And therefore you know everything that is true.

Righto.

That these truths may be known at some other time is not particularly interesting. — Ludwig V

The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later."

It begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal. the supposition is the antirealist one that if something is true, it is possible to know it is true. The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. This follows without reference to any time or duration. There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable.

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know.

If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option.

What this shows is that being true and being known are not the same.

That this is resisted hereabouts is a bit sad.

"True" is a judgement. Judgements are only made by intelligent minds in the process called "knowing". Therefore all truths are known. — Metaphysician Undercover

“True” isn’t the judgement; it is the relative quality of the judgement;
Judgements are, but not necessarily only, made by rational intellects in the process of understanding;
All truths are known, but not because of either of those.

The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it.


It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant.

Anti-realists don't have to explain how there are unstated statements.

That's not the issue.

That's not the issue. — Banno

Oh. :grin:

The necessary condition of empirical truth as such, in general, is the accordance with a cognition with its object, cognition itself being the relation of conceptions to each other in a logical proposition, re: a judgement, or, the relation of judgements to each other, re: a syllogism. It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it. — Mww

But isn't it the case that whether or not there is "accordance" is itself a judgement? You say that truth is "accordance" but isn't accordance a judgement? That "the cat is on the mat" is in accordance with reality, is a judgement. If you don't think that accordance is a judgement, then maybe you could explain how it could be anything other than a judgement?

It is not that all true things are known, insofar as the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete, some of which may be true respecting their objects, but that the criterion of any truth is known, for which the sum of possible cognitions is irrelevant. — Mww

If there is such a thing as "the criterion of any truth", doesn't this imply that truth is a judgement as to whether the specific criterion is fulfilled?

Yes, we give with one hand and take back with the other. Berkeley is a spectacular example. He says nothing can exist unperceived and that he does not deny the existence of "any one thing" that common sense believes in. (He reconciles the two by pointing out that God always perceives everything.)

Yes, that is the only way around it, we are part of God and God sees everything. Therefore there isn’t anything that isn’t seen.
If this isn’t the case, then there must be other things that are not seen, even by an anti-realist. Because there might be more than one anti-realist.

Nope, afaik the quantum vacuum is the ground state of nature.

Cool.

There's another term I would like to avoid.
— Ludwig V
Which one? "Proposition"? — J

Yes. "Sentence" and "statement" are just about acceptable. "Thought" and "judgement" are also very dubious.

"The argument is not tensed. It is not based on "Not known now, but could be known later." — Banno

That wasn't my summary of the argument. I think it may be based on the point that the manifestation of a disposition or capacity is an event, therefore not tenseless.

It begins with Up(p⊃◇Kp), which is not temporally dependent. It is modal.[/quote]
You won't be surprised that I don't know modal logic. But I had the impression that if it is possible to know that p, it is also possible to not know that p. So (forgive me that I can't do the formula properly,) the formula should read "For all p (if p is true then it is possible to know that p and possible not to know that p). I doubt that the conclusion would follow from that.

The direct conclusion is that there is no p such that p is true and not known. ... There cannot be any unknown truths if every truth is knowable. — Banno

That sounds like "If it is possible that it is raining, it is raining." More generally "possible" does not imply "actual".

If we are to hold that we do not know everything, then there are things we cannot know. If we do not know everything, then antirealism is not an option. — Banno

I don't see any problem about holding that we do not know everything.
Probability. A toss of a coin. It may land heads or tails and must land one or the other and we know that. We know the probabilities of each outcome, but we do not know which it will be.
Most questions identify things that are not known to the questioner. Many of them have answers in the sense that somebody knows the answer. But sometimes research is necessary. It's not really a problem.
I have more difficulty with the idea that there are things that we cannot know. In some cases, it is just a question of technology. Discovering the speed of light may be an example. Seeing what's on the far side of the moon is another.
But I do have a problem with the idea that there are things that we cannot know in some way that is not just a technological issue. Ex hypothesi, if we knew of some such thing, it would be something we knew.

….isn't it the case that…. — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

….doesn't this imply that…. — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.

I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it.

You asked, I answered. You could have just said thanks.

I’ll end with this: an invitation to the dreaded Cartesian theater in your critique of my perspective. It is self-defeating, systemic nonsense, to conflate the thing with a necessary condition for it. — Mww

I didn't see anything to thank you for. But since you seem to be inviting me to critique your perspective, I will.

The substance of your reply, I see as based on incorrect assumptions which make your perspective impossible to understand.
That is the following:

It is impossible not to know whether the relation of conceptions or of judgements accord with each other, for in either there is contradiction with experience if they do not. It is not given by that knowledge the cause of such discord, only that there resides no truth in it. — Mww

It's fundamentally wrong, to say that it's impossible not to know whether a relation is a relation of accordance. More often than not, we do not know that. That is because whether or not it is a relation of accordance requires a judgement of that nature.

And, the proposed problem of "contradiction with experience" does not support that basic premise, because this phrase makes no sense. What could "contradiction with experience" even mean? What is experienced must be put into words, before anything can contradict this. So that would not be contradiction with experience, but contradiction with the description of what was experienced.

Then you mention the cause of discord, but causation is irrelevant here.

Further, you conclude with a statement about "possible cognitions". But we were talking about actual judgements or actual cognitions, and neither one of us provided any principles to establish a relation between actual and possible judgements/cognitions. You simply assumed another meaningless, nonsense principle, "the sum of all possible cognitions is incomplete".

It's nonsense because "possible cognitions", as individual items which could be counted, summed, doesn't make any sense in itself. To count them requires that they be cognized. Therefore the sum would be a sum of actual cognitions. A sum of possible cognitions is nonsensical, due to that impossibility.

So you’re saying, because how I represent my perspective, insofar as it is at least non-sensical or at most just plain wrong, I couldn’t possibly agree with you that all truths are known?

WTF, man. You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way.

That doesn't seem to me to be addressing Fitch, nor antirealism, which is the epistemic position that if something is true, then it is knowable. You use ◇~Kp, where Fitch uses ~◇Kp.

If the reality we experience is the only thing that we have experienced, how do we know that there isn’t anything beyond our reality? — an-salad

Our reality? All reality is subjective private mental state. There is no such a thing as "our reality".
Again all experience is private mental event. There is no other mind involved in an experience than "I" or "my mind.

You shoulda just left it at thanks, and gone your merry way. — Mww

As I said, I didn't see anything to thank you for. And to be insincere in a discussion about truth is self-defeating.

All reality is subjective private mental state. — Corvus

...conflates reality and private mental states. The very fact that you are posting on this forum shows that you do not agree with this. Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. You want a reply such as this.

But on it goes, around and around, Corvus trying to prove to everyone else that there is only Corvus.

Moreover, that you are trying to communicate, to use language, demonstrates that there is more than your private mental state. — Banno

Private mental state is the core of your mind which is your perception. You build your extra mind with your imagination and belief. Remember the external world and other minds are just figment of your imagination. There is no actual concrete existence on these objects, but fleeting impressions and ideas.

It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant, and has been trying to discuss philosophy in the public forum with his very limited mind.

Banno read both Hume and Kant, then read a bit more. Yet neither Hume nor Kant would agree with you.

If I am but a figment of your imagination, then why am I so aggravating? Some sort of self-loathing on your part?

If this post does not exist, then what is it you are now reading?

There's something quite mad in your solipsism.

I assume you have also read Philosophical Investigations? What about the private language argument?

All reality is subjective private mental state — Corvus

It proves that Banno has never read Hume or Kant — Corvus

Kant wrote his massive tome to show this is wrong.