Something to do with meaning, one suspects. — Wayfarer

Precisely. So it gets at final cause - that which is the meaning of being, the reasons why things even are.

And it is non-mystical in that hierarchical grades of meaning can be defined. There is a natural gamut of complexity from physical tendency to biological function to psychological purpose.

Still struggling with the meaningfulness of tornadoes, or any sense in which they embody the meaning that seems intrinsic to organisms. — Wayfarer

A tornado is meaningful in the context of a weather system striving to equilibrate its thermal differences. So it is meaningful in terms of meeting the goals of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Again, there is nothing essentially mystical about this. It is just about bringing all of nature under the same general umbrella of Natural Philosophy.

Reductionism appeared to drum finality and meaning out of our scientific account of nature. Holism and systems science have been trying to bring it back in. Pan-semiosis would be a particular formalism for achieving that. Hence why a lot of scientists have gotten keen on Peircean semiotics.

A tornado is meaningful in the context of a weather system striving to equilibrate its thermal differences. So it is meaningful in terms of meeting the goals of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. — apokrisis

I get that, but what I don't get is the gap between 'bio-' and 'pan-', still. I can see that, given DNA, then something language-like exists. But how the 'spontaneous process of nature' - such as tornadoes, or undersea vents, or whatever - gives rise to that is still, I think, a mystery. I'm not pitching for any kind of ID, but I strongly suspect some manner of 'top-down causation', whatever that turns out to be. You see, this is where I think Peirce's rather Platonic theism is a factor; I think he would have assumed something very much like the Neoplatonist 'mind', and I don't know if that has been preserved in the translation to modern biosemiotics.

I get that, but what I don't get is the gap between 'bio-' and 'pan-', still. I can see that, given DNA, then something language-like exists. — Wayfarer

The answer is that physics takes an information theoretic view of causality these days. That is what folk are really talking about with things like the holographic principle, event horizons or light cones.

So the coding, the memory, the bits, are written into the spatiotemporal structure of the Universe itself. Of course each bit is some material degree of freedom - a particle in some state. But collectively, all those "bits of stuff" count as information, a generalised context that impinges on whatever is happening at some spacetime locale, shaping it as a physical state of constraint.

Think of the standard example of a magnetised iron bar and the way the information that is the global magnetic field keeps all the local dipoles aligned. It is about granting collective activity full status as being ontically real - a real top-down cause that cements a generalised tendency.

So the coding, the memory, the bits, are written into the spatiotemporal structure of the Universe itself. — apokrisis

'Written', eh?

Thales thought magnets were ensouled.

Just as there are no snakes, so there is no Donald Hoffman with objective observer-independent features. There is only my Donald Hoffman and your Donald Hoffman, which are acceptable solutions to the problem of telling me how to act in a situation. And my Donald Hoffman is talking like someone who has never encountered my Wittgenstein. What's anyone else's Hoffman saying?

This is the trouble with this kind of talk. It is without sense but the lack of sense takes a bit of fine surgery to unpick. That's why we need Wittgenstein - a real one, with objective, observer-independent features 'n' all.

It isn't consciousness that is the illusion, but the feeling of "looking at" things - the Cartesian theater - the subjectivity - that is the illusion.

I have yet to see any discussion of consciousness take into account attention and how it is a key constituent of consciousness. The feeling of looking at things in your mind is simply the distinction being made between different degrees of amplified sensory signals. Our attention is what "looks at" the other constituents of consciousness by amplifying certain sensory signals over others as it pertains to the present goal. Certain areas of consciousness are clear while others are more fuzzy and faded, with the clear areas being what we are currently attending (looking at), as opposed to the fuzzy faded stuff, which is what we aren't looking at. The feeling of "what is like" is simply the attention turning back on itself.

What's anyone else's Hoffman saying? — Cuthbert

according to conscious realism, there is a reality independent of any particular observer, and to interact intelligently or appropriately with that reality one’s sensory perceptions must be a useful and efficient guide to that reality. Conscious realism is not solipsism. There is a reality independent of my perceptions, and my perceptions must be a useful guide to that reality. This reality consists of dynamical systems of conscious agents, not dynamical systems of
unconscious matter. — Donald Hoffman

My underline. P 13 of this article.

Can you find where conscious agents gets a serious definition? I couldn't. So that's where the handwaving becomes a frantic blur.

But life and mind are the trick of being able to code for that kind of contextual information - form a memory using a symbolising mechanism like genes, neurons or words - and so take ownership of top-down causality as something packaged up and hidden deep inside. — apokrisis

You are conflating the "what it feels like" with the substrata. You said earlier:

Why should anything be anything, let alone green be green, or the Universe a something rather than a nothing? — apokrisis

There is a "something of what it's like" to experience green. That is the crux of the argument. It is the nature of the "something of what it's like" to experience green. If you do not like the fact that philosophy deals with metaphysics, that's your problem there. It is a legitimate philosophical question to ask what the nature of this "illusion" of experience is. It may not be a legitimate scientific question, you are right, but I never claimed it is or that it should be.

Ok, it's not solipsism. Now: "There is a reality independent of my perceptions,.." and "Snakes and trains, like the particles of physics, have no objective, observer-independent features..." And he doesn't answer Wittgenstein's objections. That's all my complaint. Otherwise, it's cool.

This is the trouble with this kind of talk. It is without sense but the lack of sense takes a bit of fine surgery to unpick. That's why we need Wittgenstein - a real one, with objective, observer-independent features 'n' all. — Cuthbert

As things stand, each person perceives and understands Donald Hoffman differently, which is different from how he perceives himself. That is why people disagree. There is no objective observer, not even Hoffman himself.

There is a reality independent of my perceptions, — Cuthbert

Probably so, but everyone perceives it differently.

Mind is not epiphenomenal but just what it feels like to be a model in interaction with a world, really doing something. — apokrisis

So, mind is a feeling? Is this a general definition of mind, or just a definition of human mind?

You missed the point. Even metaphysics reasons counterfactually. So if green isn't green, what else would it be? At some stage you might sound as though you are asking an intelligible question but really it isn't.

Human minds have a memory of the feeling. That is a critical thing that semiosis at the socio-linguistic level adds. The self is a socially constructed habit of thought which then serves as the anchor for remembering what it was like to be that self.

↪Wayfarer Can you find where conscious agents gets a serious definition? I couldn't. So that's where the handwaving becomes a frantic blur. — apokrisis

I agree that it's problematical. But then, try defining 'mind'! As he points out, the 'mind-body' problem has been going around in circles for centuries.

"Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. This is troubling, since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity, and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world."

It's just the last clause of his last sentence that I'm currently struggling with. — Galuchat

The brain is an 'imputed object' - what we really know of the brain is our 'experience of the brain', the same as any 'classical object'. As @Cuthbert notes on the previous page, this undercuts our instinctive and closely-held belief in the 'mind-independence' of objects; we firmly believe that objects - brains, atoms, or any other kind - are 'there anyway', and that our experience of them simply reports what is there. That is essentially derived from some form of representative realism, which is deeply engrained in Western thought. Hence the derision when it is challenged.

Hoffman is arguing that, whilst there is a reality that is 'there anyway', that reality is never what we actually encounter; or rather, our encounter with it is always given in terms of species-specific representations, which are primarily shaped by evolution. (Although, as I mentioned, I am dubious whether this can be said of pure maths, but that's a separate question.)

So when he says 'consciousness creates', what I take that to mean, is that he is referring to the way consciousness integrates all of the momentary impressions, sensations and judgements into a cognitive whole, one aspect of which we then designate as 'an object'. We're unaware of this cognitive process as it's going on, because it's by definition unconscious, beneath the threshold of conscious awareness, but giving rise to our experience of the world. I think it's basically Kantian in that sense, and also quite compatible with Buddhist philosophy of mind.

Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity, and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world." — Wayfarer

Yeah. Hoffman says to solve the problem of consciousness, we must get rid of the world. So onwards to idealism. And then the handwaving about conscious agents that he says saves him from solipsism.

As things stand, each person perceives and understands Donald Hoffman differently, which is different from how he perceives himself. That is why people disagree. There is no objective observer, not even Hoffman himself. — Rich

However, there are very broad areas across which we do indeed find common experiences, which is essential to science. Imagine if every experiment yielded different results for Bob than for Alice. Indeed science, language, maths, and so on, are constructed on shared definitions and common elements of experience.

Where you see the real fragmentation is in respect of questions which are not amenable to quantitative analysis - questions of taste, value, and social mores.

we must get rid of the world.... — apokrisis

No, only a mistaken conception of it.

No, only a mistaken conception of it. — Wayfarer

No. Read what he says again. Because "regular physics" can't seem to account for brains with minds, we should disbelieve that it does account for worlds with material structure, like brains. We should now start over by positing "generalised consciousness" as an explanation even of material structure. And then, hey guys, this is how it all works ... mumble, mumble, mumble - networks of conscious agents!!!

Classic crackpot reasoning.

However, there are very broad areas across which we do indeed find common experiences, which is essential to science. — Wayfarer

John Bell (of Bell's Theorem) coined a phrase for this: Good enough for all practical purposes (FAPP). That is, if we limit the observation for what it's essential, it is good enough. I ask for a one foot piece of longer. It's it good enough. Yes. Is it exactly one foot? Well then we get into all kinds of issues.

Similarly, with Hoffman. If we limit ourselves, we can reach some consensus. What color is his hair? What did he say? What did he mean?? It can vary.

As for science. Well tolerance of variances and what makes consensus is truly all over the place and is greatly affected by biases and of course money. I read the actual studies and it is amazing how wildly different results can be, if for no other reason than it is almost impossible to replicate - and in any case it is almost never done. But this is a matter for philosophical explorers to discover for themselves.

In some cases, great precision is sought, as in the case of particle location in the early 20th century. And what they found was that it was impossible to find, hence we must settle for good enough FAPP. If there is a real object out there (and I believe there is) each person will necessarily see it differently because we all occupy a different point of perception. Or we can say the experiment is constantly changing.

Hoffman is saying, however, that we should consider consciousness as fundamental and irreducible, which apparently is becoming a more popular conception of the nature of the universe.

Classic crackpot reasoning. — apokrisis

All due respect, there is a change in perspective required. You're arguing from a position of dogmatic realism. The indignation you're expressing is because that is being challenged.

Good enough for all practical purposes — Rich

That would also seem to be convergent with the idea of science as falsifiable hypotheses. But I am not dismissive of science, as you seem to be. Whatever veridical truths science arrives at must be respected by philosophy, otherwise that philosophy cannot endure.

The problem with Western culture is that it tries to define everything, or everything deemed worthwhile, in scientific terms - if you can't measure it, it isn't real. But one can acknowledge that as a profound error, whilst still respecting science.

The problem with Western culture is that it tries to define everything, or everything deemed worthwhile, in scientific terms - if you can't measure it, it isn't real. But one can acknowledge that whilst still respecting science. — Wayfarer

Science is one data point but like any data point, the source has to be considered. To my mind it had been so polluted my money it is no longer trustworthy. That is not too say that v there may not be some laboratory experimentalist somewhere slaving away trying to find something new (as I do in my own way) but I have learned that anyone who has an idea that may disrupt the huge money interests will be quickly be labeled a "crackpot" and disenfranchised (luckily it may be able to actually still hear these new ideas in YouTube). It would be unwise in the world we love in today to trust anything coming out of an industry that had become totally beholden to big money. It would be like someone trusting someone in the banking industry. Neither holds the merit it once enjoyed maybe 70 years ago.

Science is no longer a process of discovery, instead it has become goal seeking.

Whatever veridical truths science arrives at must be respected by philosophy, otherwise that philosophy cannot endure. — Wayfarer

It is because the science industry nowadays controls the educational process, and this is what is drummed into everyone from elementary school. It is not an accident. There is a mega industry that is being protected and watchdogs everywhere to protect it.

All due respect, there is a change in perspective required. You're arguing from a position of dogmatic realism. — Wayfarer

Of course I say a change in perspective is needed. And it is not so simple as replacing one species of substance monism - material realism - with another, conscious realism. Dogmatic idealism is indeed much worse than dogmatic realism as at least (reductionist) realism gives us useful theories of the world. Idealism just waves its lofty hand at everything and merely aims to "explain it away".

A crackpot thinker is anyone who fools themselves into believing a non-explanation is better than a real explanation. Just call existence a hologram, or a simulation, or a mental field, or whatever. Create a word that might sound as if its stands for a real idea, then look satisfied.

That is what Hoffman does with "conscious agents". It is meaningless hand-waving once you stop to ask what that could actually mean.

It is because the science industry nowadays controls the educational process, and this is what is drummed into everyone from elementary school. It is not an accident. There is a mega industry that is being protected and watchdogs everywhere to protect it. — Rich

Yep. It's a conspiracy. Pass the tin-foil hat.

Oh, I thought you would call me a crackpot. Nice change of pace.I realize that there is a belief that money never corrupts, and $trillions of money absolutely never, ever corrupts, but I stand opposing this view.

If you get cancer, are you going to go to a regular doctor, one indoctrinated by the Deep State and a corrupt shill of Big Pharma, or to your holographic holistic spirit doctor with a dream catcher and crystals spread around the office?

How deep do your own convictions run in practice? What do you think the respective mortality rates are?

Haven't used Big Pharma of any sort in 35 years. Ditto for the rest of my family and we are substantially healthier than those who do. It is a matter of knowledge and not to be taken in by fear that the medical industry pitches, e.g., "If you don't do it you will DIE", which is basically the pitch in your post. It works. Cancer is always a good fear generator and fantastic money maker. The largest gains in cancer are with long cancer because people simply stopped smoking (once the science behind safe smoking collapsed as it was revealed as a fraud).

The U.S spends twice per capita on medicine than other developed nations with the absolutely the worse life expectancy. And it should be noted the same in European countries alternative modalities such as homeopathy and acupuncture are covered by insurance. Science changes as it crosses the ocean. An interesting phenomenon to observe.

So if you or your family did get cancer, would you go to a hospital that uses medicines rather than faith healing? That was the actual question.

Would you submit your fate to these representatives of a corrupt materialistic metaphysics or seek treatment from someone expert in adjusting faulty holographic consciousness fields?

Nope, no one would go to the hospital. We all agree on that.

As for the mind healing itself, that is precisely the only thing that actually heals. It takes lifestyle changes, good food, good water, proper movement, low stress. The World Health Organisation agrees. But, with that said, if you wish to fill your diet with drugs, it is of no mind to me. I take care of my family. No illnesses, no physicians.

A good philosopher is observant, has developed good intuition, and questions everything. No stone left unturned. This is evolution.

Anyway, in today's news:

http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/insys-fentanyl-mccaskill-investigation/

A crackpot thinker is anyone who fools themselves into believing a non-explanation is better than a real explanation — apokrisis

I really don't think he's a crackpot, but I too am struggling with this concept of 'conscious agents'. I can see how consciousness creates or constructs experience, but I'm really not getting how objects themselves are 'complex dynamical system of conscious agents'. But having opened this particular can of worms, will persist for a while.

So you or your family have never taken even an aspirin? You or your family have never had a vaccination? Honestly?

Anyway, it is good at least that you might live consistent with your theories. That way they will certainly be put to the test of real life.

It takes lifestyle changes, good food, good water, proper movement, low stress. — Rich

Yeah, but those are physical things that we all agree are the way to help prevent disease getting started.

Biology - being semiotic - is self-regulating. It has an immune system that knows what is "self", what is "other", at a molecular level. So it can self-repair if it isn't overloaded by attacks on its system. And I have no quarrel with the idea that the modern consumer lifestyle - lived at a pace to suit an economic system predicated on free growth - isn't very healthy. Even if people in developed nations in fact live longer because they can also afford clever medical interventions to keep failing bodies on the road.