In QP you get answers like "maybe" if you ask if a particle is exactly at a given spot.The answer is always yes or no, even in quantum physics, the answer may change upon observation, but it is always either yes or no at one given time, no matter if it fluctuates. — TogetherTurtle
In QP you get answers like "maybe" if you ask if a particle is exactly at a given spot.
On the other hand the subject here is philosophy and hence the human condition. I'm not yet sure how that sentence contradicts human freedom but I am sure it does... — Heiko
We may not know exactly where the particle is, but we are certain that the particle is somewhere just because we don't know where it is doesn't mean it doesn't exist and isn't somewhere, that was my argument. — TogetherTurtle
Everything has a state of yes, this is truth, and no, this is fallacy — TogetherTurtle
Is fallacy your word of the day? False and fallacy are not synonymous. In philosophical argument, a fallacy is generally considered a failure in reasoning that renders an argument unsound. On the other hand, false is an attribute of a philosophical premise and/or conclusion. I strongly recommend investment in a dictionary. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is one of the best. A bit pricey. But it should last a life time. — Arne
Statements having a binary truth/false value are "apophantic" and generally considered to have minimal meaningful content. — Arne
And if you think there is any philosophical consensus regarding your theory of truth, you would be wrong. Your "state" theory of truth is a new one. And what good is it? And what is the status of the claim the all unicorns have purple tails? Well according to you, we know it must be true or false, we just do not know which. What help is that? If you are going to have a theory of truth, it ought to useful. — Arne
Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. Even if there is more than one answer, we know yes to those, and no to the rest. I don't think I have to tell you that we wouldn't be communicating right now if yes or no answers were useless. — TogetherTurtle
Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. — TogetherTurtle
Are you suggesting that all problems are mathematical in nature and therefore have a mathematical solution? — Arne
Are you suggesting that people truly interested in the nature of being are going to satisfied with know that there is an answer but that we just do not know what it is? Either god does/does not exist. We just do not know which. But it's all cool. Few people have ever asked whether there was an answer. Instead, the ask what the answer is. Surely you must have notice that? — Arne
Seriously, a reading group for Heidegger's Being and Time will get off the ground in the next few days. If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way. — Arne
If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way. — Arne
No, you have the chicken before the egg. T/F answers are what the world is made up of and math is a reflection of that. — TogetherTurtle
The reading group does intrigue me however. If I am wrong, I would like to know. My view is either true or false after all. I just got my paycheck so if I have to buy the book I could I suppose — TogetherTurtle
And though I get what you are driving at, I am not sure "prefer" is the right word. For example, most of the people I know who doggedly adhere to one or the other view of what they consider to be a binary option (such as realism or idealism) behave as if their view is more likely than not to be correct. — Arne
There is clearly many gaps in our understanding, most likely due to the limitations of the human mind, no matter how versatile it may be. — TogetherTurtle
You're right in that the primary motivation seems to be truth rather than motivation. However, the fact is so many philosophical issues haven't been resolved as such i.e. truth-value of propositions are unknown. In such cases belief is a matter of preference is it not?
Also, there are so many points of view given any situation, each pulling us in different directions which usually have competing emotional effects (some are sad, others pleasant and still others neutral). Given so isn't it preference then that ultimately has the upper hand in our decisions on whether to believe a particular philosophy or not? — TheMadFool
At some point, facts matter. — Read Parfit
I suspect there must be a meaningful difference between:
1. Philosophy is ultimately about our preference; and
2. Philosophy is ultimately about that to which we are drawn. — Arne
You're right in a way but apply this idea to the very beginnings of every branch of philosophy and we realize that logic or reason (claimed bedrock of philosophy) has a small role to play if any. — TheMadFool
I have never claimed logic or reason to be the bedrock of philosophy. — Arne
I still maintain that we are drawn in particular directions and absent some sort of competing draw, we go toward that which we are drawn. And that we do so with minimal, if any, deliberation. — Arne
How do you differentiated ''draw'' and ''preference''? — TheMadFool
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting positions, both logically adequate.The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
This language is rather confusing, because we cite reasons within arguments, not axioms. Axioms are the foundation of certain mathematical or logical universes. They don't show up in premises when we argue. It is possible you are using "axiom" more casually to mean, a starting point in an argument, e.g. the first premise of an argument. If that's what you mean, then axioms could act as reasons because we cite reasons in argumentation. Axioms would just be those starting reasons we cite. But this way of interpreting things would render your question moot, as our choice of positions would be determined by reasons/axioms.Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting position, both logically adequate.The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
This language is rather confusing, because reasons are those things we cite when we try supporting a position. If axioms support arguments, then axioms could act as reasons. From here, your overall concern is rendered moot, because we could maintain a position by citing said axiomatic reasons. When you say:Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.
But I'd examine this claim if I were you. If I smell smoke upon waking, and believe, genuinely, my house is on fire, and I desire to live, is it not rational of me to save myself? Now suppose there is no fire. There is no reason for me to flee. Am I rendered irrational because I have no reason to flee? You could say my own beliefs and desires give me reason to act, but then you'd be admitting our preferences/ mental states can act as reasons, which is contrary to your point.Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational
they are their belief. — Arne
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