:up:

It depends on what you are paying attention to. As long as you are immersed in your dream, there is no way to understand that it is a dream. It is only after you wake up that you can appreciate a wider context, extract yourself from your immersion, and realize the wider world that shows that it was a dream. — Ludwig V

like i was saying about Descarte's dream theory in a different discussion, you can "know" that the world is not just a product of your imagination through intuition and experience. You can't prove that your life is nothing but a dream, you can't prove your waking world is the waking world and the dream world is the dream world, you can't prove that you are not the only living person (solipsism), but your intuition will tell you that those theories are all rubbish. Kant's assertion that consistent objects in your environment disprove idealism and extreme solipsism are perhaps evidence, but you can actually dream consistent objects in your environment...even though dream matter tends to be more random and fleeting.

@frank

As I have followed along in this thread, it struck me that solipsism, the simulation argument, and belief in God are equivalent metaphysically.

As I have followed along in this thread, it struck me that solipsism, the simulation argument, and belief in God are equivalent metaphysically. — T Clark

Metaphysically? or do you mean epistemically?

Metaphysically? or do you mean epistemically? — frank

Hmm… explain the difference in this case.

Hmm… explain the difference in this case. — T Clark

Well, if you say belief in God and solipsism are metaphysically equivalent, it sounds like you're saying they contain the same metaphysical outlook.

If you say they're epistemically equivalent, it would sound like you're saying the two are the same with regard to what the holder of the belief actually knows.

Well, if you say belief in God and solipsism are metaphysically equivalent, it sounds like you're saying they contain the same metaphysical outlook.

If you say they're epistemically equivalent, it would sound like you're saying the two are the same with regard to what the holder of the belief actually knows. — frank

Interesting. Maybe both. I’ll have to think about it more.

I agree that Kant's argument does not directly approach the thesis of solipsism. Kant introduced the goal of his Refutation as:

The only thing I can really call a supplement, and that only in the way of proof, is what I have said at B 273 in the form of a new refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict proof (the only possible one, I believe) of the objective reality of outer intuition. No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof. — C Pure R, Preface B XXXIX

It is toward this end Kant figures he has overturned Berkeley and Descartes with one theorem even though they say completely different things:

The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience. — ibid. B275

Descartes solved his solipsism problem through a means that Kant rejects. Both Berkeley and Descartes are taking for granted a view of the self that Kant does not.

Now Kant does say a lot of things about the "self" that involves faith. The Critique of Judgement tries to make sense of that.

you can "know" that the world is not just a product of your imagination through intuition and experience. You can't prove that your life is nothing but a dream, you can't prove your waking world is the waking world and the dream world is the dream world, you can't prove that you are not the only living person (solipsism), but your intuition will tell you that those theories are all rubbish. Kant's assertion that consistent objects in your environment disprove idealism and extreme solipsism are perhaps evidence, but you can actually dream consistent objects in your environment...even though dream matter tends to be more random and fleeting. — ProtagoranSocratist

A lot depends here on what you call proof and when proof is the appropriate way to go and when alternatives need to be found. I'm not sure I'm happy with intuition - it's a bit like waving a magic wand. I don't say intuition is always wrong, but it's a bit like waving a magic wand. One needs a bit more. The question is what? I'm thinking of looking at things differently. It's a question of attitude and interpretation, rather than proofs and facts.

As I have followed along in this thread, it struck me that solipsism, the simulation argument, and belief in God are equivalent metaphysically. — T Clark

Is that because they all assert that the world is very different from what it seems to be. I've always though that the simulation argument and Descartes' demon are equivalent. Does that count?

In that case, quantum physics would go on the list as well.

I agree that Kant's argument does not directly approach the thesis of solipsism….. — Paine

Cool. That’s all I was looking for.

Regarding idealism and the refutation thereof, in A, idealism is distinguished as empirical or transcendental. In B, idealism is distinguished as dogmatic or problematic. The introduction of a dedicated title consisting of a “new refutation” in B, meaning over and above the 4th paralogism in A, I think is just his way of uniting the former distinctions into “psychological idealism”, in order to justify his reduction of the idealism being refuted in B, to “material idealism”. In other words, empirical and transcendental idealisms have a common psychological ground, countermanded this way, dogmatic and problematic idealisms have a common material ground, countermanded that way.
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What do you think Descartes’ solipsism problem was?
What do you think the view of the self both of them held was, that Kant rejected?

What do you think Descartes’ solipsism problem was? — Mww

In Meditations, Descartes wonders if all his experiences in the world are merely dreams and illusion. He asks if the people he sees are machines pretending to be human. He does not have the experience of making everything up, so he wonders if there is an evil demon producing the show. The recognition that a producer is needed divides the solipsism into a least two beings. Descartes opts for a good God over an evil demon which leads to a cosmological proof of said being.

The above is what Kant considers "assuming merely on the basis of faith" in his Preface of the B edition. The cogito ergo sum would seem to undermine this view with the introduction of a rational agency. I read both A and B versions of the paralogisms as a dismantling of the "ergo" part of the sentence. A slice of that pie:

From all this one sees that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of the subject as an object, and the category of substance is applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, through which no object is given; and thus the category of substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be cognized at all. — ibid. B420

(The long footnote at the end of this passage gives a detailed breakdown of his reasoning)

By these criteria, solipsism is an empty statement. The judgement of what exists is a process I am engaged within but did not design. It is here that Berkeley also loses the ground to declare what is imaginary or not. Humans are in the cognition through experience business. We are not allowed into the engineering room. That is why Kant has all of our experience as active agents relate strictly to the theater of Practical Reason.

Interesting. Thanks.

I might go with causal agents rather than active, with respect to practical reason. Unless you have a special meaning for “active”.

Causal agency is the language of practical reason.

I guess I am trying to see a flip side to that where Kant says we have an experience of ourselves through intuition but that does not make us a knowable object. We don't "act" through our thinking alone that would make that possible. Kant often uses a thought experiment imagining an "intellectual intuition" we do not have. Maybe there is a kind of solipsism in that 'missing limb' approach.

If nothing else, we agree the notion of solipsism is empty, thus attempts to disprove it are foolish. At least from the perspective of our mutual reference material.

Yes.

I like the way you carefully qualified the agreement.

If nothing else, we agree the notion of solipsism is empty, thus attempts to disprove it are foolish. At least from the perspective of our mutual reference material. — Mww

I agree. I think Kant constructs a system which is incompatible with solipsism. That's not the same as disproving it.

Yeah, sorry. I get skittish when language is brought into the dialectic. On the other hand, it might just be that your subtlety escaped me, re: “…language of practical reason”
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I think Kant constructs a system which is incompatible with solipsism — frank

I’m not sure he ever even acknowledged the concept as it is today. Like most -ism’s, it’s a cover for many books.

That doesn't even make sense...

Please do not be sorry. Being very specific about agreement and disagreement helps me look for what I am trying to find. I was not speaking ironically.

I figure we do have different views of language. I think there is a benefit in looking for an author's intent before questioning it.

D’accord.