Our thinking about those states, our descriptions, our categories are always our ideas. Whether we are accurate or not, right or wrong or not, they are our thoughts which are a distinct state of the world-- are descriptions and concepts are not the-thing-itself.

This is the opposite of idealism. Things are defined in themselves rather than by our ideas.

Is the world an idea then?

I'm not saying Aristotle is Kantian in the sense of having a rule thought to be floating above the world constraining what can be done. My point is that, like Kant (and many other moral philosophers), Aristotle treats moral value as ideal.

It is something "we are meant to be" separate to our actions in the world-- in knowing the nature of the psychopath, we know killing will suit him, in knowing the nature of the rational, compassionate woman of virtue, we know moral goodness will suite her. This is not true. The woman might have compassion for Nazi goals and the psychopath might be content to limit or stop their violence.

Yes and no.

Our concepts of the world are ideas. States of the world are things and are not ideal.

I can place two oranges on the table, and then immediately see that there are two oranges. Then I can place two more oranges next to them, and directly see that there are now four oranges. I can repeat this experiment as many times as I like and the result, it seems obvious will always be the same; for the simple reason that objects do not appear out of nowhere; and even if they did that would not contradict the formula, if I really did put two oranges there both times. — John

2+2=4 isn't as easy to falsify as you think. You're basically appealing to our intuition. You're saying, "we all know 2+2=4, right?" The question you need to ask yourself, is again, "do we all know it because it's true... or is it true because we all agree?"

Remember the white swan problem? Find one black swan, and your theory is shot. You haven't falsified anything. You're just stating, "we all know 2+2=4, right?" "it seems obvious" doesn't work for ethics, why do you use the phrase when it comes to math? It's like you think there some "mathematical facts" out there in the universe somewhere.

But, anyway, I see you admit that math is intuitive in another post above.

I agree, I think that in the final analysis, both math and logic must be intuitive — John

One of the rules that must be made clear in responding to The Willow of Darkness' posts are that (1) they are not required to 'make sense' (on account of 'making sense' is an arbitrarily imposed 'external rule'); and (2) The Willow of Darkness is free to take issue with any proposition, by any person, on any grounds which The Willow of Darkness sees fit, even if those grounds seem to be in direct contradiction to an earlier post by The Willow of Darkness. — Wayfarer

That just seems wrong to me in a way that is incrumulating. 8-)

Aristotle treats moral value as ideal — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, he doesn't.

It is something "we are meant to be" separate to our actions in the world — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, it isn't.

It's shown otherwise with your own example.

You expected, without reference to actions, that the psychopath with be suited to killing and the rational, compassionate woman to morally good actions. Analysis of them in reference to moral action was made on what you expect them to do, based on the concepts you have of them, not on what actions they actually take or what they understand.

He's not too far wrong actually. My position is there is no "ground." Truths are worldly (states of existence) or they are in-themselves (logical). Idealism is false. There is no "ground" of an idea which determines any truth.

(1) is true in the sense my points don't depend on them making sense to anyone.

(2) is also true because ideas don't limit what the world can be. Just because someone thought or said something in the past doesn't mean they can't think something different or even something inconsistent with it. I am always free to take issue with any argument someone makes, even if it were to contradict something I (or anyone else) said.

I'm even free to argue pure nonsense or incoherence if I want (e.g. you are wrong becasue the spade is in the sky and cups sing with dancing lasers on their way to my sister's birthday party). So is anyone.

Ideas to not define which states of the world occur or can occur. The world and logic cannot be reduce to one unified form, principle or idea which accounts for everything. You can't rule the extent of the world or meaning by what you think it is meant to be. Things and meaning always extend beyond you and your ideas.

So all you're saying basically is that 'the world' is an idea but the world is not. So, why, according to you, does the same not apply to nature.
:-}

No...

I'm saying "the world" and the world are ideas-- both are our concepts about the world. The former being our concept of speaking about our concept of the world, the latter being our concept of the world. "Nature" and Nature are similar.

States of the world themselves are neither of these. The world doesn't depend on us thinking about it to be. "The world" and the world are both our concepts, significance in representation, meaning expressed by existing experiences. These are never the "thing-itself." Outside of us, there are many existing states and logical truths which are never any of our ideas, no matter how well or badly we might think of talk about them (if we even do at all).

2+2=4 isn't as easy to falsify as you think. — anonymous66

Well, I haven't actually claimed that it is falsifiable, but that it is, within the limits of our definitions, (and what else do we have to work with?) verifiable as I described.

The black swan analogy doesn't work as far as I can see, because even prior to the discovery of black swans it would have been easy enough to imagine and describe a scenario in which encountering a swan of any colour other than white would falsify the claim "all swans are white".

Can you imagine and describe a scenario in which 2+2=4 would be falsified? I can't.

It's not really apt to say that I have "admitted that maths is intuitive" since I never claimed otherwise.

So, if the world and nature have the same status according to you, then just as there may be states of the world which do not consist in thought, why can there not be a following of nature which does not consist in thought?

The former being our concept of speaking about our concept of the world, the latter being our concept of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I disagree; the former is a word that stands for the concept of the world, or better, stands for the word that stands for the world and the latter is a word that simply stands for the world. If the latter were a word that stood for our concept of the world then the former would be a word that stood for our concept of our concept of the world; and that's just plain ridiculous. In any case what you have said above would place you firmly in the idealist camp, despite any protestations from you to the contrary.

I don't wish to be rude, but the rest of your last post seems like gibberish to me.

There can be. And used properly, that's pretty much what "nature" means-- a pointer to states of the world whether known or unknown. Just as we say "the world" as a pointer to the logical expression of any state of existence, we may say nature to point to the logical expression of anything in causality.

The problem is following. That's an idea of what the world is meant to do. You take that meaning (e.g. psychopath) and say it derives a different truth (e.g. suited to killing), without taking into account that the world is distinct from the idea which is our expectation of it.

the former is a word that stands for the concept of the world and the latter is a word that simply stands for the world — "John

That's what I said. The world, which simply stands for the world, is our concept.

Our experiences stand in for things which are not them. That's how we know about stuff that's distinct from us. I experience my computer screen, but I am not my computer screen. My experience copies the meaning of the object such that I am awareness of the computer screen (rather than, you know, just being a "third person" computer screen who feel and thinks nothing).

You've already admitted what I'm arguing here. The world stands for the world. It is not, itself, the world. It's concept, our understanding of meaning, not the world itself.

The account of realism and idealism you are giving is backwards. For the realist, experience "stands" for things. For the idealist, experience is all things (i.e. experience=thing-in-itself). That's why things without experience are impossible under idealism.

The point of my thread is to suggest that the claim, "you can't get an ought from an is" may not actually be binding. I don't think we can say much without resorting to ought claims. — anonymous66

I think this is an odd way of talking, at least.

I would separate the argument for moral realism from the argument for moral facts. The former is a more general belief where the argument for moral facts is a particular kind of moral realism, but we need not accept the existence of moral facts while still arguing that morality is somehow real.

I would also separate the argument for moral realism from the argument for objective morality. This I would do mostly because "objective" is a slippery word.

Further, I would say there's a difference between "there are moral facts" and "we can not say much without resorting to ought claims" -- since we can dispute the existence of moral facts while still claiming that one ought to do something. Error-theory seems to account for this possibility fairly well; at least, it explains how we can both talk about and make claims about ought-sentences, or with them, while at the same time there not being any kind of entity to back up such talk.

And I wanted to point out that facts are odd things. I'm not convinced that moral facts would be any more odd than "just plain old regular facts".

Washington D.C. is the capital of the United States.

What ought-statement has the same quality and force as this statement?

You've already admitted what I'm arguing here. The world stands for the world. It is not, itself, the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I don't admit this at all. Our experience of the world is not the world. Properly speaking we don't experience the world at all, but things, people, events and so on. What we say or think about the world refers to the world, but only the phrase "the world" stands for the world. Now, you've already admitted that the case with nature is exactly the same; in fact the world could be alternatively called 'nature', So there can be states of nature.

So, contrary to what you claim I would say that for the realist experience does not stand for things, rather it is of things. We speak of our experiences, but what we say does not stand for, and is not about, our experiences, rather it stands for and is about the things we experience. In any case the danger here is that of getting caught up in language; inconsistencies and ambiguities may always be found in anything that is said; that's why, for instance Hegel speaks about "the inverted world".

It is also true that without experience things do not appear, but from that it does not follow that things do not exist without experience. If it were possible to get completely discursively clear about all this philosophy would have been finished a long time ago.

But that's exactly why "nature" doesn't work in the context you are trying to use it. When dealing with ethics we are picking particular truths and their relationship to the world. We are talking about people and whether specific actions suits them or ought to be done. There are states of nature, but no state has a nature.

That's a strawman. I never claimed that our experiences were always about our experiences. Indeed, I've said the exactly opposite at least twice-- if I thinking about my computer screen, I am not thinking about thinking about my computer screen. I'm just thinking of my computer screen. "Stand for" in my argument means the same thing as "of things" in yours.

My point is not about what the world or nature stands for, but rather that those instances are states of existence. Our thought (e.g. the world), is a state of experience, as opposed to what we are speaking about. I'm talking about how our experience relates to the world logically.

That despite the way our experiences represent accurately (or inaccurately), they are not the brute existence of the world, only what we thinking about them-- our discourse (as Landru would say).

Ought from is:

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss...

you will notice that the post you're quoting was deleted by me, actually about 30 seconds after dashing it off, because I had second thoughts about being so blunt.

Tautology and redundant.

"Whatever a firefighter ought to do" tells us nothing. It doesn't describe what a firefighter does and its ethical significance. No doubt a firefighter ought to do what, but it doesn't say anything about how a firefighter is virtuous. It gets us nowhere in expressing the firefighter's ethical significance.

The function characteristic of being a firefighter is missing. Of course, those who understand the ethical significance of being a firefighter will know what it means to be virtuous firefighter, but in that case they know ethics. There is no "ought for is" (just "this firefighter ought to" ) and "nature" is irrelevant. Rather than a telos which defines what a firefighter is meant to do, there is an ethic which the world and the firefighter expresses.

Rather than a telos which governs what a firefighter is meant to do, there is an ethic which the world and the firefighter expresses. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Empty rhetoric. The firefighter may be said to express her telos.

There are states of nature, but no state has a nature. — TheWillowOfDarkness

On the contrary, I would say all states have a nature.

She doesn't have a telos. In being a firefighter, she is not ordained by logic to be or do anything. Her presence as a firefighter is a state of the world and logic doesn't tell us anything about what sort of firefighter (e.g. good, bad, moral, immoral, virtuous, not virtuous, etc.,etc.) she is. Only her actions can define that. And only the existence of our understanding gives us that knowledge. She not expressing her telos. She's expressing her ethic.

This is not empty rhetoric. You are just ignoring the distinction between telos and ethic.

We can say that, by definition, every person expresses the actions they take, their particular thoughts and movements-- but that's descriptive not normative.

That's a strawman. I never claimed that our experiences were always about our experiences. Indeed, I've said the exactly opposite at least twice-- if I thinking about my computer screen, I am not thinking about thinking about my computer screen. I'm just thinking of my computer screen. "Stand for" in my argument means the same thing as "of things" in yours. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I've tried to read what you write; but to be honest I can't make head nor tail of most it. You seem to be constantly contradicting yourself and disagreeing with things others have written more for the sake of it than anything else.

So. I think I'll leave it there for now.

I know... that's what I've been arguing against this entire time. You say we can tell the significance of state or ethic by preset logic concept, "a nature," from which the state or ethic (supposedly) comes-- "trees have leaves, psychopaths are suited to killing, if it's biologically caused it's legitimate, humans are heterosexual, having a penis means you're male, black people are savages, etc.,etc., etc.-- such that we can tell the meaning of the state or ethic without having to describe the meaning of the state or ethic itself.

I said all states have a nature - or form, if you prefer; I haven't said their natures may be adequately characterized by truisms or cliches. You continue, in accordance with your own preconceptions, to mischaracterize what I have argued. The axe you are grinding will never become sharp if you continue with the unproductive method you have been using.

My point is that nature or form is totally inadequate to characterise anything. It doesn't describe any state. Any attempt results in a generalised notion which presets what the world is supposed to be.

Let's say you see an apple that's red and round. You say: "Ah, apples are red and round. That's the form/nature of apples." You are prejudiced against any apple which is not "red and round." They don't even make sense because impossible for apples to do anything else. Any use of nature of form in this way, no matter how qualified, always closes off discourse to possible meanings, to recognising things which fall outside the form/nature understood.

If I present a green, knobbly apple, you will dismiss it. You will say: "That's not an apple. Apples are only red and round." Assuming I managed to convince you that it is an apple, and you now say: "Apples have the form/nature of red and round or green and knobbly," the closure of meaning repeats. You won't recognise the spotty blue apple. And so on and so on. No matter how many different properties you add to the form/nature of apple, it will not be enough, for meaning expressed in one apple does not define what any existing apple can be.

I'm targeting this shutdown of meaning (which you don't seem to realise) your argument is performing by taking form/nature constitutive of things and states. It's not that I'm mischaracterising your argument, but rather that I'm talking about something, an assumption, an expectation, you haven't realised is there.

I wasn't saying you were arguing any of the crass and unethical examples in my last post, but rather that they function by using the idea/form meaning as constitutive of things and states.

You keep making the same mistake of thinking I am talking about looking at nature as a concept, and using that concept to justify some action. I am saying that for Aristotle, phronesis consists in an informed following of a cultivated nature; which is achieved by a kind of intuition or direct seeing akin to the way animals follow their natures (instincts).

Of course it follows that an uninformed following of an uncultivated nature is also possible but that would not be phronesis ( practical wisdom) it would be practical unwisdom.

Phronesis then is not a "shutdown of meaning" at all, but a virtuous, that is to say a refined and balanced, cultivation of meaning. There would be no room for prejudice, sexual, racial or otherwise for phronesis. Of course, again, I should stress that this does not mean anyone can actually be utterly free of all the prejudices that are inherent to their times; as with Aristotle's attitude to women and slavery, for example. That said, Plato probably did better than Aristotle in that regard; but no one is perfect!

I'm not. I'm pointing out phronesis is merely repeating that expectation in a different way. Let use me as an example.

Let's say I cultivated my nature. I understand my self to be someone who cares about a certain ideas, particular issues, has a certain out look on life, who will do certain things. I (supposedly) know what I will will be or do at anytime-- in my mind I am the "red-round apple." I have this nature, this instinct, and (supposedly) nothing else is possible.

But this is not true. I may end up being many other things than are understood in my "cultivated nature." Tomorrow I might wake up and be a Christian Fundamentalist, a Mystic or even a moral naturalist. I might even be wrong in my own appraisal of myself (I'm not, but it's possible) and be a Christian Fundamentalist, a Mystic or a moral naturalist right now.

I am not logically limited to the meaning of "red round apple," to my phronesis, to my "cultivated nature." I never will be.