The P-zombie case, as specified would seem to be the very opposite to that, in that the zombie would say that they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, etc., while not having actually had any experience of anything at all. — Janus

But the sights, tastes, sounds, etc had to be detected in some way. That set of of detected things will be remembered, and that's what the experience is to them.

So, in the zombie case the sights, sounds, feelings, emotions and so on were detected but never consciously, even though the zombie is able to report about what was detected in as much detail, and with as much nuance as we are.

In contrast the "blind experiencer" can detect the sights sounds and so on, perhaps not as reliably and with as much subtlety of detail as the conscious experiencer, but they cannot report on it because they believe that they have detected nothing. Let's say this is a failure of connections between brain regions or functions.

So, now it looks like the zombie and the blind-experiencer are actually similar, except that the zombie who has no experience at all nevertheless speaks as though it does, whereas the other consciously believes it has no experience, which amounts to saying it, like the zombie, has no conscious experience. However in fact it does have experiences albeit unconsciously.

The question then seems to be as to how it would be coherent to say in the case of the zombie, that all these feelings, experiences, sights, sounds and so on can be detected and yet to simultaneously say that nothing was experienced, when the zombie itself speaks about he experiences.

Another point that comes to mind is that I think we are not consciously aware of probably almost everything we experience, in the sense of "are aware of' like when, for example, we drive on autopilot.

I think information is of extreme importance for consciousness. But I don't have a clear idea on various specifics. What do you mean by "consciousness is informational"?

n the zombie case the sights, sounds, feelings, emotions and so on were detected but never consciously — Janus

This depends on how one defines "conscious". If it's defined as a state that necessarily includes qualia, then it's true. But a qualia-absent being could have something very similar.

Representationalists say that qualia are "representational states": pain represents body damage, with an acuteness proportional to the damage; a physical texture represents some physical property of the object; a visual image represents the surroundings we are within...

If those representations could be made in computable ways, without qualia, this arguably results in a form of consciousness. They could even have unconscious experiences: capturing representations of aspects of the world, but only storing them in memory- not in active use by the executive function.

P-Zombies. It's often held out as a gotcha for those who think consciousness could be separate from brain activity (or at least emergent from it, rather than synonymous).

What do you mean by "consciousness is informational"? — Patterner

I mean that consciousness is best understood in terms of information, not physics. Some phenomena should be thought of as material: rocks, gravity, light. But others cannot be understood physically: numbers, ideas, computer programs, novels. I claim that consciousness belongs to the latter category.

Think of a book, Moby Dick. You could try to understand it physically: "Moby Dick" is this specific arrangement of glyphs on paper. But then you look at another edition, or the book in another language, or an ebook edition, and you are totally flummoxed. You will conclude that analyzing Moby Dick as a physical phenomenon is hopeless.

The same is true for consciousness. Analyzing consciousness physically is hopeless, and leads to the hard problem. Because, consciousness is informational. Evidence?

Does consciousness have mass? Does it have a position, or velocity? What material is it made of? None of these seem answerable. In fact, to answer the latter, some want to invent an entirely new substance, with no physical evidence, no evidence at all in fact, other than that consciousness exists, therefore this substance must exist.

On the other hand, what is consciousness, phenomenologically? One thing you can say: each and every conscious moment discloses information. Every of our senses discloses information about the external world, or of our bodies. And every emotion discloses information about our minds.

Consciousness informs, it is informational, not physical. And so to understand it, it must be understood as informational. Only then can we understand how the brain implements it.

On the other hand, what is consciousness, phenomenologically? One thing you can say: each and every conscious moment discloses information. Every of our senses discloses information about the external world, or of our bodies. And every emotion discloses information about our minds. — hypericin

I'm with you. I've been saying information processing is the key. It's the key to life, because it all l began with DNA, and invoices the processing of the information in DNA to synthesize protein. And it's also the key to consciousness, because (my idea on how it works is obviously speculation) information processing is what makes a system conscious as a unit. Your thinking works fine for me.

it must be understood as informational. Only then can we understand how the brain implements it. — hypericin

Ok, what's the plan? How do we understand it as informational? What do you have *ahem* in mind?

A thought-experiment i started a thread with, on this very same topic.

There is a sentry in a watchtower, looking through a telescope. The watchtower stands on top of a headland which forms the northern entrance to a harbour. The sentry’s job is to keep a lookout.

When the sentry sees a ship on the horizon, he sends a signal about the impending arrival. The signal is sent via a code - a semaphore, comprising a set of flags.

One flag is for the number of masts the ship has, which provides an indication of the class, and size, of the vessel; another indicates its nationality; and the third indicates its expected time of arrival - before or after noon.

When he has made this identification he hoists his flags, and then tugs on a rope which sounds a steam-horn. The horn alerts the shipping clerk who resides in an office on the dockside about a mile away. He comes out of his office and looks at the flags through his telescope. Then he writes down what they tell him - three-masted ship is on the horizon; Greek; arriving this afternoon.

He goes back inside and transmits this piece of information to the harbourmaster’s cottage via Morse code, where it is written in a log-book by another shipping clerk, under ‘Arrivals’.

In this transaction, a single item of information has been relayed by various means. First, by semaphore; second, by Morse code; and finally, in writing. The physical forms and the nature of the symbolic code is completely different in each step: the flags are visual, the morse code auditory, the log book entry written text. But the same information is represented in each step of the sequence.

The question I want to explore is: in such a case, what stays the same, and what changes?

It was an epic thread, but my view is that the physical form changes, while the meaning stays the same, which says something important about the nature of information.