That the sun will rise and set is independent of my opinion. Whether or not I happen to agree with it, this will happen nonetheless. — mcc1789
I know it doesn't literally. — mcc1789
That seemed like it meant you rejected objective morality too. Are they distinct for you? On your question though, yes in some sense, or rather some natural things are good objectively.As you know I reject the very idea of there being an overarching (objective) meaning to human existence and life in general.
The word objective is ambiguous. It can mean "bright line rules", things most people in a given society understand such as speed limits, it can also mean "independent of humans". The sciences are the current most powerful authority on what exists without humans, on knowledge. Many hold the sciences to be the authority on knowledge. Correspondingly, conviction is not scientific. — InternetStranger
I don't see why we should not think there be general objective facts about human flourishing, and about what kinds of behaviour contribute to, and what kinds of behavior are detrimental too, general human flourishing. — Janus
And that is because what is objectively the case often amounts to what can be measured; and what can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. — Wayfarer
Which sounds very close to utilitarianism - the greatest good for the greatest number - expressed in the language of virtue ethics with the appeal to eudaemonia. — Wayfarer
And so 'human flourishing' turns out, in practice, to be very much like progress and economic development; which I agree are by no means bad things (as I believe in science, progress and democracy); but it still leaves a lot of questions un-answered in my view. — Wayfarer
And that is because what is objectively the case often amounts to what can be measured; and what can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful.
— Wayfarer
This makes no sense to me. Perhaps you mean to say that the fact that some things can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. If you didn't mean that then perhaps you could present an example to clarify what you did mean. — Janus
even if it were established that they [progress and economic development] are, in their most desirable forms, the best conditions; the questions remain: 'Whose progress and what kind of progress, and whose, and what degree of, economic development?'. — Janus
I don't see why we should not think there be general objective facts about human flourishing, and about what kinds of behaviour contribute to, and what kinds of behavior are detrimental too, general human flourishing. — Janus
Science generally is concerned with the domain of objective fact and measurement; it's chiefly quantitative. — Wayfarer
And, whilst I agree - what is the basis for that? If it's not a utilitarian ethos - the 'greatest good for the greatest number' - and it's not based on a transcendent good, then what kind of general ethic might we be talking about? — Wayfarer
I should judge that Hume and our present‑day ethicists had done a considerable service by showing that no content could be found in the notion "morally ought"; if it were not that the latter philosophers try to find an alternative (very fishy) content and to retain the psychological force of the term. It would be most reasonable to drop it. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be a great improvement if, instead of "morally wrong," one always named a genus such as "untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once.
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