Philosophim
Corvus
I agree. Things in themselves sounds like contradiction. If we don't know anything about it, we couldn't even name it or talk about it. The fact that it has the name, and can be talked about implies, we know something about them, if not it is possible to know something about them in other ways.I think it is inapt to say we don't know anything about things in themselves, because the idea of a thing in itself is nothing more than an abstraction. — Janus
What does knowing something exhaustively mean? Does it mean there are degrees of knowing something? Any examples?So, we don't know anything exhaustively. — Janus
Corvus
I think all readers can agree that Hegel does not put forward the humility of Kant. That means we should be extra careful about how to compare their language. — Paine
AmadeusD
Things in themselves sounds like contradiction. If we don't anything about it, we couldn't even name it or talk about it. — Corvus
Janus
What does knowing something exhaustively mean? Does it mean there are degrees of knowing something? Any examples? — Corvus
Paine
Does Hegel say time is just subjective perception? Or does he talk about time as some external entity in the material world? — Corvus
Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its centre in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself ; Spirit is self-contained existence (Bei-sich-selbst-seyn). Now this is Freedom, exactly. For if I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which I am not; I cannot exist independently of something external. I am free, on the contrary, when my existence depends upon myself. This self-contained existence of Spirit is none other than self-consciousness — consciousness of one's own being. Two things must be distinguished in consciousness; first, the fact that I know; secondly, what I know. In self consciousness these are merged in one; for Spirit knows itself. It involves an appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy enabling it to realize itself; to make itself actually that which it is potentially. According to this abstract definition it may be said of Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of hat which it is potentially. And as the germ bears in itself the whole nature of the tree, and the taste and form of its fruits, so do the first traces of Spirit virtually contain the whole of that History. — Hegel, Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree, page 27
The notion, too, is extremely hard, because it is itself just this very identity. But the actual substance as such, the cause, which in its exclusiveness resists all invasion, is ipso facto subjected to necessity or the destiny of passing into dependency: and it is this subjection rather where the chief hardness lies. To think necessity, on the contrary, rather tends to melt that hardness. For thinking means that, in the other, one meets with one's self.—It means a liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but consists in that which is actual having itself not as something else, but as its own being and creation, in the other actuality with which it is bound up by the force of necessity. As existing in an individual form, this liberation is called I: as developed to its totality, it is free Spirit; as feeling, it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.—The great vision of substance in Spinoza is only a potential liberation from finite exclusiveness and egoism: but the notion itself realises for its own both the power of necessity and actual freedom. — Hegel's Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (pp. 309-310
Corvus
but as with a situation where you see a shadow, but have no access to its causal object, we can say not much. Perhaps speculation is allowable as a matter of curiosity.. — AmadeusD
Corvus
In Hegel, the life of an individual human being happens in the context of an unfolding over time of the potential for freedom to actually come into concrete existence: — Paine
Janus
He certainly does not treat the things in themselves as a mysterious region behind the veil of appearance: — Paine
AmadeusD
Corvus
I didn't see anything directly relating to Hegel's idea on time from your quote, hence wrote what I read on Hegel's time in the reply. From my memory, most of Hegel's writings on time is in his Encyclopaedia II and III.Do you see "what you have read" in the portions I have quoted from Hegel? — Paine
It sounds like you haven't read Kant's CPR.I don't understand
which cannot be subjectively imposed on them — Paine
Corvus
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