Yes. I'm not drawing a distinction between physical stuff and idea stuff - I think that (dualistic) idea is incoherent as well. — Andrew M
What I think is incoherent is the idea that awareness of stuff somehow causes it to exist. — Andrew M
Stuff?! ... There's stuff?! How come physicists haven't found it? :wink:What I think is incoherent is the idea that awareness of stuff somehow causes it to exist. — Andrew M
Sure, people might not be able to agree about a definition, but - unless you are a cranky eliminative materialist - there is something being disagreed about. "flufffwumps" - well, if I were to ask you what that was, you wouldn't even be able to point me to a literature of disagreement with which to get started. That's one difference between "consciousness" and "flufffwumps", and its a pretty significant one, and goes someway to saving the former from "meaninglessness" whilst leaving the latter as drivel. — jkg20
The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer. — Wayfarer
I underlined that phrase as to whether 'they exist in the same way' as ordinary objects, because I think it's important. And overall, I think it's fair to say that Heisenberg's attitude to the philosophy of physics favoured some form of idealist philosophy, as did some (but not all) of his peers. — Wayfarer
Put it this way, I try to remain aware of my limitations, which are considerable — Wayfarer
The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer. — Wayfarer
Because the word "observe" you use here really does mean something different, as SX pointed out. "observation from a mind determines the outcome" is not what's being said. — Moliere
The role of observation in determining an outcome - not by 'interfering with' or physically causing an effect, but simply observing. It seems to implicate the mind of the observer.
— Wayfarer
So in what way is this example any different than, say, that of a tree falling in a forest? — Moliere
The Copenhagen interpretation is the oldest and probably still the most widely held interpretation of quantum mechanics.[4][5][6] Most generally it posits something in the act of observation which results in the collapse of the wave function. According to the von Neumann–Wigner interpretation the causative agent in this collapse is consciousness.[7] How this could happen is widely disputed. — Wikipedia
Hugh Everett's many-worlds interpretation attempts to solve the problem by suggesting there is only one wave function, the superposition of the entire universe, and it never collapses—so there is no measurement problem. Instead, the act of measurement is simply an interaction between quantum entities, e.g. observer, measuring instrument, electron/positron etc., which entangle to form a single larger entity, for instance living cat/happy scientist. Everett also attempted to demonstrate the way that in measurements the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics would appear; work later extended by Bryce DeWitt.
A realist perspective is assumed because that is the way to construct a physical theory that is conceptually coherent. — Andrew M
... all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual "world" (or "universe"). In layman's terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite —number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.
We don't have to bow before the masters and follow them in everything they believed. We are right to ask why they came to their conclusions. — Moliere
There's the mistake in the quote — Moliere
In one of your papers, you mention that Erwin Schrödinger wrote about the Greek influence on our concept of reality, and that it’s a historical contingency that we speak about reality without including the subject — the person doing the speaking. Are you trying to break the spell of Greek thinking?
Schrödinger thought that the Greeks had a kind of hold over us — they saw that the only way to make progress in thinking about the world was to talk about it without the “knowing subject” in it. QBism goes against that strain by saying that quantum mechanics is not about how the world is without us; instead it’s precisely about us in the world. The subject matter of the theory is not the world or us but us-within-the-world, the interface between the two.
It’s so ingrained in us to think about the world without thinking of ourselves in it. It reminds me of Einstein questioning space and time — these features of the world that seemed so absolute that no one even thought to question them.
It’s said that in earlier civilizations, people didn’t quite know how to distinguish between objective and subjective. But once the idea of separating the two gained a toehold, we were told that we have to do this, and that science is about the objective. And now that it’s done, it’s hard to turn back. I think the biggest fear people have of QBism is precisely this: that it’s anthropocentric. The feeling is, we got over that with Copernicus, and this has got to be a step backwards. But I think if we really want a universe that’s rife with possibility with no ultimate limits on it, this is exactly where you’ve got to go.
How does QBism get you around those limits?
One way to look at it is that the laws of physics aren’t about the stuff “out there.” Rather, they are our best expressions, our most inclusive statements, of what our own limitations are.
a bunch of moderately clever apes on a small watery rock in the middle of nowhere — StreetlightX
The hypothetical question 'if a tree falls in the forest' is another way of posing the question and is often used to stimulate discussion on this very topic. It is a 'thought experiment' in philosophy, and again, not a question answerable by physics. — Wayfarer
But if you say flat-out, outright, that 'philosophical idealism is not relevant to the issues raised by quantum mechanics', then you'd be mistaken. — Wayfarer
There may be more choices, but Heisenberg chose 'Plato and Democritus' as representative of idealism and materialism, respectively — Wayfarer
The second point is that what is at stake, again, is the notion of an independently-existing, real, physical entity, the 'point-particle' that acts as a 'building block of reality'. The reason this is a vexed question at all, is because of that. The question is, what is the nature of reality? That's why it's a philosophical issue. — Wayfarer
So the point here is that this is a philosophy that explicitly accepts that 'the subject' has a role, is part of the landscape. Whereas, the whole conceit of a lot of science is that things are seen from a viewpoint of ultimate objectivity — Wayfarer
Where I disagree is that the double slit experiment, and use of the word "observer", implies idealism. That's the specific misreading I'm getting at. It's OK to have misread. I certainly do, and have misread on this very topic. — Moliere
That is important, isn't it? Not rhetorical. I'm looking for that common ground upon which disagreement can take place. You do care that some bit of knowledge is true, don't you? — Moliere
Have you read about Bernard D'Espagnat? Richard Conn Henry? — Wayfarer
If invoking a tree falling in the woods is the same as invoking QM, why invoke QM to start a thought experiment on idealism? — Moliere
In order for us to reasonably infer implications of some knowledge we must first know it. Is that true or false? — Moliere
As is well known, one afternoon whilst walking in the woods in the 1920's, Einstein suddenly stopped and asked his friend Michele Besso, 'does the moon not continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?' And that's basically the same question as the above. So - why was Einstein compelled to ask such a question? (Incidentally, I believe it was asked rhetorically i.e. of course Einstein believed that the moon continues exist when not perceived. But the point is, he was compelled to ask the question.) — Wayfarer
Well, yes, but there are levels of understanding. When I said I wasn't a physics graduate, I'm acknowledging that I don't understand the mathematics behind quantum physics. And as it's a mathematical theory, then obviously that's a deficiency.
But on the other hand, there has been considerable commentary on this issue from the viewpoint of history and philosophy of science. I try to confine my comments to that perspective. — Wayfarer
Not, of course, that this in any way addresses the fact that it remains a case of appealing to the unexplained to explain the unexplained. — StreetlightX
Berkeley denied the existence of substance - so whatever account you have of it cannot possibly accord with Berkelean idealism. You might need to revisit what you believe to be the difference between idealisms and realisms (and notice that there are several versions of both).That doesn't necessarily commit to what the nature of this or that substance is - and so may accord with, say, a Berkelyean idealism in many respects. But conceptually, the stuff comes first, the awareness of that stuff second.
Berkeley denied the existence of substance — ProcastinationTomorrow
Now I'm confused. I thought your position was that the very term "consciousness" was drivel, by which I presume you meant "devoid of content". If it is devoid of content, there is nothing to explain, by QM or by anything else for that matter. Perhaps, though, you do not believe that the term is literally devoid of content.That said, I don't see any problem with saying that quantum processes might play certain roles in 'explaining consciousness'.
A coherent interpretation of QM must require that the mathematical formalism quantify over actual or possible conscious observations. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Even if that were true - and I'm not suggesting for one moment that it is - one would not have established that idealism is true unless you had already established that QM is true. How, though, are you going to establish that QM is true unless you already have your coherent interpretation of it? Mathematical formalisms only get to be true or false under interpretations. — ProcastinationTomorrow
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.