No, it is obviously you who is misunderstanding. Is a ship with three masts a physical thing or no? The fact that you say it isn't shows that it is you that doesn't understand what they are talking about. If the person putting up the flags never saw a ship, then why are they putting up flags? What is the cause, if not seeing a three-masted ship on the horizon? To explain this, all you can ever talk about is causal influences - why the man is putting up flags, and why he's putting them up in that particular pattern. The answers to those questions lie in causation. It's that simple.I think you misunderstand the situation. You don't see the masts, you don't see the ship. What you see is the flag. The flag is the only physical thing here. In this instance of occurrence, the number of masts, and the ship, is non-physical. The fact is, that the person hoisting the flag may not even have seen any ship nor any masts, so this aspect is clearly non-physical. In this particular physical occurrence, which is the occurrence of the flag, it is quite clear that the masts and ship are non-physical. If you haven't yet, in 67 pages of this thread, capacitated yourself with the ability to understand this, then maybe you should give it up. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because you have yet to give a concise definition of what it means to be "non-physical", and what the distinction you are making between physical and non-physical is.Why do you insistently claim that information is both physical and non-physical, when in reality you haven't apprehended the non-physical aspect? — Metaphysician Undercover
And I have told you till I'm blue in the face that information/meaning can be independent of minds. There is information everywhere, it's just that we tend to ignore a great deal of it. Information doesn't need a non-physical counterpart to exist. It merely needs causation, or for an effect to represent some series of causes.I very explicitly explained how information/meaning is not the same as cause/effect. Cause/effect implies a direct, necessary relation between two things. Information/meaning implies a system of interpretation as a medium between the two. Therefore there is no necessary relationship between the two, the relationship is contingent on interpretation The two, cause/effect, and information/meaning are clearly not the same at all, and your claim is nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, when a person is hallucinating, that doesn't indicate that they are on drugs, or that they are mentally unstable? Does one hallucinate before or after taking drugs? If one hallucinates after taking drugs, then isn't the hallucinations the effect of the drugs, and therefore refers to the drugs in the system, and can provide information about the kinds of drugs they took? You're performing these mental gymnastics in an attempt to hold your feeble arguments together, and all it does is make your position less clear and make you appear as if you don't know what it is you are talking about. This is what happens every time I engage you.What the hell are you talking about? What is the case, is that we can interpret correctly, as intended by the author of the sign, or incorrectly in a way not intended. What determines this is whether the person interpreting utilizes the appropriate system of interpretation. How does the fact that a person misunderstands, due to hallucination or any other reason, tell you anything specific or informative about the state of the person's body? What kind of nonsense principles are you appealing to? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is so stupid. We get at each other's intent every time we read each other's words, as the words are an effect of your ideas and your intent to convey them. Misunderstanding your words is misunderstanding your idea and your means of conveying it, which is the cause of me reading your words. If you had no idea, or no intent to convey them, I wouldn't be reading your words. This is so simple and obvious, the fact that you aren't getting it is shows that you are either obtuse, or simply like to argue for the sake of arguing.So we cannot look at a signal, and interpret its meaning, by referring to its cause, as you seem to think, that is a dead end method. It leads nowhere. It is a dead end, because all we will see is that a human being created the signal. We cannot see the human being's intent so we cannot know what the human being meant with that signal. Looking for the cause of the signal cannot give us an answer to what is meant by the signal, it's a dead end. We will see that the human being meant something, and so there is a "cause" of the signal, but we'll have no idea of how to determine what the human being meant. Therefore this is useless in determining meaning. The only approach we have, toward interpretation is to determine the proper system of interpretation, and this will allow us to interpret the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted. — Samuel Lacrampe
What you don't seem to understand is that the "universal form" is the abstraction, — Metaphysician Undercover
And what you never seemed to have grasped despite your voluminous posts in this thread, over several months, is that the fundamental claim of Platonic realism is that Universals are real, and don’t simply exist in individual minds. — Wayfarer
All of the specifics discussed such as triangles, numbers, and so on, are simply illustrative examples. In this respect, I think Samuel’s understanding of the issue is much nearer the actual Thomist understanding than your own. — Wayfarer
The problem with that, is that maths is predictive — Wayfarer
whether information, generally speaking, is physical — Wayfarer
My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. This view allows for both individual forms and universal forms. — Samuel Lacrampe
Unless I misunderstood, it sounds like you claim that the whole, the universe, is the one and only true identity as the starting point; and then from there, associate individual things as the divided parts of the whole, like body parts are to one body. Where does the individual form fit in, if individuals do not possess true identities? Also, is your view pantheism? — Samuel Lacrampe
maths should not be an absolute candidate to stand up because it cannot prove itself to be consistent. — Dzung
individuals are true identities. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see any reason why Thomists would say that. — Wayfarer
My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. — Samuel Lacrampe
After all the Bible states that 'God is no respecter of persons'; and 'He who loses his life for My sake, will be saved'. Christians are 'saved' not because of their personalities, but in spite of them. Of course that is bound to be a contentious claim, but in any case, I think you far overestimate the importance of the notion of 'the individual' to ancient and medieval philosophy, where it was hardly a matter of consideration for them; that only comes about with much later democratic humanism. — Wayfarer
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.
maths is predictive and useful and cherished ..etc but just to a certain extent... like any other sciences - empirical ultimately, no more — Dzung
I have just read some of its reviews, there are pro and against. Have you read both sides? And your opinion for the against (e.g http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Hamming.html)? I think they are much to my side.it's worth a read — Wayfarer
Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible."The problem is that we make mistakes, we find out later that our universals were not accurate, so we change them. — Metaphysician Undercover
Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible." — Samuel Lacrampe
To solve the paradox, we need to make the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. As per Aristotle, we have implicit knowledge of universals, obtained through the process of abstraction, and we are searching for the explicit knowledge. The ability to describe the universal accurately is the explicit knowledge, and the ability to judge if our description is accurate is the implicit knowledge. This is how the socratic method works. This also explains why we can all use the concept of 'justice' correctly and meaningfully in a sentence (e.g. "the holocaust was unjust"), but have trouble coming up with the perfect definition of 'justice'. — Samuel Lacrampe
I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.The point I made earlier in the thread, is that this perfect universal is "the ideal", and as the ideal, it is no longer a universal, it has the characteristics of a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah I said that. I did not mean it in the sense that individual persons must have individual ontological value, or do not share a common human nature. I meant it in the sense that I am me and not you, and you are you and not me. From this, we conclude that we have separate identities or individual forms (called soul in this case), although we both participate in the same universal form or species of human.My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point — Samuel Lacrampe
I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.
If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular? — Samuel Lacrampe
As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars. — Samuel Lacrampe
The concept itself must be insensible; because if it was sensible, then we would have no use to communicate the concept through a second layer of sensible images and examples, which are numerous, as you said.Is THAT concept, stripped from images, when communicated via a sensible medium- sensible or insensible? — Daniel Smith
I would also say yes, by pointing to the concept of "justice". We all understand the concept, and yet have no clear sensible image of it. The image of a scale is merely a symbol of it, not the real thing.Do ideas and concepts exist apart from the sensible images of which they are composed? — Daniel Smith
don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars". — Samuel Lacrampe
If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises. — Samuel Lacrampe
You are correct. This was not what I was saying, but I was mistaken because I forgot that universals may be a members of higher universals, like the human genus is a member of the genus of living beings.Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2). — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd.[...] The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe
We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal".So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. — Metaphysician Undercover
We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal". — Samuel Lacrampe
If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe
Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair. — Samuel Lacrampe
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