I agree with everything you said, which is why I embrace naturalism/physicalism. But the one thing that gives me pause are qualia. Consistent with physicalism, they are representitive states - they represent something that facilitates pro-survival behaviors. This counters claims that they are epiphenomenol. But what resists a physicalist account is the nature of the experience: for example, the sense of pain.

If the pain sensation exists only in the mind, then it is, in sense, an illusion with a representational character (not epiphenomenal). There needn't be a reason for the sensation to be what it is beyond the fact that it evolved this way because of random mutations that happened to have a positive impact on survival. But the problem remains as to how the firing of neurons creates this sense of pain.

I don't suggest this is a fatal flaw, but it opens the door to considering alternatives. But my problem with (for example) @Wayfarer's claims is that he only tears down the physicalist account, by suggesting the explanatory gap thoroughly falsifies physicalism. Then he offers no better alternative, so he's simply creating a much larger explanatory gap.

It accounts for everything known to exist in the universe, except possibly dark matter and dark energy.
— Relativist

And numbers. — Wayfarer

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence that is independent of the objects that exhibit them. On the other hand, and as you know, I see no reason to believe such things. Immanent universals are considerably more parsimonious.

Explain the ontological relationship between a cluster of two protons (in the nucleus ofva helium atom) and the number 2.

Yours does entail contradiction, that's the point, just like my example. Please explain how you think the two differ — Metaphysician Undercover

There are good reasons to believe JFK was killed by a single person, acting alone.

There are good reasons to believe more than one person was involved in the killing of JFK

These assertions are not contradictory. They can both be true.

The problem though, is in your statement that physicalism is the best ontology and the one you believe in . And physicalism explicitly excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. In the JFK example you are not claiming that one is better than the other, and the one you believe in.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. So you cannot believe in physicalism yet also believe that there is good reason to believe in the nonphysical without self-contradicting.

I suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". This would be recognition of your uncertainty in the matter, just like your JFK example indicates uncertainty.

It’s ontological but not physical - an intellectual act which enables the recognition of abstractions. The property can only be recognised by a mind capable of counting. — Wayfarer

In Armstrong's ontology:
-Everything that exists (every object) is a state of affairs, whose constituents are: the bare particular, a set of properties, and a set of relations to other states of affairs.
-Properties and relations are constituents of the states of affairs that comprise physical reality- hence they are part of the physical world. They are not objects, because they are not states of affairs. They exist immanently as constituents of states of affairs.

I already explained the "way of abstraction".

Nowadays atoms are conceptualised as excitations of fields, and the ontological status of fields is far from settled — Wayfarer

I was giving a simplified account to avoid having to describe quantum fields. I'll rephrase it:

physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything that exists in the material world (the domain of physics) is composed of elements of the quantum fields (as identified in the standard model) . It's a claim supported by evidence and theory. .

Do you agree there is no good reason to doubt that the standard model identifies the physical composition of everything that exists (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy)?

Do you understand how this scientific hypothesis is distinct from the metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion?

Do you deny that this metaphysical claim is true for all nonliving objects? If you do deny it, can you make a compelling case for your view?

I made it perfectloy explicit:

There is something very obvious that it excludes, as I've already said time and again. And you don't notice or acknowledge what it is — Wayfarer

You've brought up a number of mental activities you considered "obvious" that are easily accounted for in physicalism, so your judgement of what is "obvious" is suspect.

What you purport to exclude is what comprises the "negative fact", from which you have not, and can not, derive a positive fact. I've repeatedly pointed out that a negative fact (what something is NOT) tells us almost nothing. An object that is "not a duck" could be anything, and therefore "not a duck" is not a clue as to what the object IS.

It's relevant because you're claiming the negative fact falsifies physicalism. You haven't really flasified it because this "negative fact" is hypothesis and tentative- based solely on the absence of a complete physicalist account of every aspect of mental life. So physicalism is still (at least) possible. You have said nothing stronger about any alternatives, so we simply have a large space of possibilities that includes physicalist and non-physicalist theories.

Truth is not a property that objects have; rather it is a label we apply to some statements. Logic applies to statements. Meaning is a mental association, not a physical property. Intentions are behavioral.
— Relativist

Well your screen name is ‘Relativist’, and you're preaching relativism. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not. There's nothing relative about truth; my point was simply that it's a mental concept, not some platonic object.

As for 'special pleading', it's physicalism that does this. It appeals to physics as the basis of its ontology, but when presented with the inconvenient fact that today's physics seems to undermine physicalism, it will say it is 'not bound by physics'. — Wayfarer

You have an understanding of physicalism that is biased and false. I've explained the actual relationship between science and physicalism, and you choose to ignore what I said and repeat your false understanding.

The irony is that I've tried very hard to see where your negative hypotheses would lead, going so far as to entertain it as a fact. Unlike you, I have been willing to be wrong; willing to entertain other possibilities. In response, you've displayed complete ignorance as to what physicalism actually is by presenting naive objections (that simply display your lack of understanding of physicalism), and insisting on your distorted view of its relation to science. That is an ineffective way to make your case, and it was a blind alley that had virtually nothing to do with the "negative hypothesis" I had been willing to entertain as fact.

It's impossible to falsify something you don't understand. It would have been more effective to concede that physicalism is reasonable in every way EXCEPT the mind, and concentrated on somehow doing something with your negative hypothesis. Instead, you've turned much of this conversation into my refuting your misunderstandings about general physicalism.

To make the JFK example comparable, you'd have to chose one as the best explanation, as the one you believe, then also claim that there is good reason to believe the other. For example, the best explanation, and the one I believe in, is a single person acting alone, however there is good reason to believe in more than one person — Metaphysician Undercover

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would.

Once you chose one, as the one that you believe in, you cannot claim that there is good reason to believe the other, without contradicting your own belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction.

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned.

suggest you adjust your claim to "it is possible that physicalism is the best ontology". — Metaphysician Undercover

That might be appropriate for an extreme skeptic, who chooses only to believe things that can be proven to be logically necessary. IBE does not entail logical necessity. I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. If I merely said it was possible he acted alone, I would not be representing my view as accurrately.

Further, my view on physicalism is strictly subjective judgement. I try to be rational, taking into account all information I'm aware of, but I know I'm fallible, and limited by what I have studied and considered. So I usually don't make bold statements like "physicalism is true". Rather, I say "I believe physicalism is true", and am usually willing to explain why, and interested in hearing valid criticism - "good reasons" why I might be wrong.

*edit*
I ran across the following statement by (Christian, dualist) pholosopher Ed Feser:

"But other contemporary naturalists – Dennett and the Churchlands, for example, not to mention countless lesser lights of the sort who write crude atheist pamphlets and pop neuroscience books – cluelessly suggest that there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for."

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that.

Do you agree there is no good reason to doubt that the standard model identifies the physical composition of everything that exists (setting aside the mystery of dark matter and dark energy)? — Relativist

But how can you 'set aside' the posit that current physics accounts for 4% of the totality of the universe? And the entrenched controversies around the whole question of the interpretation of physics and what is says about the nature of reality? You really need to read some more in this subject.

I've explained the actual relationship between science and physicalism, and you choose to ignore what I said and repeat your false understanding. — Relativist

Remind me! Everything you've said in this exchange is predicated on equating the model of physics with a philosophy of everything. You're simply abstracting what you think are 'existents' from the models of physics as the basis for philosophy, when the very nature of the existence of these forces and entities is still very much an open question.

You've brought up a number of mental activities you considered "obvious" that are easily accounted for in physicalism, so your judgement of what is "obvious" is suspect. — Relativist

What I consider 'obvious' is that the observer or subject is implicitly present in physicalism, but has been suppressed for methodological reasons.

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence — Relativist

‘Transcendental’ is not the same as ‘objective’. Universals are transcendental because they transcend the specific forms in which they are instantiated. For example a number can be represented by a variety of different symbolic forms but still retain its identity. As Bertrand Russell said, ‘universals are not thoughts, though when known they appear as thoughts.’

I ran across the following state by (Christian, dualist) pholosopher Ed Feser: — Relativist

He is saying the exact opposite of what you describe him as saying. He is saying that Churchlands and Dennett are 'clueless' for suggesting that 'there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for.'

This conversation has been going on since 5th November 2024 - I happen to remember, as it was the date of the US presidential election. And I think it's run it's course. Thanks and so long.

I think the idea of qualia is misleading. The way I understand it when I see something I don't see a quale or the experiential quality of what I'm seeing. I can make a post hoc judgement about the quality of my experience and then reify that into entities collectively referred to as qualia.

So, I agree with your characterization "an illusion with a representational character". If all perception and thought is neural activity, then being reflectively conscious of what is being perceived (or perhaps more accurately what has just been perceived) and not being reflectively conscious of that would be two different kinds of neural activity, each with their own effects, and hence being conscious would not be epiphenomenal.

For me, to claim that there is a non-physical aspect of mind would be to claim that there is something at work which is completely independent of the whole embodied energy economy of the percipient in its environment, and that seems not only implausible but even incoherent.

I agree that @Wayfarer seems to think that the inability of physical science to explain the felt quality of experience is a slam dunk refutation of physicalism, and to me that seems to be a completely unjustified conclusion.

I know you feel that way :wink:

It's not a matter of feeling, as much as you would like to cast it in that light. On analysis I judge it to be unjustified because it simply doesn't logically follow.

I saw no reason to state the obvious. You figured out exactly what I had in mind (your stated example), as I expected you would. — Relativist

I take this as an admission of your own self-contradiction then.

Acknowledging there are reasons why I might be wrong is being intellectually honest; that is not a contradiction. — Relativist

Intellectual honesty would be to admit that you were wrong in the claims you made about physicalism. Are you ready for that yet?

On this particular example, I indeed believe a single person acted alone. But I read awhile back that there was auditory evidence of a second shooter. This evidence is "good reason" to suggest I could be wrong, however it is not a good ENOUGH reason for me to change my mind. Suppose I encountered 5 additional bits of evidence to support a second shooter. THEN I would change my mind. Individually, each bit of evidence is "good" in that it is relevant information and could contribute to drawing a different inference. It is the totality of available evidence that the conclusion should be based on and that totality can change over time as additional facts are learned. — Relativist

You are wrong here. If you admit to the possibility of a second shooter then you cannot claim to believe that there was only one shooter without contradicting yourself. In other words, if you truly believe that it is possible that there was a second shooter, you cannot, at the same time, truly believe that there was only one shooter. The two beliefs exclude each.

If you believe that X might not be the case, you do not actually believe in X, though you might believe that X is probable. The issue here is that physicalism excludes the possibility of the nonphysical. Physicalism does not posit that the nonphysical is improbable, it excludes the nonphysical. It is not a matter of saying that the nonphysical is improbable, it is a matter of saying that the nonphysical is not. The nonphysical is unreal. Now this is a big difference because once you allow for the reality of possibility, which is required to account for your attitude of "probable" rather than certain, you need to be able to find a position for possibility, and probability within your reality.

What kind of physical existence would possibility, or probability have? You could deny the reality of possibility, but then you self-contradict, if you claim that physicalism is probable, because physicalism has no place for possibility within its proposed reality. This is what "physicalism" entails, denying the possibility of the nonphysical. If you believe that the nonphysical is a possibility, you do not believe in physicalism. That's plain and simple. So, I'll ask you, do you believe in physicalism, or do you believe in possibility?

I believe Oswald acted alone, but I know I'm possibly wrong. — Relativist

This is blatant contradiction. If you think that it is possible that Oswald did not act alone, you do not actually believe that he acted alone. You are simply saying that you believe both, without considering the meaning of what you are saying. People can say all sorts of contradictory things, but please think about what you have said, and apply a true form of "intellectual honesty". Do you believe that Oswald may not have acted alone? If so, then you do not believe that he acted alone. How could you honestly say "I believe that Oswald acted alone, and I also believe that he might not have acted alone". Which of the two do you honestly believe?

So he is acknowledging that there can be "good reasons" for a position one disagrees with, since he's complaining that these naturalists won't even acknowledge that. — Relativist

You got that backward. He is saying "no good reason". That is what "physicalism" implies, because of the necessity which is associated with it, that there is no good reason to consider the nonphysical. To believe in physicalism is to believe that there is "no good reason" to think that the mind could be anything other than physical. That's why "good reason to think that the mind has nonphysical aspects" contradicts physicalism.

You persist in treating all beliefs as categorical, despite my repeated efforts to describe it to you.

Answer this: when you say "I believe X", does this mean you are certain of X?

If not, then how do you verbally describe your uncertainty, to distinguish it from statements that you do feel certain about?

If yes, then what phrase(s) do you use to convey your attitude toward X, when you lack certainty.

:up:

Remind me! Everything you've said in this exchange is predicated on equating the model of physics with a philosophy of everything. — Wayfarer

I have never said such a thing - you just assumed it. Multiple times I've said that I judge physicalism to be the metaphysical theory that is "inference to best explanation". An IBE is based on a set of facts, and in this case - the scope is universal: all facts about the world. Speculations are not facts.

Science gives us quite a few facts, so of course a viable metaphysical theory needs to account for them.

But how can you 'set aside' the posit that current physics accounts for 4% of the totality of the universe? And the entrenched controversies around the whole question of the interpretation of physics and what is says about the nature of reality? You really need to read some more in this subject. — Wayfarer

You need to start trying to grasp my reasons for considering physicalism, as I described above, instead of attacking a strawman. There are no facts about dark matter and energy to be accounted for. With regard to QM: there is no fact regarding which interpretation is correct. An interpretation is a metaphysical hypothesis, and physicalism is consistent with most of them.

What I consider 'obvious' is that the observer or subject is implicitly present in physicalism, but has been suppressed for methodological reasons. — Wayfarer

Red herring: it's irrelevant to the question.

So you embrace a the platonic principle that (at least some) abstractions have objective existence — Relativist


‘Transcendental’ is not the same as ‘objective’. Universals are transcendental because they transcend the specific forms in which they are instantiated....’ — Wayfarer

Nevertheless, you reject the account I've given that universals exist immanently.

This raises an important question: what are you trying to achieve in this discussion?

--Are you just explaining why you reject physicalism? All I'm seeing is that you're rejecting a strawman.


--If you're trying to convince me physicalism is false, then you're going about it wrong. You can't prove it false by making a claim that's inconsistent with physicalism. You've done this repeatedly.

I GAVE you an opening, by admitting there's an issue with the "hard problem", so that I was willing to entertain the "negative fact" (actually a negative hypothesis) that there's something about the mind that is non-physical. All you did with this was to suggest some vague possibilities. This led me to reconsider what I'd said about the "hard problem" because there are at least 3 possibilities that are consistent with physicalism (illusionism, Michael Tye's theory, and nonreductive physicalism).

He is saying the exact opposite of what you describe him as saying. He is saying that Churchlands and Dennett are 'clueless' for suggesting that 'there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for. — Wayfarer

You don't seem to understand what I was debating with MetaphysicianUndercover: I was simply defending my semantics, that one can believe X despite there being "good reasons" why X might be false. Here's the sentence:

"[these contemporary naturalists] cluelessly suggest that there is no good reason to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for."

From this, I infer that Feser thought these guys should admit there ARE good reasons " to think that the mind will fail to yield to the same sort of reductive explanation in terms of which everything else in nature has been accounted for". In the statement, he isn't saying that these reasons should have induced them to abandon reductive naturalism (even if he believes that to be the case); he's just saying they ought to at least acknowledge there are some good reasons to think there's no reductive naturalism.

You need to start trying to grasp my reasons for considering physicalism, as I described above, instead of attacking a strawman. There are no facts about dark matter and energy to be accounted for. With regard to QM: there is no fact regarding which interpretation is correct. An interpretation is a metaphysical hypothesis, and physicalism is consistent with most of them. — Relativist

I'm not attacking a strawman - you’re treating “the facts of science” as if they were metaphysically transparent, a window to 'how the universe truly is', when they are plainly not. You say physicalism is the “inference to best explanation” from all the facts. Yet what counts as fact in science is already theory-laden. Quantum mechanics provides experimental regularities, but the interpretations of what those regularities mean about reality are metaphysically contested. To say physicalism is “consistent with most interpretations” is just to admit that physics itself doesn’t decide the metaphysical question.

And then there’s the incompleteness issue. Even if you bracket dark matter and energy, you’re still working with a framework that according to its own posits provides for only a minute percentage of the totality of the cosmos and leaves many questions about it own foundations unresolved. How can that be invoked as the basis of a metaphysics as 'first philosophy', when it is plainly contingent in nature.

There are academics and scientists, some of whom say that quantum physics proves that the universe is mental, others who claim that it shows there are infinitely many worlds, and yet others who say that quantum physics is simply wrong. So if physicalism is consistent with wildly divergent interpretations of what physics means, how could it be meaningful?

you reject the account I've given that universals exist immanently. — Relativist

You say universals “exist immanently as constituents of states of affairs.” But what does that really mean? If I say “this apple is larger than that plum,” the 'larger than relation' is not something you can isolate in either piece of fruit. It’s not inherent in either object, but grasped by an intellect making the comparison.

That’s why I say such relations are not “immanent” in objects but imputed to them by reason. They are formal judgements. Armstrong’s ontology tries to locate them in the furniture of the world, without acknowledging that they are in a fundamental sense dependent on the mind which recognises them.

I GAVE you an opening, by admitting there's an issue with the "hard problem", so that I was willing to entertain the "negative fact" (actually a negative hypothesis) that there's something about the mind that is non-physical. — Relativist

You say I've been vague, but I’ve been quite explicit. Let me spell it out.

First: the hard problem, as Chalmers framed it in his original paper, is about experience. There is information-processing in the brain, but there is also the first-person, subjective aspect — what Nagel called something it is like to be a conscious organism. That “what-it-is-like” is experience, and objective, third-person accounts don’t capture it:



Second: this stems from the constitution of modern science since Galileo, which gave primary reality to the measurable, objective domain and relegated how phenomena appear in experience to the secondary domain of the subjective. Physicalism inherits this stance, but in doing so it excludes something very obvious: the subject to whom a theory is meaningful, the very mind that provides the definitions and draws the conclusions (which, incidentally, is also what shows up in 'the observer problem' in quantum physics.)

Third: The problem is that you can only conceive of what is not physical as a 'non-physical thing'. You request 'evidence' of 'some non-physical thing', but that is because of the objectivism that is inherent in the physicalist attitude. The 'non-physical' is not 'out there somewhere', it is in the way the mind constructs a coherent and unified world from the disparate elements of science, sense-data and judgement. This insight is, of course, fundamental to Kant, and was developed further by phenomenology.

So: the mind is not outside the physicalist scope because it’s a spooky Cartesian “thinking thing” or ghost in the machine. It’s excluded because it is not an object of cognition at all, but the seat of cognition — the condition that makes objects intelligible in the first place. Demanding “evidence of a non-physical thing” only shows how objectivism presupposes what it cannot see. This is why Kant, and later phenomenology, makes the constitutive role of mind explicit. Physicalism of Armstrong's variety methodically screens this out, or ignores this fundamental fact. Hence the critique given in 'The Blind Spot of Science'.

So I don't accept that these are vague arguments. Perhaps you might actually address them.

Answer this: when you say "I believe X", does this mean you are certain of X?

If not, then how do you verbally describe your uncertainty, to distinguish it from statements that you do feel certain about? — Relativist

When I say "I believe X" it means that I think X is the case, I think it is true. When I think X may be the case I say "I believe that X may be the case", or "X is possible". Do you recognize the difference between these two?

Neither says anything about certainty or uncertainty, and you bring this up as a distraction. We were not talking about certainty and uncertainty, we were talking about what we believe, whether you believe in physicalism, or you believe that physicalism is possible. When i want to describe my certainty or uncertainty, I use those words. Do you recognize the difference between "I believe X", and "I believe X is possible", regardless of the degree of certitude?

When I say "I believe X" it means that I think X is the case, I think it is true. When I think X may be the case I say "I believe that X may be the case", or "X is possible". Do you recognize the difference between these two?

Neither says anything about certainty or uncertainty, — Metaphysician Undercover

You simply haven't been paying attention. I explicitly stated:

Here again, you're treating all beliefs as categorical: that I can only choose to believe a proposition true or false, and these entail absolute commitments. My view is that each belief has a level of certainty. — Relativist

"Degrees of certainty" are key to the "modest Bayesian epistemology*" that I advocate. It is an epistemological approach discussed by philosopher Mark Kaplan in an article in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology ("Decision Theory and Epistemology".

When i want to describe my certainty or uncertainty, I use those words. Do you recognize the difference between "I believe X", and "I believe X is possible", regardless of the degree of certitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

For many propositions you've evaluated, you will have some sense of whether it's certain, highly likely, unlikely, etc. The level of certainty is relevant to how one evaluates other, related information to draw conclusions. Consider a valid deductive argument from premises you considered possible, but unlikely, vs a conclusion drawn from premises that you consider highly likely.

This is the point I have been driving at: the issue of degrees of certainty as attitudes toward propositions, and the effect this has on further epistemic analysis. The distraction was your quibbling about the use of the word "belief" - because your only focus was to tell me I'm wrong, rather than making an effort to understand my point.
_________
*"Modest Bayesian epistemology doesn't suffer from the mathematical fallacy that orthodox Bayesian epistemology suffers from.

"Degrees of certainty" are key to the "modest Bayesian epistemology*" that I advocate. — Relativist

OK, that makes it clear then, You are admitting that you do not believe that physicalism is the best ontology, you believe that it might be the best ontology depending on how reality is understood.

The level of certainty is relevant to how one evaluates other, related information to draw conclusions. Consider a valid deductive argument from premises you considered possible, but unlikely, vs a conclusion drawn from premises that you consider highly likely. — Relativist

And your claim that it is probably the best ontology is very subjective, base on cherry-picked principles. Do you recognize that the fact that your judgement in this matter is very subjective, is very strong evidence that physicalism is not the best ontology? This is because physicalism does not account for the subjective aspect of judgement, and you are assigning principal position to it?

This is the point I have been driving at: the issue of degrees of certainty as attitudes toward propositions, and the effect this has on further epistemic analysis. The distraction was your quibbling about the use of the word "belief" - because your only focus was to tell me I'm wrong, rather than making an effort to understand my point. — Relativist

This is the point I've been driving at. The fact that you judge ontology in this way, is very indicative of a nonphysical reality. Therefore your claim to believe in physicalism is hypocritical. If you really believed in physicalism you would be certain, due to the objectivity of what you believe in, rather than wishy washy as you demonstrate. For analogy, if you claim that you are atheist, then be atheist, rather than agnostic.

You say universals “exist immanently as constituents of states of affairs.” But what does that really mean? If I say “this apple is larger than that plum,” the 'larger than relation' is not something you can isolate in either piece of fruit. It’s not inherent in either object, but grasped by an intellect making the comparison. — Wayfarer

It's not that hard. Just recognize that the apple and the plum are aspects of the same state of affairs - a state of affairs in which the apple has a larger volume than the plum.

OK, that makes it clear then, You are admitting that you do not believe that physicalism is the best ontology, you believe that it might be the best ontology depending on how reality is understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

We disagree about how the word "belief" should be used.

The problem with saying "physicalism might be the best ontology" is that it fails to communicate that I have made a judgement. Judgements are fallible, and only as good as the basis on which they are made.

You seem to say "I believe X" only if you're certain of X. This suggests either: there are few propostions you "believe" (in your terms) or you have an unjustified certainty in your positions.

I apply the word "belief" to all propositions I have judged to be true, irrespective of how strong my justification is. But, as I said, my attitude toward the proposition is more nuanced: there is a level of certainty attached to it.

And your claim that it is probably the best ontology is very subjective, base on cherry-picked principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgements are always subjective. They are unavoidably based on background beliefs (judgements previously made). But I am always willing to explain why I believe it - thus opening myself to correction. This includes having those principles and background beliefs challenged, so that I can reevaluate. I did this here in this thread. I invite you to challenge the principles I apply (namely: IBE, and the selection criteria).

Do you recognize that the fact that your judgement in this matter is very subjective, is very strong evidence that physicalism is not the best ontology? This is because physicalism does not account for the subjective aspect of judgement, and you are assigning principal position to it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Judgement is unavoidably a subjective process, because it can only be made on the facts at one's disposal (background beliefs, methodology, and cognitive abilities). These aspects (entirely nature + nurture) account for the subjective nature of judgement, consistent with physicalism.

If you really believed in physicalism you would be certain, due to the objectivity of what you believe in, rather than wishy washy as you demonstrate. For analogy, if you claim that you are atheist, then be atheist, rather than agnostic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't regard it as "wishy washy" to honestly explain the basis of my judgement, and admit fallibility, and be open to reasonable criticism. That's all I'm doing.

I have argued that most of our beliefs (my definition) are based on judgements made on incomplete data. The best we can do, in most cases, is inference to best explanation.

I went for many years self-labelling as an agnostic. It seemed appropriate because I deemed a god's existence to be possible. Over time, I've come to conclude that a creator-god is implausible, so I now label myself as atheist. It's nevertheless logically possible such a being exists. I'd consider it wishy-washy to fail to make a judgement of something that seems so implausible, merely because I'm possibly wrong. (It's of course possible Yahweh will some day reveal himself to me; if convinced my experience were veridical, I would change my mind. Obviously, I judge this won't happen).

With your semantics, I don't see how you could be anything other than agnostic - unless you base your certainty of God on "faith". Neither God's existence nor non-existence can be proven, so both are possible.

Before I respond again, please answer the question I asked:

What is your objective?

--Are you just explaining why you reject physicalism?

-Are you trying to convince me physicalism is false?

There are other possibilities, course. Keeping it open-ended will never get anywhere.

Just recognize — wonderer1

Recognition relies on understanding the concept 'larger than'. Of course, an apple *is* larger than a plum but the mind still has a fundamental role in that recognition.

Before I respond again, please answer the question I asked:

What is your objective?

-Are you just explaining why you reject physicalism?

-Are you trying to convince me physicalism is false? — Relativist

I argue against physicalism because I believe that it's an inadequate understanding of the nature of existence. Beings are not purely or only physical, but we as a culture have lost touch with the alternative. My purpose isn’t simply to reject physicalism for the sake of argument, but to show why I think it leaves something crucial out of the picture.

This conviction goes back to before I started participating in forums (around 2009) but since then, I've been researching the question of why physicalism became so influential in culture.

The problem with saying "physicalism might be the best ontology" is that it fails to communicate that I have made a judgement. Judgements are fallible, and only as good as the basis on which they are made. — Relativist

OK, now you need to recognize two distinct judgements here. One, the judgement that physicalism is the best ontology, the other, the judgement that judgements are fallible.

You seem to say "I believe X" only if you're certain of X. This suggests either: there are few propostions you "believe" (in your terms) or you have an unjustified certainty in your positions. — Relativist

As I said, "certainty" is a distraction which you are throwing in. You believe judgements are fallible, so do I, therefore certainty is irrelevant.

I apply the word "belief" to all propositions I have judged to be true, irrespective of how strong my justification is. But, as I said, my attitude toward the proposition is more nuanced: there is a level of certainty attached to it. — Relativist

This is where I think you are making things up. I do not believe that you attach a "level of certainty" to everything you believe. In general when justification suffices, people pass judgement, and the matter is concluded. We no longer have to deliberate. That is the benefit of passing judgement. If a person was still undecided they would not pass judgement, and deliberation would continue.

I agree that you may have made a judgement that all judgements are fallible, and you may respect this at each instance of passing judgement, but I do not believe that you attach a level of certainty to each judgement you make. To determine the degree of certainty would be very time consuming and not worth the effort. The reason i say this, is that judgements are made for the purpose of acting, and you are going to act on the judgement, with a healthy respect for fallibility, whether you are 75% certain or 85% certain. In the vast majority of judgements, to figure out the degree of certitude would be a totally useless waste of time, therefore it is not practised.

These aspects (entirely nature + nurture) account for the subjective nature of judgement, consistent with physicalism. — Relativist

I do not believe that the subjective nature of judgement is consistent with physicalism which holds that everything is potentially understandable through the objective science of physics. To be consistent, you'd have to say that judgement appears to be subjective, but this is really an illusion. Nature and nurture could account for all aspects of judgement so that the judgement would be objective without anything truly subjective about it. Determinism.

I don't regard it as "wishy washy" to honestly explain the basis of my judgement, and admit fallibility, and be open to reasonable criticism. That's all I'm doing.

I have argued that most of our beliefs (my definition) are based on judgements made on incomplete data. The best we can do, in most cases, is inference to best explanation. — Relativist

The point though, is that you have gone beyond making a judgement with incomplete data, along with a healthy respect for fallibility, to making a judgement when you explicitly state that there are good reasons for the very opposite of what you have concluded in that judgement. This is not a matter of "incomplete data", it is a matter of ignoring evidence which is contrary to your conclusion. "Incomplete data" implies nothing contrary to your judgement, yet not enough data for certainty. Here it is a matter of contrary evidence. That is why I said your position is irrational, and contrary to objective science. And since this particular judgement is not required for the purpose of any immediate action, the rational response is to suspend judgement and deliberate longer. It is irrational to make the judgement in spite of contrary evidence.

Over time, I've come to conclude that a creator-god is implausible, so I now label myself as atheist. It's nevertheless logically possible such a being exists — Relativist

Sure, but in the case we are discussing, it is not only logically possible that the truth is contrary to your judgement, but also you admit that there is good evidence for what is contrary to your judgement. There is a big difference between something merely being logically possible, and there being good evidence for that thing. When there is good evidence which is contrary to what you believe, it's time to reconsider your belief.

With your semantics, I don't see how you could be anything other than agnostic - unless you base your certainty of God on "faith". Neither God's existence nor non-existence can be proven, so both are possible. — Relativist

I disagree. I believe that the reality of God has already long ago been proven, by the cosmological argument.

I do not believe that you attach a level of certainty to each judgement you make — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct- I don't have a level of certainty for every judgement. Modest Bayesian epistemology doesn't assume that I do:

"Let me begin the sketch with Modest Bayesianism’s psychology. It is, true to the name, modest. In contrast to its orthodox ancestor, which strains our credulity by assuming that actual persons have real-valued degree of confidence assignments, Modest Bayesianism assumes only that any person harbors at least some confidence-rankings: that she can, for at least some pairs of hypotheses, say in which (if either) she invests the greater confidence, in which (if either) she invests equal confidence."
--Mark Kaplan (p 650, Oxford Handbook).

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed. At that point, one can reflect on the relative degrees of confidence one has between the hypotheses.

The reason i say this, is that judgements are made for the purpose of acting, and you are going to act on the judgement, with a healthy respect for fallibility, whether you are 75% certain or 85% certain. In the vast majority of judgements, to figure out the degree of certitude would be a totally useless waste of time, therefore it is not practised. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your criticism would be appropriate for orthodox Bayesianism, but doesn't apply to Modest Bayesianism. Indeed, it's a minority of the time that one would have any reason to consider level of certainty. The Kennedy Assassination question is one such example. But it could occur anytime one hears of evidence contrary to one's prior judgements- the rational thing to do is to reevaluate the judgement.

This highlights an error that conspiracy theorists make: they are overconfident in their initial judgement, and rationalize contrary evidence. The initial confidence should be tempered by the quality of the evidence, and new contrary evidence should prompt one to reevaluate.

Similarly with IBEs: new, information contrary to the prior judgement should often lead to reevaluation.

I do not believe that the subjective nature of judgement is consistent with physicalism which holds that everything is potentially understandable through the objective science of physics — Metaphysician Undercover

Utter nonsense. Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology.

The point though, is that you have gone beyond making a judgement with incomplete data, along with a healthy respect for fallibility, to making a judgement when you explicitly state that there are good reasons for the very opposite of what you have concluded in that judgement. This is not a matter of "incomplete data", it is a matter of ignoring evidence which is contrary to your conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quibbling with semantics. You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored).

I believe that the reality of God has already long ago been proven, by the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Proven?" Do you mean that you judge some cosmological argument to offer irrefutable proof of God, or do you draw a less certain conclusion?

You earlier made this assertion:

Physicalist causation leads to infinite regress — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a claim often made by devotees of some cosmological arguments. Does the fact I proved you wrong about this lead you to reevaluate your conclusion, or is this irrelevant to the particular cosmological argument you embrace?

My purpose isn’t simply to reject physicalism for the sake of argument, but to show why I think it leaves something crucial out of the picture. — Wayfarer

My impression is that the things you have said are "left out" by physicalism are category error. Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis, not an effective paradigm for answering all questions about the human condition - your areas of interest and concern.

In theory, you could falsify physicalism by identifying some aspect of the human condition that is logically impossible to account for under physicalism. But in practice, the problem is in your framing of the issues. You frame it in the way you think about it, which is rooted in your subjective world view.

This approach gives you a valid reason to reject physicalism (i.e. it's inconsistent with your world-view), but does not constitute the objective take-down of physicalism that you think it is. Example: your rejection of immanent universals (like "4") and insistence that you established the existence of something nonphysical. From a physicalist perspective, this is trivially false. Issues like this prove you don't understand the physicalist paradigm, and the fact you've done this repeatedly, even after I've explained physicalist perspectives, suggests to me that you aren't making the effort to understand it.

Similarly with the way you see the relationship between science and the metaphysical theory of physicalism. You reject my description of the relationship, and you misconstrue it or insist on your own view. By rejecting my description, you have eliminated any possibility of objectively falsifying it, you've only falsified a strawman version that you have in mind. It also demonstrates that you aren't trying to understand.

I don't think you are interested in understanding. If you were, you'd ask more and assert less. That's observation/inference, not criticism. Physicalism isn't for you. It's inconsistent with your world view and it doesn't address your areas of concern and interest (what you consider "crucial"). I suggest you leave it at that, and accept that it fits fine with the world view of others.

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis, not an effective paradigm for answering all questions about the human condition - your areas of interest and concern. — Relativist

But surely philosophy is concerned with the whole range of questions about the human condition. The task of science is to explore and explain what exists; philosophy asks what it means to exist. That inquiry is not merely subjective in the sense of personal preference, but recognises that the subject is ineliminable.

Similarly with the way you see the relationship between science and the metaphysical theory of physicalism. You reject my description of the relationship, and you misconstrue it or insist on your own view. — Relativist

Yet you’ve said repeatedly that physics provides the paradigm for metaphysics — that the “ontological grounding” is the ontology of physics. You said earlier

Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology. — Relativist

That “burden,” as you phrase it, could only be met by demonstrating the objective existence of some “non-physical thing.” But this already presumes the physicalist framing, where what counts as real must be an object existing in the same way as physical entities.

On “immanent universals”: my criticisms here are not inventions of my own — they’ve been made by many philosophers. If I tracked down the sources, I could easily point to published critiques (e.g. E. J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics (Oxford, 1998) - Lowe argues against Armstrong’s immanent realism, suggesting that it fails to account for the reality of universals and necessary connections.)

This approach gives you a valid reason to reject physicalism (i.e. it's inconsistent with your world-view), but does not constitute the objective take-down of physicalism that you think it is — Relativist

And that is relativism in action. You hold physicalism as true; I work from an idealist framework. You don’t recognise the kinds of arguments I offer, not because they are subjective, but because they cut against what you take to be undeniable. Physicalism starts by bracketing out the subject in order to ascertain what exists independently of the subject; Kantian idealism (which you don't seem to recognise) shows why this is untenable.

I don't think you are interested in understanding. — Relativist

I've learned a great deal from this forum, about new subjects, schools of thought, and philosophers that I'd never heard of. I read constantly, often the sources that others have recommended, and I often quote from external sources in support of my arguments. So, sure, I'm interested in understanding,

But the bottom line is, you can't conceive of a way in which physicalism might be false. So, I'm quite happy to leave it there, but I will not concede that what I'm arguing is 'subjective' in any pejorative sense. But I will agree that my philosophy is incompatible with physicalism, as I would hope it to be!

//I also note you had nothing to say about David Chalmers’ challenge to physicalism//

Only in situations where one has a choice of hypotheses is the degree of certainty needed. — Relativist

In this case, you have what you called good reason to believe that the hypothesis is false. How would this affect the degree of certainty? I think it is irrational to choose a hypotheses when there is strong evidence (good reason) which indicates that it is false.

However, the issue is really much more complicated than what you describe. What happens often, is that a person will select a hypotheses with incomplete data, as you suggest. The extent of the data which is unknown is itself unknown, so the certainty level may be higher than it ought to be. The relevance of the unknown data cannot be accounted for, because the data is unknown. Therefore the data which is judged is arbitrarily weighted relative to the unknown data.

Then, as time passes more data will become available to the individual(s) who made that judgement. The data may actually be directly contrary to the accepted hypotheses, but since the hypotheses is already accepted, and plays an active role in the lives of those who accept it, they simply adjust, make an exception to the rule to allow for the now evident contrary data, and continue to work with the hypotheses, which we now have data that confirms it is faulty. In other words, the hypotheses is judged with incomplete data, it is put to use, and with use, data comes out which falsifies it. But since it has become so useful, instead of going back to the original judgement and reassessing, we simply make an exception which allows us to work around the faultiness of the hypotheses. This is actually very common in physics.

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. It's a gross caricature to suggest this means physics can replace epistemology. — Relativist

Yes, physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis. However, epistemology is what ontology grounds. Therefore it is you who speaks nonsense here.

You interpreted "good reasons" to entail facts that contradicted my prior judgement. I explained this was not what I meant by the phrase. I have identified no facts that contradict physicalism. If I use your private lexicon, I would not label the point a "good reason" to reject physicalism, but rather that it constitutes relevant information that should be taken into account (as I previously described, and you ignored). — Relativist

Your use of "facts" here is misplaced. You have talked yourself out of the usefulness of "facts", by insisting that beliefs are judged by degree of certainty. So if there is such a thing as a fact, it is irreleavnt because you do not consider any beliefs to be facts.

You have identified beliefs which you have, which contradict physicalism, i.e. that you have reason to believe that the mind has a nonphysical aspect. Therefore you believe contradictory things. To resolve the contradiction within your own beliefs you need to either demonstrate to yourself that the mind is physical, or else reject physicalism.

Yes, as you say, you have "relevant information that should be taken into account". That relevant information is that you now believe yourself to have evidence which contradicts that judgement you already made.

"Proven?" Do you mean that you judge some cosmological argument to offer irrefutable proof of God, or do you draw a less certain conclusion? — Relativist

Yes, I believe the cosmological argument provides irrefutable proof of God. In case your not familiar with it, here is a simplified version.

We observe that it is always the case that the potential for the physical object is prior in time to the actual existence of any physical object. We also know that something actual is required to actualize any potential. Therefore we can conclude that there is something actual which is prior to every physical object. That is what is known as God.

Does the fact I proved you wrong about this lead you to reevaluate your conclusion, or is this irrelevant to the particular cosmological argument you embrace? — Relativist

Duh. Your "proof" was the following:

No, it doesn't entail infinite regress. — Relativist

Furthermore, I don’t think it’s helpful to frame this as though my philosophical outlook simply reduces to my personality or my particular “areas of concern” which is essentially a form of ad hominem argument. I've given reasons, not just preferences, for why I think physicalism must be incomplete as a philosophy. If you believe I’ve misunderstood, then the most productive way forward is to show where the reasoning fails, not to suggest the reasoning is invalid because of the kind of person offering it just prefers a different approach.

I've given numerous, documented reasons for my arguments, including:

• The Hard Problem: first-person experience (“what it is like”) is not captured by third-person physical accounts.
• Universals and theory of meaning: truths, logical relations, and mathematical structures are not physical categories, even if they can be represented in physical media.
• The Blind Spot: since Galileo, science has bracketed the subject to focus exclusively on objects — but philosophy must also account for the subject who knows and experiences.

All of these are dismissed by you as 'category errors' or 'not relevant' without any attempt at addressing them.

In your prior response, you said:

My purpose isn’t simply to reject physicalism for the sake of argument, but to show why I think it leaves something crucial out of the picture. — Wayfarer

Who are you showing this to? Yourself? Me? If it's me, then it's only worth my time if you are trying to convince me, rather than just "witnessing" it to me (like the Jehovah's witness tells me, when I answer the door). Otherwise we're just stating our positions and reacting to what the other person says- a waste of our time.

I'll respond to your last post based on the assumption that you're endeavoring to convince me. But please clarify, so I can understand if its worth continuing.

Physicalism is an ontological grounding thesis, not an effective paradigm for answering all questions about the human condition - your areas of interest and concern.
— Relativist
But surely philosophy is concerned with the whole range of questions about the human condition. The task of science is to explore and explain what exists; philosophy asks what it means to exist. — Wayfarer

This has no bearing on the what I said, except to the extent that Philosophy deals with more than ontology (the ONLY thing physicalism is dealing with).

Yet you’ve said repeatedly that physics provides the paradigm for metaphysics — that the “ontological grounding” is the ontology of physics. — Wayfarer

I never said either of those things. You're AGAIN demonstrating your lack of understanding!

Most of mental life is better considered from completely different perspectives. My issue is specifically with ontology: what actually exists. I think ontology can be set aside for the issues you raised. If this is wrong, and there is such a dependency then there's a burden to make an epistemological case for that ontology.
— Relativist

That “burden,” as you phrase it, could only be met by demonstrating the objective existence of some “non-physical thing.” — Wayfarer

You're skipping over my key point, in that quote:
that philosophical issues can generally be dealt with while ignoring ontology. Ontology could be more of a distraction. You don't agree, but you haven't explained why you disagree. Set aside what I claimed your burden to be, and just show why it's "crucial" that I reject physicalism to discuss the philosophical issues that concern you.

My claim is that I can consider most philosophical issues even when framed in terms inconsistent with physicalism. That's because I regard the framing as paradigm, which can be utilized without ontological commitent to the paradigm.

But if there are issues (or solutions to issues) that DO require some (non-physicalist) ontological commitments, why wouldn't you have the burden of making a case for those commitments? If you believe it impossible to meet the burden, then how can you than construe this as an error my part? Sure, you disagree with me on physicalism, but if you haven't truly falsified it to me, then you have no rational basis to complain about my view on the subject. To do so seems similar to a Christian lamenting my failure to experience the joy of Jesus' love for me, because I'm an ignorant atheist.

Who are you showing this to? — Relativist

I hope to make a plausible case for anyone reading. So, sure, I seek to persuade. I've explained, I hope, that I believe physicalism is lacking in some fundamental respects (as would any other critic of physicalism.) As you are advocating physicalism, then I would hope to show you in particular what's wrong with it.

This has no bearing on the what I said, except to the extent that Philosophy deals with more than ontology (the ONLY thing physicalism is dealing with). — Relativist

Would I be correct in saying that you believe that 'ontology' comprises 'the set of all actually existing things', and that your position is that all actually existing things are physical? After all, you said:

Physicalism is the theory that everything that exists, is composed of physical things, and that they act and assemble entirely due to physical forces due to laws of nature.
.... — Relativist

...physics theory makes the theoretical claim that everything that exists in the material world (the domain of physics) is composed of elements of the quantum fields (as identified in the standard model) It's a claim supported by evidence and theory ....The metaphysical claim is that an object IS its physical compostion, there's nothing more to the object..

I don’t intend to misrepresent you, but when you define physicalism as the thesis that everything that exists is composed of physical things, governed by physical forces and laws of nature, supported by an argument from 'the scope of physics', then from my point of view it does sound like physics is being taken as the ontological grounding for your metaphysics. How is it not?

You don't agree, but you haven't explained why you disagree. — Relativist

I have, repeatedly, but you haven't engaged with the arguments I've put forward.

First, do you recognize any cogency in David Chalmers' argument? That 'the nature of experience' cannot be fully captured by scientific descriptons? If you don't, why not? If you do, how does it fail as argument against physicalism?

Second: I've made the point (and again, this is not something of my devising), that scientific method assumes at the outset a division between subject and object, and assigns primary reality to the objectively-measurable attributes of objects, while assigning appearances to the so-called 'secondary attributes' of the subjective mind. I'm saying that physicalism overlooks or ignores this methodological division, and this has philosophical consequences. This is the thrust of the article The Blind Spot of Science is the Neglect of Experience. The thrust of phenomenological philosophy is based on recognising the implications of this 'bifurcation' of the world into subjective and objective.

Third: I've mentioned the conflicing interpretations of physics. Rather than open a whole can of worms, let me boil it down to this question. Neils Bohr said "It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about Nature." Werner Heisenberg: 'What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning." Now, surely, this has some bearing on your physicalist thesis. These two scientists were central to the discovery of the modern theory of the atom. Yet they're saying that physics does not describe nature as it is. Do you think that is so? If not, why?

I can consider most philosophical issues even when framed in terms inconsistent with physicalism. That's because I regard the framing as paradigm, which can be utilized without ontological commitent to the paradigm. — Relativist

This seems to rest on a misunderstanding of philosophy as such. Scientific models can indeed be treated as paradigms without ontological commitment — Newtonian mechanics still works fine for spacecraft navigation, even if we know relativity is more fundamental. Same with quantum physicists' 'Shut up and calculate'. But philosophy isn’t just a pragmatic use of conceptual models. Its concern is precisely with what is real, and what it means to exist. To treat philosophical frameworks as if they can be referenced without ontological commitment is to miss the point of philosophy. Ontology can't be firewalled of to a specialised sub-division separate from the rest of philosophy, it's intrinsic to it.

I've given the above arguments repeatedly over the course of this thread, and to my recollection, you haven't engaged with any of them, other than the vague accusation of them being 'category mistakes'. If they are, then how so?