One of The Partially Examined life podcasts on Buddhism dealt with this. They argued that although evolution resulted in our brains being what they are, the brains themselves created a whole new means for generating rich mental life that was not specifically selected for by evolution. — Marchesk

My thoughts exactly (although I don't see how Buddhism fits in the picture).

There's an "absoluteness" in it that suggests a hardening of thought. — t0m

That's because Dawkins' materialism is actually a direct descendant of philosophical theism. It has the same absolutism about it, but now attached to what it sees as 'science' as opposed to 'religion'. My overall view is that this kind of darwinian materialism is like a mutant form of Christianity - perhaps even a heresy.

E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me? — Samuel Lacrampe

Much easier to deploy with 'triangles', that argument. ;-)

That's because Dawkins' materialism is actually a direct descendant of philosophical theism. It has the same absolutism about it, but now attached to what it sees as 'science' as opposed to 'religion'. My overall view is that this kind of darwinian materialism is like a mutant form of Christianity - perhaps even a heresy. — Wayfarer

Yes. Yes, indeed. As you may recall, I suggested before that it's really all about the positioning of the sacred (of "God"). My thesis is that everyone is religious. Who lives without an image of virtue? Propositions about the "supernatural" are secondary to "religious" feeling attached to basic beliefs about who we are and what we should be. In short, scientism and various political positions are just as much religions in this extend sense as religion proper. As I see it, the philosophy that matters most for the individual is just a working out of the details of one's generalized religion. What is most important in life? What is true virtue? The rest follows from that basic decision. A philosopher has already decided implicitly that his position should be examined or "reasonable."

Right - with the caveat that the individual can't, and ought not, to try and re-invent the whole of philosophy de novo. I mean, people turn up on forums and write OP's - usually their first post - trying to do that. Some geniuses probably succeed at it, but usually it's a futile effort. So overall I think we need to situate ourselves within some existing philosophical milieu. But that's yet another tangent.

Although I do have to add something (I can never shut up) - after I graduated in 2013 from my MA program, the professor gave the 'occasional address' at the graduation ceremony, on the theme of 'the unexamined life is not worth living.' It was a real paean to critical thinking, in the Socratic tradition of questioning everything. That speech summed up so many things about my whole experience at that University, and made me so glad to have been there (even though I'm not an academic or author.)

It seems my view of the world is grounded in my mind. But I see no way to support the claim that the whole world is grounded in my mind, or in anyone else's mind. — Cabbage Farmer

I just mean that the world as we value and know it as humans is only here while we are. If an asteroid wipes us out, the substratum will still be here. But I can only think or say this while I'm here. Where was the world before I was born? It was here, of course. But only because I arrived to think the world before my birth. To my knowledge, the human world (the world I care about) is only experienced first-person.

Right - with the caveat that the individual can't, and ought not, to try and re-invent the whole of philosophy de novo. I mean, people turn up on forums and write OP's - usually their first post - trying to do that. Some geniuses probably succeed at it, but usually it's a futile effort. So overall I think we need to situate ourselves within some existing philosophical milieu. But that's yet another tangent. — Wayfarer

I agree completely. I don't even see it as a tangent. We are always already our pasts. We come to language with an inherited "interpretation of Dasein [being-there]." Man is essentially historical. Our authentic options are there, in our own inheritance, simply because we have no possibility of starting from zero. This might explain the variety of positions, too. We play the cards we are dealt, and we are dealt different cards. I can tell that you've been working on the same themes for decades. So have I.

These are just my themes. My life shaped me so that I experience a sense of above-average access to my particular issues. Youthful crises and ecstasies are perhaps fundamental here.

(Y)

If it is "the ideal", it is the absolute perfect, meaning that everything about it must be precisely according to that ideal, or it will be less than the ideal. Therefore it is completely distinct from all others, it is particular, as nothing but the ideal could be the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, I get that particular ideals are particular ideals, but I don't see how that makes them particulars in the kind of sense that particular objects are particular objects. But perhaps you didn't mean that...?

However, prior to existing as that material object, it is becoming that object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but if what it is to become is not predetermined, then there is no need to think of it as having its future form determined by an ideal form.

You have written rather a lot, but unfortunately that's all I have time to respond to right now. These seem to be the most salient points anyway.

Right - with the caveat that the individual can't, and ought not, to try and re-invent the whole of philosophy de novo. — Wayfarer

I think this is too prohibitive in spirit. Of course no one works in a vacuum; but anyone who has anything to say that is worth hearing will be offering a perspective that is unique and new to some degree; just as we are all individuals with our own unique perspectives. The challenge is, in fact, just as with the arts, to find your own voice, and each individual will do that in their own way.

OK, I get that particular ideals are particular ideals, but I don't see how that makes them particulars in the kind of sense that particular objects are particular objects. But perhaps you didn't mean that...? — Janus

The same thing which makes a material object a particular (i.e., that it is unique, and there is no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference), is what makes an ideal a particular as well. Clearly, there is a difference between the two, and that difference is matter. But in the sense of being a particular, there is no difference.

Yes, but if what it is to become is not predetermined, then there is no need to think of it as having its future form determined by an ideal form. — Janus

The determination is made within the act of "becoming", not prior to. So it isn't "predetermined", it is determined at that time. The determination is made in the same way that human choice determines. We cannot "determine" things (in the sense of fix the outcome) prior to the occurrence, nor posterior to the occurrence, it is done during the occurrence. If you do not understand, it is probably because our concept of "time" is inadequate here. It creates contradiction between a point in time, and an activity occurring at a point in time..

Becoming is explained by the concept of matter, and matter has elements which appear to be unintelligible, the existence of potential, which allows for both what may and may not be. This is indeterminacy, in the common use of "determined", i.e. determined by the past. Material existence occurs only at the present, it is the human being's description of what is, at the present. When we allow for this indeterminacy, we allow for "determined by the present", which is determined by the Forms, in the act of "information". But this power is limited by the power of the being which utilizes the Forms. (Remember, these are not ideas in the mind, generals or universals, these are independent Forms, particulars, acting in the world, with particular effects.) If one assumes an omnipotent Being, this creates certain difficulties which St Augustine is famous for grappling with. The powers of the lesser beings must be willfully allowed by the omnipotent being.

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I’m telling you what I find to be a justified belief. I’m not pretending to have transcendent access to absolute truth. — apokrisis

Is it not also a justified belief that there is an "I" telling "me" what the "I" is finding to be a justified belief, or is that really happening? Is there really an instance of you telling me what you find to be a justified belief? If there is, then you do have direct access to reality as it is - that there is actually a state-of-affairs where Apo is telling Harry Hindu what he finds to be a justified belief AND that Apo is not pretending to have transcendent access to absolute truth.

What you're basically saying is that the reality is that you know you don't know - which I already pointed out is a contradiction. To say that you don't know is itself an objective statement about reality - as if you had direct access to some part of it and it's state-of-affairs - that you don't know everything.

You're arguments are so full of contradictions it's absurd that you don't see it.

Anyway, you are still successfully dodging the question of how an apple can still look red to us even when the light it reflects is not in the normal red frequency range. It can’t be then a simple cause and effect relationship in terms of the actual light entering our eye and the way we construe the hue of what we see. What we imagine we should see, given our model of the lighting conditions, takes over.

The point here is that the indirect perceptual route is more accurate in that it sees the apple as it would be understood in ideal lighting conditions. It is the interpretation that can make allowances because the modelling isn’t simply driven in causal fashion by physical inputs. — apokrisis

Hypocrisy. You, the dodger of questions, accuse me of dodging questions? I haven't avoided answering anything. It is you that is doing that. You are either confused or just a blatant hypocrite.

I've asked you several times to describe how it is that you arrived at your notions of pragmatism and semiotics. There had to be a transfer of information by causal processes somewhere.

And this talk of some "model" not being driven by "causal fashion" is preposterous. How can you say that it is a model when it doesn't include information about what caused the model? How can you say that anything that is a model doesn't include information about some cause along the line that preceded it. If it doesn't, then it cant be said to be a model of that thing.

Yes. And why not?

Of course they are also models at completely different levels of semiosis. Colour experience is biological-level perceptual modelling of “the world”. Talk about electromagnetic radiation and wavelength is socially constructed knowledge of the world.

One model can only change over eons of evolutionary time. The other we could reinvent tomorrow. — apokrisis

Again, if it is models all the way down, AND we only have access to models, then we have direct access to reality, and it would then be wrong to call it models. We'd simply have direct access to reality.

It seems my view of the world is grounded in my mind. But I see no way to support the claim that the whole world is grounded in my mind, or in anyone else's mind. I see no way to support the claim that the world disappears when any one animal goes to sleep; nor the claim that the world disappears when any one animal dies. — Cabbage Farmer

Why should the idea that the existence of the world is not independent of first-person experience conflict with the observation that the world continues when other animals sleep?

Why the single-standard assumption that what is true to say of the third-person must also be true to say of the first-person?

Why the prejudice against solipsism?

I've asked you several times to describe how it is that you arrived at your notions of pragmatism and semiotics. There had to be a transfer of information by causal processes somewhere. — Harry Hindu

Seems like a reasonable hypothesis.

You feeling up to explaining how colour constancy supports your assertions about direct cause and effect yet?

I thought I already did in the last post. I also thought I said that we can dispense with the terms, "direct: and "indirect" as they are meaningless.

If colour constancy is a model, then there must be some causal relationship with the model and what caused it. If not, then how can you say that what is happening has anything to do with, or carries information about, something else - like the experience of color having to do with the state of something else? How did colour constancy arise? What evolutionary problems did it solve? These are the questions you should be asking.

Communication relies on the fact that language has common meanings. I can't see how that is contentious. Of course, the fact that we both understand 'apple' to mean the same thing, is culturally determined, and arguably biologically determined, but I don't understand how that supports the point I took issue with, namely, that: — Wayfarer

The point you took issue with was the point that our thoughts don't have to be "identical" but only sufficiently "similar" to support communication and mutual understanding. So far as I can see, you have yet to support your bold claim to the contrary.

The fact that language involves "common meanings" is not contested here. What's contested is the characterization of such common meanings.

I can't see how whether our thoughts are the same aside from what can be communicated symbolically is even relevant to the argument. It is about the communication of ideas. — Wayfarer

Do you mean to say the only relevant conversation about communication is conversation about the symbols we use to communicate? Even if that were so: What is the symbol, how does it symbolize, how do we understand it? Aren't these relevant questions? It seems this is close to what you were asking at the outset, in your own way.

You ask how information could be physical, if each of us has "the same information" about an apple on the basis of perception, or grasps "the same meaning" of an utterance or waving flag. My answer is that it is not identical information, but similar information in similar heads.

I can understand why you might think this conflicts with your position, but I can't imagine how you could possibly think it's not a relevant concern for your position and for the theme you've introduced.

From another perspective I understand the relative nature of perception - that you and I will see things differently, due to all kinds of factors. So if you're saying that, then I wouldn't disagree, but I don't see how it has a bearing on the OP. — Wayfarer

I said that we have nonidentical, but similar, perceptions of the same; and that this is an instructive analogy for the case of speech. A point you seem to be wriggling around without addressing.

You're aware it's common to speak of perceptual "information", and you began our conversation by asking about information and about the claim that information is physical. Is there some reason perception is not relevant to this theme?

I recall you started out by talking about waving flags and other signs we interpret on the basis of sensory perception.

The idealist response: that 'the physical' is itself a matter of judgement, a way of categorising the data of experience. A certain range or kind of experience is categorised as 'physical' and then this is posited to comprise the fundamental, what truly exists, what is real, etc. As you yourself say: 'to all appearance'; but appearances are always interpreted by a mind. — Wayfarer

Did I say "the physical is fundamental"?

I say I'm not sure what it means to say that something is "not physical"; and I say it seems, to all appearances, that minds and their abstractions are grounded in the physical. I'm open to the abstract possibility that there is something that is not physical -- I don't think the very idea of something nonphysical is a logical contradiction -- but I see no reason to suppose that anything I've encountered, even in speech or thought or dreams, is not physical in the way I mean.

Your idealist has not helped to clear up the matter, and he hasn't made the case for his own point of view.

How is the fact that we make judgments of the form, "x is physical", "x is not physical", "x is mental", "x is not mental"... relevant here? It seems to me that's exactly what we're evaluating here, our judgments, the judgments of these two sentient animals.

I do know, in saying this, I'm skating over a huge topic, but it's a forum, and time is limited. But I'll try and spit it out regardless - our conception of 'the physical' is underwritten by the theories of stellar formation and biological evolution, which we suppose provides an account of how we got here, what our capabilities and attributes are, in physical terms, as understood by modern science. That is what 'physicalism' means. In this picture, 'the mind' is the product of this process, and to all intents, only appears in the last micro-seconds of terrestrial history. There's even arguments about 'why it exists', nowadays. — Wayfarer

Now I'm sure you're not addressing me, but rather some stereotype of a physicalist who stands between us, obstructing your view of my position.

As you're well aware, traditional discourse about physis and nature far predates the recent scientific theories you mention and the technologies that have enabled the investigations that inform those theories. My conception of the physical is informed primarily by my own experience as a thoughtful, perceptive, and introspective animal. I don't need an "account of how we got here" to support my conception of the physical, though to all appearances, the accounts provided by current empirical science seem among the most reliable and useful answers to that question.

You may recall I'm inclined to say empirical science is just a rigorous extension of ordinary empirical investigation and ordinary experience, a careful phenomenology of nature that does not entail any metaphysical views.

It may be that empirical investigation cannot provide an answer to questions like "why the world exists". It may be that definitive answers to such questions are impossible, and I see no reason to suppose that such answers are forthcoming. I'm no more inclined to be perturbed by that silence than I'm inclined to find contradiction in the thought that "bad things happen to good people".

You're so concerned with relevance to your own OP: How on Earth is the question "Why does the world exist?" relevant to your OP?

So the whole point of this OP is to try and show that if information is not physical, then there is something central to the entire physicalist account which is not, itself, physical. — Wayfarer

I take it there's a difference between an original post and the thread that originates from that post. Was it your purpose, in your opening post, merely to "show" that information is not physical, or rather to initiate a conversation on that topic, and to invite reflection and comment on your speech?

I expect the physicalist and I have two different views, but he'll have to come here and tell me what his view consists in before I can make up my mind, unless someone else will speak for him.

I'm not arguing on behalf of the physicalist, but on my own behalf. Whatever your purpose may be in attempting to establish the claim that "information is not physical", that is the claim I am challenging here, while you gesture repeatedly at your own initial intention and confuse my claims with the claims of others.

It is the argument that ideas are not merely 'something that brains do' ('as the liver secretes bile'.) In other words, this is an argument that ideas/information/meaning is real in its own right, and not as the product of a material process. So indeed it is an idealist argument. When people complain that 'naive idealism' is the same as 'naive materialism', I am pretty sure they don't grasp the import of idealism. — Wayfarer

Feel free to continue that argument in light of what I've actually said so far.

If colour constancy is a model, then there must be some causal relationship with the model and what caused it. — Harry Hindu

Of course. The only question is whether the state of mind is being caused directly or indirectly.

Colour experience alone shows that conciousness is mediated Interpretation. We don’t see light as it is, but light as our neurology symbolises it.

Colour constancy rams this point home. Any interpretation is relative to some judgement we are making about how some colour would look under more ideal lighting conditions.

Perception is so indirect we can experience colour as stable properties belonging to object surfaces. Which is thus both a truth and not the actual information reaching our eyes.

It is the same as distance correction. Things far away are seen as being of normal size, far away. Which is true, but not the truth of the information hitting the backs of our eyes.

All perception relies on interpretation, so is not direct but mediated by our beliefs. That sugar tastes sweet and roses are red show just how unreal our resulting reality is. We impute a useful sensory image to create a structure of experience that certainly corresponds to the world in a reliable way. It gets us around this reality, as a map symbolises a territory. But being mediated via symbols - qualia - it is not direct.

My thoughts exactly (although I don't see how Buddhism fits in the picture). — Wayfarer

Robert Wright was arguing that Buddhism is supported by evolutionary psychology, and helps us overcome our attachment to desire and what not.

RIght. Well it has to have the imprimatur of Darwinism otherwise nobody will take it seriously.

imprimatur — Wayfarer

Never came across that word before. If I have Google translate it to Korean, then French, and then back to English it says:

Print Authorization

It means the stamp of authority, and is used colloquially to denote that ‘so and so approves of such and such’.

We cannot "determine" things (in the sense of fix the outcome) prior to the occurrence, nor posterior to the occurrence, it is done during the occurrence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, so the evolution of the actual forms of things is likewise not determined priorly by ideal forms.

I take it, that by "actual forms of things" of things, you mean material things. If so, then the argument is that the "actual form" is the immaterial Form, and this determines the form of the material thing.

You are not distinguishing between being and becoming. A describable form is a state, static. The "evolution of actual forms" implies a change from one state to another. The "becoming" which is implied by this change, cannot se described as an intermediate state, or else we would need another intermediate state, and so on ad infinitum. The activity of the independent Forms, is within the intermediate of becoming, so it is not describable as the form of a material thing, which implies a static state.. So, the actual forms of material things is determined priorly by the Ideal Forms, but they are not "forms of things", meaning material things, because they are immaterial, acting on the passive material, in the act of information.

The point you took issue with was the point that our thoughts don't have to be "identical" but only sufficiently "similar" to support communication and mutual understanding. So far as I can see, you have yet to support your bold claim to the contrary. — Cabbage Farmer

I would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means.

But, whether something is 'the same' or 'similar', in both cases, the faculty that makes that judgement is essential to the matter. That is the faculty of abstract judgement. You and I, as rational beings, are able to make such judgements; it is the source of such judgement that interests me. That's why I included the long quotation from Steve Pinker in this post. He is confident that 'the computational theory of mind' accounts for such judgements; he tries to give a materialist account of how this works, in terms of 'bits that are arranged to bump into other bits'. Whereas, I'm arguing (not very well, perhaps) for a dualist view: that the symbolic and the physical are ontologically distinct. Also, I argue that even if computers are analogies for the processes of thought, that is only because humans have specifically manufactured them for that purpose, so the fact that they reflect the operations of human thought, doesn't explain the nature of thought.

What is the symbol, how does it symbolize, how do we understand it? Aren't these relevant questions? It seems this is close to what you were asking at the outset, in your own way. — Cabbage Farmer

Symbols and language are the province of semiotics and linguistics, respectively, and they're enormous disciplines in their own right; to become conversant with them takes considerable study. That's why I admit to 'skating over' a lot of major issues. It's a very general and high-level argument based on a single observation.

Did I say "the physical is fundamental"? — Cabbage Farmer

No, but it's the widespread assumption of e.g. Steve Pinker above. I would say that the cultural mainstream is generally physicalist in its orientation to these issues. I think that the account of 'how the mind works' is generally a lot nearer to Steve Pinker's view (that was the title of the book I quoted, by the way) than anything I am likely to advocate, and that it's probably a much less contentious view than my own.

Now I'm sure you're not addressing me, but rather some stereotype of a physicalist who stands between us, obstructing your view of my position.

As you're well aware, traditional discourse about physis and nature far predates the recent scientific theories you mention and the technologies that have enabled the investigations that inform those theories. My conception of the physical is informed primarily by my own experience as a thoughtful, perceptive, and introspective animal. — Cabbage Farmer

I am addressing what I see as the issue at hand. I don't regard that as a process of stereotyping but of analysis of the implications of the physicality, or otherwise, of ideas and symbols, in the context of philosophy and history of ideas. Now the fact that you will characterise yourself as a 'thoughtful, perceptive and introspective animal', is, I think, significant - incidentally, you are extremely thoughtful and highly perceptive, not to mention articulate, so let's put that aside - it's the 'animal' tag that I'm questioning. Rational animal, yes; animal, no. And it's a difference that makes a difference.

l I'm inclined to say empirical science is just a rigorous extension of ordinary empirical investigation and ordinary experience, a careful phenomenology of nature that does not entail any metaphysical views. — Cabbage Farmer

Right - are the issues being discussed here empirical in nature? Is the basic question one for empiricism at all?

This, incidentally, is why I provided that excerpt from the article on the 'indispensability of mathematics'. That article likewise notes the incorporeal nature of number, as I have done with 'information'. It says that the non-materiality of mathematical objects is very difficult to reconcile with the fact that 'our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects'. And why do 'our best arguments' do that? I suggest it's because they're empiricist in the sense you are defending. The difficulty is, that rationalist philosophy indicates the reality of rational truths that are not justifiable on solely empirical grounds. So the whole point of the argument is 'an attempt to justify our mathematical beliefs about abstract objects, while avoiding any appeal to rational insight'. (My emphasis. By the way, I can't help but find this conclusion ironic, considering the degree to which empirical science goes on about 'reason'.)

I am not going to come to any conclusions on this point, but I think it's worth considering why such an argument has to be made, in the context of modern analytical and empirical philosophy.

(Now, also, I acknowledge that my attitude is tendentious - I was accused of that as an undergraduate, and it's probably true. And I know it goes against the grain. I am trying to have these arguments, therefore, in a fairly detached manner, so they're not directed at persons, but ideas. And also that these are difficult questions - especially yours.)

would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means. — Wayfarer

= is a mathematical equivalence. "Same" cannot be reduced to =. That would mean that all qualities could be expressed as quantities. This assumption actually denies the possibility of dualism, by saying that every difference can be expressed as degrees of the same type, quantity. That's a monism.

Your argument falls down because the idea of things being "in a state" is a merely formal abstraction which does not correspond to actuality.

So, actually being is becoming. The form of material things is never actually static; we just conceive it as such, in order to simplify for the purposes of understanding. It is analogous to the use of infinitesimal calculus to model motion as a series of infinitesimal differences, differences that for practical purposes don't make such a difference that the series would not be close enough to actual motion to make calculation workable.

If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe.

To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak.

So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Technically, you may be right that we could be mistaken about our notions and the real concept, but I am optimistic that it is not the case; because if my notion of "yes" could be your notion "no" and vice versa, then it would be utterly hopeless for us to try to communicate.

Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle says, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts; this is how we can have intelligible conversations; but not necessarily the explicit knowledge. E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. Plato and Socrates used dialogues to obtain the explicit knowledge. I think their underlying assumptions is that the concept is found if all parties agree with the definition. Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). If this corresponds to your notion of it, then we can conclude that we have found the real concept.

E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me?
— Samuel Lacrampe

Much easier to deploy with 'triangles', that argument. ;-) — Wayfarer

This critical question is the sole reason I took on philosophy. Still searching for the answer.

Well if it helps, I’m sure you wouldn’t loose your intellectual acuity if you shaved your head.

Your argument falls down because the idea of things being "in a state" is a merely formal abstraction which does not correspond to actuality. — Janus

If you deny states, then you deny things. Objects exist as a describable state with a temporal extension. You might claim that this is just a formal abstraction, but unless you allow in your ontology, that it is also reality, your formal abstractions have no grounding, they are just imaginary. This is the problem with any process ontology, which denies the reality of "being" in favour of "becoming". There is no grounding for formal logic, what is and is not, as all reality is described as becoming, what may or may not be, and you are left with apokrisis', or Peirce's vagueness, where the law of non-contradiction does not apply. Dualism avoids this problem by providing an ontology with the principles for this duality of existence, being and becoming.

It is analogous to the use of infinitesimal calculus to model motion as a series of infinitesimal differences, differences that for practical purposes don't make such a difference that the series would not be close enough to actual motion to make calculation workable. — Janus

See, you are faced with a question here. Which is real, what is depicted by the model, a series of states, or what you call "actual motion"? If you cannot produce a model to represent it, on what basis are you claiming that this is "actual motion". It appears to me, like you have an imaginary idea of "actual motion", which cannot ne justified. Why insist on the realityof this "actual motion"?

Of course. The only question is whether the state of mind is being caused directly or indirectly. — apokrisis

Again, "direct" and "indirect" are meaningless, especially if it's models all the way down.

Colour experience alone shows that conciousness is mediated Interpretation. We don’t see light as it is, but light as our neurology symbolises it.

Colour constancy rams this point home. Any interpretation is relative to some judgement we are making about how some colour would look under more ideal lighting conditions.

Perception is so indirect we can experience colour as stable properties belonging to object surfaces. Which is thus both a truth and not the actual information reaching our eyes.

It is the same as distance correction. Things far away are seen as being of normal size, far away. Which is true, but not the truth of the information hitting the backs of our eyes.

All perception relies on interpretation, so is not direct but mediated by our beliefs. That sugar tastes sweet and roses are red show just how unreal our resulting reality is. We impute a useful sensory image to create a structure of experience that certainly corresponds to the world in a reliable way. It gets us around this reality, as a map symbolises a territory. But being mediated via symbols - qualia - it is not direct. — apokrisis

That's weird because I have no conscious effort, or will, to mediate my colors. Color constancy is a process that is UNconscious (unintentional) with it's EFFECTS appearing in consciousness.

Color constancy is something that helps us identify objects in different lighting conditions. Using light as a source of information about your environment has it's pros and it's cons. Mirages and camouflage are some cons, as well as not being able to get consistent information about an object in different lighting conditions. It seems that natural selection found a solution in color constancy.

So, what color constancy actually does is prove my point, not yours. It shows that we are still getting at the real property of an object, which is the apple's ripeness or rotteness, not the light, which changes, and isn't the important information you're trying to get at. Do you want to know the state of the apple, or the state of the light?

The fact that you can tell me about color constancy and that the color we see isn't the same as the wavelength of light, which means that you actually do know the wavelength of light compared to the state of the apple and the color we see, then tell me again how you don't have direct knowledge of all these relationships?

It shows that we are still getting at the real property of an object, which is the apple's ripeness or rotteness, not the light, which changes, and isn't the important information you're trying to get at. — Harry Hindu

Ah. So seeing red even in bad lighting conditions is the way we directly apprehend the ripeness and rottenness of objects.

Sounds legit. Look at that ripe postbox. Look at that ripe Ferrari. Yes I see what you mean.

The fact that you can tell me about color constancy and that the color we see isn't the same as the wavelength of light, which means that you actually do know the wavelength of light compared to the state of the apple and the color we see, then tell me again how you don't have direct knowledge of all these relationships? — Harry Hindu

Direct inference perhaps?