That would be my answer too. And how, exactly, does an assertion add something to a belief? — J

How, indeed. Although maybe "add" isn't the right word. Maybe it's two things at once, one of which is a belief. The other is... What? The possession, or awareness, of a fact?

Is there such a thing as possession/awareness of a fact that is not also belief? I would say so, if I am experiencing the fact. If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on.

If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on. — Patterner

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt.

So what about the phenomenology? I'm actually looking at the TV; do I simultaneously believe that it's on? If belief is reduced to linguistic belief, then clearly not. No such sentence enters my mind. But we've been considering the other, non-linguistic senses of "belief". Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not."

With the TV, we're thrown back on belief understood as analytical philosophy usually does: an attitude, a disposition, not a mental event and not linguistic. To say "I believe the TV is on" is to claim that my experience is factual, and that I am the one having it. It is all but the same as "I assert."

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. — J

I might respond, "No. The TV is on." I've said that kind of thing at times.

You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt. — J

Right. I think we should not. Where does it end? I believe I have ten fingers and toes. I believe my name is Eric. I understand the idea that I can't very well not believe something that I know is factual. But is not not believing it the same as belief? I don't, uh, believe it is.

Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. — J

I agree it's far-fetched.

More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not." — J

How about, "That's not real."? The flip-side of the above. Knowing something is not factual is not the same as not believing it.

There's a fantasy series called The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant, the Unbeliever. He had to consciously not believe something he knew could not be factual, even though he was living it.

You're not missing the point; our conscious experience certainly seems to rely on something like causation. But the OP question focuses on whether it's the content of a thought that causes another thought, or whether, as you describe, it's the neurons firing. Of course it's tempting to say, "They're the same thing," but as you probably know, that thesis has generated a lot of philosophical controversy. — J

If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either).

I think what can sometimes happen is that when we talk about neural correlates of consciousness, the temptation is to imagine it as some trivial mapping. That if I see a yellow ball say, there's a cascade of neural firings all resulting from that, like dominos.

But of course it's a lot more complex than that. While yes, some individual firings can be coupled to simple perception, the overall pattern of firings is continuous, extremely complex and largely based on referencing past data -- the brain running a complex internal model with outside perception just having an effect on the model.

I don't know if this slight rant is relevant here, it's just a framing that often seems assumed in these discussions. That as soon as we talk of synapses firing and cause and effect, the temptation to see cognition as serial, synchronous and passive seems too strong.

I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned. — Dawnstorm

Yes. That sounds about right, but I do not find that any of this is inevitably contradictory to what I've been saying, although it could be in its underpinnings. I agree that sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and in doing so one may have cause to defend it - for the very first time. However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. — Dawnstorm

Well, in our case, the possibility under consideration was whether or not it was/is possible for all belief to be prelinguistic. It was formulated like this: "Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

While I agree that we act on our beliefs without formulating them all the time, that's not what was in question here, nor do those facts pose any issue with what I've been setting out. I now think that you may have meant something strikingly different than me when qualifying belief as "prelinguistic".

There's no doubt that most people hold all sorts of background(foundational) beliefs. I would further say that many people have never really identified, named, and/or talked about those background beliefs as subject matters in their own right. I think our views are commensurate regarding these matters.

I would further claim that these beliefs have efficacy(which returns to the OP's concerns).

I think that our views diverge when it comes to ontological concerns; what beliefs consist of.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think. — Dawnstorm

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language. Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

I do not find it at all helpful to say that all native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language. That's simply not true, even if it is the case that they'd assent to such a description after understanding what that means.

I'm currently working on a reply to the rest of that post. I wanted to address it separately, for it invoked meaning, and we both find it promising.

I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?
— creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't. — Dawnstorm

If I understand this correctly, I'd agree that the importance that the mat plays in the cat's thought and/or belief is determined by its relevance to the cat in the current situation(at that time). So, if I understand you correctly, I think you're saying something like the mouse can be on the mat, and the cat can have a belief about the mouse that doesn't include the mat. I would agree.

The mat is meaningful to the cat in the sense of being an integral part of where the mouse is located. That's about all I meant by claiming the cat can believe the mouse is on the mat. Although, as you've suggested and I've mentioned, the mat could be much more meaningful than just that to the cat.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison. — Dawnstorm

I agree and may put that a bit stronger. Whatever the mat means to the cat is never exactly the same as whatever the mat means to the human.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart? — Dawnstorm

No, I do not think we're so far apart in that we seem to both understand that there are differences and similarities between the cat's point of view and our own, in addition to recognizing the need of a terminological framework capable of setting those out.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. — creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic". — creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions. — creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. In the traffic-lights example above I've treated belief as "behavioural implicature". But now I have the reverse problem that "behavioural implicature" doesn't quite cut it for "beliefs might all be prelinguistic". Is there away to tie these disparate situations together?

What does it mean to "have an attitude towards a proposition", and what does it mean to "imply a belief in your actions"?

I think this is instructive here:

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). — creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.)

So the following is part of it:

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature.

Note that such a disjunct is not a factor for nominative-accusative languages. People out side of linguistics may have heard "nominative" and "accusative" (less so in English, as only pronouns still decline), but that's usually the extent of it.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here.

More generally, this is the relationship between theory and praxis. It's a difficult subject to work through, but I think we need to, if we wish to consider what various creatures have in common.

However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background.
— creativesoul

I don't disagree. The question, though, is to what degree language needs to be involved in belief formation. — Dawnstorm

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language.

In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".
— creativesoul

And it would definitely make sense to say that - in this case - language had to be involved, given what I've said in this thread. So this might count as an example of a belief that is not pre-linguistic. — Dawnstorm

Okay. So, it is not the case that beliefs might all be prelinguistic.

But then we're almost exclusively talking about the proposition, and the attitude towards it:

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.
— creativesoul

But what's the relationship between a propositional attitude and a belief? — Dawnstorm

Propositional attitudes are beliefs.

I invoked belief as propositional attitude because it fit the situation. I do not deny that some belief amounts to an attitude/disposition towards some proposition such that the individual takes the proposition to be true(or not). I deny that all belief can be properly taken account of by virtue of using that framework. Notably, because i)all belief must be meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief, and ii)propositions are utterly meaningless to language less creatures, it only follows that belief as propositional attitude is found lacking in its ability to take proper account of language less belief.

I think we're in agreement there.

I'm fairly sure I've heard beliefs defined as "propositional attitudes", but since I'm comparing language-using and lagnauge-less creatures here, that definition doesn't seem useful. — Dawnstorm

Indeed, it is not useful for taking account of language less belief, aside from setting out what it cannot consist of.

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them).
— creativesoul

Nor am I. I've chosen the nominative-absolutive thing for a reason: it's so intuitive that most native speaker can't imagine it being different, and they usually have trouble learning an ergative-absolutive language. It's not the rules that determine what people do; it's what people do that determines the rules.

Language is interesting in that the expressed attitudes towards the propositions don't match what you would get from behavioural implicature. Linguists will, in these cases, side with behavioural implicature:

To make it clearer: People who will berate you for splitting an infinitive usually split infinitives themselves. That's not a one-rule-for-you-one-rule-for-me situation. They don't know they do it. They will correct themselves, and then err again. (I'm not sure this occurs with split-infinitives; but it's a common phenomenon.) — Dawnstorm

Hmmm. Is that something like a performative contradiction?

I'm fairly certain I do not quite understand the point being made here. I'm curious about this notion of behavioural implicature. Could you explain it more, please? Thank you.

Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

Knowing the associated propositions requires knowing about the typology. But the propositions are supposed to describe what people are doing. So if the propositions don't describe the behavioural implicature, the rule isn't there. So, from this perspective, either native speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way. That's the connection here. — Dawnstorm

Is that the only two options: Either native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language, or linguists are wrong in some way? Do all linguists hold that to be true? If they do, then I would say they are wrong in some way.

All I'm saying is that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires knowing how to use "nominative-accusative", whereas plenty of native English speakers have no clue what those words mean(how to use them). They are native English speakers nonetheless.

I suppose that if knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language could somehow be acquired without knowing what "nominative-accusative" means, then it could be possible for all native English speakers to know that English is a nominative-accusative language. I cannot make much sense of what that would entail.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?
— creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably. — J

Okay. That's good.

I would think that any acceptable notion/conception/theory of "meaning" would be capable of setting out how things become meaningful, including how thought and/or belief becomes meaningful to thinking/believing creatures.

If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either). — Mijin

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? And if they are co-dependent in some way, does one cause the other? How does that happen? Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events?

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is.

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? — J

Many phenomena have different characteristics that might seem wholly separate prior to establishing a model linking them. Imagine trying to explain smallpox symptoms as a cellular phenomenon to someone unfamiliar with germ theory. Microscopic jelly-bags with long helices inside is nothing like pain and pustules.

Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events? — J

Well I wouldn't use the "really" framing, because I believe both descriptions are valid. We have thoughts and we also have brain events.
But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like).

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is. — J

I'm familiar with the hard problem of consciousness. Indeed I would put it to you that you have misunderstood it, if you believe the point is to claim that the mind cannot be a neural phenomenon.

Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language.

But once you do try to talk about such language, you introduce the possibility of a disjunct between your propositional belief and your behavioural implicature. — Dawnstorm

Would you care to set this disjunct out a bit more?

But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like). — Mijin

Noting correlation is not the same as explaining how one causes the other. There is nothing about the physical events that suggests subjective experience, and there is no wild guess of an explanation. Dopamine binds to the dopamine receptor. The dopamine receptor is coupled with a G-protein. The binding changes the shape of the dopamine receptor, which activates the G-protein. activating the G-protein stimulates or inhibits enzymes, depending on what kind of receptor cell we're dealing with. But the functioning of ion channels is key. So a channel mighty open, and sodium ions flow in.

Where do you suspect the subjective experience shows up?

To the degree that the content therein is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

Sure. To me that's just rephrasing the question.

Okay. So, it is not the case that beliefs might all be prelinguistic. — creativesoul

The logo-vampires have come and drained this proposition of all its meaning.

Seriously, though: When I say anything with "all... might..." it's almost always the case that I'm wrong, so if I say "no, it's not," here, I don't feel like I have said anything too meaningful. But then I also feel like I haven't said anything meaningful in the first place, here. Agreeing to this feels like a conversation stopper: I no longer know what to say, and I don't feel anything has been accomplished either. I end up walking away feeling vaguely foolish.

As I've said before in this thread, I don't think in words. When I say something, I also do something. But saying something is also doing something, so I do two things at once. When I then need to face what I said in too much detail, I get lost: I forget what it was I was trying to do in the first place, by saying what I said.

I normally don't lay this out, but I feel its pertinent to the topic of this thread, so....

Anyway, I'll take things out of order now:

I'm fairly certain I do not quite understand the point being made here. I'm curious about this notion of behavioural implicature. Could you explain it more, please? Thank you. — creativesoul

By behavioural implicature, I simply mean that if we do X, that implies we believe Y, otherwise our behaviour would be random. On this level, "we" includes any creature capable of meaning. Behavioural implicature, for the cat, means that if the cat wants to catch that mouse over there, it must believe that there is a mouse over there, or it couldn't want to catch "that mouse over there". But that applies to me just as well: if I ask you to pass the salt, I must believe many things: that you understand my language, that there's salt, that you're willing to co-operate, etc.

Now there's an important difference here between natural and institutional facts: If I believe this glass contains some drink, but I forgot that I used this glass to prepare salad dressing, I a sip will disabuse me of my belief: I was wrong.

If I believe that one shouldn't split infinitives but I can't kick the habit, I'm not wrong. I just fail to live up to my "belief". If I'm unaware that I'm splitting infinitives, there are two possibilities: (a) I have the false believe that I don't split infinitives, or (b) I just don't topicalise myself at all until someone points out my usage, and then I have options (consider my usage wrong; allow for exceptions; refine the "rule"...).

On the behavioural-implicature level, what matters for this post is whether I modify my split-infinitive behaviour, or whether I modify surrounding propositional output.

So:

Propositional attitudes are beliefs. — creativesoul

If behavioural implicature points towards believe, and propositional attitudes are beliefs, then I think a sentence like this would be meaningful: That you belief infinitives shouldn't be split, doesn't mean you belief that infinitives shouldn't be split. I'd just be using the same word in different ways.

So we need to be careful here: if the meaning of a proposition can be present without a proposition (as in the cat-case), and if there are cases where the propositional attitude points towards a different belief than the behavioural implicature, then what are we dealing with here?

It would, for example, be a valid approach to say that if the meaning of a proposition can be present without the proposition, then we can say that the cat has an attitude towards a proposition without needing to hold a proposition in mind (and the same goes for humans). After all, my concept of "behavioural implicature" also imposes mental content I can understand onto a creature which is not me.

But I don't belief that's useful here because it de-emphasises what ties the language and the throught together. All I have here is a vague idea of directionality: behavioural implicature points upwards towards propositional attitudes, and propositional attitudes point downwards towards behavioural implicature. A "belief" would have to be the entire system. The propositional part can miss entirely with no problem, but if there's no behavioural implicature, there's no meaning to the propositional attitudes.

So:

All I'm saying is that knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires knowing how to use "nominative-accusative", whereas plenty of native English speakers have no clue what those words mean(how to use them). They are native English speakers nonetheless. — creativesoul

If the topic is the proposition "English is a nominative-accusative language," then having an attitude towards this would require understanding it, sure. But I said:

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. — Dawnstorm

They display behavioural implicature that leads linguists to make the appropriate generalisations. The linguists are the humans; the non-linguist native speakers are the cat. The phrase "nominative-accusative language" is not that important here. One needn't priviledge language like that, when it comes to thought. Each of us, in this thread, when we type, reproduce a nominative-accusative language. We simply know how. The linguists describing it like this isn't necessary; other theoretical constellations could conceivably take care of that. But what they do is describe knowledge that exists, even if not in propositional form.

My approach is vague. And it has weaknesses (it's ill equipped to deal with highly abstract stuff - which includes philosophy, heh) It's my bias that leads me to the approach (and the bias stems to the way I think - often without words).

I apologise if none of that makes sense to you; I'm trying to explain something I haven't fully figured out.

Would you care to set this disjunct out a bit more? — creativesoul

This wasn't there when I hit submit on my post above. I'm spent right now. I'll wait to see if something I said above helped make more sense of it. If not I'll (hopefully) come back to this.

ETA: It was there when I hit submit. It wasn't there when I started typing, and I didn't notice it before hitting submit. (So much for my precision...)

Noting correlation is not the same as explaining how one causes the other. — Patterner

A lot of loading in just that one sentence (whether intentional or not).

Firstly, "correlation" massively mischaracterizes what we're talking about here. We're not talking about rubbing my lucky rabbit's foot and my team wins the big game.
We're talking about the highest standard of empirical verification: being able to consistently make accurate predictions and inferences. Every time you take an ibuprofen for a headache you are again testing the idea that conscious experiences are one and the same with neurochemistry. (And I am mentioning that as an example of how often the hypothesis is tested, of course, within medicine and neuroscience the millions of tests are also extremely precise).

Secondly, I just said that my position is that thoughts and neural firings are two descriptions of the same phenomenon, yet you're still asking which way the causation goes. My answer is very obviously: neither.
You may as well be asking me whether ball causes sphere or does sphere cause ball? They're two descriptions of the same thing.

Where do you suspect the subjective experience shows up? — Patterner

Yes we don't have a good understanding yet of how the brain makes subjective experiences.
Qualia are a fascinating phenomenon, but the fact that they can be triggered, reliably and precisely with tools like deep brain stimulation suggests that they, like the mind in general, are a product of the brain.

Plus it's pretty hard to square how qualia could work as some external phenomenon or ghost in the machine. For example, we understand a lot of how our brain forms the images we see; the edge detection, movement detection, object persistence algorithms etc that happen, we have localized very well where they happen, and of course can create optical illusions based on our understanding.
We don't yet understand how the brain creates subjective experiences like "redness". But, however that happens, it needs to be embedded right within this set of visual processing algorithms, that are completely physical and even mathematical.

Yes we don't have a good understanding yet of how the brain makes subjective experiences.
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We don't yet understand how the brain creates subjective experiences like "redness". — Mijin

We don't have a hint of understanding how the brain makes subjective experiences. Which means we don't know that it does. You cannot claim to know that X causes Y if you don't have the slightest idea how X causes Y. And that is why what you are talking about is not empirical verification that this is what's happening. As you say, we know where. Where isn't how.

Secondly, I just said that my position is that thoughts and neural firings are two descriptions of the same phenomenon — Mijin

How does that work?

You may as well be asking me whether ball causes sphere or does sphere cause ball? They're two descriptions of the same thing. — Mijin

You are trying to make an analogy between two words for the same physical thing, and two things of completely different nature, one physical and one not.

Yes we don't have a good understanding yet of how the brain makes subjective experiences.
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We don't yet understand how the brain creates subjective experiences like "redness".
— Mijin
We don't have a hint of understanding how the brain makes subjective experiences. — Patterner

The problem goes the other way too: We don't know how subjective experiences, such as thoughts, create changes in the brain (and then the nervous system, and then the body). In any case, if mind and brain supervene, no given brain event should be said to cause the subjective event.

The closest analogy I can think of for brain/mind would be to ask: Do the players and the field cause the football game? Not really. Are they identical with the football game? Sort of, but not really. Can the football game be described only in terms of what the players do, physically? No. Can the game be played without the players and the field? No. Etc. Like subjectivity, it's obvious there's a football game going on, but it's extremely difficult to explain its ontology. But even this analogy falls short, since subjectivity is way more different from the brain than a football game is from its constituent physical parts.

But even this analogy falls short, since subjectivity is way more different from the brain than a football game is from its constituent physical parts. — J

That's Such an amazingly important thing. No analogy works. Of course, no one is perfect, and people always point out the problems with an analogy. The point is what is common, not to find what is different. but when trying to find an analogy for anything dealing with consciousness the differences are hard to get past.

Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks. — Aristotle, De Anima 3.5

This answers your question. Thinking is the identity of mind & its object of thought. Ultimately, it isn't algorithmic or sequential, what the ancients called discursive & it can't occur in passive matter alone since that would fail to capture all the universals qua particulars, by not allowing matter to be identical to all other matters. I would identify this active intellect with either the cosmic intellect posterior to the prime mover OR the prime mover itself. Being a physicalist (including a functionalist) is a recipe for a disastrous & poor philosophy of "mind"

when trying to find an analogy for anything dealing with consciousness the differences are hard to get past. — Patterner

Yes. The football-game analogy captures one point of similarity -- that a mere physical description must be incomplete -- and perhaps hints at another -- that different levels of description can apply to the same set of phenomena. But here we are with "same set" again. With football, we can more or less see how the game requires a first-level description of "the same" set of events, but with consciousness, all we can do is assert that it's somehow the case, without being able to understand it in the least.

This answers your question. — Sirius

Thank you, but I don't quite see how. Would Aristotle say that a thought does, or does not, cause another thought?

Thank you, but I don't quite see how. Would Aristotle say that a thought does, or does not, cause another thought? — J

Ultimately, NO. First of all, it does not make much sense to speak of the mind's objects without establishing an identity between the mind & its objects. Secondly, without all knowledge as already given in the active mind via noesis (direct non sensible intuition), our passive minds would be incapable of generating any thought by themselves since they only have the POTENTIAL for thought. You can insist on them being capable of this, but the process will be unintelligible & magical, a common problem which plagues physicalism

Otherwise, in a qualified sense, sure, one thought does follow another thought in the passive, destructible & limited mind. It's the passive mind transformed by the active mind, so it TAKES ON its causality.

There's not much I can do to help you understand Aristotle with a few quotes here & there. I recommend you check out De Anima. It's totally worth it given your interest/question.

I recommend you check out De Anima. It's totally worth it given your interest/question. — Sirius

Yes, it's been a while, probably time for a reread. But if I may: To say "one thought does follow another thought" is only to restate the observation we began with. The OP question is about explanation: Why does one thought follow another thought? It's what you're calling the "qualified sense" that interests me (and my passive, destructible and limited mind!).

I don't mean to be rude, but I won't respond to this given your inability to connect the link between the active & passive mind...the answer is already there. Is this functional illiteracy? I don't know. I doubt you understood Aristotle the first time you read him.

Good luck. :up:

Secondly, without all knowledge as already given in the active mind via noesis (direct non sensible intuition), our passive minds would be incapable of generating any thought by themselves since they only have the POTENTIAL for thought. — Sirius

Can you tell me anything about the 'passive mind'? I don't know what you mean by that.

We don't have a hint of understanding how the brain makes subjective experiences. Which means we don't know that it does. — Patterner

False, and refuted by the other parts of what I said that you didn't quote.
We can reliably, and precisely, induce subjective experiences with chemical, electrical or mechanical effects on the brain. No-one would claim that this constitutes a complete model. But we absolutely do have good grounds for thinking the brain makes subjective experiences.