The problem arises as a conflict between your desire to answer every single one of their questions and your other desires (such as the desire to do something else in your life other than to justify yourself.) — Magnus Anderson
Right, the infinite regress is about justifications. For example, how do you know X is true, because of A, B, and C. How do you know A, B, and C are true, because of D, E, and F, and so on; but my theory ends with statements or propositions that are outside of any epistemic considerations. I don't think this would solve all infinite regress problems, but some, or many. — Sam26
The problem is solved in realising that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by another rule, but in actually following the rule in what one does. — Banno
there are rules that are not given by other rules, — Magnus Anderson
...the right solution is to understand that you do not need to justify yourself "all the way down". — Magnus Anderson
Yes! That's what both Sam and I are saying! — Banno
One might be things we are cause to take as indubitable - Sam, from the OP.
Another might be constitutive rules, which might be doubted outside the game they help constitute.
A third might be propositions that are shown, such as "here is a hand". — Banno
Such "compelling grounds" are ruled out by your game of faux radical doubt. This is chimera-chasing that demands absolute certainty which can never be reached and in the process of pretending throws out the realization that in its very activity it is still taking countless things for granted. — Janus
To know the answer to Wittgenstein's question, "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" is "No," is to think about not only what he said here, but what he said elsewhere. — Sam26
His idea is that there are some propositions that we are caused to believe. — Banno
Third, the basis for beliefs in prelinguistic man is causal in nature, not based on reasoning, reasoning is a linguistic endeavor, at least as how it is defined here. How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us. The interaction between our sensory experiences and the world do not necessitate the belief, but are simply sufficient to cause the belief. One acts upon the information given through sensory impressions, which in turn has a causal relationship with the belief. — Sam26
Seeing as how you are so fond of Popper, there's always his approach, a metaphor using a castle being built in a bog. We need drive the foundations down only so far as is needed to keep the castle stable. When we add a new level, we can push the foundations down a bit further. — Banno
Why do you think I am so fond of Popper? — Magnus Anderson
Irony, lost. No offence meant.Noone cares about Popper. — Magnus Anderson
...the idea that absolute truth is unattainable; — Magnus Anderson
Banno's notion of belief as explanations for behaviour cannot do this. Our explanation results in Jack's belief. Jack's belief is then - meaningless to him. — creativesoul
If we are to say that Jack has belief, then it must be meaningful to him. — creativesoul
It all goes back to analytics conflating reporting on belief with belief, — creativesoul
If it is an explanation for Jacks behaviour, then it is his belief. — Banno
And what of just plain old truth?
Perhaps talk of absolute truth lead philosophers astray, so that they threw out good old plain ordinary truth along with absolute truth.
So folk like Apo get stuck not being able to say that it is true that Paris is the capital of France and so on. — Banno
Your explanation of my belief is not mine. — creativesoul
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