Jim Baggott was the name - not Brodie. I have also been reading Adam Becker’s What is Real? which reconsiders the debate between Bohr and Einstein, and excerpts of Philip Ball’s Beyond Weird which is likewise about interpretations of quantum mechanics.

I think it’s overall safe to say that quantum physics casts doubt on scientific realism. But scientific realism itself is, historically, a relatively recent construct. Of course, Newton believed that science could elucidate the fundamental underlying laws of matter, but at the same time there was still a general presumption that those laws were the product of a guiding intelligence in his day. The idea that the visible world could be understood in its own terms without reference to the ‘invisible domain’ of Platonic forms and divine laws was to come later.

A crucial point in all of this, is the division by Galileo et al of nature into those elements which could be described precisely in terms of physics - mass, velocity, and so on - and the so-called ‘secondary qualities’ which were ascribed to the domain of the mind.

Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos pp. 35-36

This division has been remarkably successful in many respects but has been called into question by developments in physics itself, in particular the ‘measurement problem’ which remains the outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum mechanics. And it remains an open question, which the above-mentioned books are describing or in some cases trying to rationalise.

I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself. I understand an epistemological claim to mean a claim about whether or not one is justified to have a particular doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief, degree of belief, suspension of judgement, etc) toward a particular proposition.

Classical physics seems to make ontological claims, or claims of the form “a particular set of particles exist and move about through space-time in a particular way”. However we know that classical physics is incomplete in that it does not accurately describe reality at very small scales. — Bearden

I think that you misinterpret physics, to state that it makes ontological claims rather than epistemological, according to your definitions. Physics takes fundamental assumptions, premises, theories and hypotheses, like Newton's laws, and the theory of relativity, and demonstrates with evidence whether one is or is not justified in believing these fundamental principles.

Physics does not make claims about what exists in and of itself (ontological claims). Any claims that it makes of the sort "what is the case", or "what will occur" are restricted, qualified to "what is the case, or what will occur, if X principles, or premises are true". Following this, we can judge the truth or falsity of the fundamental principles according to their capacity to provide us with an accurate indication of "what is the case", or "what will occur". That is the scientific method.

I largely agree with Metaphysician Undercover's above comment. I've been arguing on the thread I started regarding the relevance of Hawking's opinion on God, that science is mainly about epistemological claims, not ontology or metaphysics. Science is about establishing what claims can justifiably be made about reality, and that is epistemology, not metaphysics.

I agree with Metaphysician Undercover and LD Saunders about science, but add that there is also a metaphysical stance called "scientific realism" - which treats theoretical objects as ontological. E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions. That particular stance is fairly well justified. On the other hand, if one commits to some particular interpretation of quantum mechanics (e.g. many worlds) they are still being "realist" but the justification is much weaker.

Some people equate science (which is empirical/epistemological) with scientific realism (what is ontic). That said, a lot of scientists actually are scientific realists.

Of additional relevance is the idea that science cannot reveal the underlying, fundamental nature of reality, but only its (mathematically describable?) structural relationships. I found this in Brodie’s book Farewell to Reality. I think I may have also seen referenced in a Chalmers paper. If you have any insight on these topics I would be very grateful to hear it. — Bearden

Mathematical models are descriptions of a system using mathematical concepts and language. As such they are, in the end, interpretations of reality. We tend to use the models that are most useful to us.

I hold the view that science is more of a method than something else. Hence it's not actually something ontological or epistemological. Those are more philosophical questions. If we look at the "scientific method" in a more general way, the method is also used in many non-mathematical subjects, like history to give one example. Yet if math isn't so useful (as historical events are quite unique), we still have to make interpretations and models to explain events.

Wayfarer, thank you for correcting the author I cited. I made the appropriate edit.

I suppose the conversation collapses into an argument over scientific realism. Can any of you provide some sources to learn more about this debate? Also is it the case that the materialist/physicalist claim “All facts are grounded in physical facts” or “All that exists is the physical” is a scientific realist position?

I am interested in reconciling this discussion with the study of consciousness. For example Dennett has claimed an eliminative materialist model is correct “if materialism is true.” Does this committ to a scientific realist position?

I think all of Dennett's work hinges on the premise that scientific method does indeed make an overall ontological claim, namely the materialist claim that only matter (or nowadays, matter-energy) is real, and consciousness is derived from that through processes that are, at least in principle, understandable through neurological and biological sciences, but with no intrinsic reality.

What eliminative materialism eliminates is the reality of the subject as anything other than the output of a complex of inter-connected but, in reality, unconscious cellular processes. Thomas Nagel says in his review of Dennett's most recent book:

I am reminded of the Marx Brothers line: “Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?” Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”

(Also reviewed by David Bentley Hart in The New Atlantis.)

In terms of the larger debate, Thomas Nagel himself published a very controversial criticism of 'neo-Darwinian materialism' titled Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, 2012 - the title doesn't pull any punches. There's a NY Times column by him here, and a sympathetic review of the book and the hostile responses to it here. It is a pretty clear-eyed analysis in my view, by a philosopher who explicitly rejects any religious interpretation.

Books about philosophy of science and quantum mechanics - I thought Manjit Kumar's Quantum was very good, along with David Lindley's Uncertainty: The Battle for the Soul of Science.

There was a kind of mystical and idealist tendency amongst some of the pioneers of quantum physics, but that by and large fell by the wayside when the focus of physics switched from Europe to America after WWII. For a summary of that, have a look at Quantum Mysticism: Gone but not Forgotten. Of the more recent physicists to write on it from an explicitly idealist perspective, Bernard D'Espagnat (died 2015) is notable. See his Templeton Prize acceptance speech, What we call reality is just a state of mind.

Seems to me the focus of the debate has now moved to the reality of otherwise of the 'many-worlds interpretation' and the separate debate on whether string theory and the so-called 'multiverse' amount to a scientific theory or not. I don't see that debate being resolved anytime soon.

Thanks for the discourse and the resources.

You need to remember that most science is about spherical cows in a vacuum. If you are modeling the Solar system in Newtonian mechanics (or even in relativistic mechanics) you'll probably treat the Sun and the planets as point masses. FLRW cosmology (which is where the Big Bang theory comes from) treats the entire universe as a fluid. Obviously, you would be crazy to take either of these ontologies too literally; you would be even more crazy to commit to both of these, as well as all the other ontologies of the many scientific models at the same time.

It seems that science in general makes no commitment to what really exists. Science deals in models, which only need to be good enough for the job. And if point masses or ideal fluids or spherical cows do the job in a given context, so much the better.

Now, what about epistemology? Does science have anything to say about ways of acquiring knowledge, and whether or not we are justified in believing something? The scientific method, in its general outlines, is basically an empiricist epistemology. If we are talking about science in general, rather than specific theories and discoveries, then we are mostly talking about epistemology. And the epistemological discussion doesn't stop at the general principles; it can get very specific, very detailed, and sometimes even very controversial (take, for instance, arguments over the use of different statistical methods in cladistics).

Quantum mechanics seems to make claims of the form (and please further my insight if I’m wrong) “if some particular measurement is taken, there is some particular probability that the value measured will be...” — Bearden

This can be read either as an operationalization of the theory, which you can similarly do with classical mechanics or any other theory, or a particular philosophical interpretation of the theory (as in the following quote from Heisenberg). While individual scientists and philosophers of science will have different takes on metaphysics and ontology, I don't think they can be generalized to anything very specific, if we are talking about science in general.

People can be realists, but, that is a philosophical position, not a scientific one. This is why regardless of whether a person is a realist or not, it does not affect scientific research, just the meaning they assign to it.

As in many discussions of this sort, you pose a question about the philosophy of science, and then seamlessly slip into discussing physics (and only physics). Not all science is as abstract or heavily mathematized as is physics. Does, paleontology, for instance, make ontological claims? I would say almost certainly so: theories in that field postulate the existence of long-dead creatures who lived and interacted in a world every bit as "real" as ours.

E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions. — Relativist

I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is.

As in many discussions of this sort, you pose a question about the philosophy of science, and then seamlessly slip into discussing physics (and only physics). Not all science is as abstract or heavily mathematized as is physics. Does, paleontology, for instance, make ontological claims? I would say almost certainly so: theories in that field postulate the existence of long-dead creatures who lived and interacted in a world every bit as "real" as ours. — Arkady

You are conflating what it means to exist, with what it means to say that something has existed. The paleontologist makes no ontological claims (claims about what it means to exist). If it claims that certain things "existed", it assumes an ontological meaning of "exists" as a given, or as taken for granted.

You are conflating what it means to exist, with what it means to say that something has existed. The paleontologist makes no ontological claims (claims about what it means to exist). If it claims that certain things "existed", it assumes an ontological meaning of "exists" as a given, or as taken for granted. — Metaphysician Undercover

No: my understanding of the use of the term "ontological" is in line with the very first sentence of the OP:

"I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself."

Paleontologists make claims about what exists (or did exist, anyway), not on the nature of the existence itself, hence they make ontological claims.

Do you recognize the difference between exists (present), and existed (past)? To take presently existing evidence, and make claims about what existed requires temporal theory. Paleontology relies on such theory, just like physics and some other sciences rely on theories which relate present to future, to make predictions. These principles are not produced by paleontology, they are produced by ontology. So paleontology does not make ontological claims when it talks about what existed, just like physics does not make ontological claims when it predicts what will occur, they rely on an ontology which relates past, present, and future into some sort of continuous temporal existence.

Whether or not paleontological theories rely on a "temporal theory", they make claims about what does, or at least what has existed, ergo, they make ontological claims.

Paleontology claims what is rational to believe based on the evidence, not what actually exists now or earlier. If you are a realist, then you can take the epistemological claims of paleontology and consider them real, and I imagine most people do so, including myself, but that does not mean that science makes anything more than epistemological claims. Obviously, those claims are about what exists, and that's where people start to get confused on the limits of science, because the epistemology seems to merge into ontology.

E.g. one could commit to the ontological stance that space is actually curved (per general relativity) - not merely that the equations seem to make reasonably accurate predictions.
— Relativist

I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we don't have to commit to the existence of quantum fields, just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions.

That's right, you don't have to commit to mathematical realism (Platonism), just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions. However, you ought to consider that there is a reason why mathematics is so useful in making predictions. Wouldn't you say that the reason for this is that mathematics is based in something real?

I was referring to scientific realism, and this does not entail platonism.

Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism.

I'm not sure I follow this. This seems a circuitous way of affirming what I'm claiming, which is that certain sciences, e.g. paleontology do make ontological claims, insofar as their respective theories assert the existence of particular entities (and does not merely regard them as mathematical abstractions or what have you). No doubt paleontologists are generally confident (rightly or wrongly) in the rationality of their views, but it doesn't follow that they aren't asserting the existence of particular entities in particular times and places.

"Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism"
Right, and that's not entailed by scientific realism. Scientific realists can be physicalist. A physicalist rejects platonism, treating mathematics as purely descriptive. The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects.

So far as I understand it, scientific theories consist solely of models which are used to make predictions about the world. These predictions are then tested in experiments which would either confirm or falsify them. However, none of these models are, strictly speaking, tied to any particular sort of ontological view of the world in and of themselves. A good example of this would be with Quantum Mechanics and the many, many, different ontological interpretations that are often attached to the theory (though you'll also find the same sort of situation in other theories like Relativity to a lesser extent), some of which treat the world as indeterministic, and others as a multiverse, to name a couple. In that sense, they have no relevance to matters of ontology or epistemology. Any attempt to attach an ontological view to a scientific theory would thus be going beyond the model itself and into the realm of philosophy.

The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects. — Relativist

An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. Therefore "two-ness" is a relation between objects. I know that physics formulae are more complicated than "two-ness", but in the fundamental sense of describing relations between objects, how is there a difference? So if the relations described by physics are "physical relations", why is not two-ness a physical relation?

The Wikipedia entry on 'ontology' is relevant to this point:

Ontology is the philosophical study of being. More broadly, it studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence, reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.

Etymology

The compound word ontology combines onto-, from the Greek ὄν, on (gen. ὄντος, ontos), i.e. "being; that which is", which is the present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, i.e. "to be, I am", and -λογία, -logia, i.e. "logical discourse".

I think what's particularly interesting is the derivation from the present participle of the verb, to be, which is, as the passage notes, 'I am'.

Also of note is the use of the term in information sciences, namely:

In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories, properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities that substantiate one, many, or all domains.

The reason I mention this, is that I think there's a legitimate distinction to be made between the study of what exists and the study of the nature of being. The question, 'what kind of things exist' is, I think, a straightforward question of natural philosophy. But questions about 'the nature of being' (as for example in the writing of Heidegger) is a different kind of question. Likewise, questions about (for instance) the reality of the probability wave in quantum physics are metaphysical or ontological questions; as is well-known, it is not necessary to address such questions in order to successfully employ the theory, but the question is such that it has engendered considerable debate and speculation regarding the interpretation or meaning of quantum physics.

"An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. "
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7".

7 exists, not in a platonic realm, but in states of affairs composed of 7 objects.

An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things. — Relativist

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. Therefore it is impossible that "2" is a unity, one thing, without contradicting the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things. Therefore, that a group is a thing is impossible because it is contradictory.

Because of this contradiction, I suggest that we consider that the relation of the parts to a whole is something other than as a group. Furthermore, we ought to assume that numbers like "2', "3", "4', etc., refer to something other than a group, because this would result in that same contradiction.

If we take a whole, and designate it as an object, then we cannot designate its parts as objects as well, without creating this contradiction. By designating the parts as objects, we assign to them a form of independence, which negates what is necessary of them in order to be the parts of a whole. This independence annihilates the whole, rendering the parts as wholes, as does the act of division. So either the original unity is the whole (the object), or the parts are the wholes (objects), but it is impossible that both, at the same time, are wholes (objects).

Now when we take these numbers, "2", "3", "4", etc., in mathematics, we assume that they signify a whole, we do not assume that they signify groups of individual things. Each of these units, objects, "2", "3", "4', etc., have various rules about how they may be multiplied, divided, and other functions, in relation to other numbers. So "2" does not signify "two-ness" in mathematics, because "two-ness" refers to the concept of two distinct objects, whereas "2" in mathematics refers to one object with many functions.

A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7". — Relativist

So here you have given an example of that condition. Let's say that the family is an object. We can describe this object as a group of black swans which have a particular relationship to each other, validating the notion of "family", and this relation validates the claim that there is an object called "the family". The group of seven marbles on the other hand has no such validating principle, it is not an object. You have described it as seven distinct and independent objects, and any claim that it is an object is arbitrary and unsupported. You need principles, spatial relations, whatever, whereby you designate them as "a group".

Now the family, as an object has specific boundaries, which are somewhat arbitrary and unsupported in the description of your example. But let's talk about the individuals of the family now. Let's assume that each of the seven swans are objects. From this perspective we have seven objects, not one object (the family). If we want to make these seven objects into one object (a family) we need to establish some relational principles. The claim of "a group of marbles" was arbitrary and unsupported, it required some principles of relations to establish the reality of "a group". Here, we require some relational principles to establish the reality of "the family".

Here's the key point, so please pay attention. When we describe the seven swans as having familiar relations, those familiar relations are principal, or essential to the descriptions of the individuals. Therefore we are not describing the so-called individuals as individuals, we are describing them as members of a group, as parts of a whole. They cannot be understood as wholes, individuals, or objects, themselves, because the very description of them, which makes them members of a whole, negates the description of them which makes them independent, individual objects. Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. ... — Metaphysician Undercover

We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).

In Armstrong's ontology, everything that exists is a State of Affairs (which I've been referring to as a "thing"). A SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular, properties, relations. None of the constituents exist independently of states of affairs. A SOA is a (thick) particular. ("thin" refers to the abstract consideration of that constituent of a SOA that is neither a relation nor a property; "thick" particular equates to a SOA, and "thick" is usually omitted).

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...).

A neutron is thus a second order SOA composed of those ASAs, while an atom is a third order SOA composed of neutrons, protons and electrons. The properties of the higher order SOAs are determined by the properties of their constituents (i.e. Armstrong is a reductionist).

A gaggle of 7 geese is a state of affairs as well - it has properties (such as mass, volume of air they displace,...).

Armstrong accounts for universals: they are multiply instantiated properties and relations. Multiple objects can have a -1 electric charge (e.g. each electron that exists), so "-1 electric charge" is a universal. Similarly, multiple states of affairs can have the property of being a conjunction of 7 lower order states of affairs. "7" is the property they have in common, and this is a universal.

Your statement, "We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. " has no apparent meaning in this ontology. A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist.

Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion.

Arkady: Okay, then, I'll make it simple for you --- science only makes epistemological claims. To the extent that you think otherwise, you are wrong, and are confusing philosophy for science.

Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...). — Relativist

This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence. And if we go to larger states of affairs and smaller states of affairs, we could get triple, quadruple, and so on existences. How could a simple thing, a fundamental particle have numerous existences at the same time, being involved in numerous SOAs? Do you see what I mean? If an SOA is an object, then a fundamental SOA exists as such, and also exists as an atomic SOA, and as a molecular SOA, and so on all at the same time. Therefore a single object has numerous existences all at the same time. Isn't that contradiction, to say that a single object has multiple existences at the same time?

A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist. — Relativist

See where the contradiction lies? You say "a state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing". The problem is that logically,a thing is necessarily one thing. If it is more than one thing, then it is "things" plural. But you are claiming that a thing is more than one thing. And this of course, is contradictory.

I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist. — Relativist

The point I was making is that if you describe a specific swan as a member of, or part of a group, then the object here is the group, and the individual swan is attributed to that group, as a property of that group. Therefore the individual swan is not an object in this description, it is a property of an object. If you make the swan the object, and try to claim that being a member of this group is a property of that swan, you lose the necessity required to make that swan part of the group. Any property that the swan has will not necessitate it being the part of a group until you allow that the group itself is an object. Then, and only then, can the individual swan be part of this group. But it is so by being a property of this group, not vise versa.

You can say "simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist", as you do, just like you can say that simultaneously the sky exists and the blue of the sky exists, one is the object and the other the property. But you cannot say that they both exist simultaneously as objects. Either the single swan is your object, or the group of swans is the object and the single is a member (property) of this object. Likewise, either we are concerned with "2" as an object, or we are concerned with the meaning of "2". If the meaning of "2" is our concern, then we are necessarily talking about two distinct objects. But if "2" as an object is our concern, then we are talking about one object. We cannot claim both as this is contradictory, to say that one object is two objects. This is the nature of unity, it necessarily negates the identity of the parts as individual objects, giving them a completely different identity, as a part rather than as a whole. An object is a whole.

You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion. — Relativist

It is not coherent, because it does not get beyond the problem of contradiction which I referred to, because it is inferred that one object is simultaneously a multitude of objects..