One potential problem is that we don't know whether a simulation can include consciousness. The fact that we're
A. Conscious
B. Don't have any clue what it would entail to simulate consciousness
Argues against the likelihood that we're living in a simulation. — Marchesk
So if you assume any rate of improvement at all, then [virtual reality video] games will be indistinguishable from reality. Or civilization will end. Either one of those two things will occur. Or we are most likely living in a simulation. — Posty McPostface
When we create a simulation like a game or movie, it’s a distillation of what’s interesting about life. — Posty McPostface
Reality and simulations are two directly opposite things. To say that one is the other is making a category mistake. Is it "simulations" all the way down, or is it just reality all the way down?There are many many simulations. These simulations, we might as well call them reality, or you can call them multiverse. They are running on a substrate. That substrate is probably boring. — Posty McPostface
I'm saying the argument is self-undermining. I'm not making any positive claims.
If simulation, then evidence is simulated. — unenlightened
Reality and simulations are two directly opposite things. To say that one is the other is making a category mistake. Is it "simulations" all the way down, or is it just reality all the way down?
Simulation only makes sense in relation to some reality. — Harry Hindu
What does it even mean to "simulate" subjective, first-person experience? As Descartes pointed out so long ago, it doesn't even seem possible that I be deceived about such things. So, even in this simulation, there are some "real" things when it comes to phenomenal consciousness. — Arkady
A common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate ‐ independence . The idea is that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon ‐ based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon ‐ based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given. — Bostrom
It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon ‐ based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon ‐ based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. — Bostrom
I think the basic problem is learning and the interaction with the World that isn't part of you. Too many times the focus is just on the very broadly defined physical mechanisms.This claim of multirealisabilty has in fact been deeply challenged by research into the biophysics of life over the past decade.
Everything biological hinges on the ability of informational mechanisms, like genes and neurons, to regulate entropic metabolic flows, like proton gradients and electron respiratory chains. So this biology, this set up, now seems so special, life and mind could only arise with very specific “hardware”.
This familiar assumption of cogsci, and hence 1980s philosophy of mind, now sounds horribly dated. — apokrisis
Huh? You asked me “what about biological computers?” — apokrisis
Well. An example if you please. — apokrisis
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.