I agree with everything you said, which is why I embrace naturalism/physicalism. But the one thing that gives me pause are qualia. Consistent with physicalism, they are representitive states - they represent something that facilitates pro-survival behaviors. This counters claims that they are epiphenomenol. But what resists a physicalist account is the nature of the experience: for example, the sense of pain.

If the pain sensation exists only in the mind, then it is, in sense, an illusion with a representational character (not epiphenomenal). There needn't be a reason for the sensation to be what it is beyond the fact that it evolved this way because of random mutations that happened to have a positive impact on survival. But the problem remains as to how the firing of neurons creates this sense of pain.

I don't suggest this is a fatal flaw, but it opens the door to considering alternatives. But my problem with (for example) @Wayfarer's claims is that he only tears down the physicalist account, by suggesting the explanatory gap thoroughly falsifies physicalism. Then he offers no better alternative, so he's simply creating a much larger explanatory gap.

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy.
— Relativist

And numbers. — Wayfarer

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence that is independent of the objects that exhibit them. On the other hand, and as you know, I see no reason to believe such things. Immanent universals are considerably more parsimonious.

Explain the ontological relationship between a cluster of two protons (in the nucleus ofva helium atom) and the number 2.

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ — Metaphysician Undercover

There are good reasons to believe JFK was killed by a single person, acting alone.

There are good reasons to believe more than one person was involved in the killing of JFK

These assertions are not contradictory. They can both be true.

The problem though, is in your statement that physicalism is the best ontology and the one you believe in . And physicalism explicitly excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. In the JFK example you are not claiming that one is better than the other, and the one you believe in.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. So you cannot believe in physicalism yet also believe that there is good reason to believe in the nonphysical without self-contradicting.

I suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". This would be recognition of your uncertainty in the matter, just like your JFK example indicates uncertainty.

It’s ontological but not physical - an intellectual act which enables the recognition of abstractions. The property can only be recognised by a mind capable of counting. — Wayfarer

In Armstrong's ontology:
-Everything that exists (every object) is a state of affairs, whose constituents are: the bare particular, a set of properties, and a set of relations to other states of affairs.
-Properties and relations are constituents of the states of affairs that comprise physical reality- hence they are part of the physical world. They are not objects, because they are not states of affairs. They exist immanently as constituents of states of affairs.

I already explained the "way of abstraction".

Nowadays atoms are conceptualised as excitations of fields, and the ontological status of fields is far from settled — Wayfarer

I was giving a simplified account to avoid having to describe quantum fields. I'll rephrase it:

physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything that exists in the material world (the domain of physics) is composed of elements of the quantum fields (as identified in the standard model) . It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. .

Do you agree there is no good reason to doubt that the standard model identifies the physical composition of everything that exists (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy)?

Do you understand how this scientific hypothesis is distinct from the metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion?

Do you deny that this metaphysical claim is true for all nonliving objects? If you do deny it, can you make a compelling case for your view?

I made it perfectloy explicit:

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is — Wayfarer

You've brought up a number of mental activities you considered "obvious" that are easily accounted for in physicalism, so your judgement of what is "obvious" is suspect.

What you purport to exclude is what comprises the "negative fact", from which you have not, and can not, derive a positive fact. I've repeatedly pointed out that a negative fact (what something is NOT) tells us almost nothing. An object that is "not a duck" could be anything, and therefore "not a duck" is not a clue as to what the object IS.

It's relevant because you're claiming the negative fact falsifies physicalism. You haven't really flasified it because this "negative fact" is hypothesis and tentative- based solely on the absence of a complete physicalist account of every aspect of mental life. So physicalism is still (at least) possible. You have said nothing stronger about any alternatives, so we simply have a large space of possibilities that includes physicalist and non-physicalist theories.

Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.
— Relativist

Well your screen name is ‘Relativist’, and you're preaching relativism. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. There's nothing relative about truth; my point was simply that it's a mental concept, not some platonic object.

As for 'special pleading', it's physicalism that does this. It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

You have an understanding of physicalism that is biased and false. I've explained the actual relationship between science and physicalism, and you choose to ignore what I said and repeat your false understanding.

The irony is that I've tried very hard to see where your negative hypotheses would lead, going so far as to entertain it as a fact. Unlike you, I have been willing to be wrong; willing to entertain other possibilities. In response, you've displayed complete ignorance as to what physicalism actually is by presenting naive objections (that simply display your lack of understanding of physicalism), and insisting on your distorted view of its relation to science. That is an ineffective way to make your case, and it was a blind alley that had virtually nothing to do with the "negative hypothesis" I had been willing to entertain as fact.

It's impossible to falsify something you don't understand. It would have been more effective to concede that physicalism is reasonable in every way EXCEPT the mind, and concentrated on somehow doing something with your negative hypothesis. Instead, you've turned much of this conversation into my refuting your misunderstandings about general physicalism.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person — Metaphysician Undercover

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction.

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned.

suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". — Metaphysician Undercover

That might be appropriate for an extreme skeptic, who chooses only to believe things that can be proven to be logically necessary. IBE does not entail logical necessity. I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. If I merely said it was possible he acted alone, I would not be representing my view as accurrately.

Further, my view on physicalism is strictly subjective judgement. I try to be rational, taking into account all information I'm aware of, but I know I'm fallible, and limited by what I have studied and considered. So I usually don't make bold statements like "physicalism is true". Rather, I say "I believe physicalism is true", and am usually willing to explain why, and interested in hearing valid criticism - "good reasons" why I might be wrong.

*edit*
I ran across the following state by (Christian, dualist) pholosopher Ed Feser:

"But other contemporary naturalists – Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, not to mention countless lesser lights of the sort who write crude atheist pamphlets and pop neuroscience books – cluelessly suggest that there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for."

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that.

Do you agree there is no good reason to doubt that the standard model identifies the physical composition of everything that exists (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy)? — Relativist

But how can you 'set aside' the posit that current physics accounts for 4% of the totality of the universe? And the entrenched controversies around the whole question of the interpretation of physics and what is says about the nature of reality? You really need to read some more in this subject.

I've explained the actual relationship between science and physicalism, and you choose to ignore what I said and repeat your false understanding. — Relativist

Remind me! Everything you've said in this exchange is predicated on equating the model of physics with a philosophy of everything. You're simply abstracting what you think are 'existents' from the models of physics as the basis for philosophy, when the very nature of the existence of these forces and entities is still very much an open question.

You've brought up a number of mental activities you considered "obvious" that are easily accounted for in physicalism, so your judgement of what is "obvious" is suspect. — Relativist

What I consider 'obvious' is that the observer or subject is implicitly present in physicalism, but has been suppressed for methodological reasons.

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence — Relativist

‘Transcendental’ is not the same as ‘objective’. Universals are transcendental because they transcend the specific forms in which they are instantiated. For example a number can be represented by a variety of different symbolic forms but still retain its identity. As Bertrand Russell said, ‘universals are not thoughts, though when known they appear as thoughts.’

I ran across the following state by (Christian, dualist) pholosopher Ed Feser: — Relativist

He is saying the exact opposite of what you describe him as saying. He is saying that Churchlands and Dennett are 'clueless' for suggesting that 'there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for.'

This conversation has been going on since 5th November 2024 - I happen to remember, as it was the date of the US presidential election. And I think it's run it's course. Thanks and so long.

I think the idea of qualia is misleading. The way I understand it when I see something I don't see a quale or the experiential quality of what I'm seeing. I can make a post hoc judgement about the quality of my experience and then reify that into entities collectively referred to as qualia.

So, I agree with your characterization "an illusion with a representational character". If all perception and thought is neural activity, then being reflectively conscious of what is being perceived (or perhaps more accurately what has just been perceived) and not being reflectively conscious of that would be two different kinds of neural activity, each with their own effects, and hence being conscious would not be epiphenomenal.

For me, to claim that there is a non-physical aspect of mind would be to claim that there is something at work which is completely independent of the whole embodied energy economy of the percipient in its environment, and that seems not only implausible but even incoherent.

I agree that @Wayfarer seems to think that the inability of physical science to explain the felt quality of experience is a slam dunk refutation of physicalism, and to me that seems to be a completely unjustified conclusion.

I know you feel that way :wink:

It's not a matter of feeling, as much as you would like to cast it in that light. On analysis I judge it to be unjustified because it simply doesn't logically follow.

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would. — Relativist

I take this as an admission of your own self-contradiction then.

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction. — Relativist

Intellectual honesty would be to admit that you were wrong in the claims you made about physicalism. Are you ready for that yet?

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned. — Relativist

You are wrong here. If you admit to the possibility of a second shooter then you cannot claim to believe that there was only one shooter without contradicting yourself. In other words, if you truly believe that it is possible that there was a second shooter, you cannot, at the same time, truly believe that there was only one shooter. The two beliefs exclude each.

If you believe that X might not be the case, you do not actually believe in X, though you might believe that X is probable. The issue here is that physicalism excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. Physicalism does not posit that the nonphysical is improbable, it excludes the nonphysical. It is not a matter of saying that the nonphysical is improbable, it is a matter of saying that the nonphysical is not. The nonphysical is unreal. Now this is a big difference because once you allow for the reality of possibility, which is required to account for your attitude of "probable" rather than certain, you need to be able to find a position for possibility, and probability within your reality.

What kind of physical existence would possibility, or probability have? You could deny the reality of possibility, but then you self-contradict, if you claim that physicalism is probable, because physicalism has no place for possibility within its proposed reality. This is what "physicalism" entails, denying the possibility of the nonphysical. If you believe that the nonphysical is a possibility, you do not believe in physicalism. That's plain and simple. So, I'll ask you, do you believe in physicalism, or do you believe in possibility?

I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. — Relativist

This is blatant contradiction. If you think that it is possible that Oswald did not act alone, you do not actually believe that he acted alone. You are simply saying that you believe both, without considering the meaning of what you are saying. People can say all sorts of contradictory things, but please think about what you have said, and apply a true form of "intellectual honesty". Do you believe that Oswald may not have acted alone? If so, then you do not believe that he acted alone. How could you honestly say "I believe that Oswald acted alone, and I also believe that he might not have acted alone". Which of the two do you honestly believe?

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that. — Relativist

You got that backward. He is saying "no good reason". That is what "physicalism" implies, because of the necessity which is associated with it, that there is no good reason to consider the nonphysical. To believe in physicalism is to believe that there is "no good reason" to think that the mind could be anything other than physical. That's why "good reason to think that the mind has nonphysical aspects" contradicts physicalism.