Oh, and Carnap was wrong as a result of working from an utterly impoverished criterion for being meaningful... — creativesoul
I would say that they understand the meaning of the word just fine. What other's disagree with is not the meaning of "consciousness" -- it's well explicated — Moliere
The words “conscious” and “consciousness” are umbrella terms that cover a wide variety of mental phenomena. Both are used with a diversity of meanings, and the adjective “conscious” is heterogeneous in its range, being applied both to whole organisms—creature consciousness—and to particular mental states and processes—state consciousness — Rosenthal 1986, Gennaro 1995, Carruthers 2000.
To say "Nietzsche believed that the height of humanity was achieved through socialism" is just plainly false. Or to say, "Plato argued that the mind is a blank slate upon which our empirical senses impinges" is also plainly false. — Moliere
I'd just say there's a difference between verification and meaning, as well as verification and falsehood -- so there is no conflict in saying that certain statements are not verifiable yet are either meaningful, or true, or false. — Moliere
Because consciousness is the feeliness of the world -- that it feels like something. Awareness is another aspect of the mind people tend to use "conscious" for, but it's not what's being talked about. — Moliere
My suspicion is that the words will mean -- they are not nonsense -- and that the meaningfulness of the debate will be similar to the 5th postulate: It will be relative to a philosophical attitude, a community, a set of beliefs, or some such. So what is important to some is not important to others, and vice versa, primarily because of other beliefs that are being held as true or at least viewed as desirable to retain. — Moliere
The examples provided to bolster this claim that such debates are meaningless are inadequate. They do not offer an example of a meaningless debate. Rather, they offer an example of two sides working from different frameworks(talking past one another). It does not follow that such a debate is meaningless. When it is the case that two are arguing from different frameworks, then it is the case that both sides are employing meaningful, but different linguistic frameworks. They very well could be said to be arguing about different things despite using the same name. The frameworks are nevertheless meaningful. So, it is not the case that the debate is meaningless. — creativesoul
Doesn't explanatory power hold value equal to verification/falsification? — creativesoul
Doesn't explanatory power hold value equal to verification/falsification? — creativesoul
Nagel thinks there's something it's "like" to be us and calls this consciousness, others disagree that there is something it is 'like' to experience being us and equate consciousness directly with awareness. — Pseudonym
So, given that is right, I am left wondering how we would go about gauging the explanatory power of metaphysical theories. — Janus
Yes, but it's hard to believe them when they say there's nothing it's 'like' to experience being us, unless they are philosophical zombies.
I think it's far more likely they know what it's "like", but they're convinced it has to be an illusion on other grounds, so they argue that there is no actual subjective experience. — Marchesk
Dennett understands what Chalmers is saying and vice versa. They just don't agree. — Marchesk
I can't speak for speak for Pseudonym, but the point I have been emphasizing is the undecidability, as opposed to the meaninglessness, of metaphysical disagreements. If we disagree over some empirical claim, the issue as to who is correct can be decided, by checking; by observation in some cases, referencing documented information in others, asking the experts and so on. Of course, no scientific hypothesis is ever proven, either, but there are at least accepted ways to corroborate opinion. I think this kind of corroboration just does not exist when it comes to metaphysical views.
So, I said I have not been emphasizing the meaninglessness of metaphysical disagreements, but actually because of the undecidability of the truth of competing views (which are themselves not meaningless, obviously, or else they could not qualify as views at all) and the presupposed premises upon which they rest, disagreement would seem to be, if not meaningless, then at least pointless. — Janus
We could go on like this forever, but I'm fairly certain that the meaning of the term consciousness is not agreed on, that's the point. Nagel thinks there's something it's "like" to be us and calls this consciousness, others disagree that there is something it is 'like' to experience being us and equate consciousness directly with awareness. In what way could one of these definitions possibly be wrong? Yet they can't both be right. — Pseudonym
These are not interpretations of propositions, these are historical facts about the positions broadly held. As I said, I'm not suggesting that nothing outside of hard science has any vague truth value, I'm saying there is a gradation at one end of which is empirical science and at the other some of the more obscure metaphysics and religion. At some point on this gradation it becomes meaningless to debate the matters (and by debate, I mean attempt to show your interlocutor is wrong). I cannot even pinpoint exactly where that line is, but then I cannot pinpoint exactly how many grains of sand are required for it to be a 'pile'. So, the fact that saying "Plato argued that the mind is a blank slate upon which our empirical senses impinges" would be wrong, does not undermine the assertion that any individual propositions of Plato's could be interpreted in any grammatically correct way and no-one could say which interpretation was more 'right', by any measure. — Pseudonym
Again, you seem to be missing the point, perhaps my writing is not as clear as I'd like to think, but I did write it in a single bolded sentence so I'm not sure why the message isn't getting home - I'm not saying that the beliefs themselves are meaningless, I'm saying that debating them is.. A non-verifiable statement could be packed with meaning, it could be the most meaningful thing ever said, but if it is non-verifiable, then to say it is right or wrong is meaningless, to say it is better or worse is meaningless, without first agreeing what 'better' would consist of. Using a word in a sentence your meaning of which is not the same as the meaning for the person to whom you are communicating is almost literally meaningless. It's practically the definition of the word. — Pseudonym
Basically I take a kind of Ramsey-Quine synthesis, which I think answers this point. All scientific theories are in the form of Ramsey sentences. "There are things called electrons which...[the rest of particle physics]", or "There is a relation between humans and their environment which...[the rest of human ecology" etc. Quine then goes on to say that metaphysics is like a science, in that it uses the same techniques on less empirical problems, but to a gradually decreasing degree until it starts becoming meaningless. The sentences become more and more fantastical and relate less and less to the real world, until they are nothing but stories. again, just to drive this point home, that doesn't make them meaningless. In fact I think stories to explain how we exist in the world are of absolutely vital importance and meaning. But it does make trying to argue that one story is better than another meaningless, it does mean that slavishly following someone else's story on the presumption that you can't develop your own meaningless. In short it makes most of the activity of modern metaphysics meaningless. — Pseudonym
Well, they can both be right, insofar that we are clear on what we're saying. So if we're talking about "what it is like", then it does no service to a discussion to argue over what consciousness means -- it is, in that context, wrong to say that consciousness is something else. — Moliere
Of course, and the exact same argument has been used against atheists. "I can't believe they don't really feel the presence of God, they're convinced it's just their conscience or something but they do really feel it" — Pseudonym
I'm not seeing the link you're making here. You seem to jump from saying the frameworks are meaningful (which I can agree with) to saying that the debates are therefore meaningful, and I don't see any argument which got you from the one proposition to the other. How are you reaching the conclusion that because the frameworks are meaningful, debating between two different ones must also be meaningful? — Pseudonym
I can completely sympathise with your finding some value in 'testing' your beliefs against those of others, you might find another position more satisfying, or more robust, and we do seem to like our beliefs to be robust (well, some of us anyway) but that's a one way passive event. The philosopher only needs to 'present' you with their proposition, for you to do with what you will. But then there's no sfnsd in which you're "studying" anything, there's no body of knowledge to learn (other than the entirely historical facts of who said what). No one is 'better' than anyone else, there's no sense in which some grammatically correct interpretation could be 'wrong' (again, other than in a purely historical sense that such an interpretation is unlikely to be what the author intended to say. Because what the author intended to say is a fact of history, not metaphysics). — Pseudonym
As I say, I have a lot of sympathy for the value in the more mystical metaphysical propositions. I think I would even go as far as to say it would be virtually impossible for a person to go through life without taking a position on some of the most important metaphysical questions,and I'd love to be involved in discussing them as such, but that, sadly, is just not how it's done. — Pseudonym
.There is no such metaphysics, since any consistent metaphysics is merely a valid elaboration of premises which cannot be demonstrated from within the system
.(if at all).
.This is analogous to the way the axioms of geometry cannot be proven geometrically except that metaphysical premises are not self-evident.
Nearly all metaphysicses depend on a brute-fact. Materialism is the familiar example of that. — Michael Ossipoff
So, given that is right, I am left wondering how we would go about gauging the explanatory power of metaphysical theories. — Janus
Metaphysical theories are explanatory on conceptual grounds. You argue for or against the ideas. How well they hold together, what their flaws are, whether there is anything contradictory or confusing, etc. — Marchesk
I'd say that decidability is still a possible feature of metaphhysical debate, though -- but only under certain conditions. And I'd also say that metaphysical debate can still have a point, even if it is not decidable.
On conditions of decidability: If two persons have a shared tradition, then metaphysical debate is (possibly) decidable. There are a set of propositions held T, and the arguments for or against some view from those propositions gives a kind of ground upon which disagreement can take place. (Propositions don't have to be what is shared -- it can be attitudes, goals, or whatever else might serve as the bed of agreement upon which disagreement rests)
On "the point of it all": Even if there is not a bed of agreement upon which disagreement can take place in order that some disagreement may be decidable, then debate can take place to clarify and elucidate. Sometimes I'd rather debate with my polar opposite for this purpose, because I know that they, at least, will be motivated to pick apart what I'm saying in order that I may further refine my own thinking. — Moliere
If by "brute-fact" you mean "unsupported axiom" that would apply to all metaphysics. — Janus
The aim of any metaphysical theory is to postulate the fundamental nature of being or reality.
Explain clearly for once just how your "Faraday" metaphysics doesn't depend on any assumptions.
That words don't describe Realiity is easily shown by the fact that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words. — Michael Ossipoff
What assumption(s) do you think it depends on? — Michael Ossipoff
However, along the way, the possibility of arriving at a 'unitive vision' of the nature of things seems to have become impossible, as the amount of data and information, and the number of disciplines that science embraces, makes it impossible for any individual to understand the whole picture. Maybe that's why metaphysics has indeed become meaningless. — Wayfarer
The aim of any metaphysical theory is to postulate the fundamental nature of being or reality.
~ Janus
You're kidding, right? — Michael Ossipoff
metaphysics
noun
the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, identity, time, and space.
I would agree that probably no one can master every one of today's many intellectual disciplines, but I don't think that one has to master them all in order to get a sense for what they all share in common. — Esse Quam Videri
but having God experiences is not universally reported, unlike dreams, imagination, feeling pain, etc. — Marchesk
Subjectivity is universal. But when the nature of subjective experience is argued about it, some are convinced that it's an illusion and not something fundamentally hard to explain in objective terms.
Or they pretend they don't understand what having your own individual experiences means, and they argue about something else related that's third person, such as being awake and responsive, or reports. — Marchesk
What is a one way passive event? What is a two-way active event that makes it more valuable? — Moliere
There is an art to it, and sometimes you use examples, sometimes you use empirical methods, sometimes you use thought experiments, and sometimes you use arguments. — Moliere
Science is a lot like this. The only difference is that science is institutionalized to be a certain way, whereas philosophy is broader and able to change traditional assumptions -- to make new traditions, if it happens to bear fruit. — Moliere
The only reason it's more decidable than all of philosophy is because it is a tradition, which holds certain things as true, wherein many people believe such and such and so are able to appeal to that bed of agreement to decide upon what is being disagreed with. — Moliere
I'd still insist that within the context of a tradition that a metaphysical belief can be decidable based upon what is being held T -- such as the belief that the universe is coherent, or the belief that we live in the best possible world, or something. — Moliere
Absolutely, I'd venture to say that for most people it holds more value, since most people leave the verification to professional scientists. But almost anything can be explained in almost any way, given sufficient imagination. I could quite easily construct a coherent explanation for all events in the world using an imaginary pantheon of Gods I just made up. Or I could come up with some New Age woo to explain everything, use quantum physics to construct some weird reality (god knows it's weird enough to allow almost anything). Any of these might have enormous value to me, but it would be meaningless to try and convince you they were right, or that yours was wrong. What measure would I use to do so? — Pseudonym
In the empirical arena the explanatory power of a hypothesis or theory is gauged according to the success of its predictions of observable phenomena. So, given that is right, I am left wondering how we would go about gauging the explanatory power of metaphysical theories. — Janus
I might just get this available as a keyboard short-cut to save time... I'm not suggesting that the arguments in either camp are impossible to understand, or meaningless in themselves. I'm suggesting that the sentence "argument X is wrong" is meaningless because of the failure to agree on the meaning of 'wrong' in this context. — Pseudonym
but really I think its just the latest story we came up with to explain the chaos of our senses, and there's no sense in saying my story is better than yours because it 'feels' right. There's no sense in telling someone else their story is 'wrong' because it doesn't 'feel' right to you. — Pseudonym
So how do you determine whether someone is "pretending" to not understand. Is this not just narcissism?, Failure of a theory of mind? "how could anyone possibly think differently to me?" — Pseudonym
Coherency(lack of self contradiction) is yet another. — creativesoul
We can assess which one works from the fewest number of unprovable assumptions — creativesoul
We can also follow the logical consequences. — creativesoul
There's a bit of irony here however with Pseudonym, in that the subject of contention is what it takes to be meaningful. As far as I know, meaning is itself a metaphysical matter, at least in part. The case at hand has opposing sides. The one is arguing that if there is no agreed upon sense of the term "meaningful", and each side argues from their own sense, then the debate itself is meaningless.
That's exactly what's going on here. So, does Pseudo think that s/he is involved in a meaningless discussion/debate? — creativesoul
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