One potential problem is that we don't know whether a simulation can include consciousness. The fact that we're

A. Conscious
B. Don't have any clue what it would entail to simulate consciousness

Argues against the likelihood that we're living in a simulation. — Marchesk

I don't see how that follows. We'd have to have some reason to believe that consciousness requires something like a human brain and that a human brain cannot be manufactured (e.g. a "brain in a vat"), but not knowing how consciousness works isn't a sufficient reason to believe this.

Of course on the other hand Bostrom's trilemma might seem to assume that it is possible to simulate consciousness, which may be unwarranted. Perhaps it requires a fourth option? Although I suppose this can be covered by the first option.

bear in mind that Elon Musk and the people like him are a product of too much sci-fi reading, too much ego inflation, and possibly the influence of masonic understanding of the world, that is: that the natural universe is garbage and something to use and get rid of, and the chosen ones must do whatever it takes to upload their "soul" to a non-physical plane (gnosticism, it´s been plaguing us some XXV centuries). That is, the way Elon Musk, or psychopaths like Jeff Bezos or George Soros see the world is heavily filtered by an ideology that is all about ego-survival and demonization of nature. I wonder if, having as main competitor an empathy-free ego like Jobs is what made Bill Gates to develop his philantropic ways. I´m looking forward to shit on his last product!

^I think the simulation argument is sound, that's why it is still arguable today. It is possible that there are technology like The Matrix (Even Better) in which that machine restrict us from perceiving/imagining the "Outside World". The problem is not in "Is it possible to do that simulation" because it is possible.

The question are, "Why does the simulation is being done in the first place?" because if you don't find a reason for the simulation, then there are no simulation and our reality is real. That is the problem.

Some of the reason are, the concept of Post-Human or Alien. which Nick Bostrom's state. It is because the Post-Human want to "Experience" this life. Maybe to test a scenario, or for enjoyment, etc.

If you don't believe in the concept of Post-Human, or a more intelligence alien, then it is safe to say that we are not in a simulation. But if you believe that concept, then it is indeed possible.

But again, it is not yet proven, then either you work to prove it (Which is hard and almost impossible). Or you put your head into something that is real, like the existential crisis of Super AI for example : D

It’s a metaphor with obvious appeal in our technological age. Nothing more. But it would suit the technocracy if a lot of people were to believe it.

So if you assume any rate of improvement at all, then [virtual reality video] games will be indistinguishable from reality. Or civilization will end. Either one of those two things will occur. Or we are most likely living in a simulation. — Posty McPostface

That section couldn't be more of a non-sequitur.

And calling any computer activity "intelligent" at this point is simply a manner of speaking. What makes it "intelligent" is our interpretation of computer events, where we are anthropomorphizing to some extent.

Quantifying improvements is dubious as well. We can easily quantify things like processor speed, storage capacity, etc., but that's not the same thing.

When we create a simulation like a game or movie, it’s a distillation of what’s interesting about life. — Posty McPostface

Ideally.

Lots of video games and movies are unfortunately a distillation of how little imagination some folks have, how little effort they put into the work at hand, etc.

There are many many simulations. These simulations, we might as well call them reality, or you can call them multiverse. They are running on a substrate. That substrate is probably boring. — Posty McPostface

Reality and simulations are two directly opposite things. To say that one is the other is making a category mistake. Is it "simulations" all the way down, or is it just reality all the way down?

Simulation only makes sense in relation to some reality.

I'm saying the argument is self-undermining. I'm not making any positive claims.

If simulation, then evidence is simulated. — unenlightened

The idea is that the simulation is a simulation of (a part of) the actual world under representative conditions. So yes, evidence is simulated, but if the simulation is accurate enough, then this simulated evidence is close to the real evidence.

Like, for instance, if I was simulating an engine turbine, I would be putting in the material properties, geometry, physics, and boundary conditions that are characteristic of the real engine that I am interested in.

(I am not endorsing the simulation hypothesis, btw, least of all Musk's OP. Why are we even talking about Musk?)

I think it's more accurate in this case to say that merely because a person is smart in their areas of expertise, that doesn't imply that they're smart in all areas.

What does it even mean to "simulate" subjective, first-person experience? As Descartes pointed out so long ago, it doesn't even seem possible that I be deceived about such things. So, even in this simulation, there are some "real" things when it comes to phenomenal consciousness.

Reality and simulations are two directly opposite things. To say that one is the other is making a category mistake. Is it "simulations" all the way down, or is it just reality all the way down?

Simulation only makes sense in relation to some reality. — Harry Hindu

Yeah, you can't have "only simulations." That's incoherent.

What does it even mean to "simulate" subjective, first-person experience? As Descartes pointed out so long ago, it doesn't even seem possible that I be deceived about such things. So, even in this simulation, there are some "real" things when it comes to phenomenal consciousness. — Arkady

Another good point.

He's just repeating whatever Bostrom says.

Btw from Bostrom's paper
https://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html

A common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate ‐ independence . The idea is that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon ‐ based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon ‐ based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given. — Bostrom

lol, :grin: I like he sweeps away the age old mind/body problem in a sentence. The literature for this premise is also not readily provided from what I can see.

It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon ‐ based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon ‐ based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. — Bostrom

This claim of multirealisabilty has in fact been deeply challenged by research into the biophysics of life over the past decade.

Everything biological hinges on the ability of informational mechanisms, like genes and neurons, to regulate entropic metabolic flows, like proton gradients and electron respiratory chains. So this biology, this set up, now seems so special, life and mind could only arise with very specific “hardware”.

This familiar assumption of cogsci, and hence 1980s philosophy of mind, now sounds horribly dated.

What are your thoughts about this?

https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/artificial-life-quantum-computing/

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-33125-3#Abs1

This claim of multirealisabilty has in fact been deeply challenged by research into the biophysics of life over the past decade.

Everything biological hinges on the ability of informational mechanisms, like genes and neurons, to regulate entropic metabolic flows, like proton gradients and electron respiratory chains. So this biology, this set up, now seems so special, life and mind could only arise with very specific “hardware”.

This familiar assumption of cogsci, and hence 1980s philosophy of mind, now sounds horribly dated. — apokrisis

I think the basic problem is learning and the interaction with the World that isn't part of you. Too many times the focus is just on the very broadly defined physical mechanisms.

If life and mind are defined by information that has material consequences, then be suspicious of all claims that talk about plays of information without material consequence.

A pattern running on a computer is just syntax. Symbol processing. It still takes an actual biological being to read the pattern as having meaning and thus wanting to act on it in some way. The material consequences are what give a modelling relation with the world any semantics.

If you think that life and mind are just essentially machines, then you will be forever insensitive to the chasm that in fact exists between the biological and the mechanical. Life is based on the physics of dissipative structures. And the mechanical is defined by its insensitivity to entropic reality.

The parts constituting a machine are essentially dead in being fixed and stable. The parts constituting an organism are essentially unstable - poised to fall. And that is how regulating information can actually insert itself into the material equation and determine which way the instability will fall.

Yeah. If we are talking about neural network architectures, then we are starting to talk about legitimate attempts to follow the path of biological realism. And I doubt you would find neural networkers spending a lot of time worrying about whether we are figments of a matrix simulation.

And the mechanical is defined by its insensitivity to entropic reality. — apokrisis

:confused: So why aren't there perpetual motion machines?

If life and mind are defined by information that has material consequences, then be suspicious of all claims that talk about plays of information without material consequence — apokrisis

As far as I'm aware information doesn't equate with the "material" so, what do you think?

What about biological computers?

Computation does rely on being able to produce a frictionless world. But yes. My point is that that is in the end a thermodynamic fiction.

There is always a cost attached to every time a symbol is written, a gate is switched. The cost is simply being made the same for any such informational action. And as small as possible.

Likewise, your car engine will always eventually wear out. The hardened parts will erode with use. I like the fact that car design has reached the stage where all the parts have been strengthened to the exact degree that they will all tend to fail about the same time.

So the mechanical is about stepping outside the usual entropic deal - the world of self organised flows like rivers, plate tectonics and solar flares - to control what is going on with rigid material form and imposed systems of informationally operated switches, gates and timing devices.

And yet all that machinery still erodes. Friction can be minimised but never eradicated. Dissipation wins in the end.

Do you have one?

No.

Point to information that exists without a physical mark then.

And why would that be?

Because I don't have the knowledge, skills, or technology to build one, and know of nobody who does and has and who is willing to give or sell it to me?

I don't understand the relevance of your questions.

The number two or one-hundred or a million? These numbers dont denote anything in the real world but are snippets of information about it.

I don't understand the relevance of your questions. — Michael

Huh? You asked me “what about biological computers?”

Well. An example if you please.

You made some marks appear on my screen - 2, 100, 1,000,000. And so the party started.

Numbers stand for acts of counting. Some set of marks to be scratched or instances to be recorded. The efficiency of a notation shouldn’t fool you that symbols don’t need grounding. Every act of reference is also a physical event.

Huh? You asked me “what about biological computers?” — apokrisis

Because you took issue with Bostrom's claim that silicon-based computers could give rise to consciousness. So what if we considered biological computers running these simulations instead? Would that address the concern you had? I don't understand why me having or not having one is relevant to this question.

Well. An example if you please. — apokrisis

I can't exactly give you one, but there's information about them here.