It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation. — Relativist
You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does. — Relativist
Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. I have raised two objections that no one has refuted. You seem to accept my objection about the multiverse. I needn't show that multiverse is more likely than God, just that it is equally likely.You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.
Agreed, but consider the implication. The hypothetical open-minded agnostic approaches the argument on the fence, neither affirming nor denying God's existence. If the argument is consistent with both his existence and non-existence, then it doesn't shift his position.there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers.
Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. — Relativist
You're reversing the burden of proof. — Relativist
My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. It's tempting to base it on the principle of indifference, but that has a major flaw.anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).
1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely.
What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.
because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance. — Relativist
I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged. In any world, something will exist, and the a priori probability that it would exist is infinitesmal. Yet, something must exist.the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.
I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what? — Relativist
I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged — Relativist
The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. — Relativist
A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives. — Relativist
If there's a God ..., — Relativist
Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. — Relativist
Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."
Clearly, it does.
Assertion without evidence. — Relativist
life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance. — Relativist
“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams) — Relativist
How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). — Relativist
Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact. — Relativist
I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness
All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives. — Relativist
It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.
That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God. — Relativist
1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.
You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot. — Relativist
Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented. — Relativist
3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility
I have no idea what you're talking about. — Relativist
Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science — Relativist
We can show God exists?! — Relativist
clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence — Relativist
Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae — Relativist
It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.
It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out. — Relativist
I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption — Relativist
If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed. — Relativist
Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. — Relativist
Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). — Relativist
Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. — Relativist
Relativist: "The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts."
In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence.
I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.
You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say.
the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.
Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, and this again betrays your special pleading in exempting the designer-hypothesis from this methodological criterion.We have abundant evidence [of the persuasive power of the FTA]. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.
This is a key point that deserves more discussion. Obviously, we all value human life - it's human nature to do so. And this explain why many people uncritically accept the FTA (and hence, its persuasive power is due to a lack of imagination in challenging a questionable assumption) - it seems to us that human life is special. The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. Holding human life to be of value obviously has a survival value, and so our having this value is consistent with natural selection and doesn't depend on there being an objective truth that we're (magically) grasping.<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.
I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended".I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").
You're missing the point: the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it.Relativist: “ imagine a puddle ..."
For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.
You're changing the subject. I was pointing out that a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, because accounting for the existence of natural law is in the realm of metaphysics (science just investigates what actual natural laws exist).Relativist: "How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question..."
When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply.
Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". Logical priority pertains to epistemic investigation of propositions that are about reality, and hence it has no bearing on what actually exists. Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon.I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe
You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. But I inferred that you were claiming the "finely tuned" constants entail intentionality, and I'm pointing out that this is a presumption - or just an alternate way of presenting the fine-tuning hypothesis. Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God. So this doesn't in any way support your case, it's just another way of stating it.No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.
A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete, but it certainly does depend on speculation and assumptions. Consider a nominalist metaphysics: it's the product of sound reflection and analysis, and it can account for everything that exists, but it is founded on the assumption that universals do not exist. An assumption of universals existence/non-existence is not an arbitrary assumption - it takes a great deal of analysis to convince oneself either way, but clearly these are pivotal to a metaphysical system and their existence can be neither firmly proven nor firmly disproven.Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.
The facts presented in evidence for the fine-tuning also serve as evidence for a metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. That's why I've said we have to consider this an "inference to best explanation."(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.
Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. We could debate how many assumptions are entailed by multiverse vs God, but I doubt we'd ever find common ground.(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.
Special pleading: failing to apply consistent criteria to the various possible explanations.That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).
Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer).Relativist: "clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence"
I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA.
We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. Each generation was capable of breeding with the prior generation (and many generations back), throughout evolutionary history, so any criteria that might be developed will necessarily draw an arbitrary line. Each change that has occurred in evolutionary history is an accident, and therefore every property that exists in humans today is accident -there is therefore nothing to distinguish an accidental property from an essential property.If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.
All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters.So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?
It is a postulate (which is an assumption) that has explanatory scope and is consistent with physicalism. These relations are also universals. It's used to account for the observed regularity in the world which could also be accounted for through trope-like behavior that a nominalist metaphysics might have).Relativist: Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). "
Definitions are not assumptions.
That is my point. One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. Both are developed consistent with observed reality through contemplation and analysis. Both are coherent. The one that concludes "God" is basically "defining itself a conclusion about reality."You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality.
I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.
It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis. — Relativist
Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist
the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it. — Relativist
a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, — Relativist
Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". — Relativist
Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon. — Relativist
You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. — Relativist
Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God — Relativist
1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground. — Relativist
multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation — Relativist
Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. — Relativist
Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. — Relativist
Multiverse is conceptually possible — Relativist
Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist
Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses — Relativist
it seems to us that human life is special. — Relativist
The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. — Relativist
I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").
I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended". — Relativist
A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. — Relativist
It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete — Relativist
Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. — Relativist
Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. — Relativist
it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR. — Relativist
Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer). — Relativist
We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. — Relativist
So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?
All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters. — Relativist
One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. — Relativist
think about what infinity means....and also think about what time is. — xxxdutchiexxx
But the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. Each hypothesis deserves equal consideration, and they should all be evaluated on the same basis- this is the heart of my objection to your analysis. If all hypotheses that lack direct empirical evidence are to be excluded, then you won't get very far. If you're going to enter the "fact" of fine tuning into evidence for your preferred hypothesis, then you have to accept them into evidence for the alternate hypotheses as well.The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction.
Special pleading. Apply the same rules to your preferred hypothesis.Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable.
It is absolutely analogous to my objection concerning the value (or specialness) of life - the objection that you have not dealt with much at all, as I'll show in a bit.As I said, this is not an analogous case
if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.
You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations.Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.
R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"
Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.
[Causation is temporal] is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.
Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way
Relativist: "Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God"
Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.
What is the observable sign of intentionality? Is it not a systematic time development ordered to ends?
First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.
When I said it "seems entailed" I was referring to statements like this (from the article I linked):Relativist: "multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation"
There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.
First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.
Relativist:" Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know."
No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.
Relativist: " Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy"
This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."
I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable.As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.
Your entire case depends on utilizing methodological "norms" as rationale for special pleading. You overlook the fact that all disciplines of study (science, history, mathematics, philosophy...) are unified in being a search for truth. An epistemological method valid for one discipline is not invalid for another - either it serves to advance us toward truth or it does not. There are more stringent norms for science, like falsifiability, only because the empirical nature of scientific investigation makes it feasible - so we needn't settle for less. But metaphysical investigation (i.e. looking beyond science) has to settle for less, or it doesn't get off the ground. So even if it were true that a scientific multiverse hypothesis fails to meet the norms of science, it's fair game to consider it in our search that looks beyond science, and it deserves that same looser standards under which any other metaphysically possible hypothesis is tested.Relativist: "Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses
False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.
I agree - and this seems problematic for your position.<value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.
If you do not start with the assumption that life has value then what is your basis for claiming there is intentionality for life? As I brought up earlier, you can't claim there's a remarkable coincidence without there being two coinciding things. The existence of life coincides with nothing - unless you assume it is coinciding with an intent for life, which is circular.The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.
I didn't decide it! I've merely argued that you have not even considered it. You're the one claiming fine tuning entails intentionality/a mind/God - so you have the burden of proof to show why "intended" is more likely than unintended. You've agreed to take value of life off the table, so what's left?[accidental=not intended] is begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments
Obviously we're not omniscient, and we can't prove coherence - but philosophers try to prove incoherence in the theories of those they disagree with. The opponent then responds with a new or revised account that maintains coherence.No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.
That reflection on our experience beings results in a conceptual framework. The objective and hope is that the conceptual framework actually corresponds to reality (i.e. "is true" per correspondence theory). Correspondence can't be vague and imprecise, it must be a perfect match to be true. Is it true, or is it actually just assumed true? I contend it is the latter. As an example, consider Aristotelean agent causation - as I pointed out, reference to agents does not fully account for causation. Unless you can fully account for causation, then there's clearly something untrue about the conceptual framework.I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.
I wasn't suggesting philosophers had failed to do their due diligence of reflection and analysis. Rather I'm highlighting that this reflection and analysis leads to different answers among different philosophers. I'll assume each of them has a rationally justified belief in whatever they decide - so how do we account for the differences of opinion? I submit that this is due to assumptions within their analysis - there have to be, because it's not based solely on analytic truths.The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution.
The variability of physical constants is due to exactly one assumption: that the constants are a product of quantum uncertainty - that they arise from entanglements with the environment from a superposition of all the possibilities. This one additional assumption is not superfluous, because it explains the alleged fine tuning.The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.
Provide an account of intelligence in the cosmos based on standard physics.the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.
That observational basis has taken decades to reveal itself, but GR was accepted physics long before that.The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.
I agree, but my problem with your argument is your creative special pleading, holding multiverse to the higher standard of science while using a looser standard for your preferred solution.We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion
I have yet to see any such sound reasoning. They all depend on assumptions.Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.
My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. — Relativist
It's interesting you'd say that, because it is the exact opposite of what I think. The atheists and agnostics I've engaged with invariably consider themselves on a perpetual search for truth. For example, I wouldn't at all mind being shown I'm wrong - I invite criticism of my reasoning. I adapt what I believe based on what I learn. On the other hand, every committed theist I've engaged thinks they have the truth - and this certainty ends up being an end-point - they have no motivation or desire to look further. IMO, one should always be open to the possibility he is wrong, and it depends on seriously entertaining the possibility that one is wrong. Do you seriously entertain the possibility a God does not exist?How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further.
the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. — Relativist
if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.
You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. — Relativist
Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. — Relativist
There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle) — Relativist
Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.
You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations. — Relativist
R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"
Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.
You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. — Relativist
You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context. — Relativist
Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. — Relativist
This again suggests you're considering life an ends. — Relativist
But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). — Relativist
The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. — Relativist
he fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as — Relativist
You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. — Relativist
Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation ... — Relativist
So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking ... — Relativist
I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable. — Relativist
3. The FTA is not an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case. — Dfpolis
And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. I do not dispute that some paths lead in the direction you are defending, but merely point out that other paths do not lead there. You object to my label of "assumption" to metaphysics, but label aside - metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. You would recognize this problem better if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics - this is a clear deficiency in your analysis. I strongly suggest you read A World of States of Affairs and What is a Law of Nature?, both by D. M. Armstrong. Then you could perhaps show why this path is a blind alley, but ignoring it doesn't make your perferred path any more credible - indeed, it makes it seem misleading.1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.
Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? This is my issue with ignoring other metaphysical theories.2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. That sums up my objection. I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. Your argument therefore has no persuasive power to me. I suggest that anyone who understands that there are indeed multiple (but incompatible) coherent metaphysical theories would agree it is unpersuasive.3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.
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