The answer is always yes or no, even in quantum physics, the answer may change upon observation, but it is always either yes or no at one given time, no matter if it fluctuates. — TogetherTurtle

In QP you get answers like "maybe" if you ask if a particle is exactly at a given spot.
On the other hand the subject here is philosophy and hence the human condition. I'm not yet sure how that sentence contradicts human freedom but I am sure it does...

In QP you get answers like "maybe" if you ask if a particle is exactly at a given spot.
On the other hand the subject here is philosophy and hence the human condition. I'm not yet sure how that sentence contradicts human freedom but I am sure it does... — Heiko

We may not know exactly where the particle is, but we are certain that the particle is somewhere just because we don't know where it is doesn't mean it doesn't exist and isn't somewhere, that was my argument.

We may not know exactly where the particle is, but we are certain that the particle is somewhere just because we don't know where it is doesn't mean it doesn't exist and isn't somewhere, that was my argument. — TogetherTurtle

This is a difficult question. When I listen to physicians I get the impression that the uncertainty is really attributed to nature itself like: the particle there is really some "potential" to manifest as a particle there.

Everything has a state of yes, this is truth, and no, this is fallacy — TogetherTurtle

Is fallacy your word of the day? False and fallacy are not synonymous. In philosophical argument, a fallacy is generally considered a failure in reasoning that renders an argument unsound. On the other hand, false is an attribute of a philosophical premise and/or conclusion. I strongly recommend investment in a dictionary. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is one of the best. A bit pricey. But it should last a life time.

And broaden your mind a bit. "Disagreeing with TogetherTurtle" is not on any list of fallacies I have seen. In it is philosophical courtesy to be able to identify an alleged fallacy in someone else's argument. And if can't identify it, then it is likely you do not know what you are talking about.

Statements having a binary truth/false value are "apophantic" and generally considered to have minimal meaningful content.

And if you think there is any philosophical consensus regarding your theory of truth, you would be wrong. Your "state" theory of truth is a new one. And what good is it? And what is the status of the claim the all unicorns have purple tails? Well according to you, we know it must be true or false, we just do not know which. What help is that? If you are going to have a theory of truth, it ought to useful.

Is fallacy your word of the day? False and fallacy are not synonymous. In philosophical argument, a fallacy is generally considered a failure in reasoning that renders an argument unsound. On the other hand, false is an attribute of a philosophical premise and/or conclusion. I strongly recommend investment in a dictionary. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is one of the best. A bit pricey. But it should last a life time. — Arne

When I am wrong, I will admit it and improve. I now know that I was using the word incorrectly and change from now on. Thank you for that.

Statements having a binary truth/false value are "apophantic" and generally considered to have minimal meaningful content. — Arne

Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. Even if there is more than one answer, we know yes to those, and no to the rest. I don't think I have to tell you that we wouldn't be communicating right now if yes or no answers were useless.

And if you think there is any philosophical consensus regarding your theory of truth, you would be wrong. Your "state" theory of truth is a new one. And what good is it? And what is the status of the claim the all unicorns have purple tails? Well according to you, we know it must be true or false, we just do not know which. What help is that? If you are going to have a theory of truth, it ought to useful. — Arne

Why would consensus indicate accuracy in any way? The consensus has been wrong about very many things in the past, and it changes when proven wrong, because that is logical. Also, why would I think there was a philosophical consensus regarding anything? Isn't the whole idea of philosophy that there is no consensus until there is a correct answer?

This "State" theory as you put it isn't really new. As I mentioned before math, and science are pretty much entirely the studies of how things are, and proving that they can't be something else.

Regarding the in character sarcastic comment about unicorns, we know they don't have purple tails because we know unicorns do not exist, and if they do exist and do have purple tails, then that is true. And lastly, knowing that unicorns don't have purple tails and don't exist is useful because we now know that we don't have a missing piece of the ecosystem. If they did exist, and we just have not seen them because they are hiding, we would notice a lot of fields being consumed over night. Conservation efforts would be that more inaccurate because we failed to factor in an entire species, and that could have disastrous consequences on the Earth. If they existed and didn't have purple tails, we now know that we shouldn't identify them that way.

Essentially, you have challenged the idea that knowing whether something is true or false is useful, and you can't really argue that you'd want to know that it is true there is a spoon in your garbage disposal before you turn it on.

QP really is intriguing. I can't wait to see what the minds of tomorrow can make with using it. I guess we do know there is an answer, but have no clue how to solve the problem. Only time will tell.

Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. Even if there is more than one answer, we know yes to those, and no to the rest. I don't think I have to tell you that we wouldn't be communicating right now if yes or no answers were useless. — TogetherTurtle

That is a fair enough question. But I did not say they were useless. I said to the effect they were considered to have less meaningful content. I did not say they had no content at all. A real life example is (and I am going on memory here), there was a time when a little more than half of Americans surveyed said they were unhappy with Obamacare. But further digging into the issue found that about 30 percent of those who were unhappy with it were unhappy because they would have preferred a single payer option.

And for the most part, those questions that can honestly be answered yes/no or true/false are not questions philosophy deals with. For example, it may be technically correct to say freewill is true/false but we just do not know which. At true as that may be, we already know that. And telling people interested in the issue what they already know is generally not a significant contribution to the discussion. Just saying.

Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. — TogetherTurtle

"Reasoning is but reckoning." -Thomas Hobbes

You may find this hard to believe, but not all philosophers agree with Mr. Hobbes.

Are you suggesting that all problems are mathematical in nature and therefore have a mathematical solution?

Are you suggesting that people truly interested in the nature of being are going to satisfied with know that there is an answer but that we just do not know what it is? Either god does/does not exist. We just do not know which. But it's all cool. Few people have ever asked whether there was an answer. Instead, the ask what the answer is. Surely you must have notice that?

And if your answer is yes, are you going to be rude to all who disagree with you? (there will be many of them).

Are you familiar with Professor Hubert Dreyfus?

I strongly recommend his book What computers cannot do. It is a bit outdated. But his primary premise is that the "world" (which I am confident in this case does not mean what you think it means) probably does not mean what you think it means) cannot be represented with a Cartesian subject/object approach.

Seriously, a reading group for Heidegger's Being and Time will get off the ground in the next few days. If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way.

Are you suggesting that all problems are mathematical in nature and therefore have a mathematical solution? — Arne

No, you have the chicken before the egg. T/F answers are what the world is made up of and math is a reflection of that.

Are you suggesting that people truly interested in the nature of being are going to satisfied with know that there is an answer but that we just do not know what it is? Either god does/does not exist. We just do not know which. But it's all cool. Few people have ever asked whether there was an answer. Instead, the ask what the answer is. Surely you must have notice that? — Arne

No, I am not saying people should not be satisfied with knowing just that there is an answer, in fact, that dissatisfaction is the major driving force for scientists and the rest. I feel as if you only understand what you wish to.

Seriously, a reading group for Heidegger's Being and Time will get off the ground in the next few days. If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way. — Arne

The reading group does intrigue me however. If I am wrong, I would like to know. My view is either true or false after all. I just got my paycheck so if I have to buy the book I could I suppose

If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way. — Arne

Interesting. If your argument is that questions with yes/no answers are of little philosophical meaning and are rarely perused by philosophers (a position I'm inclined to agree with), I wonder how you justify your assertion quoted above. Surely it is just as possible that he will be entirely unmoved by an in depth analysis of Heidegger.

Philosophy seems ever caught up in this contradiction. Even such seemingly obvious ideas such as that I have a hand simply because I see one in front of me (per Moore) is considered up for debate and open to question, yet the idea that Heidegger (or similar) is saying something meaningful goes virtually unquestioned,by the same group of people.

Edit - "Either his ontology is correct or it is not." - Arne

Paradoxes are interesting. Consider "This sentence is not true."

I've pondered that one. Usually I consider that most paradoxes are simply flaws in human language, but isn't human language just a product of its circumstances, those circumstances being the very nature of the universe? There is clearly many gaps in our understanding, most likely due to the limitations of the human mind, no matter how versatile it may be.

No, you have the chicken before the egg. T/F answers are what the world is made up of and math is a reflection of that. — TogetherTurtle

I am more of a cart before the horse guy.

The reading group does intrigue me however. If I am wrong, I would like to know. My view is either true or false after all. I just got my paycheck so if I have to buy the book I could I suppose — TogetherTurtle

There are two widely accepted translations. I presume one of them will be used. Both are available for download free of charge.

Will you be wrong? Yes and no and I am sincere in saying that. Nothing you have said is incompatible with Heidegger. But if you are serious, you will walk away with a much deeper and broader understanding of "world", though not inconsistent with the one you expressed. But once you grasp his understanding of "world" you will laugh to yourself every time you hear the term used in a colloquial manner. And the same with T/F. Heidegger would not quibble with your understanding. But he will sure as hell deepen it.

Heidegger was educated as a mathematician and a physicist.

And though I get what you are driving at, I am not sure "prefer" is the right word. For example, most of the people I know who doggedly adhere to one or the other view of what they consider to be a binary option (such as realism or idealism) behave as if their view is more likely than not to be correct. — Arne

You're right in that the primary motivation seems to be truth rather than motivation. However, the fact is so many philosophical issues haven't been resolved as such i.e. truth-value of propositions are unknown. In such cases belief is a matter of preference is it not?

Also, there are so many points of view given any situation, each pulling us in different directions which usually have competing emotional effects (some are sad, others pleasant and still others neutral). Given so isn't it preference then that ultimately has the upper hand in our decisions on whether to believe a particular philosophy or not?

:up:

There is clearly many gaps in our understanding, most likely due to the limitations of the human mind, no matter how versatile it may be. — TogetherTurtle

On the other Hand mental products are the kind of things we can assign a definite truth value on. Like mathematics: We just define something to be true or false and conclude from there. And - of course - your initial statement that we can do this for all statements is the natural stance we take towards matters to organize them. But there is a degree of freedom which point of view to take towards things. This is reflected in phrases like the application of mental models.
There is do discordance over the measurement having shown a certain value but how to interpret it.
If we are at the point where "preference" is the right criterion there must be many equally appropriate models to chose from.

You're right in that the primary motivation seems to be truth rather than motivation. However, the fact is so many philosophical issues haven't been resolved as such i.e. truth-value of propositions are unknown. In such cases belief is a matter of preference is it not?

Also, there are so many points of view given any situation, each pulling us in different directions which usually have competing emotional effects (some are sad, others pleasant and still others neutral). Given so isn't it preference then that ultimately has the upper hand in our decisions on whether to believe a particular philosophy or not? — TheMadFool

It is an interesting issue. But does the history of philosophy and its issues unfold before people in the manner you describe? Are people not more likely to be "drawn" to issues from a particular area of philosophy or "drawn" to the approach of a particular school or "drawn" to the writings of a particular philosopher long before they acquire any deep and broad across the board understanding of philosophy and its issues?

And if that is the case, do we choose what we are "drawn" to? How would preference play any significant role except in the rare cases where people are strongly drawn in more than one direction? But even then, the draws from different directions would have to be relatively equal or people would simply go the direction they are more strongly drawn.

Perhaps we overestimate the role that choice, preference and free will play in our lives. In our average everydayness, we spend very little (if any) time contemplating directions of our movement? We simply move forward in the direction we are drawn and only contemplate (briefly) when we feel the pull from a different direction.

Of course, some would likely attempt to confuse the issue by trying to make some sort of cause and effect connection between our preferences and the directions we are drawn and thereby render trivial all decisions. I suspect there must be a meaningful difference between:

1. Philosophy is ultimately about our preference; and
2. Philosophy is ultimately about that to which we are drawn.

“What I've observed is philosophy can be essentially divided into opposing concepts. For every thesis there's an antithesis. The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.

There's no flaw in the logic I suppose. Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them.

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).

Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.”



For the sake of argument, let's say that I prefer a worldview that everything is comprised of 3 types of Monads as Leibniz put forth in his philosophy. Lest also say I put forth a thesis repeating Leibniz. A philanthropist, preferring the rigor of modern day science commissions an antithesis that will pass the scrutiny of the the peer review process at Journal Nature. Which thesis do we have most reason to believe?

Moving to moral theory. For the sake of argument, let's say I prefer to believe that germs and viruses do not exist, and this is the axiom behind my reasoning in my thesis entitled “Public health, sumglic health, why we should regularly poop on the street.”

At some point, facts matter.

At some point, facts matter. — Read Parfit

But there is no one fact that we can all hang our philosophical coats on. Different points of view exist and are encouraged by philosophers. The problem is, depending on the angle of view, different conclusions arise.

As a simple example take the fallacy of appeal to misery. If we stick to facts then a young boy did steal the bread. However, the other fact that's relevant to the matter is the boy was dying of hunger.

I suspect there must be a meaningful difference between:

1. Philosophy is ultimately about our preference; and
2. Philosophy is ultimately about that to which we are drawn. — Arne

You're right in a way but apply this idea to the very beginnings of every branch of philosophy and we realize that logic or reason (claimed bedrock of philosophy) has a small role to play if any.

You're right in a way but apply this idea to the very beginnings of every branch of philosophy and we realize that logic or reason (claimed bedrock of philosophy) has a small role to play if any. — TheMadFool

I have never claimed logic or reason to be the bedrock of philosophy. And if it is not, are you suggesting that preference would necessarily be the only other option? I still maintain that we are drawn in particular directions and absent some sort of competing draw, we go toward that which we are drawn. And that we do so with minimal, if any, deliberation.

Philosophy is like science, but without the experiments. Philosophy uses observations, anecdotal evidence and logic to draw conclusions. It is similar to the front end of development science, but stops short of proof of concept in the lab, with the lab often adding unexpected data that sometimes requires a revision.

I have never claimed logic or reason to be the bedrock of philosophy. — Arne

I thought it was and is. It isn't?

I still maintain that we are drawn in particular directions and absent some sort of competing draw, we go toward that which we are drawn. And that we do so with minimal, if any, deliberation. — Arne

How do you differentiated ''draw'' and ''preference''?

By contrasting reason with preference I meant to expose the truth about certain aspects of philosophy; specifically some areas where reason has failed to make progress and that leaves us with what's left - ''preference'' or your ''draw''.

How do you differentiated ''draw'' and ''preference''? — TheMadFool

Why are you asking me the questions I asked you?

Please see my comment from three days ago.

A lot has been said, but it seems the underlying assumptions in your post haven’t been quite extracted yet.

The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.

I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting positions, both logically adequate.

Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them

This language is rather confusing, because we cite reasons within arguments, not axioms. Axioms are the foundation of certain mathematical or logical universes. They don't show up in premises when we argue. It is possible you are using "axiom" more casually to mean, a starting point in an argument, e.g. the first premise of an argument. If that's what you mean, then axioms could act as reasons because we cite reasons in argumentation. Axioms would just be those starting reasons we cite. But this way of interpreting things would render your question moot, as our choice of positions would be determined by reasons/axioms.

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).

Do we choose axioms? We certainly choose arguments. Perhaps that is what you were trying to say.

philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.

Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.

Also, is something irrational if it is chosen by our preferences?

A lot has been said, but it seems the underlying assumptions in your post haven’t been quite extracted yet.

The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.

I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting position, both logically adequate.

Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them

This language is rather confusing, because reasons are those things we cite when we try supporting a position. If axioms support arguments, then axioms could act as reasons. From here, your overall concern is rendered moot, because we could maintain a position by citing said axiomatic reasons. When you say:

Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).

If axioms are reasons, then citing them can be “rational.”

philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.

Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.
It seems you think reasons are required for rationality when you say:

Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational

But I'd examine this claim if I were you. If I smell smoke upon waking, and believe, genuinely, my house is on fire, and I desire to live, is it not rational of me to save myself? Now suppose there is no fire. There is no reason for me to flee. Am I rendered irrational because I have no reason to flee? You could say my own beliefs and desires give me reason to act, but then you'd be admitting our preferences/ mental states can act as reasons, which is contrary to your point.

Also, why is something irrational if it is chosen by our preferences?

Well. How does one argue (logically)?

We start off with some agreed upon initial assumptions. ''Assumptions'' because we can't defend each and every premise (infinite regress).

These initial assumptions are the murky waters, don't you agree?

Take the abortion debate. Pro-lifers begin with the assumption that fetuses are persons and therefore abortion is murder. Pro-choicers begin with fetuses are NOT persons and advocate abortion as women's right.

They don't agree with the initial assumptions and that's why have contradictory beliefs. The logic isn't faulty but the initial assumptions are different.

The main problem is to determine whether a fetus is a person or not. That, it seems, isn't possible within the current scientific and religious systems.

So, it then becomes a matter of preference which argument to buy into.

That's what I mean.

seriously? Not one in a thousand people would change their position on this issue if you could prove a fetus was or was not a person. This is simply not an issue amenable to empirical evidence. This is an issue of passion. Do you really believe these people are making a choice? They do not "buy into" any argument that is not already consistent with their belief. They did not choose their belief, they are their belief.

Have you considered the life and the paths we take do not unfold as your examples suggest? I suspect most radical pro lifers grew up into their beliefs long before they even entertained, if ever they did, the notion that they could believe what they preferred.

they are their belief. — Arne

I'm of the opinion that people reason their positions on all matters. It simply can't be a matter of blind belief. Naive? Wrong?

it is matter of being born into an always already existing world. Most radical prolifers grow up into that world. How many baseball fans that grew up in Boston ever actually chose to Red Sox fans instead of Astro fans. Many of us are who we are before we ever even consider the possibility that we had a choice.