The way I'm using the term indubitable, is in the sense of being undoubtable, which is exactly what Wittgenstein was getting at with Moore's propositions. Now whether you agree with this or not is up to your interpretation, but it's not just my interpretation, but many other philosophers believe these bedrock propositions are indubitable. I don't see how this cannot be the case.

My conclusions about prelinguistic beliefs are that some are causal in nature and some are not, and I explained the difference in another post. The point though is that these beliefs form a kind of world picture for us. So that I have two hands is a world picture belief, and is demonstrated in our actions apart from propositions/statements, and is also demonstrated in our use of propositions/statements.

This is not true. Wittgenstein does not answer this question with "No". It is very clearly implied that the answer here is "Yes". And that's why he replaces "objective certainty" with "objective certitude" at 270. If the answer were "No" he wouldn't need to replace "certainty" with "certitude". It is only because the answer is yes that he is forced to seek something other than "certainty", and that is "certitude". — Metaphysician Undercover

When he talks about objective certainty and objective certitude, it's basically the same thing. Both are epistemic in nature, and certitude is a synonym of certainty, so what are you talking about? Why do you think they are two different words? There can be a slight difference, but when used in terms of objective certainty or objective certitude as Wittgenstein is using it in this quote, and in the quotes that follow 270, there is very little or no difference. So again my argument stands.

MU much of what I'm saying isn't just my interpretation, but what other philosophers familiar with Wittgenstein's On Certainty are saying. Now that in itself doesn't make it right, but it sure lends support to this interpretation. On the other hand, I have read nothing in support of your interpretation, and if there is writing that supports your interpretation, please share it with us, because I for one would love to read it.

I make a distinction between respecting the person, and respecting their beliefs. I may show respect for a person I don't agree with, but I don't necessarily have to respect what they believe. They have the right to have any belief they desire, but I or we have the right to reject that belief.

At some point I just stop engaging with certain people (MU for e.g.), because I don't see that we agree on much, even the use of certain words, e.g., the post above (objective certainty and objective certitude). There has to be some basis for agreement, otherwise it seems pointless. So I just keep posting for those who are reading the thread and are not necessarily responding.

An agreeable attitude.

objective certainty and objective certitude — Sam26

Yes. Odd that this should take prominence.

I think I'm on Australia time. lol It's 4:20 am here.

The trouble with my living in your future. It's half past eight tonight here, from your point of view.

Get some sleep.

The way I'm using the term indubitable, is in the sense of being undoubtable, which is exactly what Wittgenstein was getting at with Moore's propositions. Now whether you agree with this or not is up to your interpretation, but it's not just my interpretation, but many other philosophers believe these bedrock propositions are indubitable. I don't see how this cannot be the case. — Sam26

I've explained this to you already in this thread, but I'll explain it again. To doubt is to request justification. Knowledge requires justification. Bedrock propositions as you describe them, are not justified, therefore they are not knowledge. In order that it may be accepted as part of a body of knowledge, any proposed bedrock proposition requires justification, therefore it must be doubted. If it is not doubted, (and consequently justified), it remains outside the body of knowledge and cannot serve as a fundamental proposition.

When he talks about objective certainty and objective certitude, it's basically the same thing. — Sam26

Again, that 's clearly not true. Look at the difference between where he describes objective certainty at 194: "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible." and where he describes objective certitude at 270: “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective."

Your claim that "when a mistake is not possible" means the same thing as "I have compelling grounds for my certitude" for Wittgenstein is clearly untenable. What has actually happened in "On Certainty" is that Wittgenstein started out with the intent of seeking the highest degree of certainty, (when a mistake is not possible), to provide an approach to the skeptic's doubt. However, he realized that such a certainty, "objective certainty" cannot be ascertained in any practical way. So he settles on a different type of "objectivity", one which allows him to say that "my certitude" is objective.

There's a substantial difference here:

True objective certainty, "it is certain", which Wittgenstein recognizes as "mistake is not possible", is attributed to the object, "it" is certain. True objective certainty represents the facts, the way it is. Whether or not any human beings know the way that it is, there is a way that it is, and this is represented by "it is certain that...", where mistake is completely impossible, because "..." represents the way that it is.

On the other hand, when my certitude is "objective", the certitude is a property of me, a subject. So we are now saying that I, the subject have a property which is objective, and this is my certitude. What makes this certitude objective is that it is grounded in the bedrock of inter-subjectivity. Now we have an objectivity that is not based in the object, which was the case with "it is certain that...", it is based in an inter-subjectivity, "we are certain that...".

As reference, consider the difference between how Wittgenstein uses "certain" at 175-200, and then after 200.

Between 175 and 200 he is discussing what it means for a proposition to be certain. At 178 he uses "It is so". Between 183 and 184 he uses "It is certain that". After 200 he switches his focus toward what does it mean if I am certain. At 230 he is asking what gives me certainty? At 242, "Mustn’t we say at every turn: 'I believe this with certainty'?" At 246 he is asking what does it mean if I am completely convinced. And this is where he talks about bedrock, and then produces objective certitude at 270. At 273 he asks "What qualifies as "objectively certain"?", and answers "There are countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us."

Notice, he has switched from objective certainty, "it is certain", prior to 200, to "objectively certain", "certain to us", after 270.

My argument is that when something is objectively certain, "certain to us", it is unreasonable for us to doubt this, as it is unreasonable to doubt that which one is certain of. However, the "us" referred to here, is never absolutely inclusive, there are always those who are outside the "us". For those outside the "us", the propositions which are certain to us, are not certain. For these people, it is reasonable to doubt those propositions and ask for justification. Furthermore, it is unreasonable for "us" to insist, to those who doubt these propositions, that it is unreasonable to doubt them. It is unreasonable for "us" to do this because it is just an excuse, a tactic to avoid having to justify these propositions.

He wouldn't, but that's exactly what doubt is, being unsure. — Metaphysician Undercover

He wouldn't know he is only hallucinating? Then is he doubting or not?
I just said previously, You are the one making this observation about him. What is his observation?

Perhaps talk of absolute truth lead philosophers astray, so that they threw out good old plain ordinary truth along with absolute truth. — Banno

But that's not really the issue, is it. Yes, of course, it is impressive that we seem to find it pretty easy to deal with everyday "truth". Agreeing on the facts is simply about mastering the right social habits.

So where philosophy begins is when we want to move on to an epistemic theory that itself is "true", or at offers an analysis of the best way to go about things. This is basic to moving away from the everyday socially-constructed forms of knowledge and establishing an epistemic method that can be extended way beyond into the realms of the metaphysical even.

The search for that ideal epistemic method is hard and ongoing. But we can see that it has largely cashed out as pragmatism and the scientific method of reasoning. And philosophy as a training aims to foster the critical thinking skills which are involved in applying that epistemology.

So you can continue with your anti-metaphysical griping. It counts for nothing. Metaphysics is alive and well. In scientific circles anyway. :)

The correct employment of doubts (and beliefs) is an issue. But just as obvious is that most folk have no trouble distinguishing between the everyday socially constructed truths (like Paris being the name given to a city that has also been designated a nation's capital) from the philosophical issues surrounding epistemology itself.

In conflating the everyday with the deeper story, you not only show a failure in critical thinking, you also wind up excluding what is actually fun and interesting about metaphysical level inquiry. And that makes for a dull life, wouldn't you say?

So I just keep posting for those who are reading the thread and are not necessarily responding. — Sam26

:) Good man. But do get some rest! Sorry I'm busy so am having to dip in and out of paying attention.

But that's not really the issue, is it. — apokrisis

Notions of absolute truth were laid to rest at the start of last century, with Moore and Russell's criticism of Absolute Idealism. The world is too complex for one Grand Scheme to provide us with The Truth. The notion that pragmatism holds all the answers is a romantic infatuation, as is the "search for that ideal epistemic method". Such Grand Schemes are never broad enough to encompass everything; they only give that illusion by reducing everything to their own terms.

Pragmatism says nothing of the truth of love, beauty, courage, respect. It is a philosophical sideline.

Wittgenstein's claim is that there are propositions that lie beyond questions of knowledge and doubt. That's my interest. — Magnus Anderson

"Proposition" is probably a bad choice of term in this connection. But what am I to think of you if refuse to acknowledge that you have hands, if you claim to genuinely doubt that, and yet continue to type your responses on your keyboard? Do you really want to claim that I should take you seriously?

Also, you have not addressed the distinction between being able to doubt any particular thing (although even that is questionable) and being able to doubt everything at once.

I was going to discuss this in messages with @Sam26, to avoid the multiple distractions in this thread. But perhaps things have progressed to the point where something helpful will come form it here.

Grayling, in an essay entitled Wittgenstein on scepticism and certainty, juxtaposes what he suggests are two conflicting arguments in On Certainty. The first, which he refers to as OC1, is found in the sort of refutation of scepticism with the foundationalist arguments found in this thread. The second, OC2, is the relativist claim that truths are dependent on history, language, perspective and so on.

Grayling sees the resolution of the tension between these two views as the the unfinished task of OC. In this, I agree with him.

Grayling proceeds to see the relativist off with reference to Davidson's anti-relativist arguments, and again I am in agreement with him.

Are we left with truths within frameworks, each of which can be interpreted in terms of the other?

Indeed, to call for further proof when all others are convinced is at the least antisocial.

Some quotes to support the relativist line of thought in OC:

65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change.

95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

164. Doesn't testing come to an end?
165. One child might say to another: "I know that the earth is already hundred of years old" and that would mean: I have learnt it.
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

255. Doubting has certain characteristic manifestations, but they are only characteristic of it in particular circumstances. If someone said that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn't 'all done by mirrors', etc., we should not be sure whether we ought to call this doubting. We might describe his way of behaving as like the behaviour of doubt, but this game would be not be ours.
256. On the other hand a language-game does change with time.
257. If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn't know what it would mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I had said something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why.

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
 But is there no objective character here?
 Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.
337. One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive - I expect this. 
If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that. If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren't switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory the whole time, and trust it without any reservation. The certainty here is the same as that of my never having been on the moon.

The first, which he refers to as OC1, is found in the sort of refutation of scepticism with the foundationalist arguments found in this thread. The second, OC2, is the relativist claim that truths are dependent on history, language, perspective and so on. — Banno

By "foundationalist arguments" are you referring to Moorean types of 'arguments' or something else?

It would seem that we are left with "truths within (translational) frameworks". I think a distinction needs to be maintained between the idea that truth is dependent on "history langauge, perpective..." and the idea that expressions of truth are so dependent.

Notions of absolute truth were laid to rest at the start of last century, with Moore and Russell's criticism of Absolute Idealism. — Banno

Hah. Well there is certainly still something in Hegelianism. But it took Peirce to make the case that there is no direct correspondence between the reasoning subject and the objective world. The mediation of the relation by signs pretty much ensures that there isn't - as the comprehending self and its comprehended world arise separately from the world in itself.

So what you are expressing here is some personal prejudice about what have been the twists and turns in the development of epistemology. Moore and Russell hardly ended anything. They were already blundering into logical atomism.

The world is too complex for one Grand Scheme to provide us with The Truth. — Banno

Oh dear. Again that may be your impression, but after checking out the great variety of epistemologies on offer, I am repeatedly surprised by what a robust scheme Peirce arrived at.

So you have your view. I have mine. The difference is mostly that I am prepared to supply the arguments and evidence for mine. You instead have adopted the easy position of the arch-sceptic. You can just keep saying "I doubt that very much".

You even seem proud that you won't even read anything about Peirce when it is offered. It's a funny attitude to encounter. But variety is what I enjoy.

Pragmatism says nothing of the truth of love, beauty, courage, respect. It is a philosophical sideline. — Banno

Hmm. But pragmatism done properly speaks directly to the values of the "self" that is doing the philosophising. I keep point that out to you. It puts the other side of things - the self that hopes to discover itself in its world - in the limelight.

Of course, this is a fundamentally anti-Romantic and anti-Transcendental enterprised. A lot of folk - you too apparently - don't like that mystical side of life being called into question and treated as a scientific inquiry.

Yes. I can see how it might seem to threaten Philosophy. Science has taken over metaphysics pretty much entirely, and now it is back for the rest. :)

But to me, that is what progress looks like. And I'm always willing to make the argument in full. I don't need to hide behind ambiguous non sequiturs and one liners.

But what am I to think of you if refuse to acknowledge that you have hands, if you claim to genuinely doubt that, and yet continue to type your responses on your keyboard? Do you really want to claim that I should take you seriously? — Janus

I think I have to state this in order to clarify my position. I do not refuse to acknowlede that I have hands. I do have hands. I don't doubt that. What I am saying is that the reason I don't doubt that statement is not because it is impossible or non-sensical to doubt such a statement but because I choose, for one reason or another, not to do so.

You appear to be arguing that it makes no sense to doubt our memories. I don't understand that. You think it's impossible for us to wake up one day and realize that we've been dreaming all along?

Again, I share @Banno's sentiment that we should not take such possibilities seriously. It's possible that I am a centaur who's dreaming of being a human but that does not mean that I should take such a possibility seriously. I personally don't. I think I am a human and that I will remain so for the rest of my life.

I think a distinction needs to be maintained between the idea that truth is dependent on "history langauge, perpective..." and the idea that expressions of truth are so dependent. — Janus

Quite so. Truth is not one thing - indeed, it varies from case to case, as is demonstrated by the T-sentence.

Special Relativity has a strong metaphorical role here. What is true in one frame of reference may not be true in another - except that the mathematical transformations developed by Einstein permit what we might call a translation from one frame of reference to another. Using that translation, the frames of reference are found not to contradict one another.

This is quite close to Davidson's argument agains relativism. What is true is what is the case under translation in both frames of reference.

What I am saying is merely that the reason I don't doubt that statement is not because it is impossible or non-sensical to doubt such a statement but because I choose, for one reason or another, not to do so. — Magnus Anderson

While non impossible, it is, I submit, nonsensical to doubt that you have hands while you are engaged in typing.

OR can you provide a sensible account of how tis might come about?

And I'm always willing to make the argument in full. — apokrisis

Indeed, as you were so forthcoming when asked if it is true that Paris is the capital of France.

While non impossible, it is, I submit, nonsensical to doubt that you have hands while you are engaged in typing.

OR can you provide a sensible account of how tis might come about? — Banno

My point is that you can question your memory. For example, I remember the sensation of my fingers hitting the keys on my keyboard just a few moments ago. My point is that this memory can be questioned. Perhaps no such experience took place. Perhaps there is nothing but an imagination of such an experience. That's all I am saying.

I think I have to state this in order to make my position crystal clear. I do not refuse to acknowlede that I have hands. I do have hands. I don't doubt that. What I am saying is merely that the reason I don't doubt that statement is not because it is impossible or non-sensical to doubt such a statement but because I choose, for one reason or another, not to do so.

You appear to be arguing that it makes no sense to doubt our memories. I don't understand that. You think it's impossible for us to wake up one day and realize that we've been dreaming all along?

Again, I share Banno's sentiment that we should not take such possibilities seriously. It's possible that I am a centaur who's dreaming of being a human but that does not mean that I should take such a possible seriously. I personally don't. I think I am a human and that I will remain so for the rest of the eternity. — Magnus Anderson

I haven't seen any argument from you as to how it could be reasonable to doubt that I have hands, or why, just because someone (who, for the sake of the argument, is not deranged) could always say they doubted the existence of their hands, I should believe that the person genuinely doubted that.

As to doubting our memories, of course individual memories may be more or less subject to doubt; my point is that memory as a whole faculty cannot be coherently doubted.

I also agree with what you say about taking such possibilities seriously. Really, that is the whole point. I guess where we disagree is that you seem to believe that otherwise reasonable people are capable of genuinely doubting the kinds of things we have been discussing (which would mean taking such possibilities seriously) whereas I see no reason to believe that they are any more capable of doing that than I am.

Indeed, as you were so forthcoming when asked if it is true that Paris is the capital of France. — Banno

That's a little lame when you wouldn't give a definition of what "truth" might be taken to mean in your view.

I agreed it might be tautologically true according to some social convention. And I pointed out how inadequate such a definition of "true" might be in any sensible debate about realism - as might hinge on Prof Moore and his flapping hands.

But as usual, when faced with an actual argument, you went radio silent for a while. And now re-emerge clinging onto this as some unanswered winning remark you might have made.

You can always go back and address my actual replies. But I know you won't. It's all impression management as usual.

you wouldn't give a definition of what "truth" might be taken to mean in your view. — apokrisis

"P" is true IFF P.

That's as close as can be got, and I have said it to the point of tedium.

You can always go back and address my actual replies — apokrisis

Apo, a reminder that you are a sideshow here. This is a thread about On Certainty, not about Pragmatism.

You did not answer the question. If you did, provide links.

I also agree with what you say about taking such possibilities seriously. Really, that is the whole point. I guess where we disagree is that you seem to believe that otherwise reasonable people are capable of genuinely doubting the kinds of things we have been discussing (which would mean taking such possibilities seriously) whereas I see no reason to believe that they are any more capable of doing that than I am. — Janus

Let's make it simple. If you agree that it is possible that our memories can turn out to be wrong, we are on the same page. Because that's all I am saying.

It seems we do agree then. :)

OK. Next?

The next step is belief revision. The belief I am revising is "the subject of this thread is . . ."

That's as close as can be got, and I have said it to the point of tedium. — Banno

And to the point of tedium, you won't discuss the informal acts of measurement that are needed to show such truth in practice. So same old same old. You leave out the "self" that is needed to give propositions any grounding purpose and any natural limits to their concerns about errors, exceptions or doubts.

And of course, that extra stuff is central to making sense of such different classes of proposition as Paris is the capital of France, and here is one hand, here is the other.