Two excellent posts with a huge amount to consider in both. I will reply later.

Snap!

Modifying Floridi, I have: Dedomena (Pure Data) is that which is inferred from (contingent upon) physical experience (i.e., Universals), or required by (necessary to) mental experience (i.e., Transcendentals).

(Y)

Nice joint effort.

This is what I see as the riddle of Kant"s "Critique of Pure Reason". — Metaphysician Undercover

Agree. I looked into 'noumenal' and found that it is derived from 'nous' which is the seminal Greek term for 'mind' or 'intellect'. (Perhaps it means something which can't be expressed in the modern lexicon.) In any case, the 'noumenal object' is indeed something like 'the ideal object' - something as it truly is, as distinct from how it 'appears for us'. Kant says we only know how things 'appear to us'.

But recall that passage from Lloyd Gerson on Aristotle, where A. says that when we know something intelligible, then the mind is 'identical with that intelligible'. That plainly cannot be the case with any actual object which is by its nature separate from us. When we know a logical or mathematical truth, then that truth is immediately apparent in a way in which knowledge of a particular cannot be; it is known 'in the mind's eye' so to speak, which is higher than the 'corporeal eye'.

Plato, on the other hand seems to allow that the human intellect can apprehend intelligible objects directly, through the means of "the good". — Metaphysician Undercover

It is more that they're illuminated by 'the light of the Good'. We see by that light the truths of reason, that possess a certainty that sensible things cannot. That is how we can know 'a priori', and on the basis of reason alone.

(1) Are 'forms' synonymous to 'necessary entities', like the laws of logic and morality? — Samuel Lacrampe

That is an excellent question. I have been proceeding as if they are, but I really don't know if that is correct. Bear in mind, Plato was an ancient thinker and that such ideas as logical laws, hadn't even been devised in his time; it was Aristotle who was to put that into a methodical form. When I go back and read the originals, it is not nearly so neat and conclusive as that. There are hints, to-and-fro's, questions, and aporia, and so on. One thing I am finding, is that Plato seems to think the Forms are real, or are actual existing things, whereas I interpret them as having a kind of implicit reality which is less literal than Plato seems to understand it (or at least as many people says he understands it). In other words, I am abstracting what I think the Forms mean, but I might be taking liberties with the idea in so doing.

Nevertheless, a point that strikes me is this: that the idea of the separation of 'form and substance', which was started by Plato, but finalised by Aristotle, seems really foundational to Western thinking generally. Think of something that we all take for granted: a template. If you have any experience with IT, you will know the concept of 'the template' is used in an enormous number of ways, from simple MS Word templates, to entire bodies of code. Now, how could that concept have been developed without Plato? (Note to self: must read Plato at the Googleplex.)

So anyway, my short answer to your question is Yes, even if it is not actually obvious from the original texts that this is what Forms do mean. I take the knowledge of the forms to be the 'rational insight into principles', in the broadest sense, although in saying that, I know I'm taking liberties.

I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

Agree. This is one of the notions that Ockham exploited - he depicted the forms in such a way that suggested 'a heavily populated universe of discourse'. However

The existence of the form “sight,” by which the eye sees, may be some positive presence in the nature of things (which biologists can describe in terms of the qualities of a healthy eye that gives it the power to see), but the existence of the form blindness in the blind eye need be nothing more than the nonexistence of sight ‒ the form of blindness is [therefore] a privation of 'the form of sight' and so not really an additional form at all. In general, distinguishing and qualifying the different ways there can “be” a form present in a thing goes a long way toward alleviating the apparent profligacy of the realist account of words signifying forms.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH OCKHAM?, JOSHUA P. HOCHSCHILD

3) I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. It seems to be an unnecessary hypothesis: What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter? — Samuel Lacrampe

This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity, and his hylomorphism. Every object has a "what" it is, which is proper to it, and it alone, this is its form. According to the argument in the middle of his Metaphysics, the important metaphysical question to ask of existence, is "why is anything what it is, rather than something else?". He argues that when an object comes into existence, it is necessarily the object which it is (what it is), and not something else. It is impossible by contradiction that it is something other than what it is. So he concludes that the form of the object is necessarily prior to the material existence of the object, in order to fulfil this condition, that it is impossible that the object is something other than it is.

Plato gets to a very similar conclusion through a long and round about adventure which spans his entire career of writing. He expresses this in the Timaeus, as the creation of material objects from the divine mind. Form is given to material existence, in the process of creation (what I called information earlier in the thread). Plato's method is more like this. We see that things are desired, wanted by the human mind, as "the good". So the human mind designates something as "good", and forms a conception of that object, then proceeds to give physical existence to that object, produces it. So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world.

And since naturally occurring things exist with an intelligible order, or form, Plato sees the need to extend this principle to all material things. They must have been created by an intelligent mind in order that they are observed to exist with an intelligible form. So the same principle of creation is followed in natural things as in artificial things, such that the immaterial form of the thing precedes the material existence of the thing. And this is necessary in order to account for the fact that things are intelligible, i.e. that they have intelligible forms.

I hope that this satisfactorily answers your question: "What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter". What is explained by assuming that each thing has its own particular form, is the intelligibility of the material world. Consider that if we could not distinguish one thing from another, the entire world would appear as random nonsense. It is the act of distinguishing differences within the world, which we all do, that is the act of making sense of the world. This is what the various senses have evolved to do, each one distinguishes a different type of difference, and the mind tries to make sense of all the different differences.

So it is the fact that each thing has its own particular form, peculiar to itself, which makes the world intelligible. That is why we manage to tell the difference between one thing and another, rather than being confused. But as soon as we accept this fact, as the brute fact which it is, we are faced with the much more difficult, and very imposing question, which Aristotle asks, of how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else.

In any case, the 'noumenal object' is indeed something like 'the ideal object' - something as it truly is, as distinct from how it 'appears for us'. Kant says we only know how things 'appear to us'. — Wayfarer

Right, so this is the difficulty exposed by Kant. How do we reconcile "the ideal object" (what the object really is, it's real form) with "what appears to us"? Kant implies that this cannot be reconciled, and therefore we cannot really know the physical world. All we can know is the phenomenal, what appears to us.

But recall that passage from Lloyd Gerson on Aristotle, where A. says that when we know something intelligible, then the mind is 'identical with that intelligible'. That plainly cannot be the case with any actual object which is by its nature separate from us. — Wayfarer

So this is the exact problem which I've been referring to, how the human mind is deficient. The mind cannot become identical with any particular object, because it desires to know every object. Therefore it has evolved to know universals rather than particulars. The result is that we cannot know any particular object to the point of perfection, because we identify with these particulars through the means of universals. This principle indicates that we cannot know, completely, any particular object.

When we know a logical or mathematical truth, then that truth is immediately apparent in a way in which knowledge of a particular cannot be; it is known 'in the mind's eye' so to speak, which is higher than the 'corporeal eye'. — Wayfarer

A logical or mathematical truth is a universal truth. But remember, according to Plato's hierarchy, this is not the highest form of knowledge. The highest knowledge is knowledge of the Forms. And to understand the Forms is to understand that each particular has a Form proper to it, which cannot be completely apprehended by the human intellect. This knowledge of the Forms is not sense knowledge, it is derived from reasoning, but is indicative of the defect of sense (phenomenal) knowledge. And through extension we learn the defect of logical and mathematical truths. As universals they cannot completely know particulars. Despite the fact that mathematical principles are grasped immediately and completely, they cannot give us a complete understanding of reality, which consists of particulars. There is a categorical gap which we need to reconcile through principles other than mathematical principles.

It is more that they're illuminated by 'the light of the Good'. We see by that light the truths of reason, that possess a certainty that sensible things cannot. That is how we can know 'a priori', and on the basis of reason alone. — Wayfarer

I agree, it is "the light of the Good". The Good is the light which makes intelligible objects intelligible. But this principle casts our attention in the direction of "the good", if we desire to follow, and understand the true nature of intelligible objects. And the good is inherently subjective, it is determined from within, by the subject and that's why it is associated with pure reason, not requiring anything empirical. It is the basis of the a priori because it is what inspires us to agree on a definition, we see that it is good. But in recognizing "the good", we are required necessarily to turn our attention inward, and recognize the particularities of the subject. And when the particularities of the subject are recognized as real, we are induced to extend this to all material existence, and recognize the particularities of all material things as a fundamental aspect of reality.

Agree. This is one of the notions that Ockham exploited - he depicted the forms in such a way that suggested 'a heavily populated universe of discourse'. — Wayfarer

Please read my reply to Samuel, above, as to why it is necessary to assume particular forms of individuals in order to account for the intelligibility of material existence.

So you are saying that if there is a physical obstacle, like distance between the message and the recipient, which prevents the receiving of information, then info must be physical; because if it wasn't, then there could not be any physical obstacles. But this is not necessarily the case, because the physical container could simply act as a cause to the existence of the information, as opposed to being the information itself. I.e, the physical container is the efficient cause of information, not the formal cause. And a cause is a separate thing from its effect; therefore if this is true, then the container is a different thing than the information it causes to exist.

So this is the exact problem which I've been referring to, how the human mind is deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's more about the inherent unreliability of the physical senses. That comes out more clearly in Thomism as was discussed earlier - the 'corporeal senses' receive sensations from the 'particular', whilst the 'incorporeal soul' apprehends the form. Note here the link between 'form' and 'formal cause'. So to see the form of a thing, is also to see it's reason for existence. That link between the reason for something, and its existence, or essence and existence, is what was severed by nominalism, culminating in the typically modernist view that things exist for no reason, or only out of 'adaptive necessity', or perhaps that 'existence precedes essence' in existentialist terminology.

it has evolved to know universals rather than particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't bring biological evolution into it.

why it is necessary to assume particular forms of individuals in order to account for the intelligibility of material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - types, not persons. You see the difference? In other words, all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate Ideas, one for each individual. 'An essence is general, in that more than one individual may have the same essence' 1; and the essence is the 'is-ness' as can be seen from the etymology of the word 'essence'. (This of course leads to many other conundrums, such as whether Socrates can be thought of as a man, or mankind, generally, which is, I think, one of the inherent shortcomings of Aristotelian logic.)

So

Despite the fact that mathematical principles are grasped immediately and completely, they cannot give us a complete understanding of reality, which consists of particulars. — Metaphysician Undercover

I really can't see how this can be correct. Again, I think you're defaulting to nominalism - not deliberately, maybe, but because modern culture has been shaped by nominalism which was the predecessor of empiricism. It is natural for us to attribute reality to particular objects of perception, but I'm sure that's not how the ancients understood it. And I'm not saying the ancients had it right, and we have it wrong, but it's important to recognise this distinction, which I think you're consistently blurring in your analysis. You're always attributing reality to the concrete particulars, whereas the ancients thought individuals were real only because they realiize, or make real, the Form or the Idea. That may not have been correct in saying that, but you're consistently interpreting them to be saying something that they (both Plato and Aristotle) didn't actually say.

I haven't really started studying the Timaeus yet, but from my reading of the summary I can't see where Plato proposes 'individual forms' of the sort you're proposing - if you could point that out I would be obliged.

It's more about the inherent unreliability of the physical senses. That comes out more clearly in Thomism as was discussed earlier - the 'corporeal senses' receive sensations from the 'particular', whilst the 'incorporeal soul' apprehends the form. — Wayfarer

All right, but when the incorporeal soul apprehends the form, through the means of the mind, that form is always apprehended through universals. This necessitates that some aspects of any object, are always neglected by the mind, as accidental. The mind apprehends what is perceived as essential to the object, while missing the accidentals. But the nature of a particular is such that each accidental is essential to its existence as the particular which it is. The accidentals are what give it its uniqueness.

So the mind suffers from an inversion of the same limitation which the corporeal senses suffer. The senses can only detect particulars, while the mind only knows universals. So the mind is limited in its capacity to know and understand the uniqueness of the forms of the particulars of the sense world.

To claim that forms only exist as the universals which the mind apprehends represents a misunderstanding of the nature of reality. Where Plato and Aristotle clearly agree is on the idea that each particular must have a form proper to itself. My argument is that the human mind is limited in its capacity to know the form of the particular.

That link between the reason for something, and its existence, or essence and existence, is what was severed by nominalism, culminating in the typically modernist view that things exist for no reason, or only out of 'adaptive necessity', or perhaps that 'existence precedes essence' in existentialist terminology. — Wayfarer

This is why the position I argue is not a nominalist position. Nominalists proceed away from realism in the opposite direction from me. I see that reality is more complicated than what the realist believes, because I see two distinct types of forms, particulars and universals. These are known by Aristotle as primary and secondary substance, primary being the form of the object itself, secondary being its description. The nominalist claims that reality is simpler than what the realist believes, dismissing the reality of forms altogether.

I think the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - to types, not to persons. You see the difference? In other words, all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate ideas, one for each individual. — Wayfarer

OK, but the form of a thing is "what" the thing is. So the question is this: Do you not believe that there is a "what it is", which is specific, and particular to each individual human being, and object? In other words, there is a description which describes MU, one for Wayfarer, and one for Samuel Lacrampe, etc.. If there is a particular description which is proper to each particular person, then it is necessary to conclude that there is a particular form which is proper to each person.

An essence is general, in that more than one individual may have the same essence 1; and the essence is the 'is-ness' as can be seen from the etymology of the word 'essence'. (This of course leads to many other conundrums, such as whether Socrates can be thought of as a man, or mankind, generally, which is, I think, one of the inherent shortcomings of Aristotelian logic.) — Wayfarer

An essence is general, but we can ask of the individual, the particular, "what is the essence of an individual". And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals.

I really can't see how this can be correct. — Wayfarer

It's a really straight forward principle, and I do not understand why it's tough for you to grasp. Say you and I are both human beings, and it is this universal form, "humanness" which makes it true that we are both humans. This is the universal form. However, there is something which makes you Wayfarer and me Metaphysician Undercover, and this is the particular form which we each have. So we must assume that each person and thing has a particular form that is proper to it, which makes it the unique thing which it is, allowing us to identify it as itself, and distinguish it from others. This is fundamental to Aristotle's physics. All existing matter has a form which is proper to it, and it alone, such that if any matter had the same form, it would necessarily be the same matter.

haven't really started studying the Timaeus yet, but from my reading of the summary I can't see where Plato proposes 'individual forms' of the sort you're proposing - if you could point that out I would be obliged. — Wayfarer

I would say that the entire book is an argument for this principle, that each individual thing has its own form. Timaeus describes all different types of things, explaining how each has a form unique to it. Let me see what I can dig up quickly. Start at the end of 30, going into 31, where Timaeus emphasizes that the universe is "one", a unique and individual thing, rather than two, or an infinite number of similar universes. He spends some time describing Same and Different. At 44 he is describing how intelligence is the ability to distinguish between what is the same and what is different. He then provides a physical description of the human body. By p49 he starts to talk about what later becomes known as "matter", as the "a receptacle of all becoming". He discusses the nature of this receiving thing for a few pages.

I see at 51 he says: "Is our perpetual claim that there exists an Intelligible Form for each thing a vacuous gesture, in the end nothing but mere talk?" Then he offers a brief argument to support this claim. By page 80 he is describing very particular things, particular motions, and how they are not random, just particular. Then he gets into the uniqueness of fragmented parts, and the specifics of various diseases. He continues to describe all the uniqueness in the world, and how this is good and a perfection, closing the book with this

These then are the conditions which govern then and now, how all the animals exchange their forms, one for the other, and in the process gain intelligence or folly.
And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its conclusion. This world of ours has received and teems with living things, mortal and immortal. A visible living thing containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Thing, its grandness, goodness, beauty and perfection are unexcelled. Our one universe, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.

Bear in mind, Plato was an ancient thinker and that such ideas as logical laws, hadn't even been devised in his time; it was Aristotle who was to put that into a methodical form. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is a great point. As I was wondering myself, if the theory of forms is so important in philosophy, then why is it that nobody really speaks of them outside of the context of Plato, as though it is more of a theoretical exercise than something relevant to our days? I think the answer is that forms are still very much around, but under different names. Thus Plato's Forms (1) are now called necessary / eternal / rational truths or natural laws, or simply Truth as per Kierkegaard; and Aristotle's forms (2) are now called concepts (not to be confused with the ambiguous term 'concept' as a mere idea or draft for a design). And in both cases, forms have essential properties or essences because they are universals.

One thing I am finding, is that Plato seems to think the Forms are real, or are actual existing things, whereas I interpret them as having a kind of implicit reality which is less literal than Plato seems to understand it (or at least as many people says he understands it) — Wayfarer

Well, if Plato's Forms (1) are indeed synonymous to necessary truths, then we can prove that they are real and separate from matter: Necessary truths are, by definition, eternally existing; and if matter is not eternal (which is reasonable to suppose), then Forms (1) must be able to exist separate from matter. And that makes them more real than anything which exists only temporarily, or which existence depends on other things.

Also I think Plato does refer to necessary entities and not contingent entities, as most of his dialogues are about either logic and maths, such as in the Meno (geometry), or morality, such as in the Republic (justice), both of which are typically considered eternal truths.

So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".

But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template.

And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity [...] how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. Even using the law of identity, I find that a particular form for particular things remains an unnecessary hypothesis: Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. Then consider rock A only, which has identity A. Split the rock in two halves A1 and A2. Which of the two halves retains identity A? They cannot both retain the same identity, because A1 and A2 have different x, y, z properties, just like rocks A and B. Glue them back together, and we obtain the original rock A, because the physical separation is gone.

Similarly, consider a tree which is able to grow many trunks, but is one organism (they exist but I forgot the name). We call it one thing and not many, because all the trunks are physically connected. But now cut the roots connecting the trunks together; all trucks will live, and what was one is now many living things; separate identities. The reason is because there now exists a physical separation between the trunks.

Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?)

all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate Ideas, one for each individual — Wayfarer

Actually ... upon further thinking, I have to make an exception when it comes to humans. Split a human body in two, and we do not obtain two separate humans. Assuming the human survives, only one of the two parts retains the human identity, that is, its self, personality, subjectiveness, soul. And that is the part that is still able to think. So I am siding with Metaphysician Undercover when it comes to a being who has a self or soul, that this particular being has indeed a form that is particular to it.

Note here the link between 'form' and 'formal cause'. So to see the form of a thing, is also to see it's reason for existence. — Wayfarer

I think Aristotle separates the formal cause (essence) from the final cause (reason or end). Thus the formal cause of a triangle is "a flat surface with three straight sides", but I don't think that would be a relevant final cause. Having said that, I think this is true when it comes to man-made things, as described at the beginning of this post.

The notion of particular forms coincides with that of empirical data. For me, the discussion on the Platonic/Aristotelian forms has been essential in understanding the difference between pure and empirical data (pure data consisting of universals and transcendentals), but once understood, I would prefer to drop the archaic term "form" and replace it with "data", largely because "data" is an equivalent term used in modern information theory and philosophy of information.

(Empirical) data being a set of distinct (unique) physical or mental variables (objects capable of change), accessed and elaborated at a given level of abstraction.

Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".

But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point is that there must be both, general forms and particular forms. Suppose there is a blueprint from which a product is mass produced. We still have to account for the difference between each of the items produced. They cannot be the same in the sense of identical, because each is unique. You might be inclined to say that the differences are "material" differences, rather than formal differences. But if the difference can be described (in the sense of "what" constitutes that difference) it is a formal difference. Descriptions, as what the intellect can grasp, are always formal, as the intellect only grasps forms.

This is Leibniz' principle, "the identity of indiscernibles". If two items have the exact same form, they are necessarily one and the same thing. So we must allow that even products which are mass produced, have a different form from each other. Since the mind only grasps forms, if the numerous items had the same form, we would have no principle whereby we could say that one is not the other. But we do say one is not the other, therefore there is a difference between them, and they have different forms.

But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. — Samuel Lacrampe

Under Aristotelian hylomorphism, all physical things consist of both matter and form. It is a type of dualism. That is the fundamental principle of Aristotle's physics, which you and Wayfarer don't seem to be getting. Physical existence is composed of these two constituent parts. So it makes sense, in a way, to say that forms are not physical, as you do, but the form is a constituent part of the physical.

Some philosophers prior to Aristotle had posited a "prime matter", like the atom. The prime matter was supposed to have no form whatsoever, but capable of taking any form. This allowed that all things are composed of the same underlying thing, prime matter (perhaps atoms), which, by themselves have absolutely no form. Having absolutely no form under the Aristotelian system, would mean that they are absolutely unintelligible. What Aristotle demonstrates with the cosmological argument, is that matter cannot exist without a form. Matter without form is an illogical principle. Therefore the concept of prime matter, though it was very useful for the scientific investigations of his time, is something which cannot possibly be real.

After Aristotle, the Neo-Platonist respected his cosmological argument, because it is very strong. The argument though, proves that matter cannot exist without a form, but it allows that form can exist without matter. So the Neo-Platonist took up the cause of independent, non-physical Forms, while maintaining consistency with Aristotle. But when you say "forms are not physical", this is not the whole truth, because a form may be physical, or it may not be physical, depending on whether it has material existence.

Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you are not respecting here, is that to describe the properties of a thing is to describe its form. Properties are always aspects of the form of a thing. That's what makes the difference between rock A and rock B intelligible, the fact that they have different forms. If they didn't have different forms, then the difference between them would be unintelligible, and the claim that rock A is not rock B would be an unintelligible claim.

Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?) — Samuel Lacrampe

So this is a mistaken claim. We cannot explain differences in properties by referring to matter. Matter on its own (prime matter without form) is inherently unintelligible. Having the nature of potential, it accounts for what may or may not come to be, violating the law of excluded middle. The intellect can grasp forms only. So if we can differentiate between two objects by referring to different properties, it is differences in form which is being referred to.

So you are saying that if there is a physical obstacle, like distance between the message and the recipient, which prevents the receiving of information, then info must be physical; because if it wasn't, then there could not be any physical obstacles. — Samuel Lacrampe

Well, that's not really the point I'm making, but I think this could be a great initial path of inquiry if you start again the interrogation taking for starting point the assumption that information is physical. If we exclude error in data-processing, can we find non-physical obstacles to communication beween two properly-primed processors? None come to mind easily.

I'm rather taking the more defensive position that the argument brought forth initially, the distinction between potential causes, does not actually weight in one way or another. I'm also criticizing the recourse to higher-level form of communication to treat information ontologically. Looking, feeling and hearing are all forms of information treatment which precedes the attribution of meaning in any epistemologically relevant way and the series of distinction between objectivity/subjectivity that necessarily comes muddle the analysis.

But this is not necessarily the case, because the physical container could simply act as a cause to the existence of the information, as opposed to being the information itself. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is the explanatory power of such a theory? Imagine two agents trying to communicate information from one to another. Unfortunately, despite all their best intentions and efforts, they fail. Agent B never understands whatever it is that Agent A wanted to say. So how does this ontology helps us? Can you explain in terms of the information and the information alone why B couldn't get A, without ever bringing up the container? It doesn't strike me as possible. However, the opposite does seem possible. I believe an explanation in terms of the physical treatment of the input, it's association with an index of common 'experiences' (in other terms, another piece of pre-processed information) would be able to explain away the situation.

I.e, the physical container is the efficient cause of information, not the formal cause. And a cause is a separate thing from its effect; therefore if this is true, then the container is a different thing than the information it causes to exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

You could reframe this in terms of an emergentist account of the informational property of matter. I think, all in all, this is all that the application of aristotelean metaphysics can lead to, on this subject. Again, this does not really support your argument. It can as well support the idea that information is material as the idea that it isn't.

They cannot be the same in the sense of identical, because each is unique. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point you're arguing is that forms pertain to individuals, whereas I understand them to pertain to types. I dealt with that issue in this post, specifically, 'the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - types, not persons. An essence is general, not specific to the individual, contrary to what you're arguing.

I provided a reference. This whole paper is about ways in which Aristotle might be interpreted so as to support the notion of 'individual essences', which, the author says, he is sure Aristotle did not propose. This does result in many interpretive difficulties, but that is one of the shortcomings of the whole system.

when you say "forms are not physical", this is not the whole truth, because a form may be physical, or it may not be physical, depending on whether it has material existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

The form, as such, is not physical, only the particular is physical. That is so even now, and very much to the point. 'A model of car' is not physical, it's a set of specifications which are then manufactured or real-ized physically.

That's what makes the difference between rock A and rock B intelligible, the fact that they have different forms — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you will find a discussion anywhere of the difference between individual rocks, as such differences are accidental. You might find a discussion of the different types of rock. But recall that the notion of there being forms for 'dirt, hair and mud' are ruled out very early in the debates on forms. Again, you're thinking about 'intelligibility' in terms of particulars - that this or that particular individual 'is intelligible'. That is not how the ancients thought about it.

But, look, this debate goes nowhere, because when you're challenged, it results in long digressions which ultimately end up repeating the same things. So I'm buying out of this thread now, unless anything new comes in, and thanks to all for your feedback, I have found it very interesting.

The point you're arguing is that forms pertain to individuals, whereas I understand them to pertain to types. I dealt with that issue in this post, specifically, 'the forms are those of an individual particular, not a particular individual - types, not persons. An essence is general, not specific to the individual, contrary to what you're arguing.

I provided a reference. This whole paper is about ways in which Aristotle might be interpreted so as to support the notion of 'individual essences', which, the author says, he is sure Aristotle did not propose. This does result in many interpretive difficulties, but that is one of the shortcomings of the whole system. — Wayfarer

Here's a quote from the Wikipedia (of all places) entry on "essence":
"Aristotle moves the Forms of Plato to the nucleus of the individual thing, which is called ousía or substance."
As I said, I do not deny forms as types, or universals, I just see the need, as Plato and Aristotle did, to assume forms of particulars as well.

But OK, you have a different opinion than I, a different interpretation of Aristotle than I. Though I think you misunderstand, I respect the difference. The question though is which opinion, or interpretation best suits reality. Whichever best describes reality is the one we should go with.

Do you agree that we can only know things through their form, or essence, this is what is intelligible to us? The form, and nothing else is what is grasped by the intellect. And do you agree that we can know two things of the same type to be distinct, different things? If so, then doesn't this produce the conclusion that two distinct things of the same type must each have a different form?

The form, as such, is not physical, only the particular is physical. That is so even now, and very much to the point. 'A model of car' is not physical, it's a set of specifications which are then manufactured or real-ized physically. — Wayfarer

But don't you agree that the physical object has a form? Without a form, what would the particular object be other than random matter? Look at a car. It is not just random matter, it is matter with a particular form. When you look at the car, you do not see matter, you see particular aspects of the form, its colour, and shape. If you touch it, you feel other aspects of its form. You can hear some aspects of its form, and maybe smell some, or even taste some. But all these things which you sense, are aspects of its form. That's why the physical object, that particular car, is intelligible to you as that particular car because it has a form, and you've come to know its form. The form is part of the physical thing, the part which you perceive and is intelligible to you. If you cannot distinguish one particular car from another, it is because you have not come to know each one's form well enough, not because they do not each have a particular form.

Upon abstraction, intellection, the intellect receives the form of the physical object. But it cannot be the exact same form which exists within the physical object, or else the mind would actually be that object by the law of identity. Let me refer you back to a quote you posted two weeks ago, pay particular attention to the first paragraph.

“EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual. Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower. But, whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; [this is 'body'] and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner [this is 'intellect']. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.

Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

The separation of form from matter requires two stages if the idea is to be elaborated: first, the sensitive stage, wherein the external and internal senses operate upon the material object, accepting its form without matter, but not without the appendages of matter; second the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and identifies it as a particular something.

Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable. The product of abstraction is a species of an intelligible order. Now possible intellect is supplied with an adequate stimulus to which it responds by producing a concept.

From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941. — Wayfarer

I don't think you will find a discussion anywhere of the difference between individual rocks, as such differences are accidental. You might find a discussion of the different types of rock. But recall that the notion of there being forms for 'dirt, hair and mud' are ruled out very early in the debates on forms. Again, you're thinking about 'intelligibility' in terms of particulars - that this or that particular individual 'is intelligible'. That is not how the ancients thought about it. — Wayfarer

Your claim "that is not how the ancients thought about it" is not right, because this is at the root of Aristotle's law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". Aristotle's rendition of the law of identity is intended to account for accidental differences, in response to sophists who could produce absurd conclusions from the assumption that two distinct things with the same description were logically the same thing.

The problem is that there aren't any right angle triangles except those created by human beings. So it doesn't really make any sense to say that The Pythagorean theorem describes something that is real whether or not perceived by humans, because the terms within the theorem refer to things only created by humans. So it is not correct to say that this feature is not created by humans.

The same is the case for pi, and circles. A cirtcle, as well as pi, are concepts created by humans. There are no naturally occurring circles, and that's why pi is an irrational ratio. All of these are concepts, are created by human beings, and are used to assist human beings in understanding the various natural features. They are tools, built by human beings. They are understood as absolutes, ideals, perfections, but without the human mind they have no existence because there is nothing natural that they refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is from earlier in the thread and is the crux of the issue. When you say 'created by the human mind', that is modernist thinking - nearly every modern philosopher would agree with you. But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right.

Accordingly, geometric forms are both mind-dependent, and mind-independent. They're 'mind dependent' in that they're only perceivable by the rational intellect. But they're 'mind-independent' in that their existence doesn't depend on them being perceived by the intellect, and certainly not created by them. They exist - or rather, they are real - whether or not they're perceived. That is why Platonism is called 'objective idealism' - it says there are such things as 'real ideas', which is the crux of the entire thread. They're not 'in the mind', but can only be grasped by a mind. But the fact of them being both dependent on, and independent of, the particular mind, is, I think, my own interpretive contribution to this debate. I haven't seen reference to that argument anywhere in the literature (and if anyone knows better, I would be very interested.)

All through your posts, I agree with many things, up to a point - but then I run into statements I can't go along with, which I think are due to the fact that you're viewing the topic with a modernistic bias, which you yourself don't recognise. So what you think is 'natural' or 'normal' - for instance, that particular things are intelligible, or that triangles are the creations of the human mind - is not at all what the classical theories say. (And I acknowledge my own inexpertise in the subject, but I honestly can't say that I think you know better ;-) But I will also acknowledge, you are almost the only poster who is attempting to address the issue with reference to the classical tradition. This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.)

So - let's keep at it at that for now. As I said, I think it's been a very interesting exchange, but the questions are vast - like 'angels on the head of a pin', it could go for centuries, and I have to attend to more mundane issues.

But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer

I do not think it is correct to say that the A-T understanding is different from what I claim, because this is what Aristotle argues in BK 9 of the Metaphysics. This forms a crucial part of the cosmological argument, and his famous refutation of Pythagorean Idealism. I think I referred you to the actual passage earlier in the thread. He states that prior to being "discovered" by the mind of a geometer, the geometrical constructs do not have actual existence. They only exist potentially. And, the cosmological argument demonstrates that potential cannot be eternal, so the eternal Ideas of Pythagoreanism is refuted. The word "create" is mine, but to bring something from potential existence to actual existence is to create.

Furthermore, Aquinas in the Summa Theologica is very explicit about distinguishing between independent Forms, which are attributed to the divine, and human concepts which are mind dependent. I must admit that when I first read this in Aquinas, it threw me off, because I couldn't see where he was deriving this principle from. It wasn't until I read through Aristotle's Metaphysics again ( I don't know how many times that made) that I understood where he was getting this principle from.

That is the point of those Edward Feser articles and references that I provided earlier in the thread; it's also the point of the passage you have quoted again, but I still think you're not reading it right. — Wayfarer

What do you mean I'm not reading it right? The first three sentences, as the premise to the entire passage, state:

"EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual."

How can you ignore what is explicitly stated, as the opening premise, then claim that I'm not reading it right when I bring your attention to this?

Accordingly, geometric forms are both mind-dependent, and mind-independent. They're 'mind dependent' in that they're only perceivable by the rational intellect. But they're 'mind-independent' in that their existence doesn't depend on them being perceived by the intellect, and certainly not created by them. They exist - or rather, they are real - whether or not they're perceived. That is why Platonism is called 'objective idealism' - it says there are such things as 'real ideas', which is the crux of the entire thread. They're not 'in the mind', but can only be grasped by a mind. But the fact of them being both dependent on, and independent of, the particular mind, is, I think, my own interpretive contribution to this debate. I haven't seen reference to that argument anywhere in the literature (and if anyone knows better, I would be very interested.) — Wayfarer

You are mixing up mind-dependent with mind-independent in a category mistake, which can only lead to confusion. If you allow that some forms, universals, are mind-dependent, and other forms, the forms of particulars, are mind-independent, then you avoid this confusion. From this perspective a huge part of the A-T perspective will suddenly make sense to you.

So what you think is 'natural' or 'normal' - for instance, that particular things are intelligible, or that triangles are the creations of the human mind - is not at all what the classical theories say. (And I acknowledge my own inexpertise in the subject, but I honestly can't say that I think you know better ;-) ) But I will also acknowledge, you are about the only poster who is attempting to address the issue with reference to the classical tradition. (This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer

Here's something to consider. I've read the original material, and reread the original material, in some cases many times. Understanding does not come easy. The material is complex and layered. It takes a very long time for the understanding to sink in. Every time you go back you apprehend something which you missed before, because of what you've learned since. The cosmological argument only made sense to me more than twenty years after I first encountered it. And although I've understood Aristotle's principle that physical things consist of matter and form for a very long time, the arguments in the Timaeus for particular forms, and Aquinas' distinction between human concepts and independent Forms, only made sense to me after the cosmological argument did.

You insist that my interpretation is biased by a modern perspective, but this does not necessarily mean that I misinterpret, it may only mean that the material is very relevant in the modern world. Please, read Aristotle's Metaphysics BK9, ch 8 and 9, and then decide whether or not he is saying that triangles are the creation of human minds. Here's parts of a passage from 1051a,

"It is by an activity that geometrical constructions are discovered; for we find them by dividing. If the figures had already been divided, the constructions would have been obvious; but as it is they are present only potentially.
...
Obviously, therefore, the potentially existing constructions are discovered by being brought to actuality; the reason is that the geometer's thinking is an actuality; so that the potency proceeds from an actuality; and therefore it is by making constructions that people come to know them..."

(This is why, if I can sort out employment, I fully intend to enroll in an external metaphysics course at Oxford in January.) — Wayfarer

I think that this is an excellent idea. Take the time and read the original material as much as possible. As I said, it's very complex and layered, but each time that you understand something new, it's a revelation which opens all kinds of doors toward understanding other things. University professors will typically focus on bits and pieces, offering an interpretation, and sometimes an entire platform based on these bits. Unless you take the time to read a lot of work by any particular author, and put the bits into context, you cannot even begin to judge the professor's interpretation.

When you say 'created by the human mind', that is modernist thinking - nearly every modern philosopher would agree with you. But the classical A-T (Aristotelian-Thomist) understanding is completely different. I don't think those philosophers would agree at all that the human mind 'creates' any such thing as a form; it receives sensations, and apprehends the form, which is an 'intelligible object'. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, you are correct to assert that the A-T tradition accepts the mind-independent existence of forms, but only insofar as they are the immanent constituents of some substance. At the end of the day, particular substances are what exist, whether material or immaterial, and a substance is always a composite of potency and act. In the case of material substances, form is the principle of act and matter is the principle of potency, and neither can be said to exist in the absence of the other.

Interestingly, Thomism does allow for the existence of pure forms as a consequence of accepting the so-called "real distinction between essence and existence". Aquinas supposed that angels exist as pure forms, but still as composites of potency and act. In the case of angels, form plays the role of potency in relation to the pure act of existence ("esse") bequeathed via the direct creative power of God. But angels are here understood as intellectual agents that are capable of interaction with material existence, and not as Platonic "Ideas" subsisting in some independent realm of purely intelligible being.

In the case of mathematics things get a little more complicated. Aquinas maintained mathematical objects were abstractions produced via the agent intellect out of the contents of sense perception ("phantasiari") and, as such, consigned entirely to the realm of ens rationis (mind-dependent being). He did not deny the real, mind-independent existence of quantity in the material world (which is always manifest as an accident of some material substance, and therefore exists only in or through material substance), but he did deny that material quantity is identical to mathematical number. For Aquinas, to confuse mathematical number with material quantity is to mistake the map for the territory.

At the end of the day, particular substances are what exist, whether material or immaterial, and a substance is always a composite of potency and act.

...

Aquinas supposed that angels exist as pure forms, but still as composites of potency and act. — Aaron R

I disagree with this aspect of what you wrote Aaron. Aquinas allows for substantial existence which is not a composite of potency and act. This is obvious in the case of God. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, a form is actual. Pure independent Forms, like God and the angels are pure act. Matter is what provides potency so independent Forms are pure act. This is most evident in God whose essence is His existence. The angels are also pure act, but having been created they are described as aeviternal rather than eternal.

In the case of angels, form plays the role of potency in relation to the pure act of existence ("esse") bequeathed via the direct creative power of God. — Aaron R

So this doesn't make sense at all, to say that form plays the role of potency, because it is an obvious inconsistency. The angels do not partake of matter, or potency, but having a slightly different temporal position from God, they have a slightly different relationship to potency.

Aquinas allows for substantial existence which is not a composite of potency and act. This is obvious in the case of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

God is the only exception.

So this doesn't make sense at all, to say that form plays the role of potency, because it is an obvious inconsistency. — Metaphysician Undercover

My understanding is that just as matter is potency with respect for form, so form is potency with respect esse, which is the act of existence bequeathed by God to every finite substance. Aquinas is quite clear that angels are composites of potency and act. See "Article 2: Reply to Objection 3" at the link below:

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1050.htm#article2

Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. [...] Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. — Aquinas

What do you mean I'm not reading it right? The first three sentences, as the premise to the entire passage, state:

"EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual." — Metaphysician Undercover

However the passage then goes on to say that while the Forms are 'concrete', they're nevertheless not material:

if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. — Wayfarer

So, if what you're saying is true, those forms only exist in the mind of the observer. And if so, they can't be 'received' from anywhere, because they don't exist until the mind conceives of them. Whereas, here, the 'intellect' is [u[receiving[/u] the forms. Then, the 'active intellect' combines the received sensation with the apprehended form, to create a concept, but the concept is dependent on the form. //edit// so the fact that they're 'received' shows that they exist as immaterial but concrete realities.

You are mixing up mind-dependent with mind-independent in a category mistake, which can only lead to confusion — Metaphysician Undercover

Not so. I believe, like Einstein, that 'the Pythagorean theorem' is mind-independent in the sense that it is not the product of a mind:

I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man. — Albert Einstein

However, I don't think Einstein realised, or acknowledged, that the Pythagorean theorem can only be known by a rational intelligence. That is what I mean by 'both mind independent and mind dependent'. It is not confused, I say it is a novel idea.

angels are here understood as intellectual agents that are capable of interaction with material existence, and not as Platonic "Ideas" subsisting in some independent realm of purely intelligible being. — Aaron R

Many thanks for your contribution.

I have yet to plumb what this 'independent realm' really comprises. I conceive of it as something akin to the 'domain of natural numbers'. Now, where does that exist? Plainly, it exists nowhere - but it is nevertheless real.

Now, where does that exist? Plainly, it exists nowhere - but it is nevertheless real. — Wayfarer

Per Aquinas, it exists as a product of the intellect, which is as real as anything else that exists.

But, it's real in a different sense to corporeal objects such as tables and chairs, is it not? i.e. Aquinas' ontology allows for the reality of incorporeals in a way that naturalism generally does not.

So if I understand you correctly, particular things must have particular forms (3) because only forms are intelligible to our minds, and matter is not. Now why is that the case? If I perceive a particular chair, why can't we not simply conclude that it is because my mind perceives the matter of the chair through direct sense data?

Correct. Mathematical objects are not material substances. They exist only as a nexus of relations (i.e. signs) initially abstracted from sense perception and constructively elaborated by the intellect.

I'm sorry, but I admit I have trouble understanding your posts. And unfortunately, it seems this conversation has drifted far away from the original argument on whether info is physical or not. Maybe I can go back one last time to my original argument in the form of a syllogism, and perhaps you could pinpoint which part you disagree with?

P1: A thing A is not identical to thing B if A remains when B is removed.
P2: Information A is present when container B is present. But information A is also present when only container C is present, and C ≠ B.
C: Therefore information A is not identical to either containers B or C.

Mathematical objects are not material substances. — Aaron R

But they're nevertheless real. I am arguing for Platonic realism.

I've read the original material, and reread the original material, in some cases many times. Understanding does not come easy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry if I was discourteous or unkind.

My understanding is that just as matter is potency with respect for form, so form is potency with respect esse, which is the act of existence bequeathed by God to every finite substance. Aquinas is quite clear that angels are composites of potency and act. See "Article 2: Reply to Objection 3" at the link below: — Aaron R

OK, I stand corrected on this matter, thanks. But this is extremely difficult to understand, and it appears as inconsistency. In Aristotle's metaphysics, the existence of potential, which is central to his physics and biology, is substantiated by matter. It is the same problem we approached with Aquinas' description of the passive intellect. The passive intellect is said to be of the nature of potential yet it is immaterial. So Aquinas assumes a potency which is not associated with matter. For Aristotle, potency is inherently unintelligible due to its relation to the law of excluded middle. It is known by relating it to other things, analogy and metaphor. So the existence of potential is only made real (intelligible) by its relation to matter, and the assumption that matter is real.

If we separate potential from its association with matter, we need another principle to give it real existence, or else we just have an unsubstantiated assertion of reality. This is like the assertion that a possibility is a real possibility because it is a logical possibility. Any imaginary possibility (it is possible that a cow could jump over the moon) is a real possibility unless we insist that the possibility is substantiated by physical existence (matter).

This is why I think it is necessary to turn to Aquinas' conception of time to understand the existence of angels. When we look at the order of creation, the angels are after God yet prior to material existence. This implies time which is prior to material existence. Not all temporal existence is material existence. From here we can work to substantiate the concept of potential and potency, in relation to time rather than matter. So we may leave behind Aristotle's metaphysical principle, which substantiates potency with matter, and now substantiate potency with time.