Why wouldn't matter be better represented as a continuous field, — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this would be Bohm's quantum potential. He also perceived the universe as some sort of holographic field which he called the Implicate/Explicate Order. Rupert Sheldrake goes a bit further and describes it as hierarchies of morphic resonance fields that define the forms of biological life.

But the key to believing it, or accepting it, is to recognize the logical necessity of concluding that physical objects are necessarily re-created at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are not being recreated. They are morphing. There are no static states. Static states (nothing is static) are symbolic projections which the mind creates to share observations or solve practical purposes.

I can extrapolate to conclude that all physical existence must come into being at each moment as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, existence is just continuously morphing exactly as it is perceived. Memory of the past gives us the sense of duration.

I am not sure why your model is overcomplicating itself, because fundamentally the pieces are all there. Maybe you are trying to preserve some remnants of some other ontology that really doesn't fit. If you observe anything from any angle, it is just a holographic form morphing, via movement in duration, into a new form. It's all "out there" just as it is perceived. Nothing is "in the brain" which is somehow, in some magical way, storing images.

They are not being recreated. They are morphing. There are no static states. Static states (nothing is static) are symbolic projections which the mind creates to share observations or solve practical purposes. — Rich

This is where I disagree with process philosophy. Process assumes no static states. But the biological systems create static states by which we perceive and apprehend the physical world. So the assumption of static states is fundamental to the conscious understanding of the physical world, as is evident from the basic laws of logic. Since these static states are fundamental to conscious understanding, we must give some sort of reality to them, even if their realness is completely artificial. Artificial things are real, and if the biological systems are creating these artificial states we need to understand how, and why.

There is a problem which process philosophy runs into which involves associating one activity, or one type of activity, to another. Then process philosophers end up having to invent imaginary things, like Whitehead's prehension and concrescence, to account for the relationships between various activities. So instead of going this route I find it much more reasonable to assume the real and natural existence of the imaginary static states, which is supported by the natural trend of biological systems.

No, existence is just continuously morphing exactly as it is perceived. Memory of the past gives us the sense of duration. — Rich

The assumption that all of reality is completely composed of continually morphing forms, doesn't give us what is required for a complete understanding reality. We need a static viewpoint, independent of the morphing forms, from which to observe and produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. Without this perspective our understanding will never be complete. That is why the biological systems evolved in this way, to produce the static states from which we understand the world. If we cannot give reality to these static states, we cannot produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. So, the model may appear to be "overcomplicating itself", but these complications are what is necessary to understand reality. Some of us like to believe that science is on the verge of a complete understanding of reality, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that we're very far from it, due to these complications.

the assumption of static states is fundamental to the conscious understanding of the physical world, as is evident from the basic laws of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't ever actually obseve anything that it's static. However, we can sort of view something as static in our minds though it too is always changing. The closest thing we can create that is static is some c symbolic language, but when we do this, the mobile nature of nature is lost.

We need a static viewpoint, independent of the morphing forms, from which to observe and produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. Observing movement directly, e.g. music, is Infinitely better than trying to understand music from notes. Everything is lost with a musical score, but it can be brought back to life with the movement and creativity of mind. Symbolics are practical for certain problem solving or communication but have very little to do with the movement of nature. Movement can only be comprehended by the mind. Once this is fully set and understood, then it is possible to understand the practical value of symbolics which is why the mind invented them.

We don't ever actually obseve anything that it's static. However, we can sort of view something as static in our minds though it too is always changing. Three closest thing we can create that is static is some c symbolic language, but when we do this, the mobile nature of nature is lost. — Rich

The point being that we choose a static unchanging thing to act as the temporal reference. So for example the day, or the year is a relatively unchanging thing which acts as a reference to measure time against. To the extent that these activities of the earth are static and unchanging, our measurements according to these references would be inaccurate.

Not really. Observing movement directly, e.g. music, is Infinitely better than trying to understand music from notes. — Rich

To observe music, we need a static unchanging point, the present. From the perspective of this point, the notes and musical score flow past as a procession. If your perspective flowed from future to past, like one of the notes, you would only be able to observe that one note or chord, which you exist along with. So we have a perspective, which we assume as the unchanging present, the now; we assume that the soul exists at the eternally unchanging now; and from this static perspective we can observe and measure all the changes as they occur around us.

From the perspective of this point, the notes and musical score flow past as a procession. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't observe it that way. For me, music just flows in my mind, one sound penetrating into another.

I see what you mean. But at the same time, conflating the "actual" and the "potential" can appear to be inelegant in its way. — boundless

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical.

Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself.

In any case, if this perspective is used then one must accept MUH (Mathemaical Universe Hypothesis). — boundless

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe

Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal.

the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

While the Schrodinger equation is all well and good, one still had to give credit to the minds that created it based upon the observations of said minds.

Yes.

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant.

Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself. — Andrew M

Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe


Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal. — Andrew M

Good point. BTW what I meant is that the universe becomes literally a "mathematical structure" also in "normal" MWI. To me saying that "the universe is" (nothing more than) "a universal wavefunction which never collpases" is reductionism. I prefer to use the much more modest epistemological view of Bohr, or something similar to that. I do not deny however that also his version of QM has problems.

Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".

Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI and before considering the ethical, let us now see what MWI predicts. According to MWI as time passes the universe continue to "split". The are now a huge number of "boundless adults" that "came" from "boundless child". With some I share the same memories. However we all have a distinct consciousness. Therefore while every "story" is in fact meaningful since can be traced back to "boundless child", the problem is that in the opposite verse of time there is a continuous splitting. I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things.

Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. Therefore, "boundless" is simply one of the possible actual outcome of the "universal wavefunction". Free will becomes meaningless because in fact "one" of the "boundlesses" always commits the "wrong action" (or the "right action"). In this case what "boundless" does is simply due to the fact that it is a possibility. But at the same time the other possibilities are, in fact, actualized. Therefore unless you add some "subsystems" in the structure of the universe MWI has the same problems of other determinisms in ethics. The "right" action becomes simply a possible (and therefore actual) occurence. In fact if there are two possible choices, then both in two different branches are done.

So all actions in reality have the same value since they are inevitable. If the universal wavefunction is all there is, then all stories are actual and our "illusion of free will" is due to the fact that we see a story. Note that IMO according to most ethical theories it is of fundamental importance that they can be broken. In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized.

Had to jump in on this. Quoting some of Andrew M comments and boundless's replies to them.

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do.

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant. — boundless

Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems.

Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong.

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence.

I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms

Doing away with ontology might appear to you as a solution, but we, as good philosophers are interested in determining the truth, and that means the true nature of reality. Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal.

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. — noAxioms

Stephen Hawking proposed "model-dependent realism" as your replacement for ontology. This claim of yours, that ontology "doesn't matter" is nothing more than intellectual laziness. If the problem is to difficult, let's direct our attention away from it and pretend that it doesn't matter. Of course it really does matter though, as is evident from the difference between the geocentric and the heliocentric models of the solar system.

Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?

No, the model is not the reality. Turns out we don't yet have an accurate model, so I can hardly claim that say the current standard model is our reality.

My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification.

To quote fragments from the wiki header:

"Where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist"
That use of 'exist' is open to interpretation, but I agree, the stance would seem to be contradictory if 'exist' means 'is objectively real'. If used as a relation as I propose, then yes, all of the models (if they are accurate ones) describe existing realities. Idealism even makes sense this way.

"[MDR] claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything. "
This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality?

I will look at it more, and what Hawking has to say about it.

The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance!

Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed! If our POV is dimensionless then the "experienced world" would be a succession of static images and change is an artifact of memory, so to speak. If this is the case, we would not percieve change but rather we would only infer it (and also, our memory would "create" the illusion of continuity between the static images - which a-priori for us would be independent).

If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if we do not want to fall into solipsism or a sort of "Evil Genius" theory we have to assume that there are two "times". And the "real time" is not a part of our experience but a part of the "external world". But as I said some posts ago, this is only a "reasonable inference" for the "external world". And in fact "the sense of continuity" is a "creation" of our memory, which a-priori is unrelated to the "real time".

So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmmm, very interesting. In fact we started by assuming that the "static" view was the "natural" one and we ended up with three "times". The real time is "behind" both the external reality and the workings of our senses, the "static" is the perspective of the "soul" and finally we have the "time" that is created by memory (or other falculties) to "connect" the static images. So in fact our "perception" of time is completely artifical.

Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites).

This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, if our model is "right" then also spatial existence must be reconsidered. In fact as the "static image" is a construction also space is. We continue to recreate "space".

At the same time, however, like time we can think that there is a "real space". But like "real time", "real space" is beyond (in the sense that it precedes) our experience. If this is the case then the same ideas about the "multi-layered" represention applies also to space and therefore we have a lot of maps. And each map has its "space", its "time", its "objects" etc.

So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the only way to know (at least partially) the tint is to study all our senses and the relationship between them.

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah the relation between the various timelines is a very problematic issue. In fact as you say we even recreate space as we change the scale. So, yeah in order to avoid these issues we need to determine the tint.

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)? — noAxioms

It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false. So you ask "which empirical observation would be different", and the answer is every observation would be different. That is because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. If you replace description with mathematics, you no longer have a description. True understanding requires description because it will always come to a point where you have to say what it is that is being counted.

My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification. — noAxioms

This is the point, to quantify something and to describe that thing are two distinct procedures. To understand something requires that one do more than quantify that thing, it requires that one can describe it, say what it is that is being quantified.

This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality? — noAxioms

No, I believe that MDR states that there is no "true reality", reality is according to the model, very similar to what you stated in the last post. That's why it's called "model-dependent reality", reality is according to the model. It's a radical idealism.

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant. — boundless

OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below):

Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph's theorem, which has come to be known as the PBR theorem, essentially offers an ultimatum. If quantum mechanics is right, then the wavefunction cannot be epistemic - it cannot merely represent an experimentalist's partial knowledge about reality. It must instead be ontic and directly correspond either to part of reality (as Bohm said) or to reality in full (as Everett said). — The life of psi - Jon Cartwright

Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".

Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI ... — boundless

The Schrodinger equation is deterministic but it is descriptive/predictive not prescriptive. That I predictably drink tea rather than coffee doesn't imply I don't freely choose tea. And showing me an equation predicting that I will drink tea wouldn't prevent me from drinking coffee on that occasion.

I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things. — boundless

Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI.

Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. — boundless

Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things.

In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized. — boundless

I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee).

I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do. — noAxioms

Unitary QM does. If a quantum state describes a photon being emitted towards a 50/50 beam splitter then, per the Schrodinger equation, this initial quantum state evolves into a superposition of two quantum states with one state describing a transmitted photon and the other state describing a reflected photon.

Other interpretations provide different accounts because they alter or add to unitary QM in some way (e.g., adding collapse).

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms

There are either two photons emerging from the beam splitter in the scenario I described above (per unitary QM) or just one (per most other interpretations). Aren't they mutually exclusive claims?

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms

OK, but the theory still has to be coherent. I think it's a category mistake to talk about "the human in the mathematical structure..." or to presume that humans and numbers have the same ontology.

interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance! — boundless

You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time.

I would make a graphic representation similar to Meiland's. At each moment of passing time there is something occurring. I can represent each moment as a horizontal line, with an arrow pointed left, like Meiland. The lines are numbered from bottom to top as t1, t2, t3, etc.. I can then make a perpendicular line (P1, perspective 1) crossing all the t lines, with an arrow pointed up, and this represents a standard model of the flow of time. Each horizontal line crossed represents a static image of a moment in time. However, our experience is of a wide present, so I produce two lines of time flow, one to represent the beginning limit to our experience, the other to represent the end limit. So we now have two parallel vertical lines representing the beginning and end of the human experience of the present, one is perspective 1 (P1) the beginning, and the other perspective 2, P2, the end. Now you can imagine that P1 is crossing t2, t3, or even a later time, as P2 is just crossing the earlier time, t1.

The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops.

So the correct order of coming into existence must be established. This is what is represented by the horizontal arrows at t1, t2, t3, etc. It is directly perpendicular to our experience of passing time, so it cannot be observed, but we infer logically everything we know about it from the discrepancies in our observations due to the breadth of our observational present.

If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites). — boundless

Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not. Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.

Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2.

Unitary QM does. If a quantum state describes a photon being emitted towards a 50/50 beam splitter then, per the Schrodinger equation, this initial quantum state evolves into a superposition of two quantum states with one state describing a transmitted photon and the other state describing a reflected photon.

Other interpretations provide different accounts because they alter or add to unitary QM in some way (e.g., adding collapse). — Andrew M

Wait, how is a collapse-interpretation not unitary? Unitary seems to mean that probabilities of various outcomes of measurements add up to 1. There are apparently some interpretations where this is not so, but I'm not very familiar with them. Granted, they all seem to describe superposition states.
I always wondered how they detect superposition of say macroscopic states. They put some object (a small bar just large enough to see unaided) into a superposition of vibrating and not. I didn't get from the article how they knew this state had been achieved.

There are either two photons emerging from the beam splitter in the scenario I described above (per unitary QM) or just one (per most other interpretations). Aren't they mutually exclusive claims?

The interpretations with which I am familiar say the photons are both there, in superposition, so long as they've not been measured. It is only after measurement where they differ. Mostly talking about collapse or not interpretations. Copenhagen is mutually exclusive with MWI only in its choice of reality against which the state is defined. If reality is a relation, this is no more contradictory than my location being both north-of and south-of something. Just different things.

OK, but the theory still has to be coherent. I think it's a category mistake to talk about "the human in the mathematical structure..." or to presume that humans and numbers have the same ontology.

If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?

- - -

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?
— noAxioms

It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false [...] because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it.
I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different.

Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it. — noAxioms

If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology.

I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different. — noAxioms

I'm, not questioning your view, I haven't taken the time to properly interpret it. I'm questioning the claim that you could produce a model of reality without an ontology. Without an ontology you couldn't call it a description of reality. And if it's a model without an ontology, then you have no claim to model reality.

If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure.

As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not.

I'm, not questioning your view — Metaphysician Undercover

I am. I don't really hold to a specific view. I'm just exploring in this area lately, and looking for inconsistencies.

The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution.

I've been following this thread with interest over the last few days, and read most of the messages. I've only been lurking because I've been quite busy with my readings. Some of my readings, though, may interest some of you.

Michel Bitbol, Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles
(In this paper, Bitbol compares his own pragmatist interpretation to Rovelli's relational interpretation, and he compares the latter to both Bohr's and Everett's. It's the fourth paper by Bitbol that I read on the topic of the intepretation of quantum mechanics.)

Michel Bitbol, De l'intérieur du monde : Pour une philosophie et une science des relations
(This is a fascinating 720 pages book. I've only read a few dozen pages. It appears to have much affinities with my own neo-Kantian pragmatist proclivities in metaphysics and epistemology.)

Manuel Bächtold, Interpreting Quantum Mechanics according to a Pragmatist Approcach
(This is a summary of Bächtold pragmatist interpretation, which he developed more fully in his thesis, written under the supervision of Michel Bitbol)

Manuel Bächtold, Le Possible, l'actuel et l'événement en mécanique quantique : Une approche pragmatiste
(This is Bächtold's thesis. I am currently reading section 3.8 Les interprétations everettiennes, and section 3.9 L’interprétation en termes de corrélations)

Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure. — noAxioms

So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?

As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not. — noAxioms

Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? What do you think it means to say "a thing is real to something else"? Does this mean that reality consists of at least two things?

The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution. — noAxioms

Here's a suggestion. Forget about the question of why there is something rather than nothing because you will never find a satisfactory answer. Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. Suppose you answer this with "there is what there is, instead of something else, because of the particular relations which exist". We still have to ask what does it mean to occupy the position of being related to something else.

OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below): — Andrew M

Hi, interesting. Have to think about it. This seems interesting: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/is-the-pbr-theorem-valid.924718/ . <a href="https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/</a>

I will read these threads...

Tank you for the objection!

Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI. — Andrew M

Agreed!

Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things. — Andrew M

Good point!

In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)

I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee). — Andrew M

Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.

Thank you for the insights!

Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms

Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms

Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms

Well this seems a "relational ontology", i.e. that everything exist in virtue of relation with something else. Nothing exist independently. Well, this is really a fascinating idea to me!

So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't think 6 needs to have platonic reality for 12 to be even.

If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?

I think the term is 'existential quantification'.

Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes to both questions. The reality of both things is probably the same.

Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are biases in the asking of this. I wanted to get below that. So wrong question.

Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory? — boundless

No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation.

Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation? — boundless

Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested.

Have to look it up. — noAxioms

Rovelli's paper on relational quantum mechanics is available here.
He also discusses his idea of relationality in non technical terms in his popular book Reality Is Not What It Seems: The Journey to Quantum Gravity.
He also has co-written with Federico Laudisa the entry on Relational Quantum Mechanics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

As I mentioned above, Bitbol's paper Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles ? Une lecture non-métaphysique de l’interprétation relationnelle de la mécanique quantique de Rovelli is excellent. It's a pity that it's only available in French. Bitbol has written a bunch of papers in English about his favored interpretation of quantum mechanics, though. Most are available on his web-page. I recommend especially:

Quantum Mechanics as Generalised Theory of Probabilities and
Reflective Metaphysics: Understanding Quantum Mechanics for a Kantian Standpoint.

No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation. — noAxioms

Sorry for the misunderstanding. Anyway, I suggest you to check Rovelli's ideas and similar. (for a start you might enjoy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/)

Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested. — noAxioms

Yeah, MDR is very nice too (If I recall correctly, it has also a more "epistemological" streak, so to speak, rather than an "ontological" one. By this I mean that MDR is more interested on what we can know about reality, rather than what "is" reality. However I might be wrong :wink: ).

Well I am quite slow, too. So it is not a problem for me :wink:

So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why must there be "time passing between still frames"?

this is already stepping into interpretation territory — noAxioms

It would have been far preferable if in fact 'the atom' was discovered as this would have dispensed with 'the problems of metaphysics'. Then, existence = 1, non existence = 0 - atoms and the void. What a perfect model.


Didn't work out, though. Hence the problems of interpretation.

Meta pointed me to MDR — noAxioms

Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism.