I don't think your analysis really comes to terms with Aristotle. The fact that you designate him a 'naive realist' speaks volumes. — Wayfarer

I think it's fair to say that all of the ancients were naive realists insofar as they considered things to be substances; substantive entities that in their own independent being possessed qualities including what were later called 'secondary qualities".

I can't see how Aristotle's idea of four causes is relevant to the point I was making? Could you explain? Perhaps reference the "volumes" you say my imputation of naive realism to Aristotle "speaks". :wink:

So by all means, criticize hylomorphic dualism, but on the basis of what it actually is. I think trying to reconstruct the meaning of universals in the basis of sensations is never going to get there. — Wayfarer

Where in the post you were responding to, or elsewhere, have I presented a criticism of hylomorphic dualism?

And where have I claimed that the meaning of universals could be reconstructed (whatever that means) from sensation?

What I have said is that generalities have their genesis in pattern recognition, in difference, similarity and repetition, and that at their most abstract generalities become universals, which may then be reified as "somethings" which exist independently of the experienced world. What you might think that has to do with "reconstructing the meaning of universals on the basis of sensation", I am left wondering.

Seriously Wayfarer, you need to engage with the points I am actually making, otherwise no meaningful discussion will be possible.

Right, I'd say we can ask them simply because of the combinations of ideas made possible by language; which is no small thing. The fact that we can combine ideas to ask questions; or better to entertain ever-new conceptual reframings is what makes human life so rich.

This is exactly what happens in the arts, and all the other disciplines and religions and sciences as well, each of which have their own languages; so it is not just philosophy that benefits from this human capacity. Blessed be the semantics!

My own approach when it comes to questions of ontology, debates over realism vs. nominalism, etc. is to ask, What is at stake? Why is this important? What difference in our worldview would one position make vs. the other? — SophistiCat

Are you a physical being, book-ended by birth and death - or something other than that? It might turn out to be important. That is why one of the influential books on this very topic is Richard Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences. Our metaphysical theories deeply influence the way we live.

I think it's fair to say that all of the ancients were naive realists insofar as they considered things to be substance — Janus

The Platonic tradition (of which Aristotle was a part, even if dissident) was by no stretch 'naive realism'. It was a critical tradition through and through. The foundational texts such as The Parmenides, and the other metaphysical dialogues of Plato, and the other philosophers even including the Sceptics, were critical philosophies that considered very deep questions of the nature of being and existence.

The origin of the term 'substance' in Aristotle was the Latin translation of the term 'ouisia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being'. It is understood as the subject of which the particular qualities are attributes. So the 'substance' is in a sense the genus, or generic type, of which this particular individual (i.e. Socrates) is an instance. And that is nothing like 'substance' in the sense that I think you're thinking.

One of the driving forces of the Enlightenment was just the rejection of classical metaphysics - positivism, generally, and the Vienna Circle were obviously a manifestation of that. And positivism is much nearer to 'naive realism' than was Greek philosophy. Why? Because it accepts 'the sensible realm' as being real in its own right and then tries to work backwards from there to first principles on the basis of scientific empiricism. But it's turned out that metaphysics dies hard; philosophy, as Etienne Gilson remarked, always ends up burying its undertakers.

where have I claimed that the meaning of universals could be reconstructed (whatever that means) from sensation? — Janus

Here, in the discussion about the sensation of being struck. Here, in the discussion about causality.

And here:

It is the fact that there are never sheer perceptions of 'bare' particulars, but always simultaneous affective and cognitive processes of comparison and re-cognition that explains how generalities are generated. Generalities then become reified as universals. — Janus

What you might think that has to do with "reconstructing the meaning of universals on the basis of sensation", I am left wondering. — Janus

That is exactly what you appear to be doing.

Seriously Wayfarer, you need to engage with the points I am actually making, otherwise no meaningful discussion will be possible. — Janus

No kidding.

The origin of the term 'substance' in Aristotle was the Latin translation of the term 'ouisia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being'. — Wayfarer

substantive entities that in their own independent being possessed qualities including what were later called 'secondary qualities". — Janus

Thanks for the lesson on Plato and Aristotle. I've actually read them, and about them, extensively. have you read them yourself? A lot of what you say makes me wonder! At least you know how to be condescending...

I explained why I said the Ancients were naive realists; because they didn't not have the benefit of a scientific understanding of the complexities of perception which leads to a more nuanced process realism. I obviously didn't make the claim based on the their total lack of thought about the nature of being. Talk about strawmanning!

where have I claimed that the meaning of universals could be reconstructed (whatever that means) from sensation? — Janus

Here, in the discussion about the sensation of being struck. — Wayfarer

That has nothing to do with universals, but with the argument as to whether we experience causation.

Here, in the discussion about causality. — Wayfarer

Again, it's a discussion about causality not about universals. Are you serious?

Note, I have explicitly acknowledged that both generality and particularity are intrinsic to our sense-making. Our most basic pre-conceptual embodied experience cannot be, in any determinate sense, either; it is something like Peirce's 'firstness'; pure affect or feeling.

You really haven't addressed anything that I wrote at all. So why should I respond further?

It is true that accusations of "meaninglessness" (as well as some others, such as "incoherency") are often thrown around rather loosely. But, returning to the topic of the thread, you need to remember that Carnap was a positivist, and so he had stringent and, perhaps to our ear, rather idiosyncratic criteria of meaningfulness.

But let's not nitpick vocabulary. I think the idea in this particular instance is that some debates just lack substance and worth. Some - in fact, probably many - questions that have been mainstays of philosophy, and metaphysics in particular, are pseudo-questions.

My own approach when it comes to questions of ontology, debates over realism vs. nominalism, etc. is to ask, What is at stake? Why is this important? What difference in our worldview would one position make vs. the other? If it seems to me that nothing substantial is at stake, except perhaps minor differences in language, then I judge such questions to be - let's say "worthless," if you don't like "meaningless." — SophistiCat

I prefer that way of saying things, though I'd still insist on saying that it is only worthless to someone -- that this is a matter of preference more than a matter of the value of the philosophical debate.

Usually philosophical puzzles are things found after having developed a worldview -- so given such and such beliefs, attitudes, arguments, and so forth that form a worldview we come across some element that is paradoxical, puzzling, difficult to reconcile, self-defeating, or simply problematic to everything that came before. So if we are Platonists, for instance, the problem of universals has more at stake than if we are nominalists. If we are scientific realists then the problem of demarcation has more at stake than if we are spiritualists, who have some view of the world that incorporates religion into its ontology. If we are apatheists, as I really am anymore, the question of the existence of God doesn't hold much interest to me because of my commitments, but if I were a Christian then there would be something at stake.

That is, what's at stake is relative to a point of view. And if that's the case I suppose I really prefer people to just say, "I am not interested in that" to "That problem is worthless" or "That problem is nonsensical" (Which, yes, I believe do get thrown about all too often)

I explained why I said the Ancients were naive realists; because they didn't not have the benefit of a scientific understanding of the complexities of perception which leads to a more nuanced process realism. — Janus

The problem is that Carnap, and positivism generally, both tend towards 'scientism'. Even sophisticated neuroscientists who write on philosophy often fall into that. For sure the ancients didn't have much of a grasp of cognitive science or neuro-science, but the basic task of philosophy is not dependent on them.

//and I don't know if Carnap and the Vienna Circle had anything to say about Whitehead, but I daresay that if they did, it would hardly be positive.//

//

it's a discussion about causality not about universals. Are you serious? — Janus

You said, 'generalities become reified as universals'.

OK, well that still seems irrelevant to recent discussion, but at least it's back to the OP. I agree that people succumb to, or opt for, scientism. But you already should know from long experience, that I have no truck with that. I even think @apo, despite all his brilliance, tends to be unnecessarily reductionist in the scientistic (but not the mechanist) sense, and I have said that many times. For me, philosophy is certainly not totally dependent on science; but since science is a huge part of human experience, cannot afford to ignore it, either.

As I've also said earlier in this thread, I agree, and I think Wittgenstein would also, with the positivists insofar as saying that metaphysical claims are not decidable; but I think they go too far in saying they are meaningless. Wittgenstein does say that such claims have no sense, but I take that to mean "no empirical sense" which is to say they are not 'of the senses', not decidable, not to say they have no meaning. Of course they have meaning, just as poetry does, which is to say that they are more or less rich in conceptual and perceptual associations. It's a question of aesthetics, not of truth.

:up:

Of course they have meaning, just as poetry does, which is to say that they are more or less rich in conceptual and perceptual associations. It's a question of aesthetics, not of truth. — Janus

Not sure I agree with that last part. Just because metaphysics might be undecidable for us doesn't mean there isn't truth. It's undecidable whether alien civilizations exist beyond our light cone, but I see no reason to say it isn't a matter of truth whether they do. Either they do or don't exist. We have reasons to believe the universe is bigger than our light cone, and so they might exist.

My view is that truth can be verification-transcendent There are some things we just don't have the means to find out, but that doesn't mean there isn't a truth. It could be mathematical, physical, metaphysical, whatever.

Otherwise, we limit truth to what human beings can know, despite all the evidence that humans aren't the center of existence.

Whether or not there are aliens is not a metaphysical question, though, is it?

Whether or not there are aliens is not a metaphysical question, though, is it? — Janus

No, but whether or not there are aliens too far away for us to know about it is unverifiable.

So it is verifiable in principle but not at the present time? Oddly enough there are mamy examples of what we count as knowledge which are not verifiable even in principle unless time travel were to turn out to be possible. Any claims concerning the past, for example.

What is the relevance of such a question? In effect, it ignoring it's own insight. It takes an instance we know to be unverifiable... then supposes to address the question of whether it's veritable or not. The supposed "metaphysical" condrum being tackled, to have some verfied account of what is true or not, is directly obliterated by its definition.

If a claim is unverifiable, a challenge to verify it does not make sense.

So it is verifiable in principle but not at the present time? — Janus

Beyond our light cone, or even a few billion light years away is probably not ever going to be verifiable for us. But I don't know what advanced technology or new discoveries in physics might yield someday.

Oddly enough there are mamy examples of what we count as knowledge which are not verifiable even in principle unless time travel were to turn out to be possible. Any claims concerning the past, for example. — Janus

Depends on the past claim, doesn't it? Some past events have tons of evidence, even video. Some things, like the exact number of T-Rex in the year 69,335,678 BC, are not knowable, short of a time machine. (And even then, counting all the T-Rex would be a challenge, despite their size).

takes an instance we know to be unverifiable... then supposes to address the question of whether it's veritable or not. The supposed "metaphysical" condrum being tackled, to have some verfied account of what is true or not, is directly obliterated by its definition. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I was giving an example of a situation where we have good reason to suppose that the truth is verification-transcendent. You can't verify whether there exists aliens too far away for us to ever detect. However, the universe appears to be fairly similar overall as far as we can see, with the same physics and distribution of matter, stars and most likely planets.

The Andromeda Galaxy is probably far enough away that we'll never know whether an intelligent civilization exists there.

Yet we have every scientific reason to think that the following proposition is true or false:

There is an intelligent civilization in the Andromeda galaxy.

But the 2 million light year distance might be too far in space and time-delay to ever detect such a civilization. For that matter, we may never verify whether we're alone. But even if we fail to find evidence, the following proposition would also be true or false:

We are alone (as a technological civilization) in the cosmos.

Unless one thinks the light from space is all just an appearance (maybe fed to us from the aliens to fool us into thinking the cosmos is empty!)

Whether there is or is not an alien civilization is not metaphysical question.

Right, but verification-transcendent propositions support the meaningfulness of metaphysics. I believe this is a Michael Dummett distinction for settling such disputes.

My point is we cannot tell.

The question of trying to verify such a claim is meaningless. It not longer makes sense to ask: "What is the verified answer to this question?" or "What is the verified answer to this question/how do we know this is true or not?"

This takes out the sort of questions you are asking with respect to metaphysics and knowledge. There is nothing to say on the level of verification.

If you want to talk about what is true of a distant galaxy or some other unknown space and an instance of knowledge about it, you have to use a different account of knowledge, such as expected behaviour based on (an assumed) likely similar form (i.e. the space is like the rest of the universe) or outright conceptual grasping itself (i.e. like a prophetic vision: "I'm aware that an inhabitant of Earth will have toast for breakfast tomorrow" ).

verification-transcendent propositions support the meaningfulness of metaphysics. I believe this is Dummett distinction. — Marchesk

I think I see the point - but not persuaded by it. But on the other hand, right now debate is raging in physics about the so-called multiverse - the debate being whether this is even a scientific theory, or if it's 'just metaphysics'. My two cents is, it's bad metaphysics, but obviously there's a lot of heavyweights involved, so my two cents is probably not worth two cents. :sad:

This takes out the sort of questions you are asking with respect to metaphysics and knowledge. There is nothing to say on the level of verification. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But I've argued against verification being a requirement for statements being meaningful. Metaphysical statements can't be verified. They go beyond the empirical domain. But they can be argued for. And they can be true, if there is some real state of affairs the metaphysical argument is about.

That's a realist take on truth and metaphysics, anyway.

For sure, but I don't think anyone was arguing statements weren't meaningful without verification. Carnap certainly isn't trying to make that point in his accusations against metaphysics. The point is, rather, to avoid making errors in our thinking, tricking ourselves into asking questions that are "meaningless" and don't have an answer. (as the oppose a logical incoherence own the premise of their query).

With respect to empirical claims, for example, that means them being verifiable in principle. That's to say, the posing of some state of affairs such that if someone encountered them, the claim would be verified by their observation/perception of the world.

So in the case of the distant galaxy, to form a coherent empirical claim, one would have to pose something which, if encounter in observation, would be verified-- e.g. the alien planets orbiting each other, the, lifeforms with three heads, etc. One couldn't just allude to some undefined, unknowable mystery and make a coherent empirical claim. (e.g. in the distant galaxy, there is creator God who is beyond description).

I should go back trough the questions to try and clarify where I think you are going wrong.

1. isn't a metaphysical question. You are asking whether dragons and aliens exist in Middle Earth. It's an empirical question of an imaginary world.

2. is an empirical question. The site is just beyond our observation range. Inside or outside our light cone doesn't matter to this one. "Out in the larger universe" is just a red-herring. Other places are still exits in the same reality no matter which universe we are identifying them with.

3. is a metaphysical question... but it doesn't off up any contingent alternatives. There is no alternative structure because a world in which A follows B form necessary causality is identical to a world in which the randomly follow each other. We have A followed by B. This presents the same whether B is necessarily caused by A or if it just randomly follows A.

Thus, we have no metaphysical question of whether there is casual stature or not.

(at this point, we need to reconsider causality and what it means, since there is literally no difference in the world between our supposed opposition of causal structure vs no causal structure).

4. That's an empirical/phenomenological question. Whether an "illusion" is present is down to if the appropriate experiences exists, ones which show the relevant states or not.

In your examples, you haven't got one coherent ontological question. They all involve some sort of confusion formed out of putting speculation before knowledge.

I guess so, but documentary evidence, even video is not the same as witnessing it yourself. Anyway the point of distinction is between verifiable at least in principle and not verifiable even in principle, whatever you might want to say about individual cases.

Is that somehow different from saying that consciousness is an illusion? And don't they understand the meaning of the word in responding like this? — Moliere

Not very different, no, but that's the point. They think they understand the 'meaning' of the word, but others disagree. Conciousness is a noun, its meaning is its correct referent (in some form), so how can a debate have meaning when one side is using the word 'conciousness' to refer to a thing the properties of which the other side do not agree with. It's like changing the atheist/theist debate from "does God exist or not?" to "what are the properties of God?" by saying that both sides know the meaning of the word 'God' and can therefore have a meaningful conversation about the properties of the thing. It's perfectly possible - we could say that one of the properties of God is non-existence - but that's just not how normal people talk and I don't see how it gets us anywhere to set up this artificial manner of discourse without good reason. The normal way for atheists to talk about God is to say that no such thing exists, not to discuss its properties (one of which is non-existence). So there are these two groups with conciousness, those who believe that conciousness is just an illusion, nothing more than an artefact of mental processes, and those who think explaining its properties is the most important question of humanity. To say that the one group can have a meaningful conversation with the other simply on the grounds that they both make grammatically correct use of the word 'conciousness' is stretching normal discourse really far for no good reason.

What metric do you use to determine that a child has learned how to speak? Is there really some set of criteria you apply, or do you just understand the words being said? — Moliere

Whether their use of words communicates the message they intended. The words have a purpose, they must communicate some message to other language users otherwise they fail. This is not the case with the interpretation of philosophical propositions. One cannot say that my interpretation of some proposition is wrong, because the interpreting a proposition never had a stated purpose by which mine could be measured. That's the point. Philosophy is constantly trying to have its cake and eat it. It wants to be as vague and aesthetic as possible when people like Carnap try to attack it for lacking verification, but then when it comes down to preserving the hierarchy of the 'big' philosophers, the professors and the students, it clams up again into pretending that there's definitely something solid and verifiable, something one can definitely be 'wrong' about.

Surely it's possible to be misunderstood. If you said consciousness was awareness, for instance, then in the debate on conscioussness you'd be using the term incorrectly. — Moliere

In what way? If I made the claim that conciousness was awareness, maybe on the basis that I'm claiming that an awareness of awareness is indistinguishable in neurological terms from an awareness of anything else and I'm an eliminative materialist about the mind, then how could I be using the term 'incorrectly'

Just because there is the possibility that someone doesn't understand a term, but only the grammar, doesn't mean that everyone using said term is in the same situation.

Consider the 5th postulate of geometry. The same would hold there. All that one would have to do is append a "not" in the appropriate place, and yet could get by without understanding the 5th postulate of geometry. — Moliere

Yes, but if one were to refute the fifth postulate just by saying "no it doesn't", everyone would disagree with them. That's the difference. The fifth postulate has consequences, claiming it to be false simply by restating it with the word 'doesn't' instead of 'does' would mean that all of geometry would have to change because I can draw two straight lines crossing another and they will meet on the side with the smaller angles. I've no doubt there are clever mathematical constructs and ways out of this (perhaps non-eucledean geometry?) but there is sufficient widespread agreement to make the terms meaningful. This is not the case with most metaphysical propositions.

Come on! Unicorns aren't hard to understand, anymore than drgaons or wizards are. They're just fictional creations. That doesn't make them meaningless. — Marchesk

I didn't say Unicorns are meaningless. We're going round in circles here. It is the debate about them that is meaningless. Not the question, not the answers to the question, not the terms themselves, the debate (in the form that metaphysical debates are currently held).

The thing that is meaningless is the statement "the claim that unicorns have pink tails is wrong". We can all understand what unicorns are - they are fictional beasts a bit like a horse with a single horn. We can all understand what the question "what colour are unicorn's tails?" means - it means, if I were to look at a unicorn's tail, what sensation of colour would I experience". We can all understand what the answer "Unicorn's tails are pink" means - we can conjure up an image of a unicorn with a pink tail and your image would not be too dissimilar from mine. What we can't make sense of is what the word 'wrong' means in that proposition.

What does it mean to be 'wrong' about the tail colour of a fictional beast whose tail colour is not specified in any of the mythological traditions which gave rise to the widespread agreement about it's horse-likeness and its single horn?

Now an Invisible Pink Unicorn has an inherent contradiction in what sort of thing it's supposed to be, so that falls under the umbrella of incoherency, which was the point of the term (to parody incoherent religious concepts). Just like a four sided triangle is an incoherent concept. But a triangle in a time travel story isn't incoherent, it's just part of a fictional story. — Marchesk

An invisible pink unicorn is not incoherent at all. It could be invisible to most people, therefore justifying the adjective, but to those to whom it is visible, it appears pink. Or maybe it thinks it's pink and we're going to define the colour of a thing by what it thinks it is because we're being solopsistic about it. It might be that it is pink in the sense of the the 'thing-as-it-is', but we can only ever perceive it as invisible because of the limits of our senses. Maybe it's pink in some light conditions that do not currently exist and so we could never falsify it.... I could go on. Metaphysics is easy.

Your four-sided triangle might be incoherent, but that's because the properties of a triangle are widely agreed upon, and one of them it that it doesn't have four sides. There's no-one in the world seriously claiming that triangles have four sides, for that very reason.

The idea that some metaphysical propositions can be rejected because they are incoherent, or inconsistent, or self-contradictory, is just a lack of lateral thinking on the part of the proponent. Give it enough time and someone will be able to find a way to make it coherent again. Have they achieved anything by doing this? yes, I think they probably have, they've made their story more valuable to themselves because it is more robust. That's the value of such discussions. We're they wrong in the first place because they were incoherent? well obviously not, minor tweak in expression and they're back to being coherent again, nothing about the fundamental truth value of the proposition changes.

Not very different, no, but that's the point. They think they understand the 'meaning' of the word, but others disagree. — Pseudonym

I would say that they understand the meaning of the word just fine. What other's disagree with is not the meaning of "consciousness" -- it's well explicated -- but on whether or not what is being said is true. And that this is the sort of thing which debates consist in anyways. It's possible to misunderstand, but with enough time we come to understand exactly what we mean and the disagreement hinges on something other than what a word means.

Whether their use of words communicates the message they intended. The words have a purpose, they must communicate some message to other language users otherwise they fail. This is not the case with the interpretation of philosophical propositions. One cannot say that my interpretation of some proposition is wrong, because the interpreting a proposition never had a stated purpose by which mine could be measured. — Pseudonym

I would say that you can say an interpretation is wrong. There are multiple interpretations of philosophers, but there are also incorrect interpretations. To say "Nietzsche believed that the height of humanity was achieved through socialism" is just plainly false. Or to say, "Plato argued that the mind is a blank slate upon which our empirical senses impinges" is also plainly false.

I don't think you need metrics to understand these things. And I'd argue that a language-user still uses meaningful words regardless of whether their message they intended is communicated. Plus I'm not sure that's really a metric anyways -- intent seems an odd sort of thing to provide as a metric.

That's the point. Philosophy is constantly trying to have its cake and eat it. It wants to be as vague and aesthetic as possible when people like Carnap try to attack it for lacking verification, but then when it comes down to preserving the hierarchy of the 'big' philosophers, the professors and the students, it clams up again into pretending that there's definitely something solid and verifiable, something one can definitely be 'wrong' about.

I'd just say there's a difference between verification and meaning, as well as verification and falsehood -- so there is no conflict in saying that certain statements are not verifiable yet are either meaningful, or true, or false.

And that it's actually quite common for people to believe more than what they can verify, and to do so because of [various reasons] -- so engaging in what people believe, and for what reasons, makes sense. How many people do you think are strict verificationists, both in terms of meaning and in terms of what they believe?

Why is verification important?

In what way? If I made the claim that conciousness was awareness, maybe on the basis that I'm claiming that an awareness of awareness is indistinguishable in neurological terms from an awareness of anything else and I'm an eliminative materialist about the mind, then how could I be using the term 'incorrectly' — Pseudonym

Because consciousness is the feeliness of the world -- that it feels like something. Awareness is another aspect of the mind people tend to use "conscious" for, but it's not what's being talked about.

Yes, but if one were to refute the fifth postulate just by saying "no it doesn't", everyone would disagree with them. That's the difference. The fifth postulate has consequences, claiming it to be false simply by restating it with the word 'doesn't' instead of 'does' would mean that all of geometry would have to change because I can draw two straight lines crossing another and they will meet on the side with the smaller angles. I've no doubt there are clever mathematical constructs and ways out of this (perhaps non-eucledean geometry?) but there is sufficient widespread agreement to make the terms meaningful. This is not the case with most metaphysical propositions. — Pseudonym

In order for agreement to take place we must understand what we mean by some statement. Else, prior to there being agreement, we'd be talking nonsense until we all finally decided to say "I agree!" -- and does the statement somehow magically gain meaning at that point, due to this intonation?

So as you note there is non-Euclidean geometry. I chose the 5th postulate for this reason. There was a point in time when the 5th postulate was widely agreed upon as simply true, or derivable from the other postulates -- until it was demonstrated that appending that "not" could actually hold, we'd just be dealing with another sort of geometry that behaves differently.

Before people agreed with them what they said still meant something. It wasn't because the mathematical community at large said "I agree!" that the terms used in their papers suddenly gained meaning -- the meaning was well understood, and what was argued over was the truth or falsity of said meaning.

The debate really was only a meaningful debate insofar that there was disagreement -- if, today, you were to try to rehash the debate, claiming that the 5th postulate was true simpliciter, no one would take you very seriously.


Now, as to most metaphysical propositions -- on that I think we'd need a heartier notion of metaphysics in order to begin counting what counts. My suspicion is that the words will mean -- they are not nonsense -- and that the meaningfulness of the debate will be similar to the 5th postulate: It will be relative to a philosophical attitude, a community, a set of beliefs, or some such. So what is important to some is not important to others, and vice versa, primarily because of other beliefs that are being held as true or at least viewed as desirable to retain.

Which seems to indicate, as far as I can tell, that it would depend upon preference. So a verificationist, for instance, probably cares about verification and what that means. I, on the other hand, don't see much value in verification as a principle of meaning, so it really doesn't interest me all that much.

Which seems to indicate, as far as I can tell, that it would depend upon preference. So a verificationist, for instance, probably cares about verification and what that means. I, on the other hand, don't see much value in verification as a principle of meaning, so it really doesn't interest me all that much. — Moliere

I can't speak for speak for Pseudonym, but the point I have been emphasizing is the undecidability, as opposed to the meaninglessness, of metaphysical disagreements. If we disagree over some empirical claim, the issue as to who is correct can be decided, by checking; by observation in some cases, referencing documented information in others, asking the experts and so on. Of course, no scientific hypothesis is ever proven, either, but there are at least accepted ways to corroborate opinion. I think this kind of corroboration just does not exist when it comes to metaphysical views.

So, I said I have not been emphasizing the meaninglessness of metaphysical disagreements, but actually because of the undecidability of the truth of competing views (which are themselves not meaningless, obviously, or else they could not qualify as views at all) and the presupposed premises upon which they rest, disagreement would seem to be, if not meaningless, then at least pointless.

Of course it isn't possible to experimentally distinguish between metaphysicses...largely because many or most of them predict the same observations in the physical world, which is largely because many or most are contrived to agree with what we observe.

For example, suppose that there's a metaphysics that doesn't need any assumptions or brute-facts, and that what it says there metaphysically is, is something that's uncontroversially inevitable. And say that there's another metaphysics that has a brute-fact. Suppose both metaphysicses predict our physical world, as we find it.

It's undecidable whether there is what the 2nd metaphysics says there is, but what can be said is that there's no doubt about there being what the 1st one says there metaphysically is. It can also be said that the 2nd one is superfluous, and that it doesn't do well by the Principle of Parsimony, or the customary discrediting of unverifiable, unfalsifiable theories.

So there are definite things that can be uncontroversially-said about metaphysics.

I suggest that, in metaphysics, there's no place for speculation or matters-of-opinion.

For example, I don't go so far as to speculate about whether this physical universe is more than my metaphysics says it is (or whether there additionally is what Materialism says there is (whatever that is) ). I don't go so far as to express an opinion on that matter.. My metaphysics is only about what there metaphysically at least is.

Michael Ossipoff

For example, suppose that there's a metaphysics that doesn't need any assumptions — Michael Ossipoff

There is no such metaphysics, since any consistent metaphysics is merely a valid elaboration of premises which cannot be demonstrated from within the system (if at all). This is analogous to the way the axioms of geometry cannot be proven geometrically except that metaphysical premises are not self-evident.