Sure. That's not what meta said, but we can proceed; all propositions are always, already, interpretations.

So is Meta's point that a given proposition can be true under one interpretation, and false under another?

Because I can't see how that could work. — Banno

The group of words can be interpreted in different ways, and can be true or false depending on the interpretation. The proposition is, as you say, always already an interpretation. So this interpretation, which comprises the proposition, must be always already verified as the correct interpretation. Therefore there cannot be an unverified true proposition. The proposition is by its very nature already verified, and it is only by means of this "verified correct interpretation" that it may be true or false.

If the proposition p is an unknown truth then either the proposition "p is an unknown truth" is an unknowable truth or there are no unknown truths. — Michael

Why can't "p is an unknown truth" itself be an unknown truth (if it is indeed true); why must it be unknowable? Am I missing something here?

But then I think sentences of the kind "p is an unknown truth" are different to sentences of the kind "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe", and so even if the former must be unknowable truths it doesn't then follow that the latter can be unknowable truths. — Michael

If p is "there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe", and we allow that it could be true or false, although we don't currently know which, then p could indeed be an unknown truth without entailing that it must be unknowable. Perhaps Fitch had in mind the kinds of metaphysical propositions which would seem to be undecidable in principle.

So, if the proposition "God created the world" is p, then if that were a truth, it would seem to be not merely an unknown, but an unknowable truth.

Here's a question for you Banno. Since it is required that a proposition be already verified, in the sense that I described, such that it consists of the correct interpretation of the words, wouldn't this verification process also verify whether it is true or not?

For example, take your proposition, "it is raining". Inherent within that proposition is the correct interpretation of those words. Wouldn't the same process which determines the correct interpretation of those words also determine whether those words speak a truth or a falsity?

He said that a statement is true iff it is verifiable, which isn't the same as saying that it is true iff it is verified, — Michael

Ok, so my point is that a propositions being true is not the very same thing as a propositions being verifiable; there are, of course, verifiable falsehoods...

SO at the very least he will need to take more care with his wording.

If some statement is true under one interpretation and false under another, then these two interpretations express distinct propositions.

That's pretty much what a proposition is.

The Gordian Knot of @Metaphysician Undercover misunderstandings. Think i might have to leave you to it, @Janus.

The group of words can be interpreted in different ways, and can be true or false depending on the interpretation. The proposition is, as you say, always already an interpretation. So this interpretation, which comprises the proposition, must be always already verified as the correct interpretation. Therefore there cannot be an unverified true proposition. The proposition is by its very nature already verified, and it is only by means of this "verified correct interpretation" that it may be true or false. — Metaphysician Undercover

A group of words is not a proposition. It's not even a sentence, unless it follows some grammatical rule. The apparent slide between strings, sentences, statements and propositions does not help your case.

That slide should be clear to @Janus and others, in the paragraph I quoted. If not, then... leave it.

Every false proposition has an observely true counterpart, so truth and falsity are two sides of the one coin.

I'd say it's not so much about true propostions as it is about truth-apt propositions; the latter can of course be true or false.

Why can't "p is an unknown truth" itself be an unknown truth (if it is indeed true); why must it be unknowable? Am I missing something here? — Janus

It's never possible to know that "p is an unknown truth" is true because to know that you must know that p is an unknown truth, which is a contradiction.

I'd say it's not so much about true propostions as it is about truth-apt propositions; — Janus

Now we have truth apt, and presumably non-truth-apt-propositions.

In my world, all propositions are either true or false. that's what it is to be a proposition.

Ok, so my point is that a propositions being true is not the very same thing as a propositions being verifiable; there are, of course, verifiable falsehoods... — Banno

He's saying that a statement is true iff it can be verified as true (and presumably false iff it can be verified as false).

SO at the very least he will need to take more care with his wording. — Banno

I think he did: "a proposition is only true if it would be verified as true after exhaustive inquiry".

He's saying that a statement is true iff it can be verified as true — Michael

It's not a good thing to have the definiendum on both sides of the definition.

So there's one issue: defining verification without using truth...

...after exhaustive inquiry — Michael

When is an inquiry exhausted?

It's not a good thing to have the definiendum on both sides of the definition. — Banno

Why? I am guilty iff a jury declares me guilty. My name is Michael iff my birth certificate or deed poll states my name to be Michael.

So there's one issue: defining verification without using truth... — Banno

I'm sure you know what it means to verify/justify a proposition as being true. I doubt you and Janus disagree on that.

When is an inquiry exhausted? — Banno

When there's no more evidence to find.

Does it make sense for there to be two indistinguishable worlds where in one the cat is on the mat and in the other it isn't? @Janus, as I understand him, would say it doesn't. That it's true in one world and false in the other just is that there is some relevant distinguishing feature.

[/img]

Brilliant!

http://existentialcomics.com/comic/252

When there's no more evidence to find. — Michael

How do you know when there is no more evidence to find?

How do you know when there is no more evidence to find? — Banno

You probably don't, but that has nothing to do with Janus' claim.

If some statement is true under one interpretation and false under another, then these two interpretations express distinct propositions.

That's pretty much what a proposition is. — Banno

Right, so if you and I are talking about the proposition "it is raining", what is the process which ensures that we each have the correct interpretation of the words "it is raining", such that we are both talking about the same proposition?

Is this not a process of verification? Or, is it the case that when we discuss specific propositions, the different people in the discussion, having slightly different interpretations of the same words, are never really discussing the same proposition? if there really is such a thing as "a proposition" under this definition, where would the interpretation which constitutes "the proposition" exist? Isn't this what Plato questioned, inquiring into independent ideas?

Right, so if you and I are talking about the proposition "it is raining", what is the process which ensures that we each have the correct interpretation of the words "it is raining", such that we are both talking about the same proposition? — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps a better example would be something like "he's pissed". Are we talking about someone being drunk or angry?

I guess if there is no clear and evidently correct interpretation, there is no proposition there. That's why I asked, if there really is such a thing as a proposition under this definition. Try The Second Amendment, I guess there's no proposition there either.

what is the process which ensures that we each have the correct interpretation of the words "it is raining", such that we are both talking about the same proposition? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why suppose there is such a process?

Is that a teleological assumption - there must be one true shared meaning, so there must be a process for verifying that we share the one true shared meaning - although apparently without making use of the word "true"...

Or are there just sentences spoken to let people know it is time to jump in the puddles?

It's never possible to know that "p is an unknown truth" is true because to know that you must know that p is an unknown truth, which is a contradiction. — Michael

OK, I see what the point is now, I think; but, I wasn't thinking that we could know that the truth of a particular true proposition is unknown, but of knowing that the truth or falsity of some propositions are unknown. The first is indeed a contradiction if applied to any actual proposition; how could we know it is a true proposition, if its truth is unknown? On the other hand it is at least reasonable to believe that there are true propositions the truth of which are unknown; I can't see any contradiction in that.

So, to say it again in the way you have: "It's never possible to know that "p is an unknown truth" is true because to know that you must know that p is an unknown truth" but it is possible to know that there are unknown truths (just not possible to know which ones they are). There must be unknown truths about distant galaxies, for example.

Now we have truth apt, and presumably non-truth-apt-propositions.

In my world, all propositions are either true or false. that's what it is to be a proposition. — Banno

I don't think it makes any sense to say that there are non truth-apt propositions; which is the same as to say that "all propositions are either true or false". Now we back to Collingwood's "absolute presuppositions" which he explicitly says are not truth-apt propositions, or Peirce's "regulative assumptions".

So, to return to a previous example, we do not propose that every event has a cause we necessarily assume it in order to investigate anything at all. Thus it makes no sense to say that "every event that can be explained must have causes or determining conditions" could be true or false, unless we want to assert with Kant that it is true a priori, but then it could not be false, and again could not count as a proposition according to your definition.

Why suppose there is such a process?

Is that a teleological assumption - there must be one true shared meaning, so there must be a process for verifying that we share the one true shared meaning - although apparently without making use of the word "true"... — Banno

No, I don't think there is anything teleological here. Interpretation is a process. Do you not agree? An interpretation is the result of an act of interpretation. So whatever it is that produces the one "correct" or "true" interpretation, which is necessary for the existence of a proposition, this must be a process as well.

I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning", we all interpret things in our own unique and idiosyncratic ways. The "correct" or "true" interpretation, therefore cannot be a one shared interpretation, because there is no such thing as a shared interpretation. interpretation is something one does on one's own. This is why I question your assumption that there is one "true" or "correct" interpretation. That would require one "true" or "correct" act of interpretation. Is this supposed to be an act of God?

Do you guys read what you have written?

we each have the correct interpretation of the words — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning" — Metaphysician Undercover

This appears to me to be a pretty direct contradiction. I'm lost.

I don't think it makes any sense to say that there are non truth-apt propositions; — Janus

Nor do I; a proposition, if it is anything, is truth-apt. And yet you said:

I'd say it's not so much about true propostions as it is about truth-apt propositions; the latter can of course be true or false. — Janus

The phrase "truth-apt propositions" was contrasted with "True propositions", as if there could be propositions which were not truth-apt...

SO you lost me with that wording.

"regulative assumptions". — Janus

...are rubbish. You look in your wallet to see if there is money in it; you do not assume that there is money in it, and try to falsify your assumption. Regulative assumptions result from forcing explanations out of pragmatic preconceptions.

we each have the correct interpretation of the words — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning" — Metaphysician Undercover
This appears to me to be a pretty direct contradiction. I'm lost. — Banno

The former, "we each have the correct interpretation of the words", is a statement of what is required for the existence of a proposition under your definition of "proposition". The latter, "I don't believe there is any such thing as "one true shared meaning", is a statement of what I believe. The two are directly contradictory. Therefore I do not believe that there is any such thing as a proposition under your definition of "proposition". In other words, I think your definition of "proposition" is wrong, it doesn't describe the thing which is referred to with that word.

ll t

The phrase "truth-apt propositions" was contrasted with "True propositions", as if there could be propositions which were not truth-apt... — Banno

No, the point, which you apparently failed to get, was merely that not all truth-apt propositions are true propositions.

...are rubbish. You look in your wallet to see if there is money in it; you do not assume that there is money in it, and try to falsify your assumption. Regulative assumptions result from forcing explanations out of pragmatic preconceptions. — Banno

I can't see what point you are trying to make here; all this seems to show is that you have no understanding of the notion of regulative assumption.
Perhaps no point continuing...

No, the point, which you apparently failed to get, was merely that not all truth-apt propositions are true propositions. — Janus

Then why didn't you say that?

I can't see what point you are trying to make here; all this seems to show is that you have no understanding of the notion of regulative assumption. — Janus

I doubt that I have missed much.