one day be explained, then we still have the problem of how the experience can affect physical substance. The second problem is a serious issue since the experience is a mental event only, and it lacks any physical property, so it cannot affect the physical. — MoK
I have frequently said why I think what I think. Most recently, a few posts above, I explained why I think :It's obvious that you have a different view of things than I do, but that does not constitute either an explanation or a justification for your views. — Janus
You said "Being conscious means being aware." I'm saying it doesn't. Awareness is just what we subjectively experience/are conscious of. Awareness is not consciousness. Some things that are conscious are not aware.I haven't said that what people are conscious of is what consciousness is — Janus
I don't think of "being conscious" the way I think you do. I don't think it's particular mental states, or complex brain activity. I don't know how you would word it.I've asked you what the difference is between consciousness and being conscious. To give some analogies sleeplessness just is being sleepless, restlessness just is being restless and sexlessness just is being sexless. Or, closer to home, unconsciousness just is being unconscious. — Janus
A couple people said they appreciated that I tried to be clear about what I think consciousness is here:You also say that you don't think being conscious means being aware, and yet you offer no explanation of what you think the difference is. — Janus
No, I very much do not mean that. I mean there is activity in the brain. Ions crossing barriers, neurotransmitters jumping synapses, signals running along neurons. Etc. Etc. That is all just physical activity. More complex and intricate than pool balls banging around on the table, but physical just the same. Photons hit retina, setting off a chain reaction of physical events in the brain. Vibrations in the air enter through the ear, setting off a chain reaction of physical events in the brain. A molecules of NaCl touches the tongue, sitting off a chain reaction to physical events in the brain. We are able to distinguish various frequencies of protons and vibrations in the air, and distinguish between different molecules that hit our tongue.I don't understand why you talk about subjective experience of various functions of our brain, when I think it is obvious that we have no in vivo awareness of brain functions. Perhaps you meant to say that our subjective experience is a manifestation of certain brain functions. — Janus
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