It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation. — Relativist

The point is, scientific methodology has one golden claim: that what it does, works. Stick this electrode on this plate, and bingo, copper sulphate - or whatever. And Ellis' contention is that, while there may be nothing the matter with the 'scientifically-informed speculation' arising from string theory, it's not actually science. So here you've given up the one thing that actually distinguishes science, and then asking of the resulting argument 'well, how is that any different from a religious metaphysic?'

And there is actually an answer to this, which is that religious faiths make demands. There is an element of validation required, which is you have to have enough faith in the doctrine, to commit yourself to it. Then it's not simply empty arguments or word-games. To those with skin in the game, the fact of the matter, matters.

So the fact that the most non-scientific aspect of current science, namely, the speculation of 'billions of unknowable universes' is said to be a counter-argument against having to go to the bother of seriously considering any metaphysical claims, suggests a failure of the imagination, at the very least.

You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does. — Relativist

You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.

also there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers. What I find interesting is those who support the multi universe often do not appreciate that all they are doing is elevating science to a religion.

They prefer that hypothesis simply as a matter of faith. There really is no difference in believing the multi-universe as a matter of faith in science, or believing in God as designer as a matter of theistic faith.

Your point on a theistic bias is exactly the same thing as those with a scientific bias.

Let me update the deck of cards thought experiment and look forward to your response:

You walk in and find me sitting at a desk with a deck of cards in front of me.
You pick up the cards and begin turning them over, and see they are in order ace, 2,3 etc and according to suit.

I give you 3 possible explanations and ask you which is most probable:

1. I have spent the last 15 minutes putting them in order
2. I have just finished shuffling them and that is the order it ended in
3. there are an infinite number of other me's and you's and desks and decks of cards
and in that infinite set, there is one deck that randomly is in order, and that is
the one we happen to be conscience of.

You are conflating science with physicalism (as a metaphysical theory). A physicalist believes that only physical things exist, and this is based on the observation that every aspect of the world is explainable in physicalist terms, and that the physical sciences are the means for exploring the nature of what exists. A physicalist will ask: why assume immaterial things exist, if reality is fully describable in physicsl terms? It violates the principle of parsimony.

You statement "it fails to do that" needs an IMO in front of it.

Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. I have raised two objections that no one has refuted. You seem to accept my objection about the multiverse. I needn't show that multiverse is more likely than God, just that it is equally likely.

there is no difference in God as a designer or multi universe as far an evidence. Neither is a matter of fact, both are reasonable answers.

Agreed, but consider the implication. The hypothetical open-minded agnostic approaches the argument on the fence, neither affirming nor denying God's existence. If the argument is consistent with both his existence and non-existence, then it doesn't shift his position.

Sure, but the burden is on the FTA proponent to make the case and refute all objections. — Relativist

there is no truth claim being made by the FTA, just an assignment on one's belief on the relative probabilities of differing hypothesis on some observed data. There is no more need for the theist to support his belief in a designer than the atheist/agnostic need to support their belief in randomness or other non designer alternatives.

any thoughts on this ??

You walk in and find me sitting at a desk with a deck of cards in front of me.
You pick up the cards and begin turning them over, and see they are in order ace, 2,3 etc and according to suit.

I give you 3 possible explanations and ask you which is most probable:

1. I have spent the last 15 minutes putting them in order
2. I have just finished shuffling them and that is the order it ended in
3. there are an infinite number of other me's and you's and desks and decks of cards
and in that infinite set, there is one deck that randomly is in order, and that is
the one we happen to be conscience of.

You're reversing the burden of proof. — Relativist

No, I'm stating a fact. It is absolutely impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That fact has nothing to do with the Fine tuning argument, so I don't know why you mentioned it in reply to me.

Anyhow, anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).

From that irrationality other mistakes follow, including ones you presented in this thread.

We must not be referring to the same thing. I'm referring to arguments like this:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

The conclusion is presented as a truth claim, one deduced from the premises. The premises are also truth claims. I have seen arguments like this presented as a reason to believe God (a designer) exists.

This is the sort of argument I am refuting.

anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).

My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. It's tempting to base it on the principle of indifference, but that has a major flaw.

Yea that is not my understanding of the argument. My understanding is

1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely -

What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.

for a way better explanation see this:

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/FINETLAY.HTM

also - here is a entrapment of the multi universe alternative:

http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/Fine-tuning/Modern%20Cosmology%20in%20Philosophical%20and%20Theological%20Perspective.pdf

more information on his site on this than any or us need

1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely.

What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.

That is equivalent to saying:
The probability of (life given design) >probability of (life given no design)

Let's analyze the reasoning.

1. Every metaphysically possible world entails some type of existent (E) whose existence depends on the properties of that world - irrespective of whether that world is designed or exists by chance.
2. The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)

Conclusion 2 seems a truism, but does not imply there was design, because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance.

I looked at the linked paper, and confirmed it does not address this objection. It treats observers in a privileged way.

because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance. — Relativist

yet again, i think the point you continue to miss in your objection, and why it is not addressed in the formal argument, is you continue to revert to the conclusion

The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)

as some truth statement to the effect - therefor there is a designer. That is not the argument. The argument in total is:

The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design) - that is all. It is not a proof of any truth statement - just an argument that design is a more likely hypothesis than others. It demands no proof or completeness of hypothesis from any of the alternatives.

the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.

OK, but then the statement, "The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)" is vacuous. I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what?

the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.

I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged. In any world, something will exist, and the a priori probability that it would exist is infinitesmal. Yet, something must exist.

Consider a lottery: what is low probability is that a chosen number will match what is drawn - this entails a coincidence, two sets of numbers coinciding. Sentient life has no prior thing that it is coinciding with. It is just something that happens to exists.

I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what? — Relativist

I don't think that is a valid argument. It would be if the argument went I looked at 1 million grains of sand, they all had the exact same irregular shape, therefor it is more probable that they are designed.

I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged — Relativist

it is the only observation the FTA addresses. Your point here is just another way of saying life as we know it is a random event. It is just saying if the criteria were changed some other form of live could have been, but it didn't so we have this one. That is just the random argument said differently.

Or conversely the multi universe argument that there are an infinite number of different types of life - we are just aware of this one.

The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. — Relativist

In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence. For example, in positing the inverse square law of gravity, Newton fit a hypothesis to facts such as the relative accuracy of Kepler's laws. Those facts were evidence supporting his gravitational hypothesis.

A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives. — Relativist

Yes, if there are other, viable hypotheses, it is rational to compare them.

Newton did not do this in the Principia. In point of fact, Newton's theory, while simpler than Ptolemy's, was inferior in predictive power and continued to be less accurate for over 100 years after its publication.

I am not sure what relevance this has. I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions. You mentioned predictions made by a version of the theory, but if these don't pan out, that wouln't falsify the idea of a multiverse. Supporters would say only one version was falsified -- not the basic idea.

If there's a God ..., — Relativist

You seem not to understand how an argumentum signum quia works. It does not begin by hypothesizing its conclusion. Rather, it argues that certain facts (here, the fine tuning of various constants in the manner required to produce life) are signs of the operation of some cause (here, the intelligent direction of nature). The way to a attack this line of reasoning is not to attack the conclusion -- because it is not a premise -- but to attack the significance of the relevant facts. You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say. You have made some arguments to this effect. This is not one.

Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. — Relativist

The FTA is not a physics argument, even though it uses physics as support. Physics concerns itself neither with intelligent vs non-intelligent causality. On the other hand, the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.

Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."

Clearly, it does.

Assertion without evidence. — Relativist

We have abundant evidence. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.

life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance. — Relativist

<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." Since the physics of unobserved processes is deterministic, if you think that biogenesis and evolution are physical processes (as I do) then they are not random, but determinate. As I have argued in a number of places, including my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" paper, the laws of nature are a species of intentionality. If life is the determinate result of intentional operations, who can it be "accidental"?

“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams) — Relativist

For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.

— Relativist

How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). — Relativist

When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply. For now, I merely observe that purely mental constructs (assumptions) can't operate to produce real phenomena -- only causes operative in reality can.

Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact. — Relativist

First, I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe. Second, just because a fact is fundamental in a particular theory does not mean that it has no cause in reality.

I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness

All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives. — Relativist

No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.

to be continued

continuing...

It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God. — Relativist

Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.

Your argument is like saying that since Russell and Whitehead assumed that arithmetic could be reduced to logic (which Gödel showed to be false), all metamathematics is based on assumption.

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot. — Relativist

Right, I have not. It is irrelevant to the discussion of the merits of the FTA that other, more cogent arguments exist. Still, my statement is relevant to your claim that our knowledge of the existence of God rests on possibility instead of actuality.

Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented. — Relativist

I have. I showed:
(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.
(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.
(3) That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility

I have no idea what you're talking about. — Relativist

What I am talking about is that Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, defined "information" as the reduction of possibility. For example, in a binary message each bit we receive reduces the possible messages by half. Thus possibility is not information.

Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science — Relativist

I have not done that. I explicitly said a Multiverse is logically possible. I also gave this possibility as one reason the FTA is not a proof. I did say that the FTA is supported by accepted heuristics, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.

We can show God exists?! — Relativist

Yes.

clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence — Relativist

I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA. One can examine the merits of an argument whether or not one agrees with its conclusion. Some arguments are sound, some not. Some conform to accepted heuristics, others do not. Some are taken as serious threats by opponents, others aren't.

If we were debating the existence of God, I would rely on sound arguments, not the FTA.

Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae — Relativist

"Fusion processes create many of the lighter elements up to and including iron and nickel, and these elements are ejected into space (the interstellar medium) when smaller stars shed their outer envelopes and become smaller stars known as white dwarfs. The remains of their ejected mass form the planetary nebulae observable throughout our galaxy." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nucleosynthesis.

Thus, large stars and novae are not needed.

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out. — Relativist

I don't see any confusion in deciding which present day creatures are human. So, all of those people have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>.

As I said before, if I lived in a different time or culture, I might have a different <human> concept. In other words, concepts are neither hardwired nor pre-determined.

If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.

I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption — Relativist

That's like saying that I must show that Trump usually tells the truth to show that there are people who usually tell the truth.

If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed. — Relativist

This is utter nonsense. I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data.

Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. — Relativist

So Armstrong agrees with Aristotle's discussion of substance and accidents -- as do most medieval Scholastics and modern Aristotelians.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). — Relativist

Definitions are not assumptions. They simply tell others how you are using words.

Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. — Relativist

You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality. It did not work for St. Anselm, and it does not work here.

Relativist: "The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts."

In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence.

I agree with this, but the point is that those same facts serve as evidence for each of the hypotheses to be considered. However your next statement is problematic:

I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.

It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis.

You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say.

I've done that, by providing alternative hypotheses that explain the facts.

the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.

Wrong. Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis. You are overhasty in dismissing it as a physical hypothesis, and you fail to take it into consideration as metaphysical hypothesis.

Defense of the Multiverse Physical hypothesis:
1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground.

2. There are valid scientific reasons to believe there is multiverse, for example : multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation (which is widely accepted science). (see this). Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. These hypotheses are consistent with established physics; they simply assume there's a more fundamental basis for the laws of physics as we know them.

Defense of the Multiverse Metaphysical Hypothesis:
Multiverse is conceptually possible, it is consistent with a variety of physical models of physical reality, consistent with physicalist metaphysics, and it has explanatory value. Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis, even if one were to reject it as a valid scientific hypothesis due to some presumed methodological restriction (as you do).

We have abundant evidence [of the persuasive power of the FTA]. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.

Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, and this again betrays your special pleading in exempting the designer-hypothesis from this methodological criterion.

<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.

This is a key point that deserves more discussion. Obviously, we all value human life - it's human nature to do so. And this explain why many people uncritically accept the FTA (and hence, its persuasive power is due to a lack of imagination in challenging a questionable assumption) - it seems to us that human life is special. The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. Holding human life to be of value obviously has a survival value, and so our having this value is consistent with natural selection and doesn't depend on there being an objective truth that we're (magically) grasping.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").

I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended".

Relativist: “ imagine a puddle ..."

For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.

You're missing the point: the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it.

Relativist: "How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question..."

When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply.

You're changing the subject. I was pointing out that a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, because accounting for the existence of natural law is in the realm of metaphysics (science just investigates what actual natural laws exist).

I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe

Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". Logical priority pertains to epistemic investigation of propositions that are about reality, and hence it has no bearing on what actually exists. Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon.

No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.

You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. But I inferred that you were claiming the "finely tuned" constants entail intentionality, and I'm pointing out that this is a presumption - or just an alternate way of presenting the fine-tuning hypothesis. Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God. So this doesn't in any way support your case, it's just another way of stating it.

Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.

A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete, but it certainly does depend on speculation and assumptions. Consider a nominalist metaphysics: it's the product of sound reflection and analysis, and it can account for everything that exists, but it is founded on the assumption that universals do not exist. An assumption of universals existence/non-existence is not an arbitrary assumption - it takes a great deal of analysis to convince oneself either way, but clearly these are pivotal to a metaphysical system and their existence can be neither firmly proven nor firmly disproven.

(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.

The facts presented in evidence for the fine-tuning also serve as evidence for a metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. That's why I've said we have to consider this an "inference to best explanation."

(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.

Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. We could debate how many assumptions are entailed by multiverse vs God, but I doubt we'd ever find common ground.

That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).

Special pleading: failing to apply consistent criteria to the various possible explanations.

IF we choose to consider life as something objectively special (which you have not shown), then we need to account for fine-tuning. We've discussed two metaphysical hypotheses that can account for it: 1) God; 2) multiverse. Neither is falsifiable; neither is entailed by established physics - although multiverse is consistent with established physics while God is not.

Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. However, it doesn't even apply to the physical: all physical hypotheses are consistent with that framework, it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR.

Relativist: "clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence"

I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA.

Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer).

If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.

We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. Each generation was capable of breeding with the prior generation (and many generations back), throughout evolutionary history, so any criteria that might be developed will necessarily draw an arbitrary line. Each change that has occurred in evolutionary history is an accident, and therefore every property that exists in humans today is accident -there is therefore nothing to distinguish an accidental property from an essential property.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters.

Relativist: Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). "
Definitions are not assumptions.

It is a postulate (which is an assumption) that has explanatory scope and is consistent with physicalism. These relations are also universals. It's used to account for the observed regularity in the world which could also be accounted for through trope-like behavior that a nominalist metaphysics might have).

You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality.

That is my point. One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. Both are developed consistent with observed reality through contemplation and analysis. Both are coherent. The one that concludes "God" is basically "defining itself a conclusion about reality."

I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.

It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis. — Relativist

No, it does not. The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction. We have many examples of coordinated means signifying intelligent direction. Thus, the FTA is an argumentum signum quia -- an accepted form of heuristic reasoning. It is used, for example, by Forest Service look-outs when they call in fires after seeing smoke.

On the other hand, the Multiverse hypothesis, which pretends to be "scientific" violates fundamental canons of the scientific method. There is no experiential basis for taking life as a sign of the existence of a myriad of unobservable physical objects.

Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist

Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable. The falsifiability requirement is methodological, not discipline-specific. Unless hypotheses have testable predictions, there is no epistic point in deducing their consequences -- so instead of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, we have hypothetical reasoning -- the kind of "reasoning" used by conspiracy theorists.

the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it. — Relativist

As I said, this is not an analogous case.

a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, — Relativist

Of course it does. As Freud points out in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science. Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.
Some As require a B.
This is an A.
Therefore, this requires a B.
Is an obviously invalid line of reasoning.

Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". — Relativist

Baloney! Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon. — Relativist

This is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.

Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way,

You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. — Relativist

I think I did, but if you'd like a more detailed argument, look at my discussion of "Logical Propagators" in "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution) (pp. 5f in the on-line version).

Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God — Relativist

Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.

1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground. — Relativist

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation — Relativist

There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.

Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. — Relativist

No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.

Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. — Relativist

This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."

Multiverse is conceptually possible — Relativist

Conceptual possibility is utterly worthless. It does not even entail logical possibility. In the late 19th century it was conceptually possible to reduce arithmetic to logic. Goedel showed it was logically impossible.

Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis — Relativist

As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.

Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses — Relativist

False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.

it seems to us that human life is special. — Relativist

It is "special" because as humans (which we all are), it has, objectively, a special relevance.to us.

The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. — Relativist

As I pointed out in my last post <value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.

The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").

I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended". — Relativist

OK, then it's begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments (such as Aquinas's 5th way, Paley's argument from design, the FTA and my discussion of Mind in evolution).

A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. — Relativist

No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.

I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.

It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete — Relativist

Since reality cannot instantiate contradictions, grounding metaphysics in the experience of reality guarantees its consistency. The notion of a "complete" science is the result of self-delusion.

The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution. Any and all a priori assumptions close the mind to reality. (if you're interested in my take on universals, see my video "#46 The Problem of Universals" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7l2SSENSKvA)).

Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. — Relativist

No, the Principle of Parsimony tells us to favor the explanation with the fewest assumptions. The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.

Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. — Relativist

Right, because the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.

it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR. — Relativist

The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.

Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer). — Relativist

We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion. I may agree with the conclusion of an argument, but still judge it to be unsound (as I do with Anselem's Ontological Argument) or not a proof, but conforming to accepted heuristics as I do with the FTA. What an argument aims to prove is irrelevant to the formal question of its merit.

We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. — Relativist

1. What is said was that "I can have a perfectly well-defined set of criteria, and not be able to apply them in a particular case because of a lack of data." I did not say that I actually do, or even can, have such a set of criteria.

2. Any criteria we may devise will not be "arbitrary." They will reflect objective commonalities actually observed in our (historically conditioned) experience. They will reflect them in a way that we deem relevant to our situation.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters. — Relativist

I never said that there was agreement "on all matters." That would be ridiculous. Some issues are quite difficult, but over time, we develop more understanding.

One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. — Relativist

Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.

A falling rock does not understand how to fall or why it is falling, yet it does that. Similarly a cell can replicate itself to form a complex being without understanding how that happens.

think about what infinity means....and also think about what time is. — xxxdutchiexxx

Your reasoning assumes the existence of time. How about block-time theory? In it time does not exist prior to physical reality, the existence of which you also assume, so there can be no random chance for anything to be made before there is something. Neither can anything be designed however before there is something to design anything.

Infinity is such an interesting concept to ponder. When we think about life and time in general, it is that is has an end. So then we can question the term infinity and how that applies to things as we know it. We know that everything has an ending point at some time in its life or existence: life, resources, moments. So when we consider the infinite realm of the universe could we imply that there is an end to the universe at some point and realize infinity is something we’ve merely made up. If that was the case, what surrounds our universe if there is an end to. What surrounds the plethora of planets and stars and if something surrounds us then does maybe the true meaning of infinity lie outside of the universe were in? This is my perception and thought process on infinity, thought there may be a true meaning behind infinity and we truly exist in an infinite world.

In response to the time factor and how we continue living the same lives over and over, this is pressing. It would make sense that time is something we have conceived to give us a sense of life; however, what if we’re stuck in an infinite time loop. (In this case infinity would be given meaning) We live an infinite life but at different moments. So as you stated, we just continue living the same life over and over again and this is why we experience deja vu and may be the reasons behind our life-like dreams. We could be stuck in a moment, our life, for infinity; but then we must also question why our life ends. Does this mean infinity is merely a term used to describe a time loop. The answers are out of our hands but this was a great topic that really makes you think about the lives we live and why we are here in this moment.

The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction.

But the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. Each hypothesis deserves equal consideration, and they should all be evaluated on the same basis- this is the heart of my objection to your analysis. If all hypotheses that lack direct empirical evidence are to be excluded, then you won't get very far. If you're going to enter the "fact" of fine tuning into evidence for your preferred hypothesis, then you have to accept them into evidence for the alternate hypotheses as well.

Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable.

Special pleading. Apply the same rules to your preferred hypothesis.

As I said, this is not an analogous case

It is absolutely analogous to my objection concerning the value (or specialness) of life - the objection that you have not dealt with much at all, as I'll show in a bit.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. There may be a "first cause" (and I think it likely), and this doesn't undermine science. In fact, I expect a lot of scientists would find that laughable (consider the Hartle-Hawking "no boundary" proposal, or the Carroll/Chen model.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle), so your claim commits the fallacy of composition.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations.

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. "Logical priority" only applies to the descriptions of the sequence of states. Descriptions are products of mind (abstractions), and don't exist in the absence of minds. The physical evolution of a quantum system has no dependency on description of that evolution. Each physical state deterministically evolves to subsequent states (there being no "final" state contrary to your locution), and "logic" (i.e. reasoning) has no bearing on this physical evolution.

[Causation is temporal] is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context.

Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. Our interactions were temporal, from the reading of a post to the thinking about the post, to the formulation and typing of a reply. To have a new thought entails a prior state in which the thought is absent.

Relativist: "Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God"

Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.

I'm not seeing anything that contradicts my analysis. The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. A byproduct is logically equivalent to an unintended consequence. Your analysis is incomplete if you fail to examine both logical forks: a) the constants as being intentional; b) the constants being unintentional.

From your paper:

What is the observable sign of intentionality? Is it not a systematic time development ordered to ends?

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. I completely agree that if you make this assumption, that this entails intentionality, and a mind to hold that intention. But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). This is the point of the Douglas Adams quote.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

I still contend that the most complete analysis of fine tuning requires stepping back from the narrow analysis you seem to be contemplating, and applying consistent principles. The inference to the best explanation analysis I proposed is a fuller analysis.

Relativist: "multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation"

There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.

When I said it "seems entailed" I was referring to statements like this (from the article I linked):

"In most of the models of inflation, if inflation is there, then the multiverse is there. It's possible to invent models of inflation that do not allow [a] multiverse, but it's difficult. Every experiment that brings better credence to inflationary theory brings us much closer to hints that the multiverse is real." - Stanford University theoretical physicist Andrei Linde.

The referenced inflationary models constitute the available evidence, and so the preponderance of evidence implies the multiverse is entailed. Of course, one of the contrary models could still be true, even though it seems unlikely given that they are in the minority.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

The fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as the alternative you're pushing. The facts you submit into evidence for inferring intentionality are the same facts I'm submitting in evidence for multiverse - so your claim is false.

When entertaining the metaphysical possiblity of a multiverse, I agree it's unfalsifiable, but so is the metaphysical possibility of intentionality in nature. But as I pointed out earlier, most inflationary models entail multiverse - and these physical models are certainly falsifiable. If I were to play the same game you play, I could use this fact to simply exclude your intentionality hypothesis. But I'm interested in a balanced analysis, not merely interested in proving something to myself that I already believe.

Relativist:" Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know."

No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. This can occur during a change of phase when the system undergoes a temperature change - that's the way it's treated in inflation models. here's a tutorial.

Relativist: " Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy"

This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation, with its wavefunction collapse at observation has fallen from favor, and never really made sense as anything more that an instrumentalist's heuristic. 21st century physicists understand that an "observation" is just an entanglement between an observer and an eigenstate of the quantum system. Eigenstates can become entangled with anything in the environment. Clearly a classical world emerges from the quantum system of the Planck epoch, so there is ample environment to become entangled with.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking of eigenstates of superpostion quantum states. I don't claim this necessarily occurred, but it's consistent with the available facts.

As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable.

When I refer to this as a metaphysical theory, I am not claiming this constitutes a metaphysical system, but rather that it is metaphysically possible: the space of possibility that is broader than the narrow physical possibility you use as a methodological hurdle to dismiss anything not entailed by established science. This is the same space of possibility where your intentionality hypothesis resides: broadly logical possibility.

Relativist: "Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses

False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.

Your entire case depends on utilizing methodological "norms" as rationale for special pleading. You overlook the fact that all disciplines of study (science, history, mathematics, philosophy...) are unified in being a search for truth. An epistemological method valid for one discipline is not invalid for another - either it serves to advance us toward truth or it does not. There are more stringent norms for science, like falsifiability, only because the empirical nature of scientific investigation makes it feasible - so we needn't settle for less. But metaphysical investigation (i.e. looking beyond science) has to settle for less, or it doesn't get off the ground. So even if it were true that a scientific multiverse hypothesis fails to meet the norms of science, it's fair game to consider it in our search that looks beyond science, and it deserves that same looser standards under which any other metaphysically possible hypothesis is tested.

<value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.

I agree - and this seems problematic for your position.

The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.

If you do not start with the assumption that life has value then what is your basis for claiming there is intentionality for life? As I brought up earlier, you can't claim there's a remarkable coincidence without there being two coinciding things. The existence of life coincides with nothing - unless you assume it is coinciding with an intent for life, which is circular.

[accidental=not intended] is begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments

I didn't decide it! I've merely argued that you have not even considered it. You're the one claiming fine tuning entails intentionality/a mind/God - so you have the burden of proof to show why "intended" is more likely than unintended. You've agreed to take value of life off the table, so what's left?

No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.

Obviously we're not omniscient, and we can't prove coherence - but philosophers try to prove incoherence in the theories of those they disagree with. The opponent then responds with a new or revised account that maintains coherence.

I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.

That reflection on our experience beings results in a conceptual framework. The objective and hope is that the conceptual framework actually corresponds to reality (i.e. "is true" per correspondence theory). Correspondence can't be vague and imprecise, it must be a perfect match to be true. Is it true, or is it actually just assumed true? I contend it is the latter. As an example, consider Aristotelean agent causation - as I pointed out, reference to agents does not fully account for causation. Unless you can fully account for causation, then there's clearly something untrue about the conceptual framework.

The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution.

I wasn't suggesting philosophers had failed to do their due diligence of reflection and analysis. Rather I'm highlighting that this reflection and analysis leads to different answers among different philosophers. I'll assume each of them has a rationally justified belief in whatever they decide - so how do we account for the differences of opinion? I submit that this is due to assumptions within their analysis - there have to be, because it's not based solely on analytic truths.

The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.

The variability of physical constants is due to exactly one assumption: that the constants are a product of quantum uncertainty - that they arise from entanglements with the environment from a superposition of all the possibilities. This one additional assumption is not superfluous, because it explains the alleged fine tuning.

the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.

Provide an account of intelligence in the cosmos based on standard physics.

The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.

That observational basis has taken decades to reveal itself, but GR was accepted physics long before that.

We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion

I agree, but my problem with your argument is your creative special pleading, holding multiverse to the higher standard of science while using a looser standard for your preferred solution.

Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.

I have yet to see any such sound reasoning. They all depend on assumptions.

My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. — Relativist

There are. But the first thing an atheist does wrong is not understanding what the claim for God actually is, including it's consequences. When you truly understand the claim for God, then you see that it's absolutely impossible for even a single atheist to base his or her position on rational, logical grounds. Same cannot be said for at least some agnostics (who's position is, "I simply don't know, it's 50/50") and at least some people who think or believe that God is real to any degree higher than 50%.

In other words, there are agnostics and people who think or believe that God is real who came to their position on rational, logical reasoning. There is not a single atheist who came to his or her position on rational, logical reasoning (because it's impossible to do so). Again, the reason why it's impossible is found in implications of the claim for God.

How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further. We could call it "lazy reasoning." But if agnostic actually understands logical reasoning for God being real but dismisses it in order to stay agnostic, then that's not rational also.

Henri - How do you define "atheist"? I'm anticipating it won't apply to me. My position is that of "agnostic deist" - i.e. I acknowledge the possibility that there exists some sort of first cause, that either constitutes the world (such as in pantheism) or transcends the world. It is also possible that the physical world is all that exists (possibly with the addendum of some things that are ontologically emergent). I acknowledge this possibility because it's possible that one or more of the various arguments for "God's" existence is sound. Those arguments do not actually make a case for God (as usually defined by theists); they only make the case (say) for a first cause, or source of goodness.

This position puts me in the "atheist" category, because I think it's quite unlikely that a God exists - where "God" is defined in the usual theist sense of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent.

I disagree that one can assign epistemic priorities consistently. This has been analyzed by epistemologists, and I think they've shown it to be untenable.

How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further.

It's interesting you'd say that, because it is the exact opposite of what I think. The atheists and agnostics I've engaged with invariably consider themselves on a perpetual search for truth. For example, I wouldn't at all mind being shown I'm wrong - I invite criticism of my reasoning. I adapt what I believe based on what I learn. On the other hand, every committed theist I've engaged thinks they have the truth - and this certainty ends up being an end-point - they have no motivation or desire to look further. IMO, one should always be open to the possibility he is wrong, and it depends on seriously entertaining the possibility that one is wrong. Do you seriously entertain the possibility a God does not exist?

That said, I actually do agree that theism can be a rational position. So can atheism - at least per my definition (someone who believes God probably doesn't exist). That doesn't mean all atheists and all theists actually reached that position rationally.

the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. — Relativist

I am discussing the actual form of the argument. You are not. Changing the FTA's form to what it is not gives you an easier target, but doesn't rebut the actual argument. I've shown that the FTA is an argumentum signum quia (depending on our prior experience of works of intellect), not a case of hypothetico-deductive reasoning.

This kind of bait and switch tactic is common with naturalists. Many say, for example, that free will is compatible with determinism, but to make the case, they re-define free will. Others redefine "intent" in a way that excludes our experience of intending. I give numerous other examples in my book.

I am not responding further to this distortion.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. — Relativist

You are confused. Any scientist can limit her field of interest, but doing so does not undermine the fundamental principles of science. Specifically, we can rationally confine physics to quantifiable phenomena, but doing so does not posit the existence of uncaused phenomena. As my Becquerel example shows, denying the principle of sufficient reason undermines the structure of science.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. — Relativist

There are many meanings of "causation," but the definition you've given does not describe how the laws of nature cause phenomena. A "thing" is an ostensible unity. The laws of nature aren't "things" that can be pointed to. I'm unsure how you are defining "physical," but if you're referring to objects with localized space-time coordinates, clearly the laws of nature are not "physical things" in that sense.

The laws of nature are real, not because they are "things," but because they are an intelligible aspect of reality. Further, there is no space-time separation between the laws and the events they control. They act concurrently. If the the law of conservation of mass-energy is not operational here and now, mass-energy will not be conserved here and now. Since there is no space-time separation between the law as cause and its effect, there is no physical relation to be discerned.

Still the laws are causes -- we scientists point to their operation when we wish to explain the time development of the universe or the evolution of species.

There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle) — Relativist

Thank you for sharing your faith.

Metaphysical principles are no more or less than fundamental lessons of experience that apply to all existence.

So, of course there's an empirical basis for a different, concurrent view of causality. Aristotle's paradigm case of concurrent ("essential") causality is a builder building a house. This is one, unified event with two intelligible aspects linked by identity. The cause is the builder building the house and the effect is the house being built by the builder. These are necessarily linked because the builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder.

On the other hand, as Hume famously showed, there is no intrinsic necessity to causality considered as the orderly succession of pairs of events. Something can always intervene between separate events.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations. — Relativist

This is pettifogging. "Explanation" has two meanings, one is the aspect(s) of reality that bring about a phenomenon. That is what I am discussing. The other is a representation of how those aspects of reality bring about the phenomenon. You can tell that I'm talking about the reality by my reference to "grounds."

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. — Relativist

You seem terribly confused. Note that the subject of my first sentence is "Physics problems." Physics problems are mental puzzles that arise out of reflection on the physical world. They are not in the world, but in the mind reflecting on it. Thus, they are part of the logical order. In short, I did not say that "logical priority" is an aspect of the physical world, but of thought about the physical world.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context. — Relativist

Of course all thought and writing about reality is incomplete. We think in terms of abstractions that always leave data on the table.

The point is that Humean-Kantian ("accidental") causality is defined as the temporal succession of events according to rule, and so involves time in its very definition. On the other hand, Aristotelian concurrent ("essential") causality involves a single reality considered in different ways so, time does not enter into its definition.

In other words, essential (concurrent) causality does not reflect the emergence over time of a new state. It reflects the fact that in any given state, there are active and potential aspects and the reality of the potential aspect(s) (effects) depends on the operation of the active aspect, aka the "cause."

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. — Relativist

When I say that time does not enter in an essential way, I do not mean that my thinking of you occurs outside of time. Clearly it does not. What i mean is that time is the measure of change according to before and after, and my continuing thinking of you (as opposed to my starting to think of you), involves no essential change. Since it involves no essential change, time does not enter continuing thought in an essential way -- only incidentally.

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. — Relativist

Objectively, life is the end of the process we call "biogenesis," just as the emergence of specific species are the ends of the processes we call the "evolution" of those species. I don't see what objection you can have to me thinking of states that are objectively the end of identifiable processes are ends. What am I missing?

But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). — Relativist

To say that life is the end of the process if biogenesis is not to assume that it is intended. It is simply an observation. The fact that life is the termination of biogenesis may be evidence that life is in some sense intended, but being evidence for x is not "assuming" x.

Note that Daniel Dennett, a dyed in the wool atheist, makes a lengthy argument that these kinds of processes are intentional in his The Intentional Stance. So, seeing intentionality here does not require one to be a theist.

The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. — Relativist

No, it does not. You continue to ignore how heuristic reasoning works. It's not deductive, and certainly not ironclad. Instead, it reflects on analogous cases and concludes that the present case is like them. "Where there's smoke, there's fire," doesn't mean that smoke invariably entails fire -- it just says that fire is a very rational conclusion when we see smoke. It's certainly possible that aliens made the smoke by pouring oil on the exhaust of their hyperdrive, but we've never seen that happen before, while we've often seen fire make smoke.

he fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as — Relativist

Aliens pouring oil on their hyperdrive exhaust.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. — Relativist

I am sorry, but as a theoretical physicist, I do understand "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. It was investigated by Pierre Curie, who came to the conclusion I gave you: By definition, perfect symmetry can never be broken. As far as I know, no one has ever shown that Curie's analysis is flawed. That does not mean that "negligibly" imperfect symmetry cannot be made manifest by inflation.

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation ... — Relativist

I am not a proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation. I think the best approach is to avoid "interpretations" and look at what physics actually tells us. Still, this is not the forum to discuss interpretations of quantum theory; nevertheless, as long as the equations continue to work, we can be confident that the time-development of unobserved states is deterministic.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking ... — Relativist

You are arguing against a position I have not taken.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable. — Relativist

You are baffled because you have still not understood what I'm telling you.
1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.
2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.
3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

I do not think it is worthwhile to continue this discussion, as we are making no progress.

3. The FTA is not an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case. — Dfpolis

This seems a difficult concept for many to get their hands around, not sure why.

Yes, many people think hypothetical reasoning is the only kind of reasoning.

I meant "is an argumentum signum quia," of course. I corrected my post.

1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.

And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. I do not dispute that some paths lead in the direction you are defending, but merely point out that other paths do not lead there. You object to my label of "assumption" to metaphysics, but label aside - metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. You would recognize this problem better if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics - this is a clear deficiency in your analysis. I strongly suggest you read A World of States of Affairs and What is a Law of Nature?, both by D. M. Armstrong. Then you could perhaps show why this path is a blind alley, but ignoring it doesn't make your perferred path any more credible - indeed, it makes it seem misleading.

2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.

Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? This is my issue with ignoring other metaphysical theories.

BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. Short of that, you can argue against it by identifying areas in which its accounts are deficient. I'll even give you a tip: physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence.

3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. That sums up my objection. I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. Your argument therefore has no persuasive power to me. I suggest that anyone who understands that there are indeed multiple (but incompatible) coherent metaphysical theories would agree it is unpersuasive.