This doesn't make sense.

...If I think I am right saying abortion is wrong, how would there be a real effort in determining what is true or false about that belief? — Blue Lux

You're talking about belief regarding what's considered to be acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. "Wrong" here isn't equivalent to having false belief. Rather, it's equivalent to agreeing or disagreeing with standards of moral belief(codes of conduct).

None of this is applicable to a language less creature. Those creatures cannot have these sorts of beliefs.

What's 'this'? What doesn't make sense?

The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.
1h — creativesoul

I can easily say that it is intelligence rather than language that is the criterion of these sorts of beliefs.

What doesn't make sense?

Our discussion has gotten off the OP. That is clear because we're no longer discussing it's relevance to the OP. However, it is still relevant to the OP. Because it is still relevant to the OP, but we're not discussing that relevance, it makes perfect sense to say what I did.

Yes, one can easily say almost anything.

Belief is determined by many things, perhaps language capacity, intelligence, imagination, etc.

But what of the belief that something is right or wrong, with seemingly no conscious basis? An example of this is taboos. There are certain taboos in ancient cultures of which the basis for believing certain things transcends any linguistic approach to them.

There is too the tendency to completely change words and names of people in some ancient cultures based on beliefs that have absolutely no intelligibility ascertained through analysis.

this makes more sense.

We're talking about, and fleshing out the details for a criterion; what counts as thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

Poetic ideas. Fantasy.

Language is a rendering of experience. Belief is prior to language not in a temporal degree but is more proximal and/or primordial. Belief belongs to the realm of experience. Belief is instantiated by language in that belief lacks a manageable form prior to its translation. Language is rendered by belief. Language is, partly, a sublimation of belief. An example of this is as follows.

I met a person. I fell in love with that person. I believed that I loved them. I believe still that I love them. But the feelings constituting this belief do not originate with the words that contain them in such a statement about them. The feelings constitute an inclination, tendency and direction a sort of amalgamation of feelings and affects, and such a 'thing' crystallizes into language to be expressed. Is this not the fundamental operation of language?-- to, primarily, express? What would be expressed if it originated in the same tool of expression? Would all belief thus be a sort of simulacrum, representation after representation? Nihilistic? Some web of the arbitrary? This is obviously false. Something prior to language is expressed by language. Never does a belief originate in language, unless it is an artificial conglomeration labeled as 'belief.'

Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul

Cheers, amigo. Good news is I managed to do the more important parts of what I should’ve done. But back to debating.

False analogy. — creativesoul

Well, not by my count. The analogies intended to address non-reflective awareness of certain givens universally applicable to all awareness-endowed beings (I maintain, to all life). Here’s a very relevant, yet controversial, issue (relevant to the issue of awareness): the awareness of self. Self-awareness as it’s typically understood requires thought about thought/belief in the form of a concept of self. Yet the sheer awareness of what is other and what is not-other—and, thereby, an innate and non-reflective awareness of selfhood via which one acts and reacts—is inherent in all life; otherwise, it would starve to death, for one example. What I’m trying to get at is that the same non-reflective awareness of what is other and what is not-other—for simplicity, here strictly concerning dogs—can apply with equal validity to a non-reflective awareness of what is correct and what is erroneous. More on this below.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not. — creativesoul

Whereas I, again, think this is the case.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul

Addressing only the first sentence, yes, of course; but this only from the point of view of our adult human awareness which, in part, consists of an awareness of our abstracted notion of what the true/false dichotomy requires. But the true/false dichotomy doesn’t exist because we’ve conceptualized it as an abstraction; rather, we’ve conceptualized it as our best map of a pre-existing territory. In this case, roughly expressed, the territory is the potential relations we as sentient beings hold with that which, firstly, is other relative to us as consciousnesses and, secondly—or, even more abstractly—with that which is ontic (here including the very presence of us as consciousnesses). But one does not need to conceptualize what truth and falsity are in order to make this distinction via consciousness/awareness—just as a being does not need to hold an abstracted understanding of selfhood to hold a crude but stanch innate awareness of what is itself and what is other.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul

Here, I’m picking up on the culturally common understanding of awareness as consisting of humans’ awareness of abstractions regarding awareness. Thus, of self-awareness in the sense of being aware of an abstraction regarding awareness as the core of the (conscious) self—or something to this effect. It yet still amounts to a belief about belief(s)—and not to the non-reflective belief itself. Ok, this issue of non-reflective beliefs and acquired complex beliefs which then act as non-reflective beliefs via which we then filter yet other beliefs we're addressing can, of itself, become very complex. Still, I’m trying to clarify that this is not what I’ve previously intended:

Imagine, for example, that to the dog 1 + 1 = 1 just doesn’t feel right whereas 1 + 1 = 2 does. The dog then acts and reacts accordingly (I imagine only on average in relation to this simple arithmetic). The dog here doesn’t need to hold an awareness of the concepts of true and false (nor of the concepts of error and correctitude, for that matter … all of which being abstract thoughts/beliefs which one holds trust for, i.e. believes). Nevertheless the dog will instinctively trust via is awareness-dependent apprehensions of information (i.e. will hold a pre-reflective awareness) that one sum is wrong (and will thereby find it unfavorable) and the other is right (and thereby favorable).

I don't know if I've lost you so far—this regardless of whether or not you agree. I'm sure that if I have you'll let me know. But here's a different example that may be of greater service:

Dogs are relatively good at deceiving. This, again, requires a belief about the beliefs of others when they are being deceived. For willful deception to be at all effective, the dog then must hold a certainty that engaging in behaviors X will (or at least is very likely to) create an erroneous belief in the other which—simultaneously—the deceiving dog apprehends to be an erroneous belief and, therefore, not a correct belief. Wikipedia gives the example of a dog that sits on a treat to hide it till the other leaves the room. I’ve got plenty of anecdotal accounts of my own (e.g., with a very intelligent shepherd dog I had as a kid), but let’s go with the Wikipedia example. The dog must be aware that the treat really is beneath its bum. It must also be aware that by concealing it this way the other will then hold an erroneous belief that there is no treat in the room. Here again, I argue, is required an awareness of error and non-error regarding that which is—an awareness that is not dependent on abstract thoughts/beliefs regarding the concepts of right/wrong, or true/false, or error/non-error, etc. A belief-endowed awareness that can well be non-reflective (though in this case likely does contain some inference and, hence, reflection regarding what's going on in the mind of the other).

I’ll grant your objections to the study that dogs can discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 (thought I yet disagree with them) … but when it comes to dogs’ ability to deceive, here I’m holding fast. I’ve had too many experiences with dogs to deny them this ability.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra


Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire

I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case.

The more important part of my reply was this:

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra

In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible.

I disagree.

I was waiting for your two word post to be somehow enhanced. But seeing that it hasn’t been …

I disagree. — Cheshire

Ok. Noted.

Just read your most recent reply to me...

I think we're making progress, which is saying something. It's not so much that we're in agreement, but rather that the point(s) of divergence is becoming clearer. That is, the points where we choose alternative explanations for the same thing...

I want to do that reply justice...

I'm working on it.

:smile:

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not...

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about.

In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible. — javra

I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it. I think your saying something like 'we can subjectively know if we have objective knowledge, because objective knowledge isn't a thing'. I suspect much of our knowledge approximates objective truth to a very high degree. Right or wrong is this where our viewpoints differ?

I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case. — javra

I was kind of afraid that might be the case.

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. — javra

Sorry, this doesn't translate coherently to my ape brain. I don't disagree or agree.

We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided — javra

I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about.

I'd say we are at about a 50/50 communication barrier versus philosophical disagreement. I propose we establish three single statements we disagree on, so i know where to go from here. Perhaps the following is reasonable. Agree or Disagree

1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true.

2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition.

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice.

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul

Yes.

Since you left it at that I guess I’d need to clarify some of my underlying positions at this point. To me awareness entails a good number of things. Among them is that to hold an awareness of X is to trust that X is for the duration one is aware that X is—and, therefore, is to hold a belief that X is for the same timespan. Awareness of, to me, thus entails some form of belief-that. As an example, if I’m visually aware that there is a tree in front of me, I will simultaneously via the same awareness hold a un-thought of belief that the given tree is in front of me. I may then reflect upon this belief, articulate it, or justify it after the fact; still, the basic belief was yet there at the time I saw the tree. This will not be belief about belief, nor will it be consciously active thought in the form of inference or deliberation. Yet it is still belief.

Thought, then, is to me various associations made between beliefs that holds some aim —regardless of whether these beliefs are stored in memory or else are actively experienced.

Yea … it’s not mainstream. But yes, this way I can for example find myself cogently stipulating that a dog can believe that there’s something wrong with 1 + 1 = 1 despite the dog not having in any way thought about it.

So, this has the potential to open up a whole can of worms regarding tidbits from philosophy of mind. I'm hoping not, though.

Will wait for your replies …

I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire

Yes, or OK, but in all honestly I dislike the term “objective” in this context. Knowledge and truths are held by subjective beings and, therefore, are subjective givens by entailment. Else, you're addressing objectivity in the sense of impartiality. And neither knowledge nor truth need to be infallible in order to be (relatively) impartial.

I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire

Ah.

Again, I’m one of those fallibilists / philosophical global skeptics that uphold the following: any belief that we can obtain infallible knowledge will be baseless and, thereby, untenable. There are two ways to argue this: one is by lack of evidence to the contrary via which this belief can be falsified—and, here, the onus is on anyone other to provide evidence for any infallible knowledge (this is where evidence that the affirmed known is not perfectly secure form all possible error is provided via illustration of how this given holds some potential to be wrong); the other is by building up an argument from scratch to justify this belief (which would be lengthy … and, if I’m asked to do this, I’ll first point to a likewise lengthy first chapter on demarcations of certainty, uncertainty, and doubt that I currently have online. Again, building up a valid and all-inclusive argument for fallibilism takes some work. Meanwhile there’s the arguments found in Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and a few others.)

But in short, you believe that infallible knowledge is possible to obtain; I don’t. We might be at a standstill on account of this disagreement.

But I’ll continue replying as best I can all the same.

I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire

You may have not read or else forgotten a number of previous posts in which I’ve defined ontic truth and placed it in contrast to believed truth. Think of it as infallible belief of what is true that, thereby, factually is true belief. Or, alternatively, it might be better for me to instead refer to it as “ideal truth” … though I’ve really wanted to avoid Platonic notions of ideals, maybe this is a better terminology since I’ve already made use of “ideal knowledge” to contrast “operational knowledge”. (Again, I'm still fiddling with proper terms for the concepts.)

In my best review of previous posts: So ideal truth is factually correct correlation/conformity to that ontic given it regards. In contrast, operational truth is an embedded aspect of all beliefs-that. To believe that X is to believe that X is true, that X is not false, mistaken, erroneous, etc.—this with or without conscious conceptualization of the dichotomy between truth and falsity (added this to keep things better aligned with the discussion I’m having with creativesoul).

Any instance of operational truth can well be an instance of ideal truth. Furthermore, all, or at least most, operational truths will be assumed to be ideal truths while held by the bearer.

The fallibilist, however, will maintain that all operational truths are nevertheless fallible—not mistaken, but only hold some potential of maybe being mistaken in their in fact being ideal truths.

Hence, to the fallibilist, where any operational truth, aka belief-that, to in fact be an instance of ideal truth, it then would need to be justifiable due to its correlation / conformity to that which is real / reality at large.

Yet the fallibilist will also affirm that this justification too can only be operational / fallible—and not ideal / infallible.

So, to the fallibilist, when we believe something to be and can furthermore justify our belief we then hold demonstrable knowledge whose strength is directly proportional to the strength of the justification. And until this justification can be infallible—aka, perfectly secure form all possible error—our knowledge can only be fallible.

And again, ideal knowledge is infallible knowledge. To the fallibilist, operational knowledge can only be fallible.

Hence:

1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire

Disagree. We may be aware of an ideal truth—else, hold an factually true belief—but we cannot hold an ideal knowledge of this being so (for ideal knowledge requires an infallible justification, i.e. one that is perfectly secure form all possible error).

2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire

Disagree when the knowledge addressed is fallible and not infallible. Hence, we do fallibly / operationally know when we hold ideal / “objective” truth because, or on grounds that, our belief will be justified as being ideally true. What you’re inserting here is “infallible knowledge”, so that the quoted statement intends to read as follows: You cannot ‘subjectively/operationally’ hold an infallible known concerning when something is objectively true by definition. This rendition I’d agree with, but find it pointless on grounds that infallible knowns are baseless.

I’m guessing some of this will nevertheless yet be at least somewhat confusing, doubtless in part due to my less then perfect expression in a sound-bite post. (I too find the issue to be complex. I'm not happy with my presentation but I don't have the time to reedit it at length. Call it laziness.)

Still, I’ll again draw attention to your belief that infallible epistemic criteria are possible to obtain; in this sense, if I'm correct about this, your beliefs are then those of an infallibilist. Here there is a strong contradiction with my own beliefs, those of fallibilism.

This is the foundational issue that either becomes resolved or else will make all other debates about this matter frivolous. Are infallible epistemic criteria possible?

Because this last question is a complex issue, I’m OK with calling it a draw at this point, but it’s up to you.

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not...
— creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice. — javra

To add a bit to this...

This topic(thought and belief) is my forte, my life's work(in philosophy) as it were. Roughly put, I've found considerable reason to believe that the whole of philosophy has gotten thought/belief wrong. The consequences of not drawing the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief manifest themselves within nearly all of the greats I'm aware of, all the way up until today.

The evidence of this is clear. Convention still has it that belief content is propositional. Your claim that awareness entails some form of belief-that follows convention in this way. The belief-that approach is very useful in helping determine things about belief statements, and positive assertions in general. Hell, speaking in general for that matter. Namely, what statements presuppose and even a bit about the attitude of the speaker as well as a bit about meaning.

The approach lends itself and/or leads to reductionist and redundancy accounts of truth(although I reject those on the grounds of invalid reasoning/conclusion as a result of conflating "is true" with truth). They all still are capable of helping us to better understand ourselves and the world around us by virtue of having a good grasp upon thought, belief, truth, meaning, and how they all work together.

I do not think that any major philosopher has gotten it all wrong, per se, regarding thought and belief. Rather, it is my contention that no one has ever drawn and maintained the aforementioned distinction. The proof of that is everywhere in philosophy.

So, back to the current discussion...

I realize that there are significant differences in our taxonomies/frameworks. I'm trying to write in such a way as to avoid using terms that you define much differently than I do. It's proving difficult at times, bit I do know a 'trick' that I have yet to have performed here. We may, and I suspect must, get into how we've arrived at some of these definitions/conceptions/criterion as a means for assessing warrant, should we want to argue about which framework is superior and why/how. However, that's not necessary unless we want to argue about that stuff. I do not, at least not without provocation, and you do not seem to be looking to provoke... so... neither will I.

:wink:

I no longer have the impression that you're working from/with methodological naturalism. Of course, you're surely aware that I am, or at least I make a very concerted effort at finding the simplest adequate explanation possible. I'm also neither a monist nor a dualist. Nor am I whatever those people call themselves who've (mis)attributed meaning to Spinoza and arrived at all life being conscious in some minimalist sense. Are you one of those people? Oh yeah, pardon my forgetfulness and candor here... Now I remember... panpsychists. Your repeated assertion that you grant awareness to all life lends itself to such a view.

What follows is what I believe we agree upon. I'd like to check though, and then perhaps set out the disagreements as well, and then take it from there. That ought make this more like a real worthwhile discussion...

Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken).

Hmmm...

:rofl:

Care to add to this? I'm less certain than I realized after re-reading things...

How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language. — javra

This presupposes that belief cannot begin well-grounded. That was a very helpful... and thus good... question, by the way!

Cheers!

Here's something that looks quite promising...

"Un-reflective belief"...

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet this criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief. That criterion needs to be properly accounted for. I say "accounted for" here quite intentionally. Because we are reporting upon thought and belief, we must keep in mind that our account can be wrong when it comes to that which is not existentially dependent upon our account. Un-reflective belief is one such thing. We can also get it right.

Unreflective belief is a particular specifiable kind of belief. Our knowledge of it is existentially dependent upon written language. It is not. To be a kind of belief, is to be one of a plurality of different kinds of the same thing. This necessarily presupposes a universally applicable and/or extant set or group of common denominators. These can be thought of as individual elemental constituents. Perhaps "ingredients" is best? Each of these are an irrevocable element, for they all play their own role in all belief... statements thereof notwithstanding.

So again... as always, we look to set out a criterion...

What counts as belief? What is the criterion which, when satisfied by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for saying that that candidate is belief? This criterion must be met by any and all sensible; consistent; coherent usage of the term "belief". I say that that criterion must set out the aforementioned group of common denominators that all belief share, and that none of these ingredients can be existentially dependent upon written language, for all reflection is to think about one's own thought/belief, and that is existentially dependent upon written language.

What are your thoughts on such a method?

What criterion for what counts as "un-reflective belief" are you working from/with?

Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul

Yes.

Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification?

This presupposes that belief does not begin already being well-grounded. — creativesoul

With some ambiguity. The post you quoted from was addressing learned beliefs. Hence the issue of how a learned belief becomes well-grounded. What is presupposed is that beliefs—whether innate and genetically inherited via processes of evolution, learned via experience, or actively contemplated—can be wrong.

Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible.

Learning is a process that in part makes use of innate beliefs to arrive at learned beliefs.

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

You’ll have to better explain your stance so that I may better understand “the method” you are proposing.

Re-read that post, if you will. Everything you need to know in order to agree or disagree is there.

Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible. — javra

Innate beliefs are a kind of belief that you're proposing/asserting exist. What makes them belief? What is the criterion which, when met by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for claiming that that candidate is belief?

You’ll have to better explain your stance... — javra

Very intrigued, but relaxed. A piqued interest. A conversation long waiting to happen. Seated.

:wink:

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet the criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief.

What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul

It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition

If not, explain.