I'm curious to know the basis for saying that. If you think it's too tedious or whatever to walk me though it that's fine.

So to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind (activities of neural networks) - including material or physical objects.

You're saying this is somehow inconsistent? — praxis

You're correct; this is perfectly consistent with the physicalist view. Of course according to that standpoint we know things via the mind; it's just that the mind itself is not understood to be non-physical.

It’s not that it’s tedious, but that’s why I asked for a reference. What you think materialist philosophy says is not what they’re actually saying. I agree with you on the ‘primacy of mind’ but that is the contrary of what a Daniel Dennett or a Patricia Churchland would say. Later on I’ll dig up some refs, I’m on my iphone right now.

Saying that we know things via the mind is no more to make a statement one way or another about primacy of the mind, than saying food is digested via the alimentary canal would be to make a statement about primacy of the alimentary canal.

From Wikipedia:

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mind and consciousness, are results of material interactions.

In Idealism Mind and Consciousness are first-order realities to which Matter is subject and secondary. In philosophical materialism the converse is true. Here Mind and Consciousness are by-products or epiphenomena of material processes (the biochemistry of the human brain and nervous system, for example) without which they cannot exist. According to this doctrine the material creates and determines consciousness, not vice versa. Materialists believe that Matter and the physical laws that govern it constitute the most reliable guide to the nature of mind and consciousness.

So what I am saying is that your suggestion:

How is this contrary to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind - including material or physical objects? — praxis

mis-states the materialist view - actually gets it backwards. The materialist view (which I'm sure, incidentally, you don't hold) is something like: what we think we know of 'the mind' amounts to a 'folk psychology' which believes, fallaciously, that 'mind' is something real, when really it is simply an expression of the 'unconscious competence' (Dennett's term) of billions of neurons that have been shaped by evolution to perform in a certain way, creating the illusion of first-person consciousness.

If this seems a preposterous notion to you, you're not alone:

[Dennett maintains that] nothing whatever is revealed to the first-person point of view but a “version” of the neural machinery. In other words, when I look at the American flag, it may seem to me that there are red stripes in my subjective visual field, but that is an illusion: the only reality, of which this is “an interpreted, digested version,” is that a physical process I can’t describe is going on in my visual cortex.

I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”

Thomas Nagel, review of Dennett, Is Consciousness an Illusion

Some of the problems posed by mental phenomena [e.g. 'the hard problem of consciousness'] Dennett simply dismisses without adequate reason; others he ignores. Most, however, he attempts to prove are mere “user-illusions” generated by evolutionary history, even though this sometimes involves claims so preposterous as to verge on the deranged.

David Bentley Hart, review of Dennett, The Illusionist

Great sketch. All those thinkers are great, and those are strong paraphrases. You left off Heidegger, I note.

For me the 'first wrong move' is 'wrong' with respect to a particular and ultimately personal purpose. I want to 'speak the truth' about life, be a poet who gets it righter if not right. But it's also a matter of style, of being more wakefully present in the non-theoretical aspects of life. The alternative is to force the mess of experience into nice little word machines, constraining the experience anxiously. So the 'first wrong move' is assuming a bookish theoretical approach toward existence, one might say. Or picking up the 'how' of research unquestioned. But lots of this is already in the thinkers you mentioned, and I don't claim to be telling you something you don't know in this post.

But on the boxes: We see various boxes from the outside. To recognize the box as box is to transcend it, to subject the box (category) to a new freedom. What we took for object turns out to be the malleable projection of a subject. In retrospect, we see that we were locked in a certain perspective. We interpreted (we realize) our tunnel vision mistakenly-in-retrospect as a tunnel. (We can ignore the limits of subject-object talk for the moment. We have to pick up this imperfect junk to say anything.)

At some point, we recognize this structure of perspective-transcending as such. We can even think of philosophy as the art of seeing the box and thereby making it optional. We might even call this process 'freedom,' since the apparently necessary is transformed into the merely optional. Then philosophy becomes a kind of acid that eats away not simply at fixed ideas but at otherwise fixed paradigms. But why should we do this? To some degree, I think there is just a raw pleasure in transgression and exploration. But it also allows for a wealth of perspectives we can use and also put down when not appropriate. If an individual can bear the dissonance, then he or she becomes a richer, more flexible personality. (I'm less interested in social questions. Life is short.)

We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does.

It's considered "nowhere" because it has been stripped of all subjective qualities. The world portrayed by science doesn't look, sound, taste, smell or feel like anything. And It's not from a particular vantage point. — Marchesk

What do subjective qualities mean in this instance if not the feeling of looking out from a particular location at a particular time? Stripped of those two qualities, it wouldn't be a view from nowhere, but a view from everywhere and every time.

If you are talking about the effect the emotions have on what it is we view, then that has no bearing on where our view is from, so to say that it is a view from nowhere when our emotional attachments are stripped doesn't make sense. It would simply be a view from somewhere with no emotional influences, or no goal in using the information the view is providing.

Which then leads me to ask, what is a view for? What is the purpose of having a view of any kind (from somewhere, from nowhere, and from everywhere)?

Science describes waves, spheres, angles, (geometry) etc.

I'm having a difficult time getting through your post. Can you summarize it in your own words?

Not only ‘the last part’. Honestly, you don't seem to understand the issue - then you ask for clarification about it, then argue against the suggestions that are made, without understanding them. You really need to do some homework on the whole subject. — Wayfarer

No, the problem is that I understand it perfectly. It is you that simply fails to ask simple question of your own beliefs that you delude yourself into believing. I'm asking questions that everyone else, including you, should be asking of themselves, and their own understanding of what the distinction between physical and non-physical is. Doesn't the fact that so many people are having such a hard time getting at the distinction mean something? Go ahead and turn a blind eye, Wayfarer, and keep yourself in the dark light of ignorance.

I hear you. But do you yourself consider the first-person experience of heartbreak to be physical in the same way that an electron is physical? — ff0

I don't know. What does it mean to be physical? This is the whole point.

I've seen a few responses that describe the physical as what is described by physics, and what is non-physical is not. I already asked these questions, but they were ignored, so I'll ask again:

What are people really saying when they say that what is physical is described by science and what isn't is non-physical? Before science explained atoms, the causes of diseases, the stars, etc., were they non-physical? Are there things that exist right now that are physical that science hasn't yet explained?

We cannot measure a physical thing by measuring its effects on another physical thing. That is, as it says, measuring the thing's effect, not measuring the thing itself. From that effect we can make some inferences about the physical thing which is causing the effect. Likewise, we cannot measure a non-physical thing by measuring its effect on a physical thing. But we can draw some inferences about the non-physical thing by measuring its effect on the physical thing

Can we not get at someone's intent (non-physical) by observing their behavior (physical)? Can we not get at someone's ideas (non-physical) by reading their words (physical)?

What is the barrier between these different realms, substances, or whatever distinction is being made? The only barrier is the one in our understanding, not one out there. History has shown that when we have a gap in our understanding we tend to fill it with all sorts of self-important ideas, like believing that our minds are special, souls even, and are part of something even greater, and will continue to exist forever, etc.,. This is why the distinction is still used - to keep the mind sacred and out of the hands of science.

MU, you really need to think a bit more before posting. It takes just a few seconds of thought to come up with real examples that show that what you say simply doesn't hold any water. We get at causes all the time by measuring the effects. Just think about what a police detective and prosecutor does. — Harry Hindu

Sure, we make inferences about the cause by examining the effect, that's exactly what I said. What I said is that we cannot "measure" the cause by examining the effect. The detective and prosecutor make a judgement which is not based on measurement of the cause. If it were a measurement of the cause, we wouldn't need a trial, a judge, nor jury, we could just refer to the measurement to see if the person measured up as guilty or not guilty.

Are there things that exist right now that are physical that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu

Of course. For example, maybe the most notable and dramatic instance these days is the acceleration of the recession-rate of the more distant galaxies. But a lot of other things too, of course, such as the observed system of particles, etc.

...because physics isn't completed, and probably never will be.

For that matter, ball-lightning hasn't been given an explanation satisfactory to all who study it.

Michael Ossiopff

Can we make the way a word functions in the world totally explicit? I don't think so. At best you can sharpen the meaning as much as possible for a particular purpose within a local conversation, it seems to me.

In general, knowing what 'physical' means is (IMV) a dimly understood knowing-how to get along with others in the world. Perhaps every use of 'physical' is unique, albeit with a family resemblance. Just because we have this fixed sequence of letters from a fixed alphabet P H Y S I C A L doesn't, in my view, indicate that the 'meaning' has the same kind of quasi-mathematical static, definite presence as the mark. The foundation of our making sense of things seems to lie mostly in darkness.

I don't know why you bothered to start another thread on this when there is already a recent one that asks just the question you are asking here.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2442/what-does-it-mean-to-say-that-something-is-physical-or-not/p1

How is this contrary to a materialist view, that everything we know, we know by way of the mind - including material or physical objects?
— praxis

mis-states the materialist view - actually gets it backwards. The materialist view (which I'm sure, incidentally, you don't hold) is something like: what we think we know of 'the mind' amounts to a 'folk psychology' which believes, fallaciously, that 'mind' is something real, when really it is simply an expression of the 'unconscious competence' (Dennett's term) of billions of neurons that have been shaped by evolution to perform in a certain way, creating the illusion of first-person consciousness. — Wayfarer

I listened to a short interview with Dennett that I found when searching for the term 'unconscious competence'. Discussing his new book, he seems to think that consciousness is not as mysterious as many people believe. I tend to agree.

I read Mind & Cosmos, by the way, and though most of it was wasted on me I appreciate the gist: that we haven't figured it all out yet and need to keep searching for answers.

Incidentally, Dennett thinks as I do that consciousness is not necessary, or unnecessary dangerous, for AI. Although working within the 'black box' an AI may eventually develop consciousness in order to accomplish a goal that its been tasked with, and the black box could turn into a pandora's box.

when really it is simply an expression of the 'unconscious competence' (Dennett's term) of billions of neurons that have been shaped by evolution to perform in a certain way, — Wayfarer

So is it a real expression of "billions of neurons..."? What would an illusory expression of "billions of neurons.." look like? :s In any case wouldn't 'function' be more apt than "expression"?

A function is not reducible to the individual interactions that constitute it. For example a global economy is a function of billions of monetary interactions, but it is not reducible even to the totality of those interactions. It has developed its own trends, tendencies, effects and dynamics which transcend the individual interactions. Why should a mind not be the same in relation to neuronal activities and interactions?

Discussing his new book, he seems to think that consciousness is not as mysterious as many people believe. I tend to agree. — praxis

Yes the possibility of consciousness being mysterious does disturb a lot of people.

Yes the possibility of consciousness being mysterious does disturb a lot of people. — Wayfarer

Yes, and it pacifies others.

Discussing his new book, he seems to think that consciousness is not as mysterious as many people believe. I tend to agree.

I read Mind & Cosmos, by the way, and though most of it was wasted on me I appreciate the gist: that we haven't figured it all out yet and need to keep searching for answers. — praxis

The second statement contradicts the first.

The second statement contradicts the first. — Wayfarer

No it doesn't; the very idea of searching for answers presupposes that consciousness is not mysterious. If consciousness were assumed to be ineliminably mysterious, then there would be no point searching for answers.

I think Janus strikes at the heart of the matter.

No it doesn't; the very idea of searching for answers presupposes that consciousness is not mysterious. — Janus

It might be the case that it's forever mysterious.

New mysterianism—or commonly just mysterianism—is a philosophical position proposing that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by humans. The unresolvable problem is how to explain the existence of qualia (individual instances of subjective, conscious experience). In terms of the various schools of philosophy of mind, mysterianism is a form of nonreductive physicalism. Some "mysterians" state their case uncompromisingly (Colin McGinn has said that consciousness is "a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel"); others believe merely that consciousness is not within the grasp of present human understanding, but may be comprehensible to future advances of science and technology.

Alternatively, we might be obliged to understand that knowledge has intrinsic limits, even regarding the nature of something very near to us, namely, ourselves. When you look at the knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy-of-matter, then it's not necessarily surprising that this might be the case.

In any case physicalism is nothing so much as a way of dodging the mystery - the kind of mystery that Dennett wants to dispose of. Put a bag over it, hose it down, throw it out the door, so we can all get back to the lab, where everything is safe and predictable, and we're not menaced by spooky ideas.

Although “the joy of knowing is not always as innocent as it seems”, the line separating culture from “barbarism” is crossed when science is transformed into scientist ideology, i.e., when the Galilean principle is made into an ontological claim according to which ultimate reality is given only through the objectively measurable and quantifiable.

SEP article on Michel Henry.

It might be the case that it's forever mysterious. — Wayfarer

I already mentioned that possibility in the post you responded to. But if we assume it is then that would rule out the use of any inquiry.

Alternatively, we might be obliged to understand that knowledge has intrinsic limits, even regarding the nature of something very near to us, namely, ourselves. When you look at the knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy-of-matter, then it's not necessarily surprising that this might be the case. — Wayfarer

I think we should think that knowledge has its limits, but we are not obliged to think that those limits are on account of some "ultimate mystery" (in the sense of something supernatural): it is more likely on account of the fact that the "map is never the territory" and also on account of our limited intelligences and capabilities. We cannot sense brain activity at all for example, not even to the degree that we can sense digestive processes or muscular functions; probably because there are no nerves in the brain. Probably there are no nerves in the brain because they would be maladaptive: if we could sense brain activity it would likely just confuse us.

"The knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy of matter" firstly may not be what you think they are, since you are by no means expert in those subjects (as I am not), and secondly they may be released and untangled in the future. You have no way of knowing whether they will be or not; but would you prefer to think that they will not? If so, why would you prefer to think that? Isn't the advancement of knowledge in itself a good thing; whatever we might think about its potential for abuse or its implications for our preferred metaphysics?

In any case physicalism is nothing so much as a way of dodging the mystery - the kind of mystery that Dennett wants to dispose of. Put a bag over it, hose it down, throw it out the door, so we can all get back to the lab, where everything is safe and predictable, and we're not menaced by spooky ideas. — Wayfarer

I think this is an absolutely egregious strawman. Perhaps you feel menaced by scientific ideas, so you assume on account of that sense of threat, that those who are your opponents likewise feel menaced by mystery. Your position would be more respectable, I think, if you simply admitted you have no genuine interest in science and focused instead on the side of life you are interested in. You always seem to want to indulge in polemics. Is it a moral crusade? Or else, why is it necessary? If Dawkins and Dennett, or whoever else, are polemical in regard to science and religion; why do you need to lower yourself to their level? Wouldn't the world be better if each of us stuck to prescribing and proscribing only for ourselves, and refrained from dictating as to what it would be "best" that others should think and believe (unless of course we are prescribing that they should not think and believe that they should prescribe what others should think and believe ;) )? You vowed a month or so ago that you would never mention Dennett again on forums, but it seems you just cannot help yourself.

I agree that scientism is barbaric. (Perhaps scientists should be referred to as 'sciencers' and the terms 'scientist' reserved for those who think it has all the answers, and that it is more than merely one of the diversity of human activities and discourses.

SEP article on Michel Henry. — Wayfarer

I would be more impressed if you quoted Henry. It's true, though, that Henry does think that modern philosophy (in fact the whole movement of philosophy from the Presocratics on (including of course Plato and Aristotle) have objectified the human spirit. It is not merely a problem that has arisen since the Enlightenment for Henry; although obviously it has gained momentum since then. What I think is needed as a corrective is the relinquishing of the very notion that science or materialistic thought in general is intrinsically a threat to attitudes that foster spirituality, or that religious thought is a threat to science. To think this is to be impaled on the twin horns of an illusory fundamentalist dilemma.

I like this. Imagine a group of 10 physicists gathered together in a room. Then point out that each of these persons has a different political point of view, a different religious or spiritual disposition as well as other significant ideological commitments that distinguish them from the other physicists in the room.
Your typical Cartesian empiricist will say,"See, that's the power of science. Regardless of ones ideological biases, everyone can agree on the truths of science thanks to the objective nature of the physical world.
I will counter, "See, the logico-mathematical formulations of physics represent a conceptual language so generic as to mask the different ways in which the physicists in that room are understanding the meaning of the supposedly universal concepts of their science ".
These differences in interpretation of the meaning of their field and thus the 'evidence' shows up as arguments over proper vs improper analysis of what is supposed as the facts. By contrast, disputes among post-Cartesian philosophers are recognized as different ways of making a world

From this I form the heretical conclusion that such philosophical conceptualizations are in fact more precise than logic-mathematical empirical ones.

I don't think it is credible that different scientists would have different interpretations of the meanings,as such, of scientific theories (except insofar as their understanding of them might be limited or deficient); whereas as they will most likely have different interpretations of the practical, ethical or metaphysical significance of scientific theories.

So is it a real expression of "billions of neurons..."? What would an illusory expression of "billions of neurons.." look like? :s In any case wouldn't 'function' be more apt than "expression"? — Janus

'Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [i.e. organic molecules] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.'

Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life 202-3.

It might be the case that [the nature of mind] is forever mysterious.
— Wayfarer

I already mentioned that possibility in the post you responded to. But if we assume it is then that would rule out the use of any inquiry. — Janus

Not at all. I think one aspect of philosophy, and a crucial aspect, is to 'take you to the border', as it were. You understand by it, what are the limits to knowledge, because of the way knowledge works, and what knowledge is. That requires an epistemic humility, the paradigmatic example of which is Socrates. 'Knowing what you don't know' is a crucial aspect of philosophy, and then philosophical theology points towards 'the unknowable', which underlies all experience. Very few people will get that idea, but it's no less true on that account.

You vowed a month or so ago that you would never mention Dennett again on forums, but it seems you just cannot help yourself. — Janus

Well, in relation to this topic, Dennett is undoubtedly the best-known materialist philosopher, so it is relevant, and I can't be accused of 'attacking a straw man' when I use him as an example. I won't start another thread about Dennett, but I will comment from time to time.

"The knots and tangles in current cosmology and philosophy of matter" firstly may not be what you think they are, since you are by no means expert in those subjects (as I am not), and secondly they may be released and untangled in the future. You have no way of knowing whether they will be or not; but would you prefer to think that they will not? If so, why would you prefer to think that? Isn't the advancement of knowledge in itself a good thing; whatever we might think about its potential for abuse or its implications for our preferred metaphysics? — Janus

All I mean by that remark was response to Dennett's hubristic claim to have 'explained consciousness'. So what I'm saying is, hang on, there are many deep issues in fundamental physics and cosmology, which really are the turf of natural science - so why be so confident that science can 'explain' the mystery of consciousness, which is strictly speaking not even its concern? Don't you think it is just amazingly hubristic? I thought you were a critic of scientism, or is that only when Apokrisis says something you don't like?

I think this is an absolutely egregious strawman. — Janus

And I think it's 100% accurate. And furthermore, I've got plenty of arguments to support it.

What I think is needed as a corrective is the relinquishing of the very notion that science or materialistic thought in general is intrinsically a threat to attitudes that foster spirituality. — Janus

Agree with 'science' but not at all with 'materialistic thought'. That's why I will never cease from repeating that scientific materialism is parasitic on the actual tradition of Western philosophy. I'm not saying that of science, or scientific method, but the misapplication of scientific method to philosophical questions, of which Dennett is am=n undoubted doyen, but which is widespread all throughout current Western philosophy.