I don't think your analysis really comes to terms with Aristotle. The fact that you designate him a 'naive realist' speaks volumes. — Wayfarer
So by all means, criticize hylomorphic dualism, but on the basis of what it actually is. I think trying to reconstruct the meaning of universals in the basis of sensations is never going to get there. — Wayfarer
My own approach when it comes to questions of ontology, debates over realism vs. nominalism, etc. is to ask, What is at stake? Why is this important? What difference in our worldview would one position make vs. the other? — SophistiCat
I think it's fair to say that all of the ancients were naive realists insofar as they considered things to be substance — Janus
where have I claimed that the meaning of universals could be reconstructed (whatever that means) from sensation? — Janus
It is the fact that there are never sheer perceptions of 'bare' particulars, but always simultaneous affective and cognitive processes of comparison and re-cognition that explains how generalities are generated. Generalities then become reified as universals. — Janus
What you might think that has to do with "reconstructing the meaning of universals on the basis of sensation", I am left wondering. — Janus
Seriously Wayfarer, you need to engage with the points I am actually making, otherwise no meaningful discussion will be possible. — Janus
The origin of the term 'substance' in Aristotle was the Latin translation of the term 'ouisia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being'. — Wayfarer
substantive entities that in their own independent being possessed qualities including what were later called 'secondary qualities". — Janus
where have I claimed that the meaning of universals could be reconstructed (whatever that means) from sensation? — Janus
Here, in the discussion about the sensation of being struck. — Wayfarer
Here, in the discussion about causality. — Wayfarer
It is true that accusations of "meaninglessness" (as well as some others, such as "incoherency") are often thrown around rather loosely. But, returning to the topic of the thread, you need to remember that Carnap was a positivist, and so he had stringent and, perhaps to our ear, rather idiosyncratic criteria of meaningfulness.
But let's not nitpick vocabulary. I think the idea in this particular instance is that some debates just lack substance and worth. Some - in fact, probably many - questions that have been mainstays of philosophy, and metaphysics in particular, are pseudo-questions.
My own approach when it comes to questions of ontology, debates over realism vs. nominalism, etc. is to ask, What is at stake? Why is this important? What difference in our worldview would one position make vs. the other? If it seems to me that nothing substantial is at stake, except perhaps minor differences in language, then I judge such questions to be - let's say "worthless," if you don't like "meaningless." — SophistiCat
I explained why I said the Ancients were naive realists; because they didn't not have the benefit of a scientific understanding of the complexities of perception which leads to a more nuanced process realism. — Janus
it's a discussion about causality not about universals. Are you serious? — Janus
Of course they have meaning, just as poetry does, which is to say that they are more or less rich in conceptual and perceptual associations. It's a question of aesthetics, not of truth. — Janus
So it is verifiable in principle but not at the present time? — Janus
Oddly enough there are mamy examples of what we count as knowledge which are not verifiable even in principle unless time travel were to turn out to be possible. Any claims concerning the past, for example. — Janus
takes an instance we know to be unverifiable... then supposes to address the question of whether it's veritable or not. The supposed "metaphysical" condrum being tackled, to have some verfied account of what is true or not, is directly obliterated by its definition. — TheWillowOfDarkness
verification-transcendent propositions support the meaningfulness of metaphysics. I believe this is Dummett distinction. — Marchesk
This takes out the sort of questions you are asking with respect to metaphysics and knowledge. There is nothing to say on the level of verification. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Is that somehow different from saying that consciousness is an illusion? And don't they understand the meaning of the word in responding like this? — Moliere
What metric do you use to determine that a child has learned how to speak? Is there really some set of criteria you apply, or do you just understand the words being said? — Moliere
Surely it's possible to be misunderstood. If you said consciousness was awareness, for instance, then in the debate on conscioussness you'd be using the term incorrectly. — Moliere
Just because there is the possibility that someone doesn't understand a term, but only the grammar, doesn't mean that everyone using said term is in the same situation.
Consider the 5th postulate of geometry. The same would hold there. All that one would have to do is append a "not" in the appropriate place, and yet could get by without understanding the 5th postulate of geometry. — Moliere
Come on! Unicorns aren't hard to understand, anymore than drgaons or wizards are. They're just fictional creations. That doesn't make them meaningless. — Marchesk
Now an Invisible Pink Unicorn has an inherent contradiction in what sort of thing it's supposed to be, so that falls under the umbrella of incoherency, which was the point of the term (to parody incoherent religious concepts). Just like a four sided triangle is an incoherent concept. But a triangle in a time travel story isn't incoherent, it's just part of a fictional story. — Marchesk
Not very different, no, but that's the point. They think they understand the 'meaning' of the word, but others disagree. — Pseudonym
Whether their use of words communicates the message they intended. The words have a purpose, they must communicate some message to other language users otherwise they fail. This is not the case with the interpretation of philosophical propositions. One cannot say that my interpretation of some proposition is wrong, because the interpreting a proposition never had a stated purpose by which mine could be measured. — Pseudonym
That's the point. Philosophy is constantly trying to have its cake and eat it. It wants to be as vague and aesthetic as possible when people like Carnap try to attack it for lacking verification, but then when it comes down to preserving the hierarchy of the 'big' philosophers, the professors and the students, it clams up again into pretending that there's definitely something solid and verifiable, something one can definitely be 'wrong' about.
In what way? If I made the claim that conciousness was awareness, maybe on the basis that I'm claiming that an awareness of awareness is indistinguishable in neurological terms from an awareness of anything else and I'm an eliminative materialist about the mind, then how could I be using the term 'incorrectly' — Pseudonym
Yes, but if one were to refute the fifth postulate just by saying "no it doesn't", everyone would disagree with them. That's the difference. The fifth postulate has consequences, claiming it to be false simply by restating it with the word 'doesn't' instead of 'does' would mean that all of geometry would have to change because I can draw two straight lines crossing another and they will meet on the side with the smaller angles. I've no doubt there are clever mathematical constructs and ways out of this (perhaps non-eucledean geometry?) but there is sufficient widespread agreement to make the terms meaningful. This is not the case with most metaphysical propositions. — Pseudonym
Which seems to indicate, as far as I can tell, that it would depend upon preference. So a verificationist, for instance, probably cares about verification and what that means. I, on the other hand, don't see much value in verification as a principle of meaning, so it really doesn't interest me all that much. — Moliere
For example, suppose that there's a metaphysics that doesn't need any assumptions — Michael Ossipoff
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