I'm inclined to disagree with Witt about metaphysical language schemes/constructs. He draws a conclusion that's afflicted in the very same way that "All swans are white" is.

They got Kant wrong.

why?

Which isn't saying anything. Water is water.

Okay, but what makes water be like water and not like glass? Well, turns out ordinary matter has a chemical composition which determines that. And how does chemical composition determine the properties of water? Physics. And what determines physics? And now you're on to cosmology, which is one step removed from asking metaphysical questions. — Marchesk

It is what it is.

It is what it is. — Michael

Depends on what the definition of "is" is.

Yes, I think what you say is kind of true, though not only of philosophy, but of science, economics, anthropology; in short of all domains of inquiry. As absolute presuppositions are also operative in the kinds of everyday commonsense beliefs that we could never foresee being overturned, they may be said to resemble hinge propositions. The difference is that in the domains of inquiry the absolute presuppositions are things we can be said to necessarily suppose, rather than believe, in order to carry out any investigation at all. — Janus

Thanks, the quotes about Peirce are very illuminating. There are many strains of analytic philosophy that go on a lot about 'belief'. I've been reading a bloke called Duncan Pritchard who holds that for Wittgenstein hinges are not 'beliefs' at all, indeed they must stand outside what we think of as 'beliefs' for rational thought to function. Thus hinge presuppositions hold the same place in the intellectual firmament as Collingwood's absolute presuppositions. We recognise that these are contingent - as Tim Wood said above - on time, place, person: Wittgenstein himself, for instance, banged on about no man having visited the moon as a hinge, a basis for rational reflection, when within 20 years it would cease to be so.

Looked at in this way I don't think hinge propositions could be said to be true false or anywhere in between. Instead they're the foundations upon which claims of truth are built. So while it's a skeptical position it also claims to be an answer to a certain kind of skepticism, since it asserts that if we don't start with some presuppositions or other, there is nothing to talk about, indeed, there's probably no talking :)

Instead they're the foundations upon which claims of truth are built. — mcdoodle

So P is true iff P AND the absolute presupposition P rests upon?

Simon Blackburn is a guest on the latest Partially Examined Life talking about deflation and truth in different areas. He said empirical claims were easy: you just look and see that the cat is on the mat.

However, the presupposition underlying that truth is probably that there is an external world with a real cat on a real mat that we can perceive by just looking. Certain skeptical scenarios would undermine the presupposition, making the empirical justification false.

And indeed, he does mention attending a magic show where the illusionist performed all sorts of tricks that made it look like impossible things were happening, and as such, you can't always trust your senses.

But then again, Blackburn considers himself a quasi-realist, so maybe he's not terribly concerned about the more radical skeptical scenarios.

Depends on what the definition of "is" is. — Marchesk

I'm 90% sure it means "is", but don't quote me on that.

I'm 90% sure it means "is", but don't quote me on that. — Michael

Well, dictionary.com says:

"3rd person singular present indicative of be."

Which brings in objectivity, time, existence and being all in one sentence.

I said don't quote me on that! Yet you quoted me?!

I said don't quote me on that! Yet you quoted me?! — Michael

Uhhhhh, well, I took quoting to mean something else. So not true, exactly.

Uhhhhh, well, I took quoting to mean something else. So not true, exactly. — Marchesk

So now we're arguing on what the meaning of "quoting" is?

Oh well. It is what it is.

Oh well. It is what it is. — Michael

As all things are.

You're misunderstanding what is written there. "We hope that there is some ascertainable truth about it" means that we proceed as if there were, otherwise we would not enquire; it does not mean that we are in a state of uncertainty about whether there is "some ascertainable truth". I'ts a subtle, but salient, difference you are missing. — Janus

Notice I quoted twice where the word "hope" was used. That we "hope" there is such an ascertainable truth indicates that we are uncertain as to whether there is.

So we can say that whether or not every event has a cause is undecidable, but that does not mean that we are undecided about the truth or falsity of "every event must have a cause — Janus

If you claim, "Whether or not every event has a cause is undecidable", then clearly you are undecided as to the truth or falsity of "every event must have a cause". What you are insisting is nothing but nonsense.

If, science proceeds on the assumption that "every event has a cause", and it is an "absolute presupposition", as described, such that it makes no sense to discuss whether this is true or not, then science proceeds as if "every event has a cause" represents an uncertainty.

You might say that we "hope" that "every event has a cause" is true, but since the procedures of science in general are an attempt to prove whether or not it is true, these procedures demonstrate the uncertainty of that thought.


If the material may be "misread", there is a problem with it. I happen to believe that tim wood's interpretation is completely wrong, requiring tim wood to make up a completely fictional, and nonsense distinction between "suppose" and "presuppose" to support this misinterpretation. To "presuppose" means to suppose before hand. So at that time, before hand, when the presupposition is created, it is nothing other than a supposition. Later, when it is being used, we call it a presupposition in relation to its use.

An "absolute" is an ideal, like God, and this is where "hope" and uncertainty enters the representation. We "hope" that the "absolute presupposition" is correct, but nevertheless we are uncertain. If we proceed to represent this uncertainty concerning the absolute presupposition as certainty, e.g. "I am certain that God exists", instead of "I hope that God exists", we are mistaken. And this is misleading.

As all things are. — Marchesk

Except bald kings of France.

If, science proceeds on the assumption that "every event has a cause", and it is an "absolute presupposition", as described, such that it makes no sense to discuss whether this is true or not, then science proceeds as if "every event has a cause" represents an uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Science may have held this absolute presupposition, but modern physics forced scientists to reevaluate it, at least for the very small. Not sure whether that supports what you're saying about presuppositions equating to an uncertainty, but developments have lead people to question their presuppositions.

Except bald kings of France. — Michael

Depends on whether the past exists.

Depends on whether the past exists. — Marchesk

I don't think it does, but it probably will.

I don't think it does, but it probably will. — Michael

I think there's a possible world where that's true.

I think there's a possible world where that's true. — Marchesk

Which is to say that it's possibly true, and you're suggesting that it's actually false.

Which is to say that it's possibly true, suggesting that it's actually false. — Michael

P is false if and only if P is possibly true.

New theory of falsity.

P is false if and only if P is possibly true. — Marchesk

No, you misunderstand. Saying that "there's a possible world where that's true" is the same as saying "that's possibly true", and saying that "there's a possible world where that's true" implies that you believe that in the actual world it isn't true.

saying that "there's a possible world where that's true" implies that you believe that in the actual world it isn't true. — Michael

Okay, but what does my belief have to do with possibility and truth?

Okay, but what does my belief have to do with possibility and truth? — Marchesk

It has to do with what it has to do with.

It has to do with what it has to do with. — Michael

I want to believe:

If it's out there then it's not here. So it's false here?

So it's false here? — Michael

Only in a transcendental sense.

It is what it is.

It is what it is. — Michael

Until the goat eats it.

I am disturbed by your reply. You seem as if suffering from a mental illness of some kind. Your techniques are those of a Trump.

Be advised that the concept of absolute presuppositions is not my invention. I have listed the source many times and will again, An Essay on Metaphysics, R.G. Collingwood, at Amazon, about USD $20 and a bargain at the price.

Your remarks on the topic in the face of repeated references and descriptions is not reasoned argument, rather it is a form of badger-like viciousness. Your ignorance, applied and re-applied, becomes the definition of relentless stupidity. Read the material. Find out what the topic really is. Take up the argument when you know what you're arguing about.

In sum, to date, every thing you have written about absolute presuppositions has been plain wrong. Given your insistence on your error, I have to assume that knowledge and information is not what you're about on this site. As to what you are about, I won't waste my time on that, beyond noting that your entire credibility is now in question.