The problem arises as a conflict between your desire to answer every single one of their questions and your other desires (such as the desire to do something else in your life other than to justify yourself.) — Magnus Anderson

The problem is solved in realising that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by another rule, but in actually following the rule in what one does.

That's Wittgenstein again; I'm using him heaps here.

The regress is caused by an over-reliance on words for explanation. Telling me you can add two and two does not show that you can add two and two. The proof is in the act.

Right, the infinite regress is about justifications. For example, how do you know X is true, because of A, B, and C. How do you know A, B, and C are true, because of D, E, and F, and so on; but my theory ends with statements or propositions that are outside of any epistemic considerations. I don't think this would solve all infinite regress problems, but some, or many. — Sam26

I have yet to understand your position fully but my current impression is that this isn't the right solution. The right solution is to understand that you do not need to justify yourself "all the way down".

The problem is solved in realising that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by another rule, but in actually following the rule in what one does. — Banno

People want to know why you choose X instead of Y. For example, they want to know why you believe the Sun will rise tomorrow instead of believing the Sun will not rise tomorrow. They want to know what causes you to choose X instead of choosing Y. Really, what they are looking for is a correlation between some event or some set of events in the past and your choice of X. If there is no such a correlation then that means that your choice is arbitrary; it means it's irrational.

Now, when you say there are rules that are not given by other rules, what you are saying is that there are choices that are arbitrary or irrational i.e. that there are choices that are not caused by some other events (such as some other choices.) Does this make sense? To make things worse, you can never be absolutely sure that a choice is irrational. It might be the case that you are simply unaware of the causes of your beliefs.

You can say "the rook can't move diagonally". I can ask "why?" and you can answer "because that's the rule of the game" I can then ask "why is that the rule of the game? why not something else?" and then what do you answer? because you chose so? you chose that the rook can't move diagonally? I ask "why did you choose so?" and you say "I chose it randomly". "Well, then", I can say, "I can choose equally randomly that the rock can move diagonally". And you're fucked.

there are rules that are not given by other rules, — Magnus Anderson

I'm going to be pedantic again; I didn't say this, and for me it is important.

I said that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by other rules, but shown in the implementation.

...the right solution is to understand that you do not need to justify yourself "all the way down". — Magnus Anderson

Yes! That's what both Sam and I are saying!

Yes! That's what both Sam and I are saying! — Banno

But you are saying there are bedrock propositions that are not subject to skeptical scrutiny. I am not saying say so. It appears that you believe there is such a thing as "down". So you really want to go "all the way down". You are merely claiming that there is a point beyond which it no longer makes sense to go "down". I say that the process of going down is infinite, it has no end, so you can't go all the way down. You can go more and more down but not all the way down.

Sure. Good point.

And for me this bring us to the main purpose of this particular thread, which was started by Sam proposing a theory about the nature of hinge propositions. His idea is that there are some propositions that we are caused to believe.

SO, roughly speaking, we might have three reasonable places to stop the regress.

One might be things we are cause to take as indubitable - Sam, from the OP.

Another might be constitutive rules, which might be doubted outside the game they help constitute.

A third might be propositions that are shown, such as "here is a hand".

Now for me the topic of this thread is the prose and cons of each, and what we might add.

Seeing as how you are so fond of Popper, there's always his approach, a metaphor using a castle being built in a bog. We need drive the foundations down only so far as is needed to keep the castle stable. When we add a new level, we can push the foundations down a bit further.

One might be things we are cause to take as indubitable - Sam, from the OP.

Another might be constitutive rules, which might be doubted outside the game they help constitute.

A third might be propositions that are shown, such as "here is a hand". — Banno

1) The first is too strong. Even an axiomatic or grounding supposition needs to be doubtable to be believable. It has to be framed in a way that has an explicit contradictory - a counterfactual axiom - to even have any explanatory bite and not merely get classed with the set of propositions that are “not even wrong”.

So of course we choose axioms on the grounds of being the least doubtable. That is how they can be the most believable. But the fact that the whole business is founded in this counterfactual game means that the necessity is more about the necessity of just making some abductive leap. We can always circle back to have another go at the axiomatic basis if the results of the axiomatic system don't seem to be working out so well ... on pragmatic or empirical grounds.

2) The second is right in emphasising the need to just make some rule to get a game of inquiry going. Even a bad guess is a good guess so long as it is a definite guess - one that is crisply counterfactual in its framing.

But what we need to avoid is the suggestion that the game is arbitrary. The game is going to be judged in terms of the purpose it accomplishes. So there is that global constraint, the empirically-grounded one, that feeds back to say something about the quality of the grounding axiomatic choices.

And also, more needs to be said about the epistemology of abduction. Peirce already made the mathematical argument that the history of the universe is not long enough for humans to have made even a few right basic guesses at random. So we need an explanation for why our guesses tend to be rather good. And the reason is a non-linearity, as illustrated by the exponential ability to discard alternatives in the classic 20 questions game. If we can cut the total number of possibilities in half at every step, not just knock them off one by one, then it is much less of a surprise that we can employ a dialectical logic to generate our metaphysical axioms.

We arrive at constitutive rules via dichotomies for a good reason. Non-linear search beats linear search by a country mile^2. ;)

3) The third is the baffling one. It seems like an attempt to be empirical. It claims - in pointing to something particular - to demonstrate the existence of some grounding or backdrop context.

But while that background of belief exists, it would be better just to point to it directly. Everyone of course can see by your actions that you presume a certain dichotomy of self and world to be basic. But better to say that directly - put it verbally on the table for forensic examination - rather than try to get away with some ostensive demonstration.

It feels always too much like an attempt to evade real debate than to answer the sceptic. To grunt and point ain't ever as good as presenting a proper epistemic theory.

So yes. There must be some general ground of belief that then makes all further doubts crisply local and particular. That is standard pragmatism, and standard psychology. Without an established set of habits, we could never do anything that actually counted as creatively novel.

But flapping your hands about and appealing to the strength of some established communal belief shared by an audience just seems a bad faith attempt to dodge the serious epistemic questions at stake.

Such "compelling grounds" are ruled out by your game of faux radical doubt. This is chimera-chasing that demands absolute certainty which can never be reached and in the process of pretending throws out the realization that in its very activity it is still taking countless things for granted. — Janus

Like I said, in my daily endeavours I accept such things without a doubt. But since we're discussing fundamental principles of epistemology here, I see no reason why we ought to settle for anything other than a quest for real objective certainty (in the sense where the possibility of mistake is excluded). This means that as an epistemological principle, anything less than that which gives us real objective certainty ought to be doubted. If your argument is that nothing gives us objective certainty, therefore everything within epistemology would be doubted, then that's the way epistemology ought to be. I see no problem with believing that every fundamental principle of epistemology ought to be subjected to doubt. This could only improve certainty.

If you want to settle for less, saying that we ought to just take things for granted, and not doubt them because they appear to be correct, then that's your opinion. But I don't think your opinion will be acceptable to very many serious epistemologists.

To know the answer to Wittgenstein's question, "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" is "No," is to think about not only what he said here, but what he said elsewhere. — Sam26

This is not true. Wittgenstein does not answer this question with "No". It is very clearly implied that the answer here is "Yes". And that's why he replaces "objective certainty" with "objective certitude" at 270. If the answer were "No" he wouldn't need to replace "certainty" with "certitude". It is only because the answer is yes that he is forced to seek something other than "certainty", and that is "certitude".

Moore's proposition, as well as any other proposed hinge propositions fulfill the conditions of "objective certitude", but they do not fulfill the conditions of "objective certainty". If you do not recognize this distinction then I think you are deficient in your interpretation of Wittgenstein, by not recognizing his use of these two distinct words.

In the vast majority of circumstances,, "objective certitude" relinquishes any need for doubt. But as dedicated epistemologists it is our due diligence to call for an investigation of (doubt) any proposition which does not obtain "objective certainty".

His idea is that there are some propositions that we are caused to believe. — Banno

What does it mean that we are caused to believe some propositions? I very much notice the emphasis on the word "caused". What's so special about it?

Is it related to the following passage?

Third, the basis for beliefs in prelinguistic man is causal in nature, not based on reasoning, reasoning is a linguistic endeavor, at least as how it is defined here. How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us. The interaction between our sensory experiences and the world do not necessitate the belief, but are simply sufficient to cause the belief. One acts upon the information given through sensory impressions, which in turn has a causal relationship with the belief. — Sam26

I don't understand the distinction he's making between "causal basis of beliefs" and "rational basis of beliefs [beliefs based on reasoning]".

He also says that reasoning is a linguistic endeavor and I disagree with that. Language merely represents the process of reasoning in a manner that is useful for the purpose of communication. But then he says "at least as how it is defined here" which makes me wonder what he really means by reasoning.

Good questions. We are more or less on the same page now, and your questions would be better answered by Sam. I've listed my own problems with his approach, relating to belief not being the sort of thing that is caused.

Seeing as how you are so fond of Popper, there's always his approach, a metaphor using a castle being built in a bog. We need drive the foundations down only so far as is needed to keep the castle stable. When we add a new level, we can push the foundations down a bit further. — Banno

Why do you think I am so fond of Popper? Popper wanted to pursue truth for its own sake. He had a problem with the idea that some of us, not daring to suggest most of us, pursue truth in order to better secure the attainment of our goals (whatever they are.) He was also a staunch opponent of verification which I think was excessive. What we have common, if there is anything we have in common, is the idea that absolute truth is unattainable; that truth can only be approached or approximated. But then, that's what other philosophers, such as Nietzsche and Mach, thought as well, and that long before he was even born. And what about Hume? We are not going to mention him at all.

All in all, I agree with the stance that our foundations need only to be strong enough so that whatever is built on top of them can be stable. However, Sam's exposition sounds far more complicated than that and that suggests to me that he has something else on the menu.

If you fella's and/or ladies want to draw and maintain a meaningful coherent distinction between prelinguistic and linguistic beliefs, I suggest you begin by figuring out what they all consist of. If they do not all consist of the same core set of elemental constituents, then you're talking about different things when you talk in terms of belief being pre or non-linguistic and then again with belief as linguistic.

Banno's notion of belief as explanations for behaviour cannot do this. Our explanation results in Jack's belief. Jack's belief is then - meaningless to him.

Carry on...

I've been quite busy, but this is a great thread...

Cheers again Sam...

Why do you think I am so fond of Popper? — Magnus Anderson

Noone cares about Popper. — Magnus Anderson

Irony, lost. No offence meant.

...the idea that absolute truth is unattainable; — Magnus Anderson

And what of just plain old truth?

Perhaps talk of absolute truth lead philosophers astray, so that they threw out good old plain ordinary truth along with absolute truth.

So folk like Apo get stuck not being able to say that it is true that Paris is the capital of France and so on.

Banno's notion of belief as explanations for behaviour cannot do this. Our explanation results in Jack's belief. Jack's belief is then - meaningless to him. — creativesoul

Any explanation would be meaningless to Jack. That does not make the explanation wrong.

It's not Jack's belief Banno. It's your report thereof. That makes it wrong in the only way that matters here.

If we are to say that Jack has belief, then it must be meaningful to him. The belief as explanation leads to a reductio.

It seems like an attempt to be empirical. It claims - in pointing to something particular - to demonstrate the existence of some grounding or backdrop context. — apokrisis

No - it's just pointing to a hand.

You are still looking for mental furniture, for something in Jack's head. If it is an explanation for Jacks behaviour, then it is his belief.

If we are to say that Jack has belief, then it must be meaningful to him. — creativesoul

Going to the food bowl is meaningful to him; and not as head-furniture, but as a way of living - meaning as use.

It all goes back to analytics conflating reporting on belief with belief, due to not drawing and maintaining the crucial distinction between thought, belief and thinking about thought and belief. Belief to a classic epistemologist is equal to a proposition(or rather arguing for a proposition). That position is utterly incapable of drawing the distinction, for arguing for a proposition is thinking about thought and belief. As a result, in order to maintain coherency, one who argues that cannot admit of pre-linguistic thought and/or belief.

We all know that's wrong.

Your charge is incorrect. Belief isn't 'in the head'. The 'head' is necessary, but terribly insufficient.

Going to the food bowl is indeed meaningful to him. He has drawn a correlation between that bowl and getting fed. That is his belief. More specifically, that is belief formation. That is what all thought and belief consists of(drawing correlations)... statements and propositions notwithstanding.

It all goes back to analytics conflating reporting on belief with belief, — creativesoul

Actually, it seems to me to be that folk reify belief; they think a report of belief must be a report about a thing.

Folk assume that because Jack believes his bowl is empty there must be an empty-bowl shaped thing in his mind. But all there is, is empty bow, go meow at Banno and try to trip him and generally annoy him until full bowl. A series of actions.

If it is an explanation for Jacks behaviour, then it is his belief. — Banno

This is one of the most absurd things I've ever read.

Your explanation of my belief is not equivalent to my belief. The same holds good of Jack.

And what of just plain old truth?

Perhaps talk of absolute truth lead philosophers astray, so that they threw out good old plain ordinary truth along with absolute truth.

So folk like Apo get stuck not being able to say that it is true that Paris is the capital of France and so on. — Banno

Sure, plain old truth is attainable and there is nothing wrong with saying that it is true that Paris is the capital of France.

Your explanation of my belief is not mine. — creativesoul

It's "your explanation of my behaviour".

Behavior shows belief, sometimes...

Nice. Again we find agreement. Others tend to make things so damn complicated.

Gotta run...

Cheers Banno!

X-)

example of contrary?

I believe we ought be respectful of other beasties. But I am roasting a chook (chicken, for you foreigners) despite that.

Just as it was getting interesting...