Do you think it's more important to know the extent to which your interlocutors are grammatically correct than it is to know what they are trying to say?

Fascinating. I hope you are right about this. Could you tell me, what is it about doubting the veracity of memory that entails that all discussion (thought?) is meaningless? — PossibleAaran

The coherence of all discourse is predicated on our ability to remember what we and others have said in the past and from moment to moment. This is part of the general presupposition that what is past cannot change.

in which case we are seeking the highest level of certitude possible, it is rational to doubt until the compelling grounds for certitude reach the level of mistake having been logically excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Such "compelling grounds" are ruled out by your game of faux radical doubt. This is chimera-chasing that demands absolute certainty which can never be reached and in the process of pretending throws out the realization that in its very activity it is still taking countless things for granted.

Some people think that "you can doubt X" is the same as or is necessarily followed by "you must immediately start doubting X". Apparently, these folks are absolutists. They think like this: if there is a possibility that your beliefs are wrong you must doubt them because you cannot accept a belief if you are aware that it can turn out to be wrong -- it must be absolutely true, in your mind at least if not in reality. Black-and-white thinking. From one extreme to another. There is nothing in between. Your beliefs are either absolutely true or they are absolutely false.

The point is that in the process of doubting X other things must remain beyond doubt. You cannot doubt everything at once. You can only create artificial imaginary contexts in which you could doubt specific things.

I find the very term "language game" rather strange. It apparently means nothing other than "set of restrictions". Still, it bothers me that there are people who choose to call it "language game" instead of something simpler such as "set of rules". There must be some kind of strange process going on behind the scenes. I am not following what is popular, apparently. Certainly not Wittgenstein's train of thought. — Magnus Anderson

Yeah. It is difficult to see what is considered special about this as it seems simply another restatement of pragmatist, or social constructionist, approaches to truth.

But at heart, it seems to be driven by a particular philosophical disappointment. AP had the hope that a mathematical kind of mapping relation would apply to language use. The meaning of our words would not be some free act of interpretation - an inductive connection - but instead a rigid act of designation, or deductive kind of connection.

So ordinary language, which seems sloppy, allusive, often ungrammatical and even paradoxical, would be shown to have a tight mathematical-strength logical structure as the sturdy skeleton supporting its spongy flesh. It should thus be possible to speak with complete and unambiguous precision.

But language does not represent meaning in this kind of simple, dyadic, mapping fashion. Talk about language games and ways of life then become an examination of how we actually use language. And that leads towards a more complex triadic relation which involves a “self” in a sign relation with a “world”. Words are used to achieve purposes. And so to the degree that purposes are purposes we have in common as communities, meanings seem easy to share. Yet also, we all have more personal purposes, and so there grows that which can’t be so easily and closely shared.

All this can seem like a game, a social game, as it makes meaning a matter of subtle negotiations. We are always engaged in interactions where the personal and the communal are in tension. So every sentence spoken and offered up for creative interpretation could be pulled either way.

There are no grounding rules as such. Or none that anyone must stick to in some ultimate way. But there are general constraints at work - a deep structure of developed communal habit, like a well worn forest path - that we can detect and respond to in terms of our own agendas. We can either decide to stick as closely as possible to an inductive sense of the “standard meaning” as we can, or instead play the other game of stretching the interpretation creatively in the direction of our own interest or advantage.

All this free play in the works completely destroys the hope of finding some inner skeleton of rigid and truth preserving connections in speech acts or propositional-sounding language. But on the other hand, language still works marvellously. It has an organic flexibility that is quite unlike the brittleness and mechanicalness of a rigid mapping operation - a computational kind of relation. And the secrets of that organicism are a pretty huge and important philosophical subject to explore.

Sadly, all those who are fixated on Wittgenstein seem caught up in the tragedy that was AP’s great failed dream. They only want to talk about what turned out not to work for them, and so the complete abandonment of any grand projects.

Meanwhile largely unnoticed, there always was the organicism project taking shape in the background. CS Peirce in particular had laid out a triadic semiotic which gets at the true deep structure of what is going on.

Well, you don't have to doubt everything at once. In fact, you don't have to doubt at all. Nonetheless, the point remains that everything can be doubted; if you decide to, which you don't have to.

It's not that you don't have to, its that you can't, doubt everything at once, which makes it misleading to say that everything may be doubted. You should be saying that anything may be doubted; which still leaves the question as to whether any particular doubt is genuine and reasonable, as opposed to artificial and unreasonable.

Fortunately for me, Banno isn't a moderator, so he can't ban me. — Magnus Anderson

I'm just a grumpy old bastard.

But it is interesting to see your thinking progress. I suspect you would agree with much that Wittgenstein says - as i mentioned earlier.

Nonetheless, the point remains that everything can be doubted; if you decide to, which you don't have to. — Magnus Anderson

So, what should one doubt? It's a question worth asking.

Nonetheless, the point remains that everything can be doubted; if you decide to, which you don't have to.
— Magnus Anderson

So, what should one doubt? It's a question worth asking. — Banno

You appear to think that there is a universal set of rules that everyone must adhere to. There isn't such a thing. Anyone can do whatever they want. What I can do is I can explain to you how my type of organism functions. But I am not motivated to do so. Another thing we can do is we can explore all the different manners in which organisms that inhabit the environment within which we live operate e.g. we can observe how they behave and based on that develop various models of thinking. But I am not motivated to do so. Not at this point in time. Other than that, there is nothing we can do. We cannot ask questions such as "what one SHOULD do?" because all behavior is fundamentally irrational. It's a relative thing. You must first choose a goal in order for such a question to make sense and when you do so you are no longer asking a general question, but instead, you are asking a specific question that only applies to organisms that posit the goal we chose for our discussion.

So no normative constraints should apply to intellectual discourse; we can all just assert whatever we want? Sounds like a recipe for fun (if you like that kind of senseless chaos) and/or disaster (like it or not).

You appear to think that there is a universal set of rules that everyone must adhere to. — Magnus Anderson

Gravity and such, perhaps; but otherwise, no.

Anyone can do whatever they want. — Magnus Anderson

But that's not right. There are all sorts of things that we can't do - walk through walls, Fly like superman, play guitar well without practicing... It's a long list.

You must first choose a goal in order for such a question to make sense and when you do so you are no longer asking a general question, but instead, you are asking a specific question that only applies to organisms that posit the goal we chose for our discussion. — Magnus Anderson

Exactly. So, what are your goals?

I'd suggest that our accounts of what is going on should look to simplicity, coherence and consistency.

Integrity, if you like.

Same goes for the things we do.

You appear to think that there is a universal set of rules that everyone must adhere to. — Magnus Anderson


Gravity and such, perhaps; but otherwise, no. — Banno

When it comes to intellectual discourse the rules of consistency (non-contradiction) and coherency must apply else discourse fails. Someone who says we can doubt anything would say that we can doubt even these principles; but that would be a performative contradiction.

Edit; I see you posted something similar above while I was composing my response. 8-)

Gravity and such, perhaps; but otherwise, no. — Banno

Gravity isn't a universal rule. There is no such a thing as a universal rule. There are temporary rules and among them there are rules that exist for a long period of time and rules that exist for a short period of time.

Anyone can do whatever they want.
— Magnus Anderson

But that's not right. There are all sorts of things that we can't do - walk through walls, Fly like superman, play guitar well without practicing... It's a long list. — Banno

Anyone can do whatever they want provided that they can do it. Do I have to say that? I think it's a given.

We ask "should" questions precisely because we have a degree of freedom in deciding how we're going to act. That does not mean we can do anything we want. Freedom has limits. When I say "one can do anything one wants" I am saying "anyone can do anything one wants within the limits of their freedom".

I find the very term "language game" rather strange. It apparently means nothing other than "set of restrictions". Still, it bothers me that there are people who choose to call it "language game" instead of something simpler such as "set of rules". There must be some kind of strange process going on behind the scenes. I am not following what is popular, apparently. Certainly not Wittgenstein's train of thought. — Magnus Anderson

I can see how Wittgenstein would look odd from your point of view. "Language game" gained such notoriety in the eighties ad nineties that it became almost useless. In the Investigations it starts as a term for simple mind games such as counting apples and stacking blocks. The import was that such things do not consist only of words, but are integral to things we actually do in the world. This was Wittgenstein's reaction against those who saw language as somehow independent of our actions. The meaning of a term ceases to be some abstract entity and becomes the use to which we put that terms. It was part of an admonishment for philosophers to look to the way we actually do things rather than sit around and make things up.

It would be agreeable to think of language games as a group of actions and their associated set of rules. It's more than just the rules.

Thanks for clarifying - my apologies for the pedantry.

So no normative constraints should apply to intellectual discourse; we can all just assert whatever we want? Sounds like a recipe for fun (if you like that kind of senseless chaos) and/or disaster (like it or not). — Janus

That's not what I said. We can discuss all sorts of imaginary scenarios if you want to. We can talk about the life of a psychopath and the kind of decisions he should make if he wants to fully express his way of life. Or we can talk about us, our own ways of life, if that's what you prefer. The problem is I have no interest in these things. Alright? What I am attacking here in this thread is this idea that there are propositions (or more precisely, assumptions) that are beyond doubt. Wittgenstein's claim is that there are propositions that lie beyond questions of knowledge and doubt. That's my interest. You can discuss all the different patterns of doubting and you can discuss whether it is a good or a bad decision to doubt within a specific situation within some framework, you can do any of these things if you want, but that's not what I want to do. All I am saying in this thread is that the universe does not necessarily follow some set of rules that we came up with or any rules at all.

Yes. Of course Magnus is right that we can do whatever we want. But that still leaves the question of what to do.

There's no point in arguing for coherence and consistency. If someone does not take it as a given, the best thing is probably to walk away.

But the fact that Magnus is presenting well-crafted thoughts shows that although he(?) might say we can do anything, he has a preference for coherence and consistency, too.

"But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded (OC 194)."

To know the answer to Wittgenstein's question, "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" is "No," is to think about not only what he said here, but what he said elsewhere. However, there are a couple of important points to be made. First, there are two kinds of statements involved when considering this quote. Moore's statement, which isn't according to Wittgenstein an epistemological statement (although Moore thinks it is), hence in this context, that is, Moore's context, a mistake is ruled out. It's ruled out because Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's statements aren't the kind of statements we generally doubt. Thus, not only are these statements not a matter of knowledge, but they're outside the purview of doubt, which works alongside knowing.

Moore puts his propositions in the arena of knowledge, and it's in this arena that doubts can arise. What does this mean? It means that if you claim to have knowledge, it must be demonstrated that you do indeed have it, that is, objectively demonstrated (OC 14). What's the purpose of objectively demonstrating that one does know what one claims to know. It's to assure those of us who hear your claim, that there's no reason to doubt your claim. When we see your reasons or evidence it is supposed to alleviate the doubt. Once I too see that you have objectively demonstrated your knowledge, then the claim is validated, and the doubt is alleviated. However, if I don't agree with your assessment, then the doubt about your claim to knowledge remains. One must show that a mistake hasn't been made in your reasoning.

Remember that Moore is demonstrating his knowledge to the skeptic, and as such, he is allowing the doubt in the door. The skeptic wants to know how it is that Moore knows (hence, the doubt)? Wittgenstein is saying that both are incorrect in Moore's context, because the statements Moore is making are not epistemological, that is, there is something different about these statements. It's not only the case that Moore is in error, but the skeptic is also in error. Why? Because of the nature of these kinds of statements or hinge-propositions. The language-game of knowing and doubting are inappropriate when using them in Moorean contexts.

Now note that in OC 194 Wittgenstein's question is about objective certainty, and as such, when he asks about a mistake being logically excluded, the answer to his question is no, and we know this by looking at his assessment of Moore's propositions. Surely one's doubt isn't dismissed simply by someone telling you that one knows X. My claim to knowledge isn't a guarantee that I know, which is why we want to know how it is that you know, thus the doubt.

The language-game of certainty can be confusing because sometimes people are referring to their subjective certainty, i.e., an attitude of certainty, which Moore seems to be expressing. There is also the kind of certainty that's akin to knowledge, that is, objective certainty, in this case certainty can be used as a synonym for knowledge or knowing. However, there is another kind of certainty that is demonstrating in our actions. "My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there... (OC 7)." Wittgenstein grapples with these propositions. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game (OC 204)." These kinds of propositions are not expressions of an attitude, nor are they expressions of knowledge. This certainty lies in the way we act. Our actions show our certainty.

It would be agreeable to think of language games as a group of actions and their associated set of rules. It's more than just the rules. — Banno

It's what is known as "ontology" in AI, isn't it? I don't like that term either. Very strange. But I understand that it's basically just a bounded possibility space. When I say "rules" I mean the limits of what is possible such as "the chess board is made up of 64 positions aligned in a 8x8 grid" instead of "there is an infinite number of positions on a chess board". Also things such as "the rook can only move to an adjacent position in one of the four directions: left, right, up and down" instead of "the rook can move to any position on the chess board". Boundaries narrow the possibility space. They make it simple. And yes, when you limit the possibility space, certain things become impossible and thus immune to doubt. If we say that the chess board is made up of squares aligned in a 8x8 grid it is impossible for a chess piece to be on a position outside of this 8x8 grid (such as i9 square.) But it is better to say that it is illegal for a piece to be on a position outside of this 8x8 grid because it is nonetheless possible for a piece to occupy i9 square. Yes, that would no longer be the game of chess, but it is nonetheless possible.

My theory of knowledge rests on these Moorean propositions, or as Wittgenstein calls them, hinge-propositions. It's a kind of foundational theory that rests on our acting, and thus the certainty that that brings into the epistemological language-games. As I said early on it solves the problem of circular reasoning, and it solves the infinite regress problem.

Yes, I can choose to violate the rules, I can move the bishop like the castle, but then who will understand what I'm doing? My talk and actions would be meaningless. At least meaningless in a chess game, and by extension language-games.

Agreed. So Magnus (et al.) sees this point too, but for whatever reason does not see its import.

↪Banno Yes, we can choose to violate the rules, I can move the bishop like the castle, but then who will understand what you're doing? Your talk and actions will be meaningless. — Sam26

Not meaningless but simply difficult to understand. If I am not speaking in a language that is familiar to you, does that mean that what I am saying is meaningless? Not necessarily.

As I said early on it solves the problem of circular reasoning and it solves the infinite regress problem. — Sam26

The infinite regress problem arises when people start asking for an infinite number of explanations on how you know what you know. The problem arises as a conflict between your desire to answer every single one of their questions and your other desires (such as the desire to do something else in your life other than to justify yourself.) The problem is solved by simply ignoring their questions and objections.

The problem also arises when you think that your beliefs must be "beyond any kind of doubt" in order to accept them. In such a case, the problem is solved by understanding that your beliefs do not have to be "beyond any kind of doubt". The problem is NOT solved by deceiving yourself into thinking that there are beliefs that are beyond doubt (classical dogmatism) or that there are beliefs that are neither true nor false and thus not subject to skeptical scrutiny (Wittgenstein's position.)

Not meaningless but simply difficult to understand. If I am not speaking in a language that is familiar to you, does that mean that what I am saying is meaningless? Not necessarily. — Magnus Anderson

Exactly. The ground has moved; we are no longer playing chess.

I made my meaningless statement a bit clearer.

The infinite regress problem arises when people start asking for an infinite number of explanations on how you know what you know. — Magnus Anderson

Right, the infinite regress is about justifications. For example, how do you know X is true, because of A, B, and C. How do you know A, B, and C are true, because of D, E, and F, and so on; but my theory ends with statements or propositions that are outside of any epistemic considerations. I don't think this would solve all infinite regress problems, but some, or many.