I'm thinking more along the lines of a behavioral solipsist that inferrs wrongly that intent is wholly shown through behavior. Wittgenstein talks about this a lot in the Investigations.

So, have you developed a meta-philosophy due to semantic-holism? — Posty McPostface

As the foregoing sketch begins to suggest, three very general metaphilosophical questions are (1) What is philosophy? (2) What is, or what should be, the point of philosophy? (3) How should one do philosophy? — IEP

An improvised sketch:

(1) Something like the self-clarification of existence in conceptual terms.

(2) A clarification that results in a richer, more joyful existence, along with a kind of wonder and even the preservation of the inner child.

(3) Assuming holism, one should try to grasp things as a whole, make sense of all of existence, and not get tangled up any more than necessary in local issues that aren't really helping with (2.) Or, better, we don't really have a choice. This is actually what we already do. But we can embrace it.

I'm thinking more along the lines of a behavioral solipsist that inferrs wrongly that intent is wholly shown through behavior. Wittgenstein talks about this a lot in the Investigations. — Posty McPostface

Oh, OK. I think I know what you mean. For me this is related to fixed notions of the subject and meaning. One such notion would be that meaning is a lightning bug in our skull. If we try to give a context-independent description of meaning, we are going to run into the same old meaning-atomists problems.

It sucks, but I have to get some work done. I would rather talk philosophy, of course. I will check in later.

So, how is intent discerned apart from behavior? Is there any way to prove this as true?

Ok, see you around.

Is your ability to use English there as a whole in your RAM? — macrosoft

Insofar as I can use it, yes.

Can you survey all of this linguistic know-how instantaneously in consciousness?

It wouldn't be instantaneous. You don't use it all at once. You have something in mind as you use it, though.

I presume you roughly understood that last sentence.

Sure, because I can assign meanings to all of the terms in a manner that's coherent, consistent from my perspective.

then meaning cannot be shared. Value cannot be 'somewhat' objective. — macrosoft

And indeed I agree with both of those ideas. Meaning can not be shared and value is not at all objective.

What is the subject? How does it exist? And what do we mean by this or that explication of the subject, or of truth? — macrosoft

"Subject" in the sense of "subjective"? It's mind. Mind exists as a subset of brain function. The definition/basic workings of meaning I gave to you earlier (a few days ago)--it's the act of (an individual) making mental associations. Truth I gave you my definition/basic account of a while ago, too . . .. it just seems to me kinda like quickly jumping around from topic to topic, though.

So, I've been contemplating about how to make this reading group organized, fun, and accessable without undue burden on the participants, since it's a long work. Here is what I propose:

We engage or approach the work in an organized fashion in addressing arguments raised by Wittgenstein. By which I mean we talk for example about the private language argument or language as a form of life or the beetle in a box or family resemblances.

Of course we would address each argument raised by Wittgenstein in some logical and coherent manner; but, I honestly doubt we could make it past a couple of pages reading each paragraph in logical order.

What are your thoughts about addressing arguments raised in the book instead of the entire book itself?

What I learned from my previous reading group was that participants will get bogged down with terminology and understanding is hard achieved with two or more people talking past one another.

So, for example. Someone might ask about what Wittgenstein meant by the Beetle in a Box, as to whether it implies logical behaviorism on Wittgenstein so part. Or what Wittgenstein meant by a lion that could speak English but never being able to communicate with us in that language? Does it imply some form of intuitionalism on his part with respect to language?

And so on.

Basically what I'm hoping to do in talking about arguments is encourage discussion and dialogue. Not sure if it's the best way to do so or flawed.

Thoughts?

What I learned from my previous reading group was that participants will get bogged down with terminology and understanding is hard achieved with two or more people talking past one another. — Posty McPostface

Story of my life. All of them. :cool:

The format of how comments appear here make that development difficult to overcome. Along with the natural disgust humans have for each other.
Maybe, as a matter of courtesy, a second thread could be set up alongside the first. The primary one would just be for direct attempts at wrestling with what the author says as given, the second one would be for all other activities and complaints about what have you.

No cats, though. I insist.

Along with the natural disgust humans have for each other. — Valentinus

Oh dear. Anything but that. Hehe.

I like the idea of two threads addressing the same topic in different ways. Let's see if the moderators will allow it to happen. But, that might be too complicated for most folks. Let's see if anyone else has any suggestions.

Insofar as I can use it, yes. — Terrapin Station

Hmm. I think you know what I am getting at. In so far as you can use ---without having it all present to consciousness --is what I am pointing at. RAM is random access memory, 'random' in the sense of arbitrary. I think listening is palpably more passive and reactive than that. Words summon a know-how from where it sleeps in the background.

It wouldn't be instantaneous. You don't use it all at once. You have something in mind as you use it, though. — Terrapin Station

OK. Yes, I agree. We don't use it all at once. It lies coiled. That which lies coiled is what I mean by the dark place from which we listen. We can't fit all that we know into explicit consciousness. And much of what we know seems sub-theoretical. We never quite make it explicit without problems when we try.

Sure, because I can assign meanings to all of the terms in a manner that's coherent, consistent from my perspective. — Terrapin Station

Granted. But I don't the mind carefully assigns meaning to the terms one-by-one. The meaning is grasped as a whole. Afterward we can expand on this or that term 'from' that grasp as a whole.

And indeed I agree with both of those ideas. Meaning can not be shared and value is not at all objective. — Terrapin Station

I understand that, but I still think you are insisting using the terms in your way. So far I don't think you have even granted what someone might mean by shared meaning. Nevertheless we've been doing it all along, call it what you will. Insisting on the 'right' terms seems like something we do when we play a certain game. That game is fine. Making a 'spiderweb' might even require the (attempted) fixing of terms. But talking with others who aren't immersed in that same project requires that we learn their language. We do it all the time. I don't have an explicit theory of shared meaning, exactly since I think all explicit theories have problems. The point is to acknowledge the phenomenon 'behind' such formulations --in its vagueness.

"Subject" in the sense of "subjective"? It's mind. Mind exists as a subset of brain function. The definition/basic workings of meaning I gave to you earlier (a few days ago)--it's the act of (an individual) making mental associations. Truth I gave you my definition/basic account of a while ago, too . . .. it just seems to me kinda like quickly jumping around from topic to topic, though. — Terrapin Station

I can see why you think I am jumping around from topic to topic, but that's maybe because you don't see these as all aspects of the same issue as I do.

So, how is intent discerned apart from behavior? Is there any way to prove this as true? — Posty McPostface

At some point the demand for proof is artificial. It's like asking me to prove that you can ask questions. While it's hard to pin down what we mean by meaning or thinking, we are there all the time. What is it, I wonder, that allows us to grasp a proof as a proof? What are proofs made of if not of meaning?
What is reasoning if not meaning? You are almost asking me to prove that you have language, that you are not just a machine. 'Consciousness doesn't not exist.' Well who or what is talking there and to whom or what? 'Consciousness' is a word that points to the fundamental intelligibility of the world. You share meaning as you ask proof for it. You impose on this space we share where words signify to demand a proof that could only be more signification. See what I mean?

I split of this line of thought in a thread I thought deserves it's very own place. See if you like it.

We engage or approach the work in an organized fashion in addressing arguments raised by Wittgenstein. By which I mean we talk for example about the private language argument or language as a form of life or the beetle in a box or family resemblances.

Of course we would address each argument raised by Wittgenstein in some logical and coherent manner; but, I honestly doubt we could make it past a couple of pages reading each paragraph in logical order. — Posty McPostface

It is supposed to be a reading group, and context is important in reading. So I think it is important to start from the beginning and understand how Wittgenstein is using certain words, like "rule". However, the problem is as you say, we might have trouble getting beyond the first few pages, and the exercise could extend indefinitely in time. Some readers would insist some parts of the book are unimportant, wanting to skip ahead without grasping the nature of each problem as Wittgenstein exposes them one after the other.

But that is the theme of the Philosophical investigations, there is an endless supply of problems brought up, one after the other, with a thread of relationship connecting them. As the book proceeds, Wittgenstein offers direction toward a possible way of avoiding all these problems. But if one does not completely understand the nature of the problems, that person cannot adequately judge whether Wittgenstein's direction is correct. That is why it is important to address all the little problems, one after the other, as they are developed into one big problem. And then proceed toward the possible solution.

So it makes no sense to begin the reading group with a discussion of the beetle in the box, or some such thing, because we would have no context. The discussion would go in a multitude of different directions, following a multitude of opinions, and those who referred to the book, to put the analogy into perspective would most likely be scoffed at as offering a faulty interpretation of the book.

Basically what I'm hoping to do in talking about arguments is encourage discussion and dialogue. Not sure if it's the best way to do so or flawed. — Posty McPostface

There has already been many discussions here on those particular "arguments" which you mention, but many passages of the book have not been discussed here at all. The issue is that many parts of the book may be interpreted in many different ways (those produce interesting discussions), and other parts are less ambiguous (there is little to discuss). But the interpreters may refer to the ambiguous parts with interpretations of those parts which support their personal interpretations of the book as a whole, leaving behind some less ambiguous parts which do not support their personal interpretations. If these less ambiguous parts of the book which are incompatible with such an interpretation are brought up, the interpreter will be caught attempting to produce ambiguity in an unambiguous statement in order to support the personal interpretation. One might argue that a more ambiguous part is of greater importance than a less ambiguous part, but why would a more ambiguous part be of greater importance than a less ambiguous part? A true interpretation ought to offer consistency throughout the entirety of the book, because we ought to assume that Wittgenstein worked hard to present the piece in this way.

This is going to be very long, unfortunately (I'm not at all a fan of long posts), but hopefully it will help you understand my view better, and maybe it will give you a better position from which to offer objections, to explain your own view in counterdistinction, etc.

So re language/meaning. Let me try to explain this with a simple example. It's not easy to do that with typing, because on my view, it's important to keep in mind that (a) meaning is inherently mental and can't be "made into something else"--so I can't literally type a meaning and (b) meanings are not the same things as definitions or correlations, even though definitions or correlations are involved with meanings--they're basically "what we're operating with" when we do meanings, so I'll be mentioning them too,

So, we'll have two things at play here. One, meaning(s), which is the inherently mental act of making an association, which I'll represent via "random" symbols--¤ for example (hopefully you can see the symbol there), and two, what we're associating, and in this case, I'll use words and/or definitions a lot (for one, because that's something we actually can type).

So, let's take for an example someone saying "The cat is on the mat," since philosophy loves that example so much. On my view, "The cat is on the mat" has meaning only to the extent that a particular individual assigns meanings to it, however the individual in question assigns meanings to it, and insofar as that doesn't happen, it does not have meaning.

Probably one common way for individuals to assign meanings to a sentence like that is that they'll have something in mind for "cat"--so in other words, they hear the sound "cat," they'll make a particular mental act of association, ¤, for example, and what they'll associate it with are things like a mental image of a cat--it could be a particular real-world cat, or a particular imaginary cat based on their concept(s) of a cat, etc., and/or they might associate the sound "cat" with a definition (although for something like a cat this would probably be far more rare) a la "feline" or "a small domesticated carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractile claws" or whatever.

And then they'll have something in mind for a phrase like "is on the," which wouldn't be unusual to treat as "one thing," so that you're making a mental association, ¶, with the whole phrase, and you're associating it with something like your concept of the relation, or perhaps you're picturing the relation or whatever.

And then they'll have something in mind for "mat," similar to how "cat" worked.

There are a number of things to note here:

* The above isn't how it has to work--that they make the association for "cat" and then "is on the" and so on. It just depends on how the individual in question thinks about it. Maybe a particular individual thinks of the whole sentence as "one thing." Any arbitrary person can think about it in any arbitrary way, really.

* Each association is unique. Hence why I used ¤ in one case, ¶ in another. This isn't just a peculiarity of how meaning works. I'm a nominalist. I think that everything is unique, including "the same thing" at different times (in "scare quotes" because as a nominalist, I don't think that it's literally the same thing).

* The associations we make that are meanings aren't necessarily simple or just one thing, especially for things that we're very familiar with. So in other words, for many people, "cat" is going to bring to mind many different things--maybe a mental image of a particular real-world cat AND a mental image of a particular imaginary cat, and maybe many of each, and maybe bits of definition, and maybe that one time that Mittens plopped a dead mouse on the bed, and so on. And all of that stuff can be very dynamic, quickly changing, it can be pretty fuzzy, various things both in succession and simultaneous, with various acts of association while all of that stuff is present mentally, ¤ and § and Ç and so on.

* Aside from the meanings differing, what's being associated can vary wildly per individual. So, in other words, for some people, when they hear the word "cat," the definition they associate with that term might be "fugitive." Someone else might associate the definition "quick reflexes." It could potentially be anything.

* Again, insofar as an individual does NOT assign meaning to a word, a phrase, or even the entire sentence, it does not have a meaning.

* All of the above is "to S"--to the subject in question. Nothing has or doesn't have a meaning aside from having or not having a meaning to some particular person.

* An upshot to this re the comments about "not using all of language at the same time," is that most "words that could be said" or most text in books, etc. does not have meaning most of the time. It only has meaning when someone is thinking about it and "doing meaning" with respect to it.

So, with "The cat is on the mat," if Joe has never heard the word "mat" before, or Joe has only heard it but to Joe it's "just a sound" that he assigns no meaning to, that he makes no association for with a definition or anything, then at least the "mat" part of the sentence has no meaning, and maybe that results in more of the sentence--maybe even the whole thing--having no meaning to Joe.

Joe can not be wrong about that. Meaning/no meaning is always to someone, and Joe can't be wrong that "mat" has no meaning (to him).

Joe also can't be wrong if his meaning of "cat" associates that sound with "fugitive."

Or in other words, no one can be wrong about any meaning, any association they make. They can be more or less conventional, but it's not wrong to be unconventional. Saying that it's right to be conventional is the argumentum ad polulum fallacy. The only thing you could get wrong is something like, "'Cat' is conventionally defined as 'fugitive.'"

So, when Putnam is talking about the meaning of water and twater, a la H2O and XYZ, my response, aside from noting that meanings are acts of association, not the associations themselves, and I think this is clearly undeniable, is that "water," in terms of the associations being made, refers to whatever an individual is using it to refer to, to that individual, so that "water" can wind up being both H2O and XYZ for Betty, or it can be just H2O in a particular state to Fred, and it can be "fugitive" to Joe, and so on. And whatever is the norm for some community per usage isn't correct just because it's a norm. Talking about the way that the knowledge of chemical composition influences meaning, the way that social interaction influences meaning, etc. is all valuable, but it's not the same thing as meaning. Meaning is still the stuff going on in individuals' heads. It's just that those individuals are obviously not in vacuums with respect to each other. They interact and influence each other and so on. Despite that, if Joe's meaning of both "water" and "twater" associates those terms with "fugitive," Joe can't be wrong about that. It can't be wrong that to Joe, the definitions of both terms are "fugitive," even though Joe might be very strange in that. These things are always to someone(s). That the definition of "water" is "H2O" to Fred and Betty and Billy and Jane etc. doesn't work any differently than the definition of "water" being "fugitive" to Joe (that is, in the sense that it's simply a symptom of the act of mental association in individual cases). It's just that Fred and Betty and Billy and Jane are far less unusual, maybe they're more easily influenced, etc.

People can't "share meanings" either in the sense of possessing the same one or in the show and tell sense. People can share definitions in the show and tell sense, and they can share them in the sense that they're using "the same one" (nominalistic concerns aside).

Ok. Then the argument idea was not a good one, then.

I'm ready when you guys are.

I have my copy of the Investigations ready.

Who wants to lead this reading group?

And all of that stuff can be very dynamic, quickly changing, it can be pretty fuzzy, various things both in succession and simultaneous, with various acts of association while all of that stuff is present mentally, ¤ and § and Ç and so on. — Terrapin Station

I like that you also see this fuzzy, dynamic process. To break it into discrete acts helps us say what we hand in mind, but I do wonder if it's not even fuzzier and more dynamic than that.

(a) meaning is inherently mental and can't be "made into something else"--so I can't literally type a meaning — Terrapin Station

I agree, more or less, but can we say what the mental is? what meaning is? You say 'making an association.' That sounds roughly right to me. But what is 'making an association'? It's not that I expect a simple answer. I'm just pointing to the chase of the 'what meaning is' through a chain of synonyms. Seems to me that we have to assume that the other is just generally 'there' in language with us.

The associations we make that are meanings aren't necessarily simple or just one thing, especially for things that we're very familiar with. — Terrapin Station

I agree, and I think this also points at dependence on context. How do sentences fit words together into meanings? It is not a simple horizontal addition, nor does this 'addition' move only forward in time.

And then they'll have something in mind for a phrase like "is on the," which wouldn't be unusual to treat as "one thing," so that you're making a mental association, ¶, with the whole phrase, and you're associating it with something like your concept of the relation, or perhaps you're picturing the relation or whatever. — Terrapin Station

I think this is roughly right too, but it might still be too 'atomic' to catch all of the fluidity of the meaning experience.

* Again, insofar as an individual does NOT assign meaning to a word, a phrase, or even the entire sentence, it does not have a meaning. — Terrapin Station

Sure, I agree. We can experience sounds or written words as unknown. In the right context we will interpret them as unknown words and not just symbols or noises. We might grasp at the vaguest sense of meaning from context. But I mostly agree.

Or in other words, no one can be wrong about any meaning, any association they make. They can be more or less conventional, but it's not wrong to be unconventional. — Terrapin Station

I agree, and I'd even say being unconventional is how language evolves. We use our tokens in new ways to create new meanings. I phrase this within the strong dichotomy of meanings and tokens which I find problematic. At least most of the time I think we experience meaning 'through' the tokens.

Meaning is still the stuff going on in individuals' heads. It's just that those individuals are obviously not in vacuums with respect to each other. They interact and influence each other and so on. — Terrapin Station

Yes I agree. I don't think this is the last word, and I have tried to point out a phenomenon that complicates this, but yes: meaning is subjective in an important sense. What you maybe neglect is the meaning of 'in individual's heads.' This is view from outside, that sees air-gapped skulls. It downplays what-it-is-liked-to-be-networked 'in' those heads. In everyday experience and language use, we experience the sense of being directly plugged in to a 'meaning field.' We don't see a string of symbols first and then experience sense-making. Meaning is grasped 'through' the symbols almost instantaneously. Nor do we hear sounds and then experience those sounds becoming meaningful. They are initially meaningful. Our issue here only seems to be that you want to approach what makes sense from outside the skull and I am trying to do a kind of phenomenology of meaning. The 'shared space of meaning' is for me nothing 'magical.' * Far from it. It is a 'first-person' description. I scare-quote 'first-person' because phenomenologically this phrase doesn't get the experience right. We aren't primary trapped in our skulls translating marks and noises into elusive meaning-stuff. Meaning shines 'through' these marks and noises. And 'meanings' also slightly betray the first-person experience of a continuous meaning-field (an atomization for practical purposes that should not obscure the phenomenon.)

*In case it's clarifying, I'd say that the 'spiritual' is radically 'subjective.' The postulation of objects like 'God' or etc. as making possible some kind of theology-as-science is counter to my grasp. Experience is 'only' concepts, feelings, sensations. This trinity of concept, feeling, and sensation slightly betrays a living unity moving in existential-phenomenological time in order to get a point across that nothing 'magical' is involved. The only 'objectivity' we might find is a strong sense (never allowing for proof) that it is roughly the same for all of us to be in love, be terrified, etc. We read one another's expressions and immediately read emotion 'through' these expressions, which is not to say that we can't consciously re-evaluate such an experience of reading-through.This 'going-back' is a significant aspect of our experience.

I have my copy of the Investigations ready.

Who wants to lead this reading group? — Posty McPostface

I will have a new copy soon (old one vanished in the hurly-burly of life.)

Do we need a leader? If so, why not you?

Do we need a leader? If so, why not you? — macrosoft

I'm not quite up for the challenge. We could do without a leader; but, someone needs to organize how we proceed, I think.

We could do without a leader; but, someone needs to organize how we proceed, I think. — Posty McPostface

Personally I'm a bit of an anarchist on such matters. I'd suggest that people just bring up passages and interpretations and let the conversation rip --let it go where it goes. Even Wittgenstein was never settled about the order of the remarks.

Personally I'm a bit of an anarchist on such matters. I'd suggest that people just bring up passages and interpretations and let the conversation rip --let it go where it goes. — macrosoft

Sounds like a good strategy. But, we do need some narrative, don't we?

At any rate, so hopefully you understand my view better.

Is there anything you believe would be difficult to account for under my view?

Is there anything you believe would be difficult to account for under my view? — Terrapin Station

You define meaning in terms of undefined words. I think it would be good to address how the language is learned as a whole and seemingly can't be anchored in any one word. How is the subject's working 'set' of meanings constructed? And does my response to your long post make my approach more intelligble?

But, we do need some narrative, don't we? — Posty McPostface

This may sound strange to you, but I think that my conversation with TS is already wrestling with the PI. What we could do is work more Wittgenstein quotes into this situation. How does meaning work? Is not this the theme of PI ? Or a central theme?

You define meaning in terms of undefined words. — macrosoft

That statement doesn't make any sense to me. What undefined words are you referring to?

I think it would be good to address how the language is learned as a whole — macrosoft

Why would you say "how language is learned as a whole"? There's zero evidence of anyone learning any language as a whole.

Well, I don't know what to make of your discussion on the PI. I'm somewhat confused about what both of you mean by "meaning" here. Do you want to lead the reading group? How about you, @Terrapin Station? Or maybe someone else? I don't know.

I'll participate as I can, but I don't want to lead a reading group.