One of The Partially Examined life podcasts on Buddhism dealt with this. They argued that although evolution resulted in our brains being what they are, the brains themselves created a whole new means for generating rich mental life that was not specifically selected for by evolution. — Marchesk
There's an "absoluteness" in it that suggests a hardening of thought. — t0m
E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me? — Samuel Lacrampe
That's because Dawkins' materialism is actually a direct descendant of philosophical theism. It has the same absolutism about it, but now attached to what it sees as 'science' as opposed to 'religion'. My overall view is that this kind of darwinian materialism is like a mutant form of Christianity - perhaps even a heresy. — Wayfarer
It seems my view of the world is grounded in my mind. But I see no way to support the claim that the whole world is grounded in my mind, or in anyone else's mind. — Cabbage Farmer
Right - with the caveat that the individual can't, and ought not, to try and re-invent the whole of philosophy de novo. I mean, people turn up on forums and write OP's - usually their first post - trying to do that. Some geniuses probably succeed at it, but usually it's a futile effort. So overall I think we need to situate ourselves within some existing philosophical milieu. But that's yet another tangent. — Wayfarer
If it is "the ideal", it is the absolute perfect, meaning that everything about it must be precisely according to that ideal, or it will be less than the ideal. Therefore it is completely distinct from all others, it is particular, as nothing but the ideal could be the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, prior to existing as that material object, it is becoming that object. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right - with the caveat that the individual can't, and ought not, to try and re-invent the whole of philosophy de novo. — Wayfarer
OK, I get that particular ideals are particular ideals, but I don't see how that makes them particulars in the kind of sense that particular objects are particular objects. But perhaps you didn't mean that...? — Janus
Yes, but if what it is to become is not predetermined, then there is no need to think of it as having its future form determined by an ideal form. — Janus
Is it not also a justified belief that there is an "I" telling "me" what the "I" is finding to be a justified belief, or is that really happening? Is there really an instance of you telling me what you find to be a justified belief? If there is, then you do have direct access to reality as it is - that there is actually a state-of-affairs where Apo is telling Harry Hindu what he finds to be a justified belief AND that Apo is not pretending to have transcendent access to absolute truth.I’m telling you what I find to be a justified belief. I’m not pretending to have transcendent access to absolute truth. — apokrisis
Hypocrisy. You, the dodger of questions, accuse me of dodging questions? I haven't avoided answering anything. It is you that is doing that. You are either confused or just a blatant hypocrite.Anyway, you are still successfully dodging the question of how an apple can still look red to us even when the light it reflects is not in the normal red frequency range. It can’t be then a simple cause and effect relationship in terms of the actual light entering our eye and the way we construe the hue of what we see. What we imagine we should see, given our model of the lighting conditions, takes over.
The point here is that the indirect perceptual route is more accurate in that it sees the apple as it would be understood in ideal lighting conditions. It is the interpretation that can make allowances because the modelling isn’t simply driven in causal fashion by physical inputs. — apokrisis
Again, if it is models all the way down, AND we only have access to models, then we have direct access to reality, and it would then be wrong to call it models. We'd simply have direct access to reality.Yes. And why not?
Of course they are also models at completely different levels of semiosis. Colour experience is biological-level perceptual modelling of “the world”. Talk about electromagnetic radiation and wavelength is socially constructed knowledge of the world.
One model can only change over eons of evolutionary time. The other we could reinvent tomorrow. — apokrisis
It seems my view of the world is grounded in my mind. But I see no way to support the claim that the whole world is grounded in my mind, or in anyone else's mind. I see no way to support the claim that the world disappears when any one animal goes to sleep; nor the claim that the world disappears when any one animal dies. — Cabbage Farmer
I've asked you several times to describe how it is that you arrived at your notions of pragmatism and semiotics. There had to be a transfer of information by causal processes somewhere. — Harry Hindu
The point you took issue with was the point that our thoughts don't have to be "identical" but only sufficiently "similar" to support communication and mutual understanding. So far as I can see, you have yet to support your bold claim to the contrary.Communication relies on the fact that language has common meanings. I can't see how that is contentious. Of course, the fact that we both understand 'apple' to mean the same thing, is culturally determined, and arguably biologically determined, but I don't understand how that supports the point I took issue with, namely, that: — Wayfarer
Do you mean to say the only relevant conversation about communication is conversation about the symbols we use to communicate? Even if that were so: What is the symbol, how does it symbolize, how do we understand it? Aren't these relevant questions? It seems this is close to what you were asking at the outset, in your own way.I can't see how whether our thoughts are the same aside from what can be communicated symbolically is even relevant to the argument. It is about the communication of ideas. — Wayfarer
I said that we have nonidentical, but similar, perceptions of the same; and that this is an instructive analogy for the case of speech. A point you seem to be wriggling around without addressing.From another perspective I understand the relative nature of perception - that you and I will see things differently, due to all kinds of factors. So if you're saying that, then I wouldn't disagree, but I don't see how it has a bearing on the OP. — Wayfarer
Did I say "the physical is fundamental"?The idealist response: that 'the physical' is itself a matter of judgement, a way of categorising the data of experience. A certain range or kind of experience is categorised as 'physical' and then this is posited to comprise the fundamental, what truly exists, what is real, etc. As you yourself say: 'to all appearance'; but appearances are always interpreted by a mind. — Wayfarer
Now I'm sure you're not addressing me, but rather some stereotype of a physicalist who stands between us, obstructing your view of my position.I do know, in saying this, I'm skating over a huge topic, but it's a forum, and time is limited. But I'll try and spit it out regardless - our conception of 'the physical' is underwritten by the theories of stellar formation and biological evolution, which we suppose provides an account of how we got here, what our capabilities and attributes are, in physical terms, as understood by modern science. That is what 'physicalism' means. In this picture, 'the mind' is the product of this process, and to all intents, only appears in the last micro-seconds of terrestrial history. There's even arguments about 'why it exists', nowadays. — Wayfarer
I take it there's a difference between an original post and the thread that originates from that post. Was it your purpose, in your opening post, merely to "show" that information is not physical, or rather to initiate a conversation on that topic, and to invite reflection and comment on your speech?So the whole point of this OP is to try and show that if information is not physical, then there is something central to the entire physicalist account which is not, itself, physical. — Wayfarer
Feel free to continue that argument in light of what I've actually said so far.It is the argument that ideas are not merely 'something that brains do' ('as the liver secretes bile'.) In other words, this is an argument that ideas/information/meaning is real in its own right, and not as the product of a material process. So indeed it is an idealist argument. When people complain that 'naive idealism' is the same as 'naive materialism', I am pretty sure they don't grasp the import of idealism. — Wayfarer
If colour constancy is a model, then there must be some causal relationship with the model and what caused it. — Harry Hindu
We cannot "determine" things (in the sense of fix the outcome) prior to the occurrence, nor posterior to the occurrence, it is done during the occurrence. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point you took issue with was the point that our thoughts don't have to be "identical" but only sufficiently "similar" to support communication and mutual understanding. So far as I can see, you have yet to support your bold claim to the contrary. — Cabbage Farmer
What is the symbol, how does it symbolize, how do we understand it? Aren't these relevant questions? It seems this is close to what you were asking at the outset, in your own way. — Cabbage Farmer
Did I say "the physical is fundamental"? — Cabbage Farmer
Now I'm sure you're not addressing me, but rather some stereotype of a physicalist who stands between us, obstructing your view of my position.
As you're well aware, traditional discourse about physis and nature far predates the recent scientific theories you mention and the technologies that have enabled the investigations that inform those theories. My conception of the physical is informed primarily by my own experience as a thoughtful, perceptive, and introspective animal. — Cabbage Farmer
l I'm inclined to say empirical science is just a rigorous extension of ordinary empirical investigation and ordinary experience, a careful phenomenology of nature that does not entail any metaphysical views. — Cabbage Farmer
would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means. — Wayfarer
Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe.If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then? — Metaphysician Undercover
There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak.To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
Technically, you may be right that we could be mistaken about our notions and the real concept, but I am optimistic that it is not the case; because if my notion of "yes" could be your notion "no" and vice versa, then it would be utterly hopeless for us to try to communicate.So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover
As Aristotle says, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts; this is how we can have intelligible conversations; but not necessarily the explicit knowledge. E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. Plato and Socrates used dialogues to obtain the explicit knowledge. I think their underlying assumptions is that the concept is found if all parties agree with the definition. Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). If this corresponds to your notion of it, then we can conclude that we have found the real concept.Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover
This critical question is the sole reason I took on philosophy. Still searching for the answer.E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me?
— Samuel Lacrampe
Much easier to deploy with 'triangles', that argument. ;-) — Wayfarer
Your argument falls down because the idea of things being "in a state" is a merely formal abstraction which does not correspond to actuality. — Janus
It is analogous to the use of infinitesimal calculus to model motion as a series of infinitesimal differences, differences that for practical purposes don't make such a difference that the series would not be close enough to actual motion to make calculation workable. — Janus
Again, "direct" and "indirect" are meaningless, especially if it's models all the way down.Of course. The only question is whether the state of mind is being caused directly or indirectly. — apokrisis
That's weird because I have no conscious effort, or will, to mediate my colors. Color constancy is a process that is UNconscious (unintentional) with it's EFFECTS appearing in consciousness.Colour experience alone shows that conciousness is mediated Interpretation. We don’t see light as it is, but light as our neurology symbolises it.
Colour constancy rams this point home. Any interpretation is relative to some judgement we are making about how some colour would look under more ideal lighting conditions.
Perception is so indirect we can experience colour as stable properties belonging to object surfaces. Which is thus both a truth and not the actual information reaching our eyes.
It is the same as distance correction. Things far away are seen as being of normal size, far away. Which is true, but not the truth of the information hitting the backs of our eyes.
All perception relies on interpretation, so is not direct but mediated by our beliefs. That sugar tastes sweet and roses are red show just how unreal our resulting reality is. We impute a useful sensory image to create a structure of experience that certainly corresponds to the world in a reliable way. It gets us around this reality, as a map symbolises a territory. But being mediated via symbols - qualia - it is not direct. — apokrisis
It shows that we are still getting at the real property of an object, which is the apple's ripeness or rotteness, not the light, which changes, and isn't the important information you're trying to get at. — Harry Hindu
The fact that you can tell me about color constancy and that the color we see isn't the same as the wavelength of light, which means that you actually do know the wavelength of light compared to the state of the apple and the color we see, then tell me again how you don't have direct knowledge of all these relationships? — Harry Hindu
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