In answer to your question, the system of axioms that I'm using is the one that is usually used, stated and cited.

Well, I don't want to turn this into a thread about mathematical logic, but Peano arithmetic is one of the standard ways of defining the natural numbers — jkg20

I've already acknowledged that there are other arithmetical axiom systems, including at least one (that of Peano) in which associativity is a theorem instead of an axiom.

I've already acknowledged that, and I've already clarified that it's irrelevant to what I've been saying.

As I said, the arithmetical axiom system for the counting-numbers, with respect the the addition and multiplication operations, that typically and usually used, stated and cited is the one in which associativity is an axiom, not a theorem.

I'm not going to debate that.

, so I'd have to challenge you to provide a more "usually used, stated or cited" system of axioms for doing that.

See above.

In any case, you cannot define "1" this way (as you do):


Let "1" mean the multiplicative identity.


without already having defined multiplication (recursively) over the natural numbers, which means that the natural numbers need already to have been defined within your system

Incorrect.

The multiplicitive-identity axiom for the counting numbers says that there is an element of the counting-numbers (call it "1") such that, for every element, a, of the counting-numbers, a X 1 = a.

And yes, there's no reason why I can't say "Let '1' mean the multiplicative identity".

How very commendable that you like Peano arithmetic. But It doesn't bear on what I've said.

But in any case, you will not be able to infer 2+2=4 without all those axioms. MetaphysicsNow is right about that and you are wrong.

It's time to agree to disagree on that.

But I'll add that the common arithmetical axiom-system that I refer to doesn't include a definition of multiiplication or addition, but merely mentions them as two operations, with respect to which the axioms for the number systems are stated.

Michael Ossipoff

As I said, the arithmetical axiom system for the counting-numbers, with respect the the addition and multiplication operations, that typically and usually used, stated and cited is the one in which associativity is an axiom, not a theorem.

Please provide a link to a site where this "usually used stated and cited" axiomatic system is set out clearly, preferably by a mathematician.

Oh, ok--I wasn't trying to evade that question or issue. I just previously didn't understand that it was being raised.

I'd said:

By "substantive truth", do you mean an alleged objective, fundamental, concrete "existence" for our physical world and its things and its stuff?

Now we are getting somewhere. Idealists and anti-realists more generally can (and have) made the distinction between substantive truth and logical truth, so no, one does not need to be a materialist in order for the distinction to make sense. You seem to be a fan of online philosophy encyclopedias
— jkg20

Without them, how could I translate what is being said by people who use their terminology?

- look up "logical truth" and see how complex a notion it is...

...or how complex it (along with everything else) is in the minds and writings of academic philosophers, who must constantly have things to write about, in order to publish, and not thereby not perish. :)

...and how various philosophers have tried to distinguish it from substantive truth. As far as I can tell, every example of if-then fact that you introduce is an example of a logical truth

Yes.

, but substantive truths are the ones that concern the empirical world (whether that world be independent of our coming to know it or not).

Isn't subjective idealism the ultimate empiricism? All that we know about the physical world is from our experience. I'm all for empiricism.

But our experience, including our physics-experiments, is experience of logical/mathematical structural relation. As I said, there's no evidence that our physical world is other than that.

Now, if you want to argue that there is no genuine distinction between logical truth and substantive truth, that might be an interesting discussion to have.

That's what I'm saying. I'm saying that objective or substantive truth about an objective substantive physical world is a fiction of our declarative/indicative grammar, and a long habit of (sometimes subconscious) Materialism.

Regarding the abstract logical implications, about hypotheticals, that I refer to, and the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications--I'm saying that there's no reason to believe that any of the antecedents of those implications are true.

What there metaphysically, discussably, describably is, are willow-the-whisp, ethereal, insubstantial logical systems. Period (full-stop)..

Take a look at Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" for example.

I'll check it out.

Since we, as sentient beings, are in the empirical world, it is substantive truth that will have a bearing on whether or not we can be reincarnated, not logical truth.

We aren't just in the empirical world. We're each the center, and the fundamental, essential and primary component of each our empirical world.--which is a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story.whose only meaning is with respect to and in terms of us, its protagonist.

As for reincarnation, the complete insubstantiality of that hypothetical story makes reincarnation no seem so implausible. As I said, if the reason for our being in this life still obtains at the end of this life, then what does that suggest?

Anyway, though I definitely argue for my metaphysics, I don't set out to aggressively push the reincarnation issue. But I comment on it, because it is something that's discussed a fair amount.

Someone said that the matter of reincarnation doesn't matter, because we'll never know if there's reincarnation. Yes, whether we're reincarnated or not, we won't know about it. If a new life starts, we won't know about this one.

In fact, I've been saying that, not only are past lives unknowable, but they're also completely indeterminate. It isn't true that there were or weren't previous lives.

I don't agree that it won't matter. After all, our experience will be different, depending on whether or not there' s reincarnation. The fact that you won't eventually say, "Aha, he was wrong!" or "Ok, he was right." isn't important.

But either would be ok, however it is. The end of this life is sleep, and there isn't a need to believe in some account of where it leads.

I'm just saying that my metaphysics implies reincarnation. It's of interest as a matter of discussion, as a consequence of metaphysics, which makes it a philosophical topic. And, as I said, there's much discussion about it.

I regard it as a metaphysical matter, not a religious matter. I don't claim that metaphysics, discussion and description cover all that is.

If anyone says it does, remind him that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.

Any of Reality that isn't fully discussable and describable, I'd call meta-metaphysics. It goes without saying that there's little that can be said about it. It isn't a topic for a philosophy forum, where we discuss what's discussable.

Michael Ossipoff

If the truth of one proposition implies the truth of another proposition, that’s a state-of-affairs.

In other words, it’s a fact. — Michael Ossipoff

If it is a fact at all it is a logical or semantic fact. Paris being the capital of France is a substantive fact. See the difference? As I see it is on account of this difference that your 'argument' founders, or flounders.

Here's the arithmetical-axioms link that you asked for:

https://sites.math.washington.edu/~hart/m524/realprop.pdf

Michael Ossipoff

I'd said:

If the truth of one proposition implies the truth of another proposition, that’s a state-of-affairs.

In other words, it’s a fact.

If it is a fact at all it is a logical or semantic fact. Paris being the capital of France is a substantive fact. See the difference? — Janus

Yes. Yours is a physical fact. You can go to Paris, and walk into the Capitol buildings from which the country is governed, and painfully stub your toe on the Capitol steps.

In a recent post, and, in fact, in all of my posts about my metaphysical proposal, I've emphasized that the notion of objective, substantive existence for this physical world and its things and its stuff, is a fiction of declarative/indicative grammar.

Check out my recent reply to jkg20, where I answer about that in more detail.

As I see it is on account of this difference that your 'argument' founders, or flounders.

I don't recognize the "substantial" or "objective" facts that you believe in, as something distinct from logical facts.

You haven't pointed to a specific false-premise, incorrect statement, or un-supported conclusion in my metaphysical proposal or my arguments for it.

Michael Ossipoff

Now, if you want to argue that there is no genuine distinction between logical truth and substantive truth, that might be an interesting discussion to have. — jkg20

There is certainly a logical distinction between logical truth and substantive truth. One might want to argue, as MO does, that there is no genuine metaphysical or ontological distinction, but then such a metaphysical argument could hardly be "non-controversial", as MO so mistakenly claims his metaphysics is.



So, you obviously deny the indispensable logical distinction between semantic facts and substantive facts, because it allows you to continue believing in your own sophistry. Well done! Well, I'm done too: well done responding to your lack of cogent argument!

Can you be more specific about what I said that suggests that?

You mean reincarnation? — Michael Ossipoff

Yeah, normally in New Age circles that sort of thing is called "metaphysical." I don't see how reincarnation can be connected to metaphysics strictly so-called.

But I'll add that the common arithmetical axiom-system that I refer to doesn't include a definition of multiiplication or addition, but merely mentions them as two operations, with respect to which the axioms for the number systems are stated.

Precisely. So, in order to get 2+2=4 out of this system of axioms for the real numbers, you need already a recursive definition of addition, otherwise you are stuck with 0 and 1 and the reals between them. Sure, you can add definitions (1+1)=2 , (2+1) =3, (3+1)=4... but either that is eliptical for defining addition recursively (as per Peano arithmetic for the natural numbers) or you need to supplement the axioms you link to with axioms for the existence of 2, 3 and 4. The system of arithmetic for the real number system trades off of the system of arithmetic for the natural number system and usually in order to prove that 2+2=4 you will need all the axioms of natural number arithmetic. In all cases you will need more than just the truth of the axiom of associativity for addition, so your conditional:

IF the additive associative axiom is true, THEN 2 + 2 = 4

is false, since (without all the required additional definitions and axioms) the antecedent could be true and the consequent false.

As I said, there's no evidence that our physical world is other than that.

Other than what? Other than a system of relations? Relations relate things to other things, so the physical world - whatever else it is - certainly includes those things that stand in relations to each other, Metaphysics needs to address the nature of the things that stand in relations to each other as well as to the nature of the relations in which they do so stand.

Suit yourself. I've amply covered the topic in previous posts to this thread..

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, reincarnation is implied if metaphysics is real. You, the observing entity, the being is different from the body in the sense that body is material, it can't be aware of anything. It just works, you observe its work. And if you are beyond physical reality, death doesn't destroy you. Just like you don't feel anything while asleep but "you're still there", you experience something else. But is it something like heaven/hell or do you come back to earth? Maybe it depends on the gravity of your mind. Maybe our minds weigh on a scale which decides the realm of existence you're in. Magic? Yes. Pure magic, not science at all. But hey, you defy science in every sense of the word. Close your eyes and feel yourself for a moment. You'd observe you're not your thoughts, you're the one hearing those thoughts, feelings different sensations. You aren't visible, measurable or traceable. You are consciousness

Experiencing, feeling, hearing itself is a proof of something beyond physical universe. In a pure material universe, chemical machines exist but consciousness can't

I mean just think about it, you could build a robot but you can never make it aware of itself. Trees, animals even babies, all have feelings and thoughts; however no one is feeling, thinking, they're just closed biological machines. Interesting, don't you think?

As I said, there's no evidence that our physical world is other than that.

Other than what? Other than a system of relations? — jkg20

Yes.

Relations relate things to other things

...but not necessarily objectively-existent things.

Relations also relate hypothetical, nonexistent things to eachother. Are Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys existent things?

If the Slitheytove content of a room consists of 2 Slitheytoves by the door, and 2 other Slitheytoves near the wall opposite the door, then there are 4 Slitheyitoves in that room.

Relations don't imply or require things.

There are abstract facts, at least in the sense that we can state and discuss them.

In mentions of abstract facts, there's no need or justification for a stipulation "...provided that there's something else with some kind of 'objective existence' ", whatever that means.

Yes, that's another question: What do you even mean when you say that there are "objectively-existent" things?

When we experience "things", our experience is of their relation to our own body, and their relation to, and comparison to, eachother.

As I've said, and as Faraday pointed out in 1844, there's no evidence for those "objectively-existent" things that you believe in...no evidence for anything other than the relations that we actually experience, observe and measure.

, so the physical world - whatever else it is - certainly includes those things that stand in relations to each other,

Of course. They're as "real" as the phiysical universe itself. Those things are part of your life-experience possibility-story.

The physical world and its things are real and existent in the context of your life-experience possibility-story.

But there's no reason to believe that they have some kind of "objective existence", whatever you mean by that.

Metaphysics needs to address the nature of the things that stand in relations to each other as well as to the nature of the relations in which they do so stand.

...and it doesn't need to make unsupported assumptions about "objective-existence" of those things, especially when you can't say what you mean by "objectively-existent".

As I've said, I can't prove that the "objectively", fundamentally, "concretely" existent world that you believe in, and its "objectively" and "concretely" existent things, and stuff, don't superflously exist as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the uncontroversially-inevitable complex system of inter-referring logical implications that I've described.

Michael Ossipoff

I refer you to my previous posting in which I showed how the additive-associative axiom implies 2+2=4, by a definition of some counting-numbers in terms of the multiplicative-identity and addition.

But, as I said, it's time to agree to disagree, and to discontinue this conversation.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, reincarnation is implied if metaphysics is real.

Agreed.

You, the observing entity, the being is different from the body in the sense that body is material, it can't be aware of anything. It just works, you observe its work. And if you are beyond physical reality, death doesn't destroy you

Yes, you’re the central, fundamental and primary component of your life-experience possibility-story. In fact, you’re not just “a component” of it. Your its center, meaning, origin and reason-for-being . Its “there” because of and for you. Your experiences are its whole subject, its whole point, content, meaning and relevance.

The individual and hir (his/her) experience are primary in my metaphysics.

And yes, even as the individual that you are, death doesn’t end your experience, because obviously, in your experience, there never comes a time of no experience. Death is an increasingly deep sleep.

I’ve suggested, in agreement with Eastern tradition, that most of us don’t reach the deepest extent of that sleep, because, before that, during a less-deep absence of waking-consciousness, when subconscious emotional predispositions and inclinations remain, we find ourselves in the beginning of a life, an experience-story consistent with our predispositions and the person who are at that time, a beginning life that our experience at that time is about. …one which is consistent with the person we are at that time.

.Just like you don't feel anything while asleep but "you're still there", you experience something else. But is it something like heaven/hell

I don’t believe in the Western traditional eternal Heaven or Hell.

or do you come back to earth?

Reincarnation needn’t be to exactly the same world as the one that we left, though it seems likely to be to a very similar one.

Maybe it depends on the gravity of your mind. Maybe our minds weigh on a scale which decides the realm of existence you're in. Magic? Yes. Pure magic, not science at all.

Science is un-duly worshipped as a religion in our society.

What-is, is more remarkable than any of fiction’s magic. …and better than many people here realize.

But hey, you defy science in every sense of the word. Close your eyes and feel yourself for a moment. You'd observe you're not your thoughts, you're the one hearing those thoughts, feelings different sensations. You aren't visible, measurable or traceable. You are consciousness.

Yes, Consciousness is primary.

I mean individual Consciousness, when speaking about metaphysics. But I agree that Advaita has a valid meta-metaphysical point about the impression that there doesn't seem to be important distinction between individuals. ...and of course at a person's end-of-lives, s/he doesn't know or care that there ever was, or even could be, such things as identity or individuality (or time, events problems, situations, want, need, lack or incompletion).

Experiencing, feeling, hearing itself is a proof of something beyond physical universe. In a pure material universe, chemical machines exist but consciousness can't.

I claim that, even if Materialism were true, humans, animals, and human-duplicating robots would be conscious.
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I mean just think about it, you could build a robot but you can never make it aware of itself.

I claim that any robot that can duplicate the actions of a human, must have the consciousness of a human. …in order to do that.

Trees, animals even babies, all have feelings and thoughts; however no one is feeling, thinking, they're just closed biological machines.

Among purposefully-responsive devices, it’s completely arbitrary where we draw the line to say what is “conscious”, or what has “feeling”.

Purposefully-responsive devices include humans, other mammals, other vertebrates including birds and reptiles, other animals, including insects, and even protozoans…and including plants, bacteria, viruses, mousetraps, refrigerator light-switches and thermostats.

We can arbitrarily draw the line wherever we feel like, regarding what is “conscious”, or what has “feeling”.

Insects obviously are conscious and have feeling, and it’s quite obvious when they feel fear. Bacteria, when they swim, swim away from what things they don’t like, and towards things they like. Plants respond purposefully, sometimes on the short timescales characteristic of animals. Viruses choose to bore into cells that they’ve determined are the kind of cell that they can use.

I’ve defined “a conscious being” as a purposefully-responsive device that is sufficiently similar to the speaker that the speaker feels kinship with it.

Michael Ossipoff

Relations also relate hypothetical, nonexistent things to eachother. Are Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys existent things?

Of course not, and there are no relations that relate Slitheytoves to Jaberwockeys either. There are logical relations that relatestatements about Slitheytoves to statements about Jaberwockeys. However, there are distinct kinds of relata and relations which concern existent things and which your metaphyics remains utterly mute on because your metaphysics deals only with the logical relation between statements not the physical relations between existent things. That is a pretty significant gap in a metaphysical system. Please do not try to obfuscate the issue by equating "physical" with "material", everything I say here is consistent with an idealistic metaphysics.

But, as I said, it's time to agree to disagree, and to discontinue this conversation.

This specific issue is not about agreement or disagreement, this is about you being wrong about what one can prove in mathematics given a set of axioms. Just admit that you have a scanty knowledge of number theory, drop those kind of examples from your posts, and address the lacunae in your metaphysics.

Just admit that you have a scanty knowledge of number theory, — jkg20

jkg20 doesn't know what number theory is. He's been misusing that term for some time.

Here's a link to an article, from Brown University, explaining what number theory is.

https://www.math.brown.edu/~jhs/frintch1ch6.pdf

Demonstration of ignorance of the meanings of terms that one is using, and such things as run-on sentences like:

This specific issue is not about agreement or disagreement, this is about you being wrong about what one can prove in mathematics given a set of axioms. — jkg20

...demonstrate sloppiness that typically and unsurprisingly also shows itself in other ways, such as the content of what jkg20 is saying.

this is about you being wrong about what one can prove in mathematics given a set of axioms — jkg20

Oops! jkg20 forgot to say where, in particular, my proof of 2+2=4 contained an error, mis-statement or unsupported conclusion.

I showed that 2+2=4 is implied by the axiom-system that I posted a link to.

And no, it wasn't necessary to use all of those axioms.

Michael Ossipoff

Jkg20 says:

there are no relations that relate Slitheytoves to Jaberwockeys either. There are logical relations that relatestatements about Slitheytoves to statements about Jaberwockeys.

Facts consist of relations among, or properties of, things, referred to as “objects”. Objects can be abstract objects, and needn’t have “physical” “existence”.

However, there are distinct kinds of relata and relations which concern existent things

Oops! jkg20 forgot to answer my question about what he means by “existent”.

Anyway, all relations, among whatever kinds of things, are still only relations. Relations are what are observed and measured and can be reported, described and recorded.

…and which your metaphysics remains utterly mute on

…when jkg20 can’t say what he means by it?

…because your metaphysics deals only with the logical relation between statements not the physical relations between existent things.

…but what does jkg90 mean by “existent”? Who knows.

jkg20 isn’t saying.

And physical relations are still only relations.

Physical things? As I said, any fact about the physical world implies, corresponds, to and can be said as a logical implication.

…and is (at least part of) the antecedent of some implications, and is the consequent of other logical implications.

There’s no evidence, measurement or reason to believe that the physical world consists of other than those implications.

Tell me about an experience of yours. You'll be telling about relations.

There’s physical experience, observation and measurement….of relation. A person’s experience of physical things consists of experience of their relation to that person’s body. Likewise, scientific physical observations and measurements are of relation.

Physics is about relation. As I said, in the physical world, as Faraday pointed out, there’s no evidence for other than mathematical and logical relation.

If jkg20 believes that Faraday was mistaken, and that there’s evidence that the physical world consists of other than mathematical and logical relation, then he should feel free to share with us what his evidence is.

Michael Ossipoff

Now, if you want to argue that there is no genuine distinction between logical truth and substantive truth, that might be an interesting discussion to have.

— jkg20
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But, for Janus, the matter isn’t subject to discussion, but is instead a matter of doctrine.
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Janus says:
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There is certainly a logical distinction between logical truth and substantive truth.

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Maybe Janus means that, if there were some kind of metaphysical truth that differs from other metaphysical truth by being “substantive” (whatever that would mean), then it would be different from metaphysical truth that’s not “substantive”. :D
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Anyway, what, exactly, does Janus mean by “substantial”?
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Janus isn’t saying.
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One might want to argue, as MO does, that there is no genuine metaphysical or ontological distinction, but then such a metaphysical argument could hardly be "non-controversial", as MO so mistakenly claims his metaphysics is.

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Janus is confusing two different meanings for “uncontroversial”.
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My metaphysics is controversial in the sense that there are many who’d want to disagree with it because it isn’t consistent with what they already believe. By that meaning, there’s little that isn’t “controversial”.
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Then what’s uncontroversial about it?:
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That there are abstract facts, in the sense that they can be stated.
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That therefore there are also infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract facts consisting of implications, about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
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That, among that infinity of such complex logical systems, there inevitably is one whose events and relations are those of your experience.
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That there’s no experimental evidence that your experience is other than that.
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…given, for example, that every fact about this physical world implies, corresponds to and can be said as an implication.
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...and is at least part of the antecedent of some implications, and is the consequent of other implications.
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That’s what’s uncontroversial.
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As I’ve said, I can’t prove that the Materialist’s fundamentally, “objectively”, “substantially”, “concretely” existent universe, and its “objectively”, “substantially”, and “concretely” existent things, and stuff, don’t superfluously exist, as an unverifiable and unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the uncontroversially-inevitable logical system that I’ve described.
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↪Michael Ossipoff
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So, you obviously deny the indispensable logical distinction between semantic facts and substantive facts

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I haven’t been speaking of communication.
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Facts are states of affairs (or obtaining states of affairs, if you believe that there’s such a thing as a “state of affairs” that doesn’t obtain) that consist of one or more properties of one or more things, or a relation among two or more things. (Those things are often referred to as “objects”.)
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There’s no way of knowing if a fact, by that definition (actually a combination of two definitions) can be “insubstantive” as Janus means “substantive”.
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Janus hasn’t said what he means by “substantive”. I looked for a definition of “substantive fact”, but didn’t find one. Janus hasn’t shared with us just what it is that is lacking from a fact that isn’t “substantive”.
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, because it allows you to continue believing in your own sophistry.

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“Sophistry” means “subtly deceptive argument”. Calling a proposal “sophistry” isn’t the same as specifying a an incorrect statement or unsupported conclusion in it.
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While Janus has been continually spouting angry namecalling language, he has been invited to specify a particular error, mis-statement, or unsupported conclusion. He hasn’t done so.
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Janus evidently is a believer in namecalling as a tactic to depend on, and evidently a believer in the common Internet notion that the one who does the most namecalling is right.
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…your lack of cogent argument!

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So there. Janus refutes my argument by saying that it isn’t cogent. :D
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I thought that it would be necessary to show that one of the argument’s premises is false, or that the statement of why the premises imply the conclusion contains at least one error, fallacy, incorrect statement, or unsupported conclusion.
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Contrary to what Janus seems to want to imply, there isn’t consensus about his interpretation of “truth”. There are “minimal”, “deflationary” and “redundancy” interpretations of “truth”, and there’s widely divergent philosophical opinion on the interpretation and meaning of “truth”.
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Here’s something I found that seems to say what Janus is saying:
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Main articles: Logical truth, Criteria of truth, and Truth value
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Logic is concerned with the patterns in reason that can help tell us if a proposition is true or not. However, logic does not deal with truth in the absolute sense, as for instance a metaphysician does.

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But could that “absolute sense” for metaphysical truth be illusory? Sure. I suggest that there’s no reason to believe in it. …aside from the fact that it’s unclear what is even meant by it.
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I suggest that it’s unduly presumptuous for “the metaphysician” to claim to speak of “absolute truth”.
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Logicians use formal languages to express the truths which they are concerned with, and as such there is only truth under some interpretation or truth within some logical system.
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A logical truth (also called an analytic truth or a necessary truth) is a statement which is true in all possible worlds[46] or under all possible interpretations, as contrasted to a fact (also called a synthetic claim or a contingency) which is only true in this world as it has historically unfolded.

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That meaning for “fact” is more limited than the widely accepted definition of fact as a state of affairs, or an obtaining state of affairs, or as a combination of one or more properties of one or more things, or a relation among things….which definitions don’t say anything about validity or applicability only in only one world or only under one possible interpretation.
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Maybe “obtaining” is being used to mean “referring or applying only to our own particular world”, like the widely accepted meaning of “actual”.
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There are abstract implications that don’t only refer to our world (but which might refer to it too). So, if “obtaining” means “referring or applying only to our own particular world”, then the word “obtaining” is unnecessarily limiting in a definition of “fact”.
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Maybe that “absolute truth” that’s being referred to as opposed to “logical truth” is what I’ve been calling “meta-metaphysics”. Maybe that’s what philosophical articles mean by “meta-logic” too.
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Meta-metaphysics, as I mean it, doesn’t lend itself to description and discussion, argument or assertion.
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…and of course isn’t part of metaphysical discussion.
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I haven’t claimed that logical truth covers, applies to and describes all of Reality, all that is. …only that it covers, applies to and describes metaphysics and the things of metaphysics (because I define metaphysics by the applicability of words, discussion, and complete description to it and its things).

A proposition such as "If p and q, then p" is considered to be a logical truth because of the meaning of the symbols and words in it and not because of any fact of any particular world. They are such that they could not be untrue.

Sorry, but that doesn't make them less true, or disqualify them as facts by the definitions that I stated above.
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Anyway it isn’t possible to answer Janus, because he hasn’t been at all clear with us regarding what he means by “substantive”.
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…and hasn’t specified a particular false premise, incorrect statement, fallacy, error or unsupported conclusion in my argument for my metaphysics.

We've been hearing a lot of angry-noises about my metaphysical proposal, from Janus, for example, but no one has accepted my invitation to specify a false premise, error, fallacy, incorrect statement or unsupported conclusion.
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Michael Ossipoff

That there’s no experimental evidence that your experience is other than that.

I do not need experimental evidence to know that I have experience. Indeed, the very idea of experimental evidence presupposes the idea that someone has already had experience of some kind. So there is at least one substantive non-if-then fact (to use your curious terminology): that there is experience.
What is my experience experience of?
Well some of my experiences are of instances of colour and shape, they tend to get called visual experiences. Again, I don't need experimental evidence to know this - again, insofar as experimental evidence is visual evidence, the existence of such things is presupposed.
So, there's another non-if-then fact: There are experiences of colour and shape.
And now as metaphysicians we can start asking questions about what these experiences of colour and shape are. Can we take an act-object view of them, for instance? If we can, then not only are there experiences of colour and shape, but there are also instances of colour and shape - and so yet another non-if-then-fact emerges for us to investigate.
Looks like we can do metaphysics without if-then facts. Of course, Descartes got there before me - maybe you've heard of him. If you haven't, I suggest you try reading his Meditations, it pretty much kick-starts modern philosophy.

I didn’t say that there are no non-if-then facts in our experience.

I said that every fact about the physical world (in our experience, of course) implies, corresponds to, and can be said as, an if-then fact.

(I like to call an implication an “if-then fact”, because everyone knows what that means, where “implication” might not be clear to people who haven’t read about logic terms. I’m sorry if that non-standard term has caused trouble, but it’s understandable to more people.)

I also said that every fact about the physical world is (at least part of) the antecedent of some if-then facts, and is the consequent of other if-then facts.

That was a mis-wording, and I apologize if it led to justified mis-understanding of what I meant. Here’s what I meant:

Every fact about the physical world (in your experience, of course) corresponds to a proposition that is (at least part of) the antecedent of some if-then facts, and is the consequent of other if-then facts.

In particular, if the physical fact that you experience is F, then the proposition that I’m referring to is the proposition that F. The proposition about F…the proposition “F is a fact”.

When I first started stating my metaphysics, that mis-wording was a bit of sloppiness that has remained in the proposition…until when I’m correcting it now.

Someone, at this point, could say that now I’m introducing a new metaphysical brute-fact that every physical fact corresponds to, and is underlain by, a proposition about that fact.

Not so.

The if-then facts about those propositions are uncontroversially inevitably there, and that’s no unexplained brute-fact.

Then what about the perceived, experienced, non-if-then facts? What’s their explanation?

Well, doesn’t it go without saying that, for efficiently dealing with its situation in its world, an animal would do better to treat what it has to deal with as facts? …and therefore to perceive it as facts? What would be the point of a wood-rat being a philosopher instead of a practical wood-rat? Surely, humans, too, are designed by evolution to be practical before philosophical in that regard, as their initial default interpretation of their world.

I’ve been saying that we’re used to declarative/indicative grammar, though conditional grammar describes the inevitable complex system of logical if-then facts (implications) whose events and relations comprise our life-experience possibility-story.

To reply to another comment in the post that I’m replying to:

Of course your experience doesn’t need experimental evidence. Your experience is all the evidence you need or have.

But, because so many people worship science and measurement, I said that there’s no experimental evidence or measurement establishing that your experience consists of other than (a system of implications, and a practical perception of unconditional facts corresponding to…) a hypothetical system of inter-referring hypothetical if-then facts (implications) about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

To answer something else that you said:

Maybe metaphysics can be done without (any?) if-then facts. Of course it goes without saying that there are many metaphysicses, and innumerable conceivably-say-able ones. Nearly all of them make assumptions and posit brute-facts. Mine is different in that regard.

Michael Ossipoff

When I spoke of a "practical perception of" non-conditional facts--even though abstract implications are the metaphysical structural, mechanical, basis of what mataphysically is....

...and even though Faraday pointed out that there's no reason to believe in the Materialist's objectively-existent stuff or things...

...That gets some support from Vedantist spiritual-teachers who speak of a sense in which our factual world is illusory.

(...though of course it's real enough in its own context and the context of our lives.)

Nisargadatta said that, from the point-of-view of the Sage, nothing has ever happened.

Michael Ossipoff

The only reason we are here is to be good Human Beings.

Mushy? Yes, but often overlooked.

Until we start warring with aliens, then shit hits the fan.

Hopefully they have adapted to understand the basics for perpetual peace if such a thing were possible, but I doubt it.

So your metaphysics includes both non-if-then-facts and if-then-facts. For the former, their truth consists in some kind of relationship to the way things are (and I leave open that the way things are might in part be determined by our ways of coming to find out about them, and thus allow for both materialistic, idealistic and pragmatist metaphysics). For the latter, their truth consists in the logical relations between propositions used to express the non-if-then-facts. So even here we seem to have introduced another non-if-then-fact: there are logical relations between propositions. Since your metaphysics depends on the existence of these relationships, how do you account for their existence? Is it just a brute non-if-then-fact?

So your metaphysics includes both non-if-then-facts and if-then-facts. — jkg20

Well, as for the non-if-then facts of our daily lives, I don;t call that part of my metaphysics. The apparent non-conditional facts of our lives are just how we animals are designed to deal with our world in which we must live. Practicality, not metaphysics.

For the former, their truth consists in some kind of relationship to the way things are

Not how things really, metaphysically, are.

Their truth isn't metaphysical. But, if I were to swear in court that what I'm about to say is true, and is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and I know that there's no reason to believe that any of it is metaphysically true, that doesn't mean that I'm violating my oath and committing perjury, because it's understood that, in court, they aren't talking about metaphysical truth. It's only about what could be called "worldly truth".

Aside from that, Nisargadatta said that anything that can be said is a lie (because, of course, words can't accurately describe Reality), even in metaphysics.

(and I leave open that the way things are might in part be determined by our ways of coming to find out about them, and thus allow for both materialistic, idealistic and pragmatist metaphysics).

Pragmatic worldly "truth" I don't call metaphysics. As for Materialism, as I said, I don't claim to have proof that it isn't superflously true as an unverifialbe, unfalsifiable brute-fact...alongside and duplicating the events and relations of my proposed logical system..

For the latter, their truth consists in the logical relations between propositions used to express the non-if-then-facts.

I wouldn't say it that way. When you referred to the latter, you're referring to metaphysical if-then facts. I wouldn't say that they're used to express the non-if-then facts of our everyday experience and pragmatic life. But they're the metaphysical reality that underlies our pragmatic experential world and life.

So even here we seem to have introduced another non-if-then-fact: there are logical relations between propositions. Since your metaphysics depends on the existence of these relationships, how do you account for their existence? Is it just a brute non-if-then-fact?

Sure, that's the other objection to my proposal, with a difficultly-explained answer.But it isn't as difficult as your first objection ("How could something completely hypothetical seem so non-conditionally factual and real?")

I've been answering this 2nd objection as follows:

I make no claim for any reality or existence for the abstract if-then facts, or the infinitely-many systems of them.

What's their reality got to do with anything?

About the "existence" of those abstract if-then facts, "there are" those facts in the sense that we can mention them and state them (though we of course can't state all of them, partly due to time limitations).

That's the only "existence" I claim for them.

Can that be called a "brute-fact", if the only "existence" that I claim for them is their discussability and mentionability by us?

I'm not saying that those if-then facts have any other existence or reality. So, if that's a brute-fact, then it's a particularly un-blatant one.

And, if their metnionability and discussability is a brute-fact, it's a universally-agreed one.

I guess maybe you could call it a special kind of completely uncontroversial brute-fact. Remember, I don't claim that words can describe or explain everything. I don't claim that metaphysics can explain or cover all of Reality,

How could anyone tell an ultimate explanation, if words can't describe or explain Reality?

My proposal is only for a metaphysical explanation for what metaphysically is. Words can't explain why there's metaphysics, and the abstract if-thens at its basis. So, in that sense, a metaphysics can only be a description, not a complete explanation.

The inability to explain why there's metaphysics and why there are abstract facts that we can mention and discuss...That isn't a fault peculiar to my metaphysics. It's in the nature of metaphysics, because words can't explain, describe or cover all of Reality.

You can call this a cop-out and an evasion, but if pressed for an explanation of that completely uncontroversial "brute-fact", I'd say that its "explanation" can only be meta-metaphysical, by which I mean inaccessible to words.

A few modern philosophers have expressed agreement with Aristotle, about his meta-metaphysical suggestion that Good is the basis of what is.

I've been emphasizing that each one of the infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract logical if-then facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is quite independent of anything outside it. ...and neither has nor needs any "reality" in any frame of reference or context other than its own inter-referring context.

I'd like to comment more about your other, first, objection, but I'd like to discuss that in a separate post, because each of these two objections deserves its own post.

So I have more to say, about your 1st objection "How can something completely hypothetical seem so non-conditionally factual and real?". I might be able to discuss that in a post this afternoon, but tomorrow is more likely.

Michael Ossipoff

@JKG20 said: "For the latter, their truth consists in the logical relations between propositions used to express the non-if-then-facts. "
You replied: "I wouldn't say it that way. When you referred to the latter, you're referring to metaphysical if-then facts. I wouldn't say that they're used to express the non-if-then facts of our everyday experience and pragmatic life. But they're the metaphysical reality that underlies our pragmatic experential world and life."

Regarding this part of your reply
"I wouldn't say that they're used to express the non-if-then facts of our everyday experience and pragmatic life."
Of course they are not used that way, we use straightforward declarative statements to express non-if-then-facts. If-then facts are expressed using conditional statements of the form if P then Q.

Regarding this part of your reply

But they're the metaphysical reality that underlies our pragmatic experential world and life

Presumably by the "they" you mean your if-then facts. You seem to be contradicting yourself directly when you then go on and say.

I make no claim for any reality or existence for the abstract if-then facts, or the infinitely-many systems of them.

"

"But they're the metaphysical reality that underlies our pragmatic experiential world and life"--Michael Ossipoff

Presumably by the "they" you mean your if-then facts. You seem to be contradicting yourself directly when you then go on and say.

"I make no claim for any reality or existence for the abstract if-then facts, or the infinitely-many systems of them.". — MetaphysicsNow

You mean because, in the first of those two quotes, I used the word "reality".

In that sentence, I didn't mean "reality" literally, and I didn't mean to imply objective reality. I didn't mean to imply that those abstract implications are real in some sense. I shouldn't have used that word,

I don't claim that there's any reality to anything described or explained by metaphysics. ...including the abstract if-then facts that are the structural basis of our lives and world.

Of course obviously our lives and world, are "real" in their own context, just as each of those complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetical propositions neither needs nor has any reality other than in its own inter-referring context, I don't claim objective reality or existence for those things.

Michael Ossipoff

In that sentence, I didn't mean "reality" literally

Like one or two other people on this site, it seems that as soon as you are caught out in a contradiction, rather than rethink your position, you simply change the meanings of words. I'll leave you now to go ahead and play Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty all by yourself, and I suggest @jkg20 do the same.

I'll leave you now to go ahead and play Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty all by yourself, and I suggest @jkg20 do the same. .

:lol: :up:

Like one or two other people on this site, it seems that as soon as you are caught out in a contradiction, rather than rethink your position, you simply change the meanings of words. — MetaphysicsNow

Sorry, you didn't catch me in a contradiction.

My position on the matter of whether or not the abstract-facts are "real" has been consistent. I've been consistently saying that I don't claim any objective reality for them, or for anything based on them.

People often speak of the story-reality in a story, or a "dream reality". When doing so, then don't mean that those "realities" are objective reality. Whether you like it or not, "reality" is used with different meanings. It often refers to something with less than objective reality. It often refers to something that the speaker regards as unreal.

You're grasping at straws. Nice try.

Michael Ossipoff