This is what I see as the riddle of Kant"s "Critique of Pure Reason". — Metaphysician Undercover
Plato, on the other hand seems to allow that the human intellect can apprehend intelligible objects directly, through the means of "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover
(1) Are 'forms' synonymous to 'necessary entities', like the laws of logic and morality? — Samuel Lacrampe
I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. — Samuel Lacrampe
The existence of the form “sight,” by which the eye sees, may be some positive presence in the nature of things (which biologists can describe in terms of the qualities of a healthy eye that gives it the power to see), but the existence of the form blindness in the blind eye need be nothing more than the nonexistence of sight ‒ the form of blindness is [therefore] a privation of 'the form of sight' and so not really an additional form at all. In general, distinguishing and qualifying the different ways there can “be” a form present in a thing goes a long way toward alleviating the apparent profligacy of the realist account of words signifying forms.
3) I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. It seems to be an unnecessary hypothesis: What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter? — Samuel Lacrampe
In any case, the 'noumenal object' is indeed something like 'the ideal object' - something as it truly is, as distinct from how it 'appears for us'. Kant says we only know how things 'appear to us'. — Wayfarer
But recall that passage from Lloyd Gerson on Aristotle, where A. says that when we know something intelligible, then the mind is 'identical with that intelligible'. That plainly cannot be the case with any actual object which is by its nature separate from us. — Wayfarer
When we know a logical or mathematical truth, then that truth is immediately apparent in a way in which knowledge of a particular cannot be; it is known 'in the mind's eye' so to speak, which is higher than the 'corporeal eye'. — Wayfarer
It is more that they're illuminated by 'the light of the Good'. We see by that light the truths of reason, that possess a certainty that sensible things cannot. That is how we can know 'a priori', and on the basis of reason alone. — Wayfarer
Agree. This is one of the notions that Ockham exploited - he depicted the forms in such a way that suggested 'a heavily populated universe of discourse'. — Wayfarer
So this is the exact problem which I've been referring to, how the human mind is deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover
it has evolved to know universals rather than particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover
why it is necessary to assume particular forms of individuals in order to account for the intelligibility of material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Despite the fact that mathematical principles are grasped immediately and completely, they cannot give us a complete understanding of reality, which consists of particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's more about the inherent unreliability of the physical senses. That comes out more clearly in Thomism as was discussed earlier - the 'corporeal senses' receive sensations from the 'particular', whilst the 'incorporeal soul' apprehends the form. — Wayfarer
That link between the reason for something, and its existence, or essence and existence, is what was severed by nominalism, culminating in the typically modernist view that things exist for no reason, or only out of 'adaptive necessity', or perhaps that 'existence precedes essence' in existentialist terminology. — Wayfarer
I think the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - to types, not to persons. You see the difference? In other words, all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate ideas, one for each individual. — Wayfarer
An essence is general, in that more than one individual may have the same essence 1; and the essence is the 'is-ness' as can be seen from the etymology of the word 'essence'. (This of course leads to many other conundrums, such as whether Socrates can be thought of as a man, or mankind, generally, which is, I think, one of the inherent shortcomings of Aristotelian logic.) — Wayfarer
I really can't see how this can be correct. — Wayfarer
haven't really started studying the Timaeus yet, but from my reading of the summary I can't see where Plato proposes 'individual forms' of the sort you're proposing - if you could point that out I would be obliged. — Wayfarer
These then are the conditions which govern then and now, how all the animals exchange their forms, one for the other, and in the process gain intelligence or folly.
And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its conclusion. This world of ours has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living thing containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one universe, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.
Yes, that is a great point. As I was wondering myself, if the theory of forms is so important in philosophy, then why is it that nobody really speaks of them outside of the context of Plato, as though it is more of a theoretical exercise than something relevant to our days? I think the answer is that forms are still very much around, but under different names. Thus Plato's Forms (1) are now called necessary / eternal / rational truths or natural laws, or simply Truth as per Kierkegaard; and Aristotle's forms (2) are now called concepts (not to be confused with the ambiguous term 'concept' as a mere idea or draft for a design). And in both cases, forms have essential properties or essences because they are universals.Bear in mind, Plato was an ancient thinker and that such ideas as logical laws, hadn't even been devised in his time; it was Aristotle who was to put that into a methodical form. — Wayfarer
Well, if Plato's Forms (1) are indeed synonymous to necessary truths, then we can prove that they are real and separate from matter: Necessary truths are, by definition, eternally existing; and if matter is not eternal (which is reasonable to suppose), then Forms (1) must be able to exist separate from matter. And that makes them more real than anything which exists only temporarily, or which existence depends on other things.One thing I am finding, is that Plato seems to think the Forms are real, or are actual existing things, whereas I interpret them as having a kind of implicit reality which is less literal than Plato seems to understand it (or at least as many people says he understands it) — Wayfarer
Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world. — Metaphysician Undercover
And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover
But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. Even using the law of identity, I find that a particular form for particular things remains an unnecessary hypothesis: Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. Then consider rock A only, which has identity A. Split the rock in two halves A1 and A2. Which of the two halves retains identity A? They cannot both retain the same identity, because A1 and A2 have different x, y, z properties, just like rocks A and B. Glue them back together, and we obtain the original rock A, because the physical separation is gone.This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity [...] how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
Actually ... upon further thinking, I have to make an exception when it comes to humans. Split a human body in two, and we do not obtain two separate humans. Assuming the human survives, only one of the two parts retains the human identity, that is, its self, personality, subjectiveness, soul. And that is the part that is still able to think. So I am siding with Metaphysician Undercover when it comes to a being who has a self or soul, that this particular being has indeed a form that is particular to it.all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate Ideas, one for each individual — Wayfarer
I think Aristotle separates the formal cause (essence) from the final cause (reason or end). Thus the formal cause of a triangle is "a flat surface with three straight sides", but I don't think that would be a relevant final cause. Having said that, I think this is true when it comes to man-made things, as described at the beginning of this post.Note here the link between 'form' and 'formal cause'. So to see the form of a thing, is also to see it's reason for existence. — Wayfarer
Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".
But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template. — Samuel Lacrampe
But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. — Samuel Lacrampe
Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. — Samuel Lacrampe
Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?) — Samuel Lacrampe
So you are saying that if there is a physical obstacle, like distance between the message and the recipient, which prevents the receiving of information, then info must be physical; because if it wasn't, then there could not be any physical obstacles. — Samuel Lacrampe
But this is not necessarily the case, because the physical container could simply act as a cause to the existence of the information, as opposed to being the information itself. — Samuel Lacrampe
I.e, the physical container is the efficient cause of information, not the formal cause. And a cause is a separate thing from its effect; therefore if this is true, then the container is a different thing than the information it causes to exist. — Samuel Lacrampe
They cannot be the same in the sense of identical, because each is unique. — Metaphysician Undercover
when you say "forms are not physical", this is not the whole truth, because a form may be physical, or it may not be physical, depending on whether it has material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's what makes the difference between rock A and rock B intelligible, the fact that they have different forms — Metaphysician Undercover
The point you're arguing is that forms pertain to individuals, whereas I understand them to pertain to types. I dealt with that issue in this post, specifically, 'the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - types, not persons. An essence is general, not specific to the individual, contrary to what you're arguing.
I provided a reference. This whole paper is about ways in which Aristotle might be interpreted so as to support the notion of 'individual essences', which, the author says, he is sure Aristotle did not propose. This does result in many interpretive difficulties, but that is one of the shortcomings of the whole system. — Wayfarer
The form, as such, is not physical, only the particular is physical. That is so even now, and very much to the point. 'A model of car' is not physical, it's a set of specifications which are then manufactured or real-ized physically. — Wayfarer
“EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual. Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower. But, whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; [this is 'body'] and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner [this is 'intellect']. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
The separation of form from matter requires two stages if the idea is to be elaborated: first, the sensitive stage, wherein the external and internal senses operate upon the material object, accepting its form without matter, but not without the appendages of matter; second the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and identifies it as a particular something.
Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable. The product of abstraction is a species of an intelligible order. Now possible intellect is supplied with an adequate stimulus to which it responds by producing a concept.
From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941. — Wayfarer
I don't think you will find a discussion anywhere of the difference between individual rocks, as such differences are accidental. You might find a discussion of the different types of rock. But recall that the notion of there being forms for 'dirt, hair and mud' are ruled out very early in the debates on forms. Again, you're thinking about 'intelligibility' in terms of particulars - that this or that particular individual 'is intelligible'. That is not how the ancients thought about it. — Wayfarer
The problem is that there aren't any right angle triangles except those created by human beings. So it doesn't really make any sense to say that The Pythagorean theorem describes something that is real whether or not perceived by humans, because the terms within the theorem refer to things only created by humans. So it is not correct to say that this feature is not created by humans.
The same is the case for pi, and circles. A cirtcle, as well as pi, are concepts created by humans. There are no naturally occurring circles, and that's why pi is an irrational ratio. All of these are concepts, are created by human beings, and are used to assist human beings in understanding the various natural features. They are tools, built by human beings. They are understood as absolutes, ideals, perfections, but without the human mind they have no existence because there is nothing natural that they refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer
That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer
Accordingly, geometric forms are both mind-dependent, and mind-independent. They're 'mind dependent' in that they're only perceivable by the rational intellect. But they're 'mind-independent' in that their existence doesn't depend on them being perceived by the intellect, and certainly not created by them. They exist - or rather, they are real - whether or not they're perceived. That is why Platonism is called 'objective idealism' - it says there are such things as 'real ideas', which is the crux of the entire thread. They're not 'in the mind', but can only be grasped by a mind. But the fact of them being both dependent on, and independent of, the particular mind, is, I think, my own interpretive contribution to this debate. I haven't seen reference to that argument anywhere in the literature (and if anyone knows better, I would be very interested.) — Wayfarer
So what you think is 'natural' or 'normal' - for instance, that particular things are intelligible, or that triangles are the creations of the human mind - is not at all what the classical theories say. (And I acknowledge my own inexpertise in the subject, but I honestly can't say that I think you know better ;-) ) But I will also acknowledge, you are about the only poster who is attempting to address the issue with reference to the classical tradition. (This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer
(This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer
When you say 'created by the human mind', that is modernist thinking - nearly every modern philosopher would agree with you. But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. — Wayfarer
At the end of the day, particular substances are what exist, whether material or immaterial, and a substance is always a composite of potency and act.
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Aquinas supposed that angels exist as pure forms, but still as composites of potency and act. — Aaron R
In the case of angels, form plays the role of potency in relation to the pure act of existence ("esse") bequeathed via the direct creative power of God. — Aaron R
Aquinas allows for substantial existence which is not a composite of potency and act. This is obvious in the case of God. — Metaphysician Undercover
So this doesn't make sense at all, to say that form plays the role of potency, because it is an obvious inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover
Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. [...] Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. — Aquinas
What do you mean I'm not reading it right? The first three sentences, as the premise to the entire passage, state:
"EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual." — Metaphysician Undercover
if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. — Wayfarer
You are mixing up mind-dependent with mind-independent in a category mistake, which can only lead to confusion — Metaphysician Undercover
I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man. — Albert Einstein
angels are here understood as intellectual agents that are capable of interaction with material existence, and not as Platonic "Ideas" subsisting in some independent realm of purely intelligible being. — Aaron R
Mathematical objects are not material substances. — Aaron R
I've read the original material, and reread the original material, in some cases many times. Understanding does not come easy. — Metaphysician Undercover
My understanding is that just as matter is potency with respect for form, so form is potency with respect esse, which is the act of existence bequeathed by God to every finite substance. Aquinas is quite clear that angels are composites of potency and act. See "Article 2: Reply to Objection 3" at the link below: — Aaron R
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