I don't understand what you're trying to say.

Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else that emits or reflects light into our eyes, whereas your account is that we only have direct visual perception of light. Yours is a strange kind of direct realism.

What we should not say is that we never saw Alcaraz defeat Djokovic, only ever images of Alcaraz defeating Djokovic. — Banno

The relevant issue is that when I see the tennis match on television I do not have direct perception of the tennis match. In the context of the dispute between direct and indirect realism, "direct perception" means something substantive, and the dispute cannot be "deflated" simply by saying "I saw the tennis match" or "I see the apple".

In your example, the apple causes the pattern of light that is seen ten seconds later. Hence the apple is a constituent of the experience. — Banno

That the apple causes the experience isn't that it's a constituent of the experience. I'll repeat the quote from Martin, with emphasis:

So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. — Martin 2004

Given that the apple does not exist at 10:00:25 it is not a constituent of the experience at 10:00:25.

Are you saying that the apple is a constituent of the episode during the first 10 seconds? — Ludwig V

No, I'm saying that:

P1. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds then it is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
P2. The apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds

Moreover, this move overlooks the fact that there are other ways of cashing out what “direct” means that are neither dependent on the reification of consciousness nor reducible to deflationary semantics. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, as I have tried to explain several times, e.g. with the distinction between phenomenological direct realism and semantic direct realism. It is possible that perception is direct₁ but not direct₂, where "direct₁" and "direct₂" mean different things.

You are free to stipulate indirect realism in this purely negative way if you wish, but it’s unreasonable to expect others to adopt this stipulation given that indirect realism was traditionally a substantive, positive thesis about perception, rather than merely the rejection of one particular type of direct realism. — Esse Quam Videri

Then forget the terms "direct realism" and "indirect realism". We have two theses, one negative and one positive:

1. We do not have direct perception of distal objects
2. We have direct perception of mental phenomena

I am primarily interesting in arguing that (1) is true, where "direct perception of distal objects" is to be understood in the traditional way, i.e. mind-independent objects and their mind-independent properties are "constituents" of first-person phenomenal experience, such that things "really are" as they appear to us (e.g. coloured in the sui generis sense) even when not being perceived.

As for (2), I'd like to refer back to something you said here:

Strictly speaking, insofar as the apple has disintegrated, there is no direct object of perception during the second interval. — Esse Quam Videri

Clearly something is happening during the second interval; I am having a visual experience with phenomenal character, described as "seeing a red apple 10m in front of me". If you don't want to say that qualia or sense data or mental phenomena are the "constituents" of this visual experience then I don't really understand what you think this visual experience is (are you an eliminative materialist?). It's clearly not nothing, else I'd be saying "I don't see anything". I suspect that, once again, you just mean something else by "direct object of perception", and so are misinterpreting what is meant by (2).

Very well, then how do we falsify indirect realism as you've defined it? — Hanover

I don't know, and it's not how I've defined it.

This is the scientific account of perception:

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

This is clearly what indirect realism argues, as contrasted with their naive realist opponents, hence why it says here that "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception".

I thought the selling point of IR is that it can explain error in perception where DR cannot. — Ludwig V

What? Maybe someone else is positing that. I think its patently clear that there is no way to assess error beyond error as a mathematical/statistical exercise or a purely practical one (trial and error, i guess) no matter which theory you prefer. The DRist, I think, wants to say that a mediated perception is direct enough to capture error. I just disagree.

Well, we need to assess whether given indirect perceptions are veridical by some means that is independent of them. What do you suggest? — Ludwig V

No we dont Is my position. I don't see why. And given the above, I can't see why we would try (but that's baked into the disagreement, so just noting for completeness).

There's no better way of knowing what's going there. — Ludwig V

Exactly. So you're admitting you're seeing light which presents the sun as it was eight minutes ago. I shall leave this there and just see if it lands.

I don't think there's any reasonable ground for doubt — Ludwig V

Which is batshit insane on the facts, to my mind. Not concluding error might be reasonable, but denying any reason for doubt is just... good god. Not sure i'm cut out for such a wild claim. The following doesn't help, because its entirely recursive.

The relevant issue is that when I see the tennis match on television I do not have direct perception of the tennis match. — Michael

...and yet you saw the tennis. Thank you for such an apt example. The indirect realist is the one insisting that you never saw the tennis, only every pixels on a screen. For the rest of us, those pixels are part of watching the tennis. The causal chain is not the epistemic chain.

That the apple causes the experience isn't that it's a constituent of the experience. — Michael

This and your quote appear to be a constipated way of saying that one only sees the apple if there is an apple. Sure. At issue is whether one sees the apple or a "representation" of the apple. In your now well-beaten dead horse, one sees the apple as it was ten seconds ago. But somehow you conclude that one is therefore not seeing the apple. How that works escapes me.

Very well, then how do we falsify indirect realism as you've defined it?
— Hanover

I don't know, and it's not how I've defined it. — Michael

The physical question of how we see things isn't metaphysics. You're just telling me how scientists say we see things. That's not in dispute.

The metaphysical question deals with the fundamental ontological composition of the entity. Your post makes no reference to that.

To the question, "what is an apple," you tell me that there is a distal X that comes through my retina, into my brain, etc. I want to know what X is. I don't need to know the various points in the road where X traveled. I want to know what X is if I'm asking the metaphysical question.

Someone else says that direct realism is the case and that X appears suddenly just as X as a phenomenal state. You deny that is the case, but you have no idea what X is, so it's not clear how you deny it. You then admit you can't falsify indirect realism, which makes it non-scientific. If you don't know what X is, the scientific inquiry only tells us there is an unknown X going about the unknown world and that it appears as a phenomenal state at some point. Your conversation is physics, not metaphysics.

You assume some direct knowledge of the real, which makes you a direct realist, but you just want to explain intermediate steps as directly known and not the distal X.

That is, this conversation about what is X (i.e. the metaphysical question) is unanswerable. That you can tell me about apples, lights bouncing off apples, neurons firing is all part of the same scientific, physical conversation. You are no closer to proving what an apple is by describing the various noumenal events, which includes not just the apple, but the photons, the neurons, and all else.

So, what is an apple? We know what an apple is because we talk about it. That's what the apple is. What the X is is unknowable. It's why we needn't mention it in our conversations about apples.

And this doesn't deny a metaphysical reality or that there is a great big mystery of the unknown or that we don't have phenomenal states. It just denies that the meaning of "apple" is underwritten by the X, even if it is the X that is the hypothosized cause of the apple.

Sorry. Premature post by mistake.

In the first interval, the act is fulfilled by the apple; in the second, it is not. — Esse Quam Videri

Why not? There is no relevant difference between the information carried by the light in the first ten seconds and the second ten seconds. The presence or absence of the apple when the light arrives is irrelevant. IMO.

That asymmetry is not captured by describing the light alone, and it’s precisely what distinguishes veridical perception from residual or empty intentionality. — Esse Quam Videri

The destruction of the apple is too late to influence what has gone out; it cannot have any effect until tn seconds have elapsed, i.e. until the third ten seconds. You seem to think that the disappearance of the apple after the light has been sent on its way makes a difference to what is seen. But the apple was there when the light started its journey and so it carries the information that was accurate at the time of dispatch.

Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else that emits or reflects light into our eyes, whereas your account is that we only have direct visual perception of the light. Yours is a strange kind of direct realism. — Michael

I must have drafted something very badly. My position is that I only see objects that reflect or emit light. I don't know what it would be to see light as such - in transit, so to speak.

P1. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds then it is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
P2. The apple is not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C1. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds — Michael

If that's a good argument, then what's wrong with this?
P1a. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first ten seconds, then it is a constituent of the experience during the second ten seconds.
P2a. The apple is a constituent of the experience during the first ten seconds.
C1a. Therefore, the apple is a constituent of the experience during the second ten seconds.

Exactly. So you're admitting you're seeing light which presents the sun as it was eight minutes ago. I shall leave this there and just see if it lands. — AmadeusD

I think its patently clear that there is no way to assess error beyond error as a mathematical/statistical exercise or a purely practical one (trial and error, i guess) no matter which theory you prefer. The DRist, I think, wants to say that a mediated perception is direct enough to capture error. I just disagree. — AmadeusD

I had in mind the ordinary ways in which we realize we didn't see what we thought we saw. Which essentially means an inconsistency in the stream of perceptions that we experience. (This is a very rough sketch, because I expect you know what I'm talking about.) Philosophers tend to look for decisions on the spot. In real life, sometimes additional information comes in later or from a wider perspective.

So you're admitting you're seeing light which presents the sun as it was eight minutes ago — AmadeusD

Not quite. I'm seeing light from the sun that carries information about it as it was eight minutes ago.

Which is batshit insane on the facts, to my mind. Not concluding error might be reasonable, but denying any reason for doubt is just... good god. Not sure i'm cut out for such a wild claim. The following doesn't help, because its entirely recursive. — AmadeusD

Well, perhaps I over-stated the point. I can see the reason for doubt but don't think that it carries much weight.

This is clearly what indirect realism argues, as contrasted with their naive realist opponents, hence why it says here that "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception". — Michael

And this assessment that "they are broadly equivalent" is not science but philosophical befuddlement.

In normal perception, the object of awareness is the physical object itself, not a representation of it. We perceive objects and states of affairs in the world, not internal representations. In science, neural processes enable perception; they are not what is perceived. Science provides an alternative description of perception by incorporating ideas of diachronic and constitutive causation. Once the brain's causal powers are are accounted for by physical processes and constitutive structure, there is no explanatory gap left for "representation" to fill, like "sense data", "mental phenomena" or "inner images". If representation is just the function of neural states, your philosophical view stops being indirect and becomes more of scientific direct realism.

If representation is just the function of neural states, your philosophical view stops being indirect and becomes more of scientific direct realism. — Richard B

No.

Losing awareness of the object is not the same thing as phenomenology becoming the object of perception. It shows only that object-directedness can be bracketed or backgrounded, not that it was absent or secondary to begin with. — Esse Quam Videri

When I listen to music, I'm not in any way directed at a distal object, which I then bracket or background. The phenomenal music itself is the "object". The way the music sounds, it's specific phenomenal qualities, constitutes the musical experience.

When the observer hears the chime, that the chime presents as something is a consequence of the brain's organization of experience. Environmental sounds are " of something" because they are environmental, and the brain "tags" them as such. Environmental cues don't arise on their own, and it is important for survival to identify their origins. This is distinguished from internal experiences, such as imaginationary imagery, which are not of anything at all. They might conceptually represent objects, but they do not point to actual distal objects.

So, it does not seem that phenomenal experience is intrinsically object directed. It is only so when it is specifically an environmental cue. But there are phenomenal experiences such as music and imaginations that are not environment cues. These latter seem phenomenal on their own, without pointing to an object. And so, if phenomenal experience is able to float free of an object, it cannot be a secondary derivative of an object directed perceptual event, as you want to say.

LOL wondered how the Notifications were working.

I had in mind the ordinary ways in which we realize we didn't see what we thought we saw. — Ludwig V

Right. I've been considering exactly this is recent days - I think there's a profound difference between, say, glancing quickly, and having the incoming data run-together because it was received so fast (and you see, for instance, a blur that indicates a situation which doesn't persist once your eyes are trained on the object/s) - which I think you're describing (or, this type of 'error') and one where your mind functionally cannot distinguish between the object and a suggestion about it. That famous image with colour lines, but is black-and-white is a good example. Even if we're going to admit "redness" is inherent in an object somehow, that example shows us that our experience of redness does not rely on an object outside of us to obtain, but on our internal interpretive processes. I am sorry if this isn't directly on point, but it seems clear to me "error" comes in different kinds, and the one I mean (related to the latter example) cannot be adjudicated by further looking at the object: It can change from red to grey as I see fit, in some sense. I am not bound by the object to see it as a certain colour in that case.

I'm seeing light from the sun that carries information about it as it was eight minutes ago. — Ludwig V

Right, right. Ok fair enough to further sharpen - I think this, for me, is a fairly smoking gun concession. That isn't "the Sun" besides the idealized use of "the Sun" which we tend to use. Which leads me to something from another exchange:

...and yet you saw the tennis. Thank you for such an apt example. The indirect realist is the one insisting that you never saw the tennis, — Banno

This is 100% semantic and doesn't touch the problem. I think its possible your description of hte Sun there lands us in the same position: If that, to you, is 'direct awareness' I don't understand the claim. It is not "the object" in any sense - it is light ferried across one AU, bringing with it information about the Sun. We call this 'seeing the sun' because its easier and better for "getting on with it".

We don't argue about whether "watching the game" on recording is direct awareness of the game, or the recording (well, it seems to me we dont?). I don't quite see a difference here.

Well, perhaps I over-stated the point. I can see the reason for doubt but don't think that it carries much weight. — Ludwig V

Ok, ok, fair enough. I definitely overstated my repsonse, so sorry about that. This seems fine to me.

I don't understand what you're trying to say.

Most direct realists say that we have direct visual perception of apples and trees and everything else that emits or reflects light into our eyes, whereas your account is that we only have direct visual perception of light. Yours is a strange kind of direct realism.

Do you disagree with me? It shouldn’t matter, in any case. Light is mind-independent, a “distal object”. It is through the direct connection of the light reflecting off other objects that we can see the object. None of this implies sense-data or other mental objects either.

That's exactly what it implies: that the Light is a data medium between the object and your eyes. That would be data derived from your sensual apparati (not a real word lol) - sense data. This doesn't mean you have to accept this description, but that is what it implies quite plainly. Others avoid this problem in fun ways.

That this is being missed is odd to me. Is it the case that you accept the facts and prefer to call them a description of Direct Realism (i.e that it doesn't amount to a "sense data" story)? That's fine, I just want to be clear.

Are you saying light is sense-data?

That's exactly what it implies: that the Light is a data medium between the object and your eyes. — AmadeusD

Why isn't the light an object that requires a data medium between it and your eyes?

Cool.

I think i'm answering both here:

The light itself is not sense data - the electrical impulses your eyes send to your brain is. This explains why light does not need a medium. It literally, physically, enters the eye. There is where the 'magic' happens.

The light itself is not sense data - the electrical impulses your eyes send to your brain is. This explains why light does not need a medium. It literally, physically, enters the eye. There is where the 'magic' happens. — AmadeusD

What is the light? Brightness?

What is smell? Molecules in your nose receptors? Does the scent of the flower live in the molecule?

Does it make sense to speak of anything that causes the magic except to say it causes the magic?

So, what is the flower, the light, or the molecule I speak of? Let's say it's "really" a cat. Does that mean a flower is a cat? How can we know it's "really" a cat if I see flower, and how can I know you see a cat when I see a flower?

How is it that we in fact speak easily of flowers all the time yet I have no idea what we're talking about here.

The point here is that meaning isn't dictated by cause. It's by use.

What is the light? Brightness? — Hanover

Photons which react to/arrange themselves in light of (heheh) the objects they bounce off until they hit our eyes, as I understand. But I don't know. I've not seen any photons in any sense we could be using here (from memory, anyway).

What is smell? Molecules in your nose receptors? Does the scent of the flower live in the molecule? — Hanover

No. It's an experience (that may or may not be termed a brainstate).

Does the scent of the flower live in the molecule? — Hanover

Um, no. That is my point and the fundamental problem DRist face, from my perspective: that hte answer to this unequivocally no.

Does it make sense to speak of anything that causes the magic except to say it causes the magic? — Hanover

I don't quite know what you're getting at so I'll just clarify that when i said 'magic' i was referring to the technical process of light being transmuted to an electrical signal which travels to the brain, where it is essentially arranged and constructed into an experience. So, I'm not sure what this question does..

So, what is the flower, the light, or the molecule I speak of? Let's say it's "really" a cat. Does that mean a flower is a cat? How can we know it's "really" a cat if I see flower, and how can I know you see a cat when I see a flower? — Hanover

You have fallen back onto the semantic argument, entirely missing the one being made here. What words we use are irrelevant to the question at hand, although it is quite important we at least think we're talking about hte same thing - and we aren't here.
If you want to call a flower a cat, that's fine. That doesn't change the ontological status of the object to which you refer, or our epistemic relationship to it. I think i adequately answered the conclusory question: You can't. We can simply compare our notes and see what works. That appears to be what actually happens, and how science runs.

How is it that we in fact speak easily of flowers all the time yet I have no idea what we're talking about here. — Hanover

Because we're trying not to idealize. I have been over this. I am beginning to think that this argument is so thin that two of the better posters can't quite wrap themselves around it adequately.

The point here is that meaning isn't dictated by cause. It's by use. — Hanover

Which has precisely nothing to do with whether we are directly aware of objects or not.