Nāgārjuna’s analysis is subtler: it is the rejection of the inherent existence (svabhāva) of particulars, not of their existence tout courte. Phenomena are real, but relationally and dependently — not as self-grounding entities possessing inherent reality. In that sense, Madhyamaka doesn’t abolish metaphysics so much as reframe it, replacing substance-based ontology with an analysis of conditions, relations, and modes of appearing. A key point is that there is nothing to grasp or posit as a first principle or ultimate cause. The causality Buddhism is concerned with is the cause of dukkha — the suffering and unsatisfactoriness of existence. And Buddhism refrains from positing views of what is ultimately real, as it has to be seen and understood, rather than posited, which leads to 'dogmatic views'. Nāgārjuna is well known for saying that he has no doctrine of his own. — Wayfarer

Thank you for bringing this to my attention. I have encountered Nāgārjuna before through the secondary literature in the philosophy of religion, but I didn't realize that Bitbol was influenced by him so specifically. This actually helps me to better understand Bitbol's reticence toward metaphysics and also helps to clarify more precisely where I think Bitbol's position is unstable.

The more I reflect upon it, the more it seems to me that Bitbol's aim is really to set boundaries on what can and cannot be said. This is not the quietism of the early Wittgenstein ("what we cannot talk about, we must pass over in silence") but something more like the therapeutic stance of the later Wittgenstein ("philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday"). Bitbol isn't saying "stop talking about metaphysics", he's saying "take a critical look at what makes you talk this way and then you will stop talking about metaphysics".

I don't think this is incoherent per se, but there is definitely a major tension implicit here. Basically, Bitbol relies on the authority of rational critique, but refuses the ontological consequences of that very authority. As part of his critique Bitbol makes claims such as:

1. Some ways of framing questions really are mistaken
2. Some metaphysical claims really are illegitimate
3. Some explanations really do invert the explanatory order

It invites the question: are these claims about the way things really are? I think this is a tender point for Bitbol. He wants to gatekeep the bounds of reason, but in order to do this he needs to grant reason a level of authority that he also seemingly wants to deny to it. If reason has the power to say what is unconditionally the case when engaging in critique, then how can we deny it that same power when it comes to ontology?

Nāgārjuna, by contrast, seems to take the bull by the horns in a way that Bitbol doesn't. While Bitbol and Nāgārjuna seem share some of the same methodological interests, Nāgārjuna seems much more willing to simply jettison any ultimate commitment to grounding, normativity or truth as final arbiters of anything at all. In response to the charge of inconsistency or self-contradiction Nāgārjuna's response would simply be "yes". As such, Nāgārjuna isn't really proposing a philosophy in the modern sense of the word, but rather something more like a path of liberation from philosophy (in the modern sense of the word).

Before I say anything further I want to get your thoughts. Does my critique of Bitbol hit the mark? Is my characterization of Nāgārjuna's intent accurate?

Agreed. I am familiar with these thinkers, and would say that my own thought on these matters is indebted (at least in part) to all three of them.

An order which makes intelligibility possible is not the same thing as an intelligible order, if intelligible order implies a fixed a priori form dictating a particular logic of intelligibility.
— Joshs

While I agree with the wording, my problem here is that I don't see how these kinds of accounts are plausible. They appear to give to the subject the entire 'responsibility' of the 'ordering' of the empirical world. In other words, for all practical purposes, an epistemic solipsism — boundless

For Husserl, the nature of the order on the basis of which events cohere is not fixed but, as you say, pragmatic. It is an order of associative similarity (not associative in Hume’s causal sense, but association by relevance to an intending subject). If you dont like the idea of a pragmatic ordering of the world depending on the notion of an a priori subject, you can find accounts which follow the phenomenologists in their deconstruction of the natural empirical attitude without relying on subjectivity as necessary ground. Such accounts can be found with Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Karen Barad, Joseph Rouse and others. For these writers, we can remove human beings and livings things from the picture and show how materiality is agential or ‘subjective’ in itself, in that no object pre-exists its interaction with other elements within an already organized configuration of elements.

materiality is agential or ‘subjective’ in itself — Joshs

... which is or is not how things are objectively (re: noumena)? :chin:

"And yet", he goes on, "the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence." Of course that goes against the grain of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect'. I've had many long (and mainly fruitless) arguments about this point on the forum, contested by those who are adamant that the world is there, external, outside of us, and ideas internal, in the mind, subjective. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared,—this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all."

At this point, 99% of people will object: “But we know that the world existed before there were any sentient beings.” My reply is that “before” is a mental construct. Fossils are not mental constructs, nor is the geological record. But pastness is not something contained in those rocks. It is a form under which they are understood. Outside that form—outside a temporal framework supplied by consciousness—the fossils do not say “earlier,” “later,” or “before” at all. They simply are. — Wayfarer

This is interesting, and perhaps coherent. But my mind recoils at the offensive apparent bootstrappyness of it. Some idealists avoid this bootstrapping - Berkeley by invoking God as the prior cause, Sprigge with panpsychism providing consciousness at the start.

From the bit you quoted, the ontological foundation for everything is the first experience, which then creates the temporal causal order that is the precondition of its own ability to experience. Don't you find that offensive? If someone said that in a pub, they'd get a slap. Adding God or panpsychism makes it much easier to swallow, no?

EDIT: I'm grateful for you bringing it up though, I hadn't thought about idealism quite in these terms before.

... which is or is not how things are objectively (re: noumena)? — 180 Proof

One wouldn’t begin with pre-existing objects and then move from there to relations. One begins with configurations, which have subjective and objective aspects but are neither strictly subjective nor objective. Their objective aspect is what is relatively predictable and stable over time, their subjective aspect is the qualitatively transformative basis of their ongoing existence.

So, as a way to solve the antinomy, I propose that we need to accept both stories and reconcile them. Yes, our consciousness is contingent, is ontologically dependent etc and it can't be the ground of 'intelligibility' of ourselves and the 'external world' (and also the 'empirical world', at the end of the day). But at the same time, I take seriously the other 'side' of the antinomy and I also affirm that intelligibility seems to be grounded in consciousness. However, in order to get a 'coherent story' that includes both insights, I acknowledge that I have to posit a consciousness of some sort that can truly be regarded as the ground of intelligibility. Panentheism is a way, I believe, to overcome and at the same time accept the 'main message' of the antinomy you are referencing. — boundless

This is an insightful reply to antinomy framing. I wonder, though, if there's another way forward that renders the antinomy only apparent. An alternative framing is to see it as two separate questions that are being run together:

1. A question about the genesis of human consciousness in time
2. A question about the conditions of possibility of knowing anything at all

To my mind, these are not strictly contradictory. In order to see this, we need to distinguish between two different orders:

1. Order of being / efficient causality: how X comes to be
2. Order of knowing / intelligibility: how X can be known, affirmed, understood

I would argue that this only feels contradictory when questions about the "conditions of knowing" are collapsed into questions about the "conditions of being". But asking after the conditions of our knowing X is not the same as asking after the conditions for there being X. These two sets of conditions are not identical, and the fulfillment of the former is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the fulfillment of the latter. To put it more bluntly, transcendental conditions are not efficient causes, though they are the conditions for the knowledge of efficient causes.

Thoughts?

have subjective and objective aspects — Joshs

.... describes or does not describe an objective state of affairs?

.... describes or does not describe an objective state of affairs — 180 Proof

What does an objective state of affairs look like?

What does an objective state of affairs look like? — Joshs

We have no access to it. Everything constructed in the mind of the subject is by definition subjective. We have no choice but to believe our senses.

We have no access to it. Everything constructed in the mind of the subject is by definition subjective. We have no choice but to believe our senses. — Questioner

An objective account is in 3rd person. It's like a novel written in 3rd person, a God's eye view.

I think the answer to Josh's question is that a state of affairs looks different depending on where you're standing. And 180's point resists sophism. If you're describing the way the world is, you're giving an objective account.

An objective account is in 3rd person. It's like a novel written in 3rd person, a God's eye view. — frank

But that can be no more than fiction. Surely, there is a place for rationalism, but rationalism has got a worse record than empiricism, starting with Thales saying everything is sourced from water.

If you're describing the way the world is, you're giving an objective account. — frank

This sentence is contradictory. If it's your account, it's not objective.

But that can be no more than fiction. Surely, there is a place for rationalism, but rationalism has got a worse record than empiricism, starting with Thales saying everything is sourced from water. — Questioner

It's a model you use to make sense of what you're experiencing. If you find the model is wrong, you update it. Davidson said it's like a web of inter-related beliefs, and possessing such a web is the hallmark of rationality.

Empiricism only gets you so far. You run into the problem of induction.

If you're describing the way the world is, you're giving an objective account.
— frank

This sentence is contradictory. If it's your account, it's not objective. — Questioner

If you precede your statement with "from my point of view" then your statement is 1st person.

A physics book expresses a 3rd person account. That doesn't mean it's not derived from 1st person data, or that it's necessarily true. We're just talking about what kind of voice the account is in.

It's a model you use to make sense of what you're experiencing. If you find the model is wrong, you update it. Davidson said it's like a web of inter-related beliefs, and possessing such a web is the hallmark of rationality.

Empiricism only gets you so far. You run into the problem of induction. — frank

I agree. We need to think about what we find out by way of empiricism. Problems arise when rationalists ignore scientific knowledge. Rationalism without the benefit of empiricism is ignorant.

A physics book expresses a 3rd person account. That doesn't mean it's not derived from 1st person data, or that it's necessarily true. We're just talking about what kind of voice the account is in. — frank

A physics book is not written as a 1st person account, but by the results of scientific investigation.

A voice that gives an account without the benefit of empiricism is no authority on the subject.

What does an objective state of affairs look like?
— Joshs

We have no access to it. Everything constructed in the mind of the subject is by definition subjective. We have no choice but to believe our senses. — Questioner

Don’t we have access to it intersubjectively? Isnt objectivity intersubjective agreement? I interact with a rock, and in this way I don’t simply believe my senses , I construct my senses in line with my goal-oriented intentional activity. It’s not simply ‘seeing is believing’, it’s ‘believing is seeing’: as I interact with the rock my expectations co-determine what I see and how I see it. My subjective knowledge of the rock as object is the result of patterns of correlation that emerge from the responses of the rock to my movements in relation to it. I can reliably predict how the rock will respond to my engagement with it, such that I can think about it as a unified thing which persists as itself over time ( object permanence) , even when I pick it up and move it from place to place or hide it from view.

This first-personal process of objectivation already involves idealization and abstraction, but this object for me is not yet an empirically objective thing. I have to compare my perspective on the rock with that of other subjects, and through this intersubjective correlating, we come to a consensus on the idea of the rock, seen differently for each of us as individual subjects, as an empirically objective entity which is ‘identical’ for all. The third-personal empirically factual object is an abstraction derived from shared first personal accounts, but a scientifically useful one. This is Husserl’s phenomenological concept of the origin of objectivity. For him all third-person empirically objective accounts are subjective and relative, since they are abstracted from, without eliminating, first personal experience.

Just note that this (Schopenhauer) not any kind of phenomenology. It makes the thread a little confusing if you smash up differing philosophical approaches. — frank

Beg to differ. Schop as one of Kant’s principle interpreters is very much part of the phenomenological lineage. Not that any of them endorse him wholesale but this passage in particular is highly relevant.

But it would not be that particular music — Questioner

It would not be the same rendition, but it would be the same piece. Claire de Lune retains its identity whether played on piano, guitar, or a singing birthday card.

This is the tip of a very large iceberg for your ‘mind=brain’ materialism: how something like a composition, a sentence, a formula can retain its identity across different versions and even different media. ‘The same and yet different’.

Very perceptive as always. I will respond when time permits.

This is the tip of a very large iceberg for your ‘mind=brain’ materialism: how something like a composition, a sentence, a formula can retain its identity across different versions and even different media. ‘The same and yet different’. — Wayfarer

I alluded to this above in deriving the idea of the identical third-personal empirical spatial object from the constructed first personal object.

Right! I was going to add that the salient point of the Schopenhauer passage is the ‘co-arising of mind and world’ which becomes central in later phenomenology.

I interact with a rock. My subjective knowledge of the rock as object is the result of patterns of correlation that emerge from the responses of the rock to my movements in relation to it. — Joshs

But what is that rock, really? Objectively, it does not appear as you see it. In reality, it, and all of reality, outside of human perception, it is a conglomeration of colourless particles and waves, a haze and maze of uncertainty that turns into certainty only when you observe it. (I have heard it described as wavelength collapse, but I don't know enough about it to comment.)

The grass is not really green. That's only the light that particular conglomeration of chemistry reflects to your eyes. Outside of perception, objective reality might be "there," but it has no definition or meaning.

seen differently for each of us as individual subjects, as an empirically objective entity which is ‘identical’ for all. — Joshs

because we have the same senses, and in a manner of speaking, the same consciousness

It would not be the same rendition, but it would be the same piece. Claire de Lune retains its identity whether played on piano, guitar, or a singing birthday card. — Wayfarer

I'm sorry, you have missed my point.

Are we not all individual renditions of consciousness? And does not that consciousness emerge as the function of neurological processes?

But what is that rock, really? Objectively, it does not appear as you see it. In reality, it, and all of reality, outside of human perception, it is a conglomeration of colourless particles and waves, a haze and maze of uncertainty that turns into certainty only when you observe it. (I have heard it described as wavelength collapse, but I don't know enough about it to comment.)

The grass is not really green. That's only the light that particular conglomeration of chemistry reflects to your eyes. Outside of perception, objective reality might be "there," but it has no definition or meaning. — Questioner

You’re taking the derived abstraction ( the empirical third-person account) and making it the basis for the actual phenomenological experience which constructed the abstraction in the first place.

We use the fruits of our experience-our perceptions and observations-to create models of the world, but then turn around and treat our experience as somehow less real than the models. Forgetting where our science comes from, we find ourselves wondering how anything like experience can exist at all.( The Blind Spot: Why Science Cannot Ignore Human Experience, by Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, and Evan Thompson)

Science’s "blind spot" is ignoring lived human experience as the foundation of all knowledge, creating a disconnect that harms both our understanding and our relationship with the world.

I've never read Whitehead. I just googled, and the AI's summation seems nearly exactly my position. I guess I should get to know him.

Not that any of them endorse him wholesale but this passage in particular is highly relevant. — Wayfarer

Schopoenhauer believed subject and object are two sides of the same coin. That insight goes back to Plato. You're in danger of calling all of philosophy phenomenology.

You’re taking the derived abstraction ( the empirical third-person account) and making it the basis for the actual phenomenological experience which constructed the abstraction in the first place. — Joshs

Wow, that’s pretty philosophically dense. I think I understand, but I want to reiterate that my original point was to separate the subjective from the objective. Also, calling something an “abstraction” does not mean that it is false. In the case of objective reality, I think our “derived abstractions” better capture it, than do our perceptions.

treat our experience as somehow less real than the models.

of course, subjective reality - and subjective truths - are real. Indeed, they are the only things that have personal consequence.

Science’s "blind spot" is ignoring lived human experience as the foundation of all knowledge,

I suspect this is not really a concern for most scientists. I don't think they give up their humanity.

And does not that consciousness emerge as the function of neurological processes? — Questioner

I'm in the No camp.

I'm in the No camp. — Patterner

Do you mean just with humans? Or does that include your dog?

I do not think consciousness arises from neurological processes, regardless of what species were talking about.

In humans, we are conscious of - we experience - neurological processes. Things without neurons experience other things. They experience their own beings.

And does not that consciousness emerge as the function of neurological processes? — Questioner

I don't think so, although interestingly your view is compatible with the kind of mind-primacy that @Wayfarer has been talking about in this thread.

You’re taking the derived abstraction ( the empirical third-person account) and making it the basis for the actual phenomenological experience which constructed the abstraction in the first place.

Quite, the experience needs to be stripped bare to the bones. And compared with itself unstripped. And with the social group (or biosphere), not just the individual.

For Husserl, the nature of the order on the basis of which events cohere is not fixed but, as you say, pragmatic. It is an order of associative similarity (not associative in Hume’s causal sense, but association by relevance to an intending subject). — Joshs

Ok. But, again, if there is no a priori intelligible order, why our conceptual maps work?

If you dont like the idea of a pragmatic ordering of the world depending on the notion of an a priori subject, you can find accounts which follow the phenomenologists in their deconstruction of the natural empirical attitude without relying on subjectivity as necessary ground. Such accounts can be found with Nietzsche, Foucault, Deleuze, Karen Barad, Joseph Rouse and others. For these writers, we can remove human beings and livings things from the picture and show how materiality is agential or ‘subjective’ in itself, in that no object pre-exists its interaction with other elements within an already organized configuration of elements. — Joshs

Same as above. The problem is not which kind of 'entity' is to be taken as a subject. The problem is how to explain the appearance of intelligibility in a non-contrived way. Honestly, the only thinker I know with a certain familarity among the ones who cited is Nietzsche (I read a book of Deleuze many years ago).
However, those thinkers, in my opinion, even this kind of perspective can't given an account to explain why the empirical world - which I agree 'arises' from the interaction between the subject and the 'world' - appears to be intelligible. Are we merely going to say that it is a 'happy coincidence' that we can make conceptual models that work? Or is there a deeper reason that explain why they work?

Cratylus, a pre-Socratic thinker thought that the flux of becoming was so pervasive that 'entities' do not exist and we can only point our fingers to the changing 'reality' without any hope to get a conceptual scheme that actually leads us to an understanding of it. Let's say that Cratylus was right in saying that 'entities' are merely illusory. Yet, it seems that there are regularities in this 'flux' and even one like Heraclitus pointed out that the world seems like a 'kosmos', an ordered world. Are these regularities merely illusory? Are they mere superimpositions of our own cognitive faculties?