"It's true there is not a uniform agreement. At the same time however, there do seem some things which can be agreed upon, for instance being in constant pain is bad."

This isn't true. It may be true for you, and it may be the current general opinion of mankind. Or, perhaps the general opinion of mankind in all ages up until now. But many disagree, and even for reasons. Also, one may disagree irrationally, i.e., without reasons, why not? Such is liberal society, it allows one to be human, to choose. Or, perhaps it is no choice, but what their psychology compels them to treat as a certainty.

One who would maintain your thesis would be compelled to deem those who choose against this, or who believe against this, defective.

One needs some preliminaries though. Does agreed mean the same as ordinary certainty? In the sense that when I see water, I say, there is water in that cup. That's a psychological certainty, a judgment based on the possibly fallible psychology of a human being. Supposing one start with that as a measure of "agreeing"? Would you grant that. Ergo, we would be setting aside questions concerning the status of human psychology in relation to the universe as such. The standard is, when something is said, a sentence, one that says something, i.e., a proposition, being affirmed, due to really being judged so, by some psychology. Would you grant this standard, or something like it of your own formulation?

That the sun will rise and set is independent of my opinion. Whether or not I happen to agree with it, this will happen nonetheless. — mcc1789

The sun does not rise, nor does it set. The earth spins on its axis and creates the appearance of a rising and setting sun. Notice that the subject here, the thing which is active, is the earth rather than the sun, so the statement you made which implies that the sun is the active subject, is clearly false.

Really. Who likes to be in constant pain? Tell me.

I think that seems fine so far.

I know it doesn't literally. That earth revolves though is a fact.

I know it doesn't literally. — mcc1789

So your speaking metaphorically then. What does that have to do with objectivity?

It was metaphorical yes. Well, it's an objective fact, i.e. my opinion doesn't change this.

"Really. Who likes to be in constant pain? Tell me."

Penitents, stylites, various yogies, peculiar people, Martin Luther who said: leiden leiden croix croix, Suffering Suffering the Cross the Cross! A great many people. Communists devoted to building the rational society under the claim the party truth demands perpetual and painful sacrifice. Artists who hold a struggle with society for the sake of an obscure goal is the most worthy zenith. Those who hold the tap roots of what is most great are made firm through hard exercise, i.e., through going painfully against the grain of humans as they now exist in order to change what is. Crazy people. So forth.

I'm pretty sure that's not constant. Let me be more specific: pain such that they can't even do anything, such as unfortunately some of the sick have without medication. You describe a pain that's chosen as well. I'm pretty sure that can lead to pleasure as well (i.e. they're masochists, or they gain pleasure through achievements).

However far you go, to be sure, some human would affirm it as good by the standard of their own certainty based on their psychology. One would be compelled to judge some persons insane. Which raises certain questions about the exact criteria, and the judges of insanity.

That's true, it can be difficult. It is better to say there's a consensus.

"a consensus"

It's not wholly clear what consensus means. One speaks of "the tyranny of the majority" at some point. One must correspondingly consider the minority views. There is a question concerning what counts as consensus and on what bases one decides where the line is drawn. And from where is the hoop of those who decide described, i.e., a certain country, the whole world? The currently living human beings, there was a moment when The Marriage of Figaro was held impermissible!, utterly impossible for moral reasons!, the humans of every age up until know? Kant, for example, says, what has been held up to now is a temporary and local rumor.

I thought it was sorry. So what I mean is "general agreement". Where the line is drawn I agree would be difficult.

I wasn't aware of that. Why did they not like it?

I believe this roughly corresponds to the current notion of natural Right, i.e., what is held essential by the current population. With the difficulty that it is in question whether one can any longer speak only of a closed geographical locality, and not of universal humanity, since, amoung other reasons, we hear constantly about what happens in parts distant and can not help pass judgment.

You mean The Marriage of Figaro?

Yes.

I am a moral realist by temperament, but I think you will find - actually, you are finding - that it becomes problematical as soon as the word 'objective' is introduced. Why that is, is one of the most interesting questions in this debate.

The word objective is ambiguous. It can mean "bright line rules", things most people in a given society understand such as speed limits, it can also mean "independent of humans". The sciences are the current most powerful authority on what exists without humans, on knowledge. Many hold the sciences to be the authority on knowledge. Correspondingly, conviction is not scientific. The whole humanity can hold a view scientifically false. You aren't a moral realist, you simply hold yourself to be due to nascience. It happened sometimes under the former South Africa that people were certain there were two kinds of sex, illegal, between men, and licit, between man and woman. When it was explicitly raised that women have sex, and thought through, it came to be seen these people believed also that women could have sex. That was simply ignored by law and popular culture, but nonetheless, it was there as unkown known.

For a reason quite alien to us. Because before the French Revolution except by small groups of "Free Thinkers" the notion of mocking the ruled was thought as akin to the idea of children laughing at parents or the young making sport of the old, as the rich gorging themselves on superfluity while the poor starved, or any other common moral rule of thumb. It was thoroughly immoral by the common notion of natural morality, it was something unnatural. It should be mentioned that Mozart altered the play, as he was forbidden to adapt it, as comes out in the film Amadeus.

That's a good point; it is an interesting question. As you know I reject the very idea of there being an overarching (objective) meaning to human existence and life in general. But I also reject Hume's "is/ ought" distinction on the grounds that it fails to recognize that what is (for us humans, at least) is as much determined intersubjectively as what ought to be. It also fails to understand that life is replete with significance (which consists in relation) at every level. Animals instinctively get this and that is probably why they generally behave better towards other members of their own species than humans often do.

So, there is no objectivity in anything but principle (again, for us at least) beyond the intersubjective. There are objective empirical facts, but they are established intersubjectively, and they remain dependent on the intersubjective context for both their meaning and their truth. Given this, I don't see why we should not think there be general objective facts about human flourishing, and about what kinds of behaviour contribute to, and what kinds of behavior are detrimental too, general human flourishing. There cannot be hard and fast sets of rules, but there can be wisdom based, objective generalities that guide people who are prepared to both think and care.

Ah, that makes sense. I'm familiar with that idea from my history readings. However only having seen it once I don't remember the details of the play.

That makes sense. I'd say your view isn't that different from an ethical naturalist in practice, even if we disagree over the metaethical status of morality.

I'm not clear how we are disagreeing over the meta-ethical status of morality. Wouldn't a naturalist say that status is given by nature?

I may have misunderstood. You stated:

As you know I reject the very idea of there being an overarching (objective) meaning to human existence and life in general.

That seemed like it meant you rejected objective morality too. Are they distinct for you? On your question though, yes in some sense, or rather some natural things are good objectively.

The word objective is ambiguous. It can mean "bright line rules", things most people in a given society understand such as speed limits, it can also mean "independent of humans". The sciences are the current most powerful authority on what exists without humans, on knowledge. Many hold the sciences to be the authority on knowledge. Correspondingly, conviction is not scientific. — InternetStranger

That's the issue as I see it, in a nutshell. That's why, unlike @Janus, I think that Hume's 'is/ought' distinction is of great significance in ethics. And that is because what is objectively the case often amounts to what can be measured; and what can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. In practice, in liberal cultures, what is ethically meaningful then becomes solely a matter for the individual; but as existentialism well knows, this is a power that many fear to exercise.

I don't see why we should not think there be general objective facts about human flourishing, and about what kinds of behaviour contribute to, and what kinds of behavior are detrimental too, general human flourishing. — Janus

Which sounds very close to utilitarianism - the greatest good for the greatest number - expressed in the language of virtue ethics with the appeal to eudaemonia. But virtue ethics hails from Aristotle, and he most assuredly did believe in there being a real good, a summum bonum (although that expression was coined by Cicero).

The instinctive basis for a lot of people for ethics is evolutionary - that humans have evolved to be altruistic, not to harm others, to learn to co-operate, and so on. This appears, then, to provide a kind of naturalistic warrant for ethics. The problem then is the kind of ethics that are at least implicit in Darwinian theory, lend themselves to a certain kind of political and social outlook - one which just happens to dovetail rather well with liberal economics. And so 'human flourishing' turns out, in practice, to be very much like progress and economic development; which I agree are by no means bad things (as I believe in science, progress and democracy); but it still leaves a lot of questions un-answered in my view.

And that is because what is objectively the case often amounts to what can be measured; and what can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. — Wayfarer

This makes no sense to me. Perhaps you mean to say that the fact that some things can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. If you didn't mean that then perhaps you could present an example to clarify what you did mean.

And then, what does "may or may not be ethically meaningful" mean to imply? If what you want to say is that whether or not it is ethically meaningful is arbitrary, would that not be the same as simply saying it is not ethically meaningful. Or else, what is the difference?

Which sounds very close to utilitarianism - the greatest good for the greatest number - expressed in the language of virtue ethics with the appeal to eudaemonia. — Wayfarer

This seems confused to me. I don't see any connection between utilitarianism (which holds little appeal to me) and virtue ethics (which holds great appeal). Perhaps you could explain.

If you think the "is/ ought" distinction is a valid one, then what other grounds could you have for moral realism, for the objectivity of right and wrong, other than what is established intersubjectively?

And so 'human flourishing' turns out, in practice, to be very much like progress and economic development; which I agree are by no means bad things (as I believe in science, progress and democracy); but it still leaves a lot of questions un-answered in my view. — Wayfarer

I don't see why, on the views I have advanced, human flourishing turns out to be "progress and economic development" at all. Those conditions might (we would need to argue for that) turn out to be the best for human flourishing, or they might not. But even if it were established that they are, in their most desirable forms, the best conditions; the questions remain: 'Whose progress and what kind of progress, and whose, and what degree of, economic development?'.

Other questions would be as to what are the human costs, in terms of physical and spiritual well-being, general happiness, peace, contentment and self-fulfilment, of progress and economic development. These sorts of important questions can only be answered, to the extent they can be answered, by empirical investigation. Perhaps these kinds of empirical questions were the ones you had in mind?

OK, I think I see what you mean now. By "overarching" I meant transcendentally given from beyond nature; not dependent on the natural context at all.

Ah. I'm not sold on that either.

And that is because what is objectively the case often amounts to what can be measured; and what can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful.
— Wayfarer

This makes no sense to me. Perhaps you mean to say that the fact that some things can be measured may or may not be ethically meaningful. If you didn't mean that then perhaps you could present an example to clarify what you did mean. — Janus

Well, it's fairly obvious, isn't it? It was put quite well in the post I quoted from Internet Stranger. Science generally is concerned with the domain of objective fact and measurement; it's chiefly quantitative. That's not controversial, I would hope - do you think it is?

Whereas, the domain of ethics needs to be centred on questions that are by their nature subject to value judgement, the nature of meaning, and what is the basis for values. This has been the subject of volumes of commentary - I recall a discussion in the concluding chapter of History of Western Philosophy (the first philosophy text I read) about this very point.

even if it were established that they [progress and economic development] are, in their most desirable forms, the best conditions; the questions remain: 'Whose progress and what kind of progress, and whose, and what degree of, economic development?'. — Janus

Indeed! That is what I meant by saying they leave many questions unanswered.

But you said:

I don't see why we should not think there be general objective facts about human flourishing, and about what kinds of behaviour contribute to, and what kinds of behavior are detrimental too, general human flourishing. — Janus

And, whilst I agree - what is the basis for that? If it's not a utilitarian ethos - the 'greatest good for the greatest number' - and it's not based on a transcendent good, then what kind of general ethic might we be talking about?

Science generally is concerned with the domain of objective fact and measurement; it's chiefly quantitative. — Wayfarer

Perhaps physics and chemistry, not so much geology, biology, ecology, and others of the softer natural sciences, not to mention the human sciences. Of course measurement or quantification comes into play to some degree in all the sciences, but so does qualification, creative imagination and aesthetics (in the sense of both judgement and elegance). To the extent that ethics is the gaining of knowledge about how best to live then to that extent it is a science.

If aesthetics consists in knowledge and understanding of what constitutes the beautiful and what comes into play in our judgements of beauty then it is a science too. On the other hand all of the sciences are in fact also arts; there is no hard dividing line between the two main.aspects of all human activity; creative imagination or speculation and judging and knowing. All human activities consist in attention, understanding, insight, reason, judgement, and responsibility (to loosely paraphrase Lonergan)..

It's not surprising that Russell would support a hard exclusive division between matters of fact and matters of judgement: I don't think such a strict division is warranted.

And, whilst I agree - what is the basis for that? If it's not a utilitarian ethos - the 'greatest good for the greatest number' - and it's not based on a transcendent good, then what kind of general ethic might we be talking about? — Wayfarer

Note that consequentialist ethics relies on the notion that the greatest good for the greatest number is strictly quantifiable. I think that's strictly nonsense, the greater good cannot be used as a criterion for calculation about what must be done in specific instances, totally and inhumanly overriding any affective sentiments, deontological principles or principles of individual virtue and practical wisdom. In ethics there is no rule-based principle or method of ensuring that we get it right; what is important is good will and the right orientation in my view.

The problem is people demand either absolute proof or unimpeachable authority in these matters, rather than acknowledging that judgement is always fallible (and that includes scientific judgements, too). So in the absence of proof or the acceptance of the unimpeachable authority of dogma, some thinkers throw up their hands and declare that it must all be merely subjective, then. I think this shows the most unhelpful kind of black and white thinking. It's certainly far from enlightened thinking.

What sort of fact would a moral realist fact be? Is it like a physical fact that can be emperically measured? Is it like a mathematical or logical fact that can be derived from some formal system of axioms and rules of inference?

I think the very notion of obligation, of right and wrong, fall apart under moral realism. What, exactly, does it mean that I should do something? I can make sense of the term by referring to some rule which in turn I can make sense of by referring to some rule-giver, who for one reason or another we accept as having authority over us, but in lieu of any of that there doesn’t seem to be any sense to the term(s) at all.

To quote Anscombe:

I should judge that Hume and our present‑day ethicists had done a considerable service by showing that no content could be found in the notion "morally ought"; if it were not that the latter philosophers try to find an alternative (very fishy) content and to retain the psychological force of the term. It would be most reasonable to drop it. It has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics; they are not going to maintain such a conception; and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of Aristotle. It would be a great improvement if, instead of "morally wrong," one always named a genus such as "untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once.

how would moral realism work in society, if followed by everyone?